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Introduction	
	
This	 dissertation	 enquires	 into	 the	 metaphysics	 of	 the	 Protestant	 Reformation	 by	
examining	 the	 thought	 of	 Peter	 Martyr	 Vermigli	 (1499-1562)	 as	 a	 case	 study.	 In	 this	
introduction,	I	will	first	situate	the	present	work	in	relation	to	earlier	scholarly	literature	
on	the	philosophical	background	of	the	Protestant	Reformation.	This	will	lead,	secondly,	
to	 methodological	 reflections	 on	 the	 approach	 I	 propose	 to	 take,	 as	 well	 as	 on	 the	
structure	of	this	study.	Thirdly,	I	will	provide	a	short	introduction	to	the	life	and	work	of	
Peter	Martyr	Vermigli	for	those	readers	unfamiliar	with	the	Italian-born	theologian.1	
	
1)	The	Reformation	and	Philosophy:	A	Review	of	Relevant	Literature		
During	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 two	 scholarly	 discourses	 were	 concerned	 with	 the	
philosophical	 background	 of	 the	 Protestant	 Reformation:	 the	 discourse	 about	 the	
emergence	and	nature	of	Protestant	scholasticism,	and	the	discourse	about	the	influences	
of	(late)	medieval	philosophical	schools	upon	the	theology	of	the	Reformation.	As	we	shall	
see,	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli	has	played	a	significant	role	in	the	literature	of	the	former,	but	
only	a	minor	role	in	the	relevant	works	of	the	latter	discourse.	In	what	follows,	I	will	review	
these	older	discourses,	highlighting	some	of	their	methodological	problems.	This	will	lead	
me	to	propose	an	alternative	and	novel	methodological	approach	to	understanding	the	
philosophical	 background	 of	 the	 Reformation,	 which	 is	 based	 on	 enquiring	 into	 the	
structures	of	being	and	causality	implicit	in	the	theological	work	of	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli.	
The	merit	of	 this	approach,	 I	will	argue,	 is	 that	 it	enables	us	more	clearly	 to	express	a	
complexity	 that	 is	 present	 in	 Vermigli’s	 thought	 –	 and	 arguably	 also	 in	 that	 of	 other	
Reformers.	
A	 work	 regularly	 cited	 in	 the	 debates	 around	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	
Reformation	 and	 Protestant	 (especially	 Reformed)	 scholasticism	 is	 Brian	 Armstrong’s	
1969	 study,	Calvinism	and	 the	Amyraut	Heresy.	 In	 this	 study	Armstrong	proposes	 that	
there	 is	 a	 significant	 rift	 between	 the	 “humanistically	 oriented”	 and	 “biblically	 and	
																																																						
1	 His	 Italian	 name,	 Pietro	Martire	 Vermigli,	 was	 Latinised	 Petrus	Martyr	 Vermilius.	 His	 contemporaries	
generally	knew	him	as	Peter	Martyr	or	simply	as	Martyr,	a	form	often	used	by	the	man	himself.	Present-day	
scholarly	literature	calls	him	either	Martyr	or	Vermigli.	I	will	use	the	latter. 
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experientially	 based”	 theology	 of	 Calvin,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	 theology	 of	 the	
Protestant	scholastics	of	the	late	sixteenth	and	seventeenth	century,	on	the	other	hand.2	
In	Armstrong’s	estimation,	the	latter	prevailed	in	Reformed	Protestantism	around	1600.	
He	considered	this	to	be	a	sign	of	decline,	for	it	indicates	a	“divergence	from	a	theology	
which	 had	 been	 carefully	 constructed	 by	 Calvin	 to	 represent	 faithfully	 the	 scriptural	
teaching.”3	This	is	the	background	against	which	Armstrong	analyses	the	work	of	Moïse	
Amyraut	 (1596-1664),	 a	 professor	 of	 theology	 at	 the	 Academy	 of	 Saumur.	 Armstrong	
proposes	that	Amyraut	was	wrongly	considered	a	heretic	by	the	‘orthodox’	Protestants	of	
his	 time.	 Indeed,	 he	 holds	 that	 Amyraut	 was	 more	 faithful	 to	 Calvin	 than	 any	 of	 his	
allegedly	 orthodox,	 Protestant	 scholastic	 contemporaries.	 But	 how	 did	 it	 happen	 that	
these	Protestant	scholastics	diverged	so	much	from	Calvin’s	theology?	It	is	here	that	Peter	
Martyr	Vermigli	–	together	with	Girolamo	Zanchi	and	Theodore	Beza	–	plays	a	major	role	
in	 Armstrong’s	 account.	 Armstrong	 argues	 that	 the	 scholasticism	 that	 “held	 sway”	 in	
seventeenth	 century	 Reformed	 theology	 began	 in	 the	 work	 of	 these	 three	 men.4	
Repeatedly,	he	mentions	this	triumvirate	who	are	the	clear	villains	in	his	narrative.	It	is	
telling,	however,	that	Armstrong	also	acknowledges	that	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli’s	thought	
–	at	the	time	he	was	writing	–	had	not	yet	been	studied	sufficiently	to	determine	whether	
he	was	a	“scholastic”	at	all.5		
However,	 if	 Armstrong’s	 judgement	 is	 not	 based	 on	 an	 analysis	 of	 Vermigli’s	
writings,	where	does	it	originate?	Armstrong	claims	that	“one	ought	naturally	to	expect	a	
scholastic	methodology	in	Martyr’s	theology”6	because	Philip	McNair,	the	biographer	of	
Vermigli’s	early	years	mentioned	that	he	retained	a	“warm	regard	for	the	Aristotelianism”	
of	his	university	teachers	in	Padua	though	all	of	his	life.7	Furthermore,	Armstrong	asserts	
that	 Zanchi	 (whose	 “scholasticism”	 seems	 to	be	beyond	dispute	 for	Armstrong)	was	 a	
student	of	Vermigli’s	and	that	“it	would	seem	surprising	if	the	methodology	of	the	master	
were	not	reflected	in	his	student.”	And	finally,	he	takes	the	fact	that	Vermigli	lectured	on	
																																																						
2	 Brian	 G.	 Armstrong,	 Calvinism	 and	 the	 Amyraut	 Heresy:	 Protestant	 Scholasticism	 and	 Humanism	 in	
Seventeenth-Century	France	(Madison:	University	of	Wisconsin	Press,	1969),	32.	
3	Ibid.,	38.	
4	Ibid.,	188.	
5	Ibid.,	130.	
6	Ibid.,	131.	
7	Philip	M.	McNair,	Peter	Martyr	in	Italy:	Anatomy	of	Apostasy	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1967),	107.	
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Aristotle	while	 in	Strasbourg	to	“point	 in	 [the]	direction”	of	his	“scholasticism.”8	These	
three	reasons	–	all	formulated	in	tentative	terms	or	in	the	conditional	tense	–	are	all	the	
evidence	 that	 Armstrong	 presents	 before	 concluding	 that	 “there	 is	 little	 doubt	 in	my	
mind”	that	Vermigli’s	 thought	was	scholastic.9	Given	that	Armstrong’s	evidence	 for	his	
assessment	of	Vermigli	is	minimal,	why	does	Vermigli	nonetheless	play	a	crucial	role	in	his	
account	of	how	Protestant	scholasticism	developed?	The	reason	for	this	is	related	to	the	
architecture	 of	 Armstrong’s	 book	 and	 flows	 from	 its	 implicit	 premises.	 As	mentioned	
above,	 Armstrong	 asserts	 that	 Moïse	 Amyraut	 was	 more	 faithful	 to	 Calvin	 than	 his	
contemporaries,	 such	 as,	 for	 instance,	 Pierre	 Du	Moulin	 (1568-1658).	 That	 this	 is	 no	
impartial	 exegetical	 observation,	 but	 rather	 a	 value	 judgement,	 can	 be	 seen	 from	 his	
description	of	 the	scholasticism	of	Du	Moulin	and	others.	Protestant	scholasticism,	 for	
Armstrong,	 is	 characterised	 by	 a	 tendency	 to	 “assert[]	 religious	 truth	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
deductive	ratiocination”	in	such	a	way	that	“reason	assumes	at	least	equal	standing	with	
faith	in	theology,	thus	jettisoning	some	of	the	authority	of	revelation.”10	This	description	
has	 a	 negative	 overtone,	 especially	 when	 contrasted	with	 the	 “dynamic,	 experiential,	
historically,	and	exegetically	grounded	faith	enunciated	by	Calvin”	(as	one	reviewer	highly	
sympathetic	to	Armstrong’s	project	put	it).11	In	Armstrong’s	view,	the	scholastic	“systems”	
of	 Du	 Moulin	 and	 the	 like	 are	 simply	 “narrow,”	 “defensive,”	 “intolerant,”	 and	
“impervious.”12		
But	Armstrong	 is	not	only	 sympathetic	 to	Amyraut’s	 thought	 and	 critical	 of	Du	
Moulin’s,	he	is	equally	biased	against	any	theologian	whom	Du	Moulin	favoured,	or	whom	
Amyraut	opposed.	And	this	is	precisely	the	context	in	which	Armstrong’s	low	opinion	of	
Vermigli	originates,	as	can	be	seen	from	two	comments	made	almost	in	passing.	In	the	
first	one,	Armstrong	writes	that		
One	of	the	most	arresting	features	of	Amyraut’s	doctrine	of	predestination	
is	that	his	opposition	to	orthodox	teaching	was	made	in	the	name	of	Calvin	
																																																						
8	Armstrong,	Calvinism	and	the	Amyraut	Heresy,	131.	
9	Ibid.	
10	Ibid.,	32.	
11	 Ford	 Lewis	 Battles,	 “Review	 of	 ‘Calvinism	 and	 the	 Amyraut	 Heresy:	 Protestant	 Scholasticism	 And	
Humanism	In	Seventeenth-Century	France’	by	Brian	G.	Armstrong,”	Theology	Today	27,	no.	4	(1971):	479.	
12	Armstrong,	Calvinism	and	the	Amyraut	Heresy,	xix.	
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and	the	early	reformers,	presenting	at	the	same	time	a	decided	bias	against	
Beza,	Martyr	and	Zanchi.13		
The	same	three	men	that	are	the	villains	in	Armstrong’s	narrative	are	therefore	held	in	
disfavour	by	Amyraut.	 In	turn,	as	Armstrong	also	writes,	these	three	men	were	greatly	
esteemed	by	the	scholastics	of	Amyraut’s	time.14	 In	sum,	 it	seems	therefore	 likely	that	
Armstrong’s	bias	against	Vermigli	in	particular	originates	from	his	implicit	agreement	with	
Amyraut’s	 view	 of	 him,	 especially	 because	 he	 scantly	 knows	 Vermigli’s	 work,	 and	 is	
sympathetic	to	Amyraut.	
Carl	Trueman	and	Scott	Clark	have	convincingly	argued	that	the	view	of	Protestant	
scholasticism	assumed	by	Armstrong	has	its	intellectual	roots	liberalism’s	reaction	against	
a	pre-critical	comprehensive	rational	system.	Because	scholasticism	was	the	attempt	to	
adapt	Reformation	thought	to	the	demands	of	the	academy,	“it	constituted	something	of	
a	threat	to	post-Kantian	theology	because	it	was	a	competing	explanation	of	history	and	
reality	which	did	not	depend	upon	the	phenomenal-noumenal	distinction	for	its	starting	
point	 and	 yet	 was	 not	 anti-intellectual	 obscurantism.”15	 In	 liberalism,	 the	 Kantian	
approach	won	the	battle,	and	hence	labelled	Protestant	scholastic	orthodoxy	“dead,”	just	
as	the	Renaissance	had	labelled	the	Middle	Ages	“dark.”		
This	 labelling	 is	 most	 explicit	 in	 Armstrong’s	 characterisation	 of	 Protestant	
scholasticism.	 Apart	 from	 the	 tendency	 to	 “deductive	 ratiocination”	 we	 have	 already	
seen,	 Armstrong	 deems	 scholasticism	 to	 have	 “a	 pronounced	 interest	 in	metaphysical	
matters,	 in	 abstract,	 speculative	 thought.”	 Indeed,	 he	 holds	 that	 Calvin’s	 and	 Luther’s	
theology	 had	 been	 “overcome	 by	 the	 metaphysics	 and	 deductive	 logic	 of	 a	 restored	
Aristotelianism.”16	For	Armstrong,	metaphysics	is	therefore	associated	with	abstract	and	
speculative	 thought,	 and	 with	 an	 undesirable	 dominance	 of	 Aristotle’s	 philosophy	 in	
theological	literature.	
John	Patrick	Donnelly’s	Calvinism	and	Scholasticism	in	Vermigli’s	Doctrine	of	Man	
and	 Grace	 is	 the	most	 important	 direct	 answer	 to	 Armstrong’s	 work.	 It	 is	 Donnelly’s	
																																																						
13	Ibid.,	158.	
14	Ibid.,	188.	
15	Carl	R.	Trueman	and	R.	Scott	Clark,	“Introduction,”	in	Protestant	Scholasticism:	Essays	in	Reassessment,	
ed.	Carl	R.	Trueman	and	R.	Scott	Clark	(Carlisle:	Paternoster	Press,	1999),	xii.		
16	Armstrong,	Calvinism	and	the	Amyraut	Heresy,	32.	
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declared	aim	to	examine	“whether	Martyr	was	a	Protestant	scholastic.”17	Acknowledging	
that	 any	 answer	 to	 this	 question	 depends	 on	 the	 definition	 given	 to	 scholasticism,	
Donnelly	first	compares	Vermigli’s	with	medieval	scholasticism.	In	this	sense,	Vermigli	can	
be	said	to	borrow	his	methodology	from	scholastic	philosophy,	Donnelly	holds,	insofar	as	
he	employs	syllogisms	and	has	a	“penchant	for	constructing	definitions	according	to	the	
scheme	 of	 the	 four	 Aristotelian	 causes.”18	 Moreover,	 Vermigli’s	 literary	 forms	 “recall	
those	of	scholasticism.	He	uses	both	the	commentary	and	the	quaestio,	although	he	tends	
to	combine	them”	through	inserting	scholia	in	his	running	commentaries.19	Nevertheless,	
Donnelly	wishes	to	be	cautious;	“there	are	limits	to	Martyr’s	scholasticism,”	he	stresses.20	
These	limits	apply	especially	to	Armstrong’s	definition	of	scholasticism.	Only	one	element	
of	 Armstrong’s	 description	 of	 scholasticism	 can	 be	 clearly	 found	 in	 Vermigli,	 Donnelly	
holds,	namely	his	 affinity	 for	Aristotelian	philosophy.	However,	Vermigli	 “never	 allows	
reason	to	attain	a	status	equal	or	superior	to	faith.”21	Donnelly	therefore	concludes	with	
regard	to	the	genesis	of	Protestant	scholasticism,	pace	Armstrong,	that	“Martyr,	Beza	and	
Zanchi	did	not	bring	about	Reformed	scholasticism.”22	Rather,	according	to	Donnelly,	the	
“most	 important	 factor”	 for	 the	development	of	 this	scholasticism	was	“the	continued	
teaching	 of	 Aristotle	 as	 the	 basis	 of	 philosophical	 education,	 indeed	 of	 most	
undergraduate	 education,	 in	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 academies	 and	 universities.”23	
Nevertheless,	Donnelly	holds	that	Vermigli	set	an	example	for	these	developments:	“He	
was	the	first	important	Reformed	theologian	to	incorporate	a	large	amount	of	scholastic	
terminology	and	method	into	his	theology.	In	doing	so	he	set	a	sign	of	approval	on	this	
theological	approach.”24		
Richard	Muller	has	done	much	to	further	the	debate	about	Vermigli’s	involvement	
in	the	emergence	of	Protestant	scholasticism.	First	of	all,	in	The	Unaccommodated	Calvin,	
he	 argues	 that	 Calvin’s	 polemics	 against	 scholastic	 theology	were	more	 nuanced	 than	
previously	 thought,	 and	 did	 not	 amount	 to	 a	 rejection	 of	 scholastic	 theology	 or	
																																																						
17	John	Patrick	Donnelly,	Calvinism	and	Scholasticism	in	Vermigli’s	Doctrine	of	Man	and	Grace	(Leiden:	Brill,	
1976),	6.	
18	Ibid.,	198.	
19	Ibid.,	199.	
20	Ibid.	
21	Ibid.,	200.	
22	Ibid.,	194.	
23	Ibid.,	192.	
24	Ibid.,	194.	
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methodology.25	 In	 After	 Calvin,	 he	 extended	 this	 inquiry	 to	 the	 Development	 of	 the	
Calvinist	 or	 Reformed	 “theological	 tradition,”	 arguing	 that	 the	 negative	 bias	 against	
Protestant	scholasticism	exemplified	in	the	work	of	Armstrong	and	others	ought	to	be	set	
aside.	26	Instead	of	assuming	a	contrast	between	Calvin	and	the	thought	of	later	Calvinists,	
Muller	calls	for	more	a	nuanced	discussion	of	the	continuities	and	discontinuities	between	
the	Reformation	and	later	Protestantism.	The	setup	of	his	study	leads	him	to	survey	an	
impressive	 array	 of	 sixteenth-century	 thinkers.	 Muller’s	 comments	 on	 or	 exegesis	 of	
Vermigli’s	work	are	 therefore	not	extensive,	but	nevertheless	 insightful.	He	essentially	
considers	 Vermigli	 to	 stand	 in	 the	 same	 relation	 to	 Calvin	 as	Melanchthon	 to	 Luther:	
“Reformed	 theology,	 in	 the	person	of	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli,	 received	much	 the	 same	
impetus	 toward	 the	 appropriation	 of	 philosophy	 that	 Lutheranism	 received	 from	
Melanchthon.”27	This	means,	he	holds,	that	when	comparing	Melanchthon	with	Luther,	
and	Vermigli	with	Calvin,	the	“relative	amount	of	emphasis	on	natural	theology	and	…	on	
the	use	of	reason”	is	greater	in	the	case	of	Melanchthon’s	and	Vermigli’s	theology.28		
In	the	scholarship	which	has	been	more	directly	concerned	with	Vermigli’s	work	
than	Muller’s,	the	debate	has	largely	revolved	around	whether	and	how	Vermigli	can	be	
called	 a	 scholastic	 or	 humanist,	 or	 both.	 Joseph	 McLelland	 has	 argued	 that	 Vermigli	
“combines	‘humanism’	and	‘scholasticism’	in	a	positive	way,	so	that	he	is	less	the	villain	
than	 Armstrong	 thinks,	 and	 the	 more	 significant.”29	 By	 contrast,	 Marvin	 Anderson	
proposed	in	the	same	year	that	Vermigli	was	essentially	a	humanist,	which	–	he	asserted	
–	 could	 be	 seen	 from	 the	 “anti-scholastic	 bent	 of	Martyr’s	mind.”30	 This	 debate	 is	 so	
dependent	on	extremely	disputed	definitions	–	of	‘scholasticism’	and	‘humanism’	–	that	
it	 basically	 seems	 futile.	 Nevertheless,	 Frank	 A.	 James	 resumed	 the	 debate	 in	 1999,	
arguing	 that	 it	 was	 “Vermigli’s	 Augustinianism	 which	 provided	 the	 intellectual	 link	
																																																						
25	Richard	A.	Muller,	The	Unaccommodated	Calvin :	 Studies	 in	 the	Foundation	of	a	Theological	Tradition	
(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2000).	
26	Richard	A.	Muller,	After	Calvin:	Studies	 in	 the	Development	of	a	Theological	Tradition	 (Oxford:	Oxford	
University	Press,	2003).	
27	Ibid.,	123.	
28	Ibid.,	134.	
29	 Joseph	C.	McLelland,	 “Peter	Martyr	 Vermigli:	 Scholastic	 or	Humanist?,”	 in	Peter	Martyr	 Vermigli	 and	
Italian	Reform,	ed.	Joseph	C.	McLelland	(Waterloo:	Wilfried	Laurier	University	Press,	1980),	141–52,	here	
143.	
30	Marvin	W.	Anderson,	“Peter	Martyr	Vermigli:	Protestant	Humanist,”	in	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli	and	Italian	
Reform,	ed.	Joseph	C.	McLelland	(Waterloo:	Wilfried	Laurier	University	Press,	1980),	65–84,	here	69.	
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between	his	late	medieval	scholasticism	with	its	humanist	modification	and	his	role	as	a	
‘codifier’	of	Reformed	scholasticism.”31	James	had	earlier	completed	a	doctorate	on	the	
influence	of	the	Augustinian	Gregory	of	Rimini	on	Vermigli32	and	it	is	from	there	that	his	
conviction	that	Vermigli	should	be	best	labelled	an	Augustinian	comes.	Moreover,	James	
assumes	a	dichotomy	between	Vermigli’s	methodology	and	theology	when	he	concludes	
that	 Vermigli	 used	 “both	 scholastic	 and	 humanist	methods”	 to	 serve	 an	 “Augustinian	
content.”33		
The	assumption	of	a	division	between	form	and	content	is	indeed	prevalent	in	the	
discourses	I	have	surveyed.	Muller	holds	that	the	“scholastic	element	in	the	thought	of	
Vermigli”	 is	of	 a	 “methodological	nature”	and	 that	 generally,	 “scholasticism”	 concerns	
“issues	of	method	rather	than	issues	of	theological	content.”34	By	contrast,	most	literary	
scholars	 and	historians	would	 take	 it	 for	 granted	 that	 a	 text’s	 content	 cannot	be	 fully	
understood	 in	abstraction	from	the	 literary	form	and	historical	context	 in	which	 it	was	
written.	 To	 declare	 only	 Vermigli’s	 method	 “scholastic”	 (or	 “humanist”),	 while	 his	
theology	is	allegedly	untouched	by	this	form,	is	therefore	not	desirable	–	and	arguably	not	
even	possible.35		
In	sum,	the	broader	debate	about	the	relationship	between	the	Reformation	and	
the	developments	following	 it	has	moved	away	from	an	approach	 like	Anderson’s	that	
reifies	“Calvinism”	and	“Protestant	scholasticism,”	researching	instead	the	complexity	and	
interrelatedness	 of	 various	 thinkers	 in	 their	 developments.	 Vermigli	 scholarship,	 by	
contrast,	is	still	largely	concerned	with	seemingly	static	labels	for	Vermigli’s	theology.	As	
we	 have	 seen,	 however,	 the	 insight	 gained	 by	 calling	 Vermigli	 a	 “scholastic”	 or	 a	
“humanist”	is	minimal,	since	it	is	dependent	on	prior,	reifying	definitions	of	these	labels.	
In	order	to	get	out	of	this	impasse,	I	will	below	propose	a	different	approach	to	Vermigli’s	
																																																						
31	 Frank	 A.	 James,	 “Peter	Martyr	 Vermigli:	 At	 the	 Crossroads	 of	 Late	Medieval	 Scholasticism,	 Christian	
Humanism	and	Resurgent	Augustinianism,”	in	Protestant	Scholasticism:	Essays	in	Reassessment,	ed.	Carl	R.	
Trueman	and	R.	Scott	Clark	(Carlisle:	Paternoster	Press,	1999),	62–78,	here	77.	
32	 Frank	 A.	 James,	 Peter	Martyr	 Vermigli	 and	 Predestination:	 The	 Augustinian	 Inheritance	 of	 an	 Italian	
Reformer	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1998).	
33	James,	“Peter	Martyr	Vermigli:	At	the	Crossroads	of	Late	Medieval	Scholasticism,	Christian	Humanism	and	
Resurgent	Augustinianism,”	78.	
34	Muller,	After	Calvin:	Studies	in	the	Development	of	a	Theological	Tradition,	69;	15.	
35	In	the	context	of	Vermigli	scholarship,	this	has	been	equally	noted	by	Norman	Klassen,	“Nature,	Virtue,	
and	Humanism:	Cross-Disciplinary	Reflections	on	Vermigli’s	Romans	Commentary	(10-16),”	in	Peter	Martyr	
Vermigli	and	the	European	Reformations:	Semper	Reformanda,	ed.	Frank	A.	James	(Leiden:	Brill,	2004),	197–
212,	here	197.	
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work,	which	is	based	on	a	re-appraisal	of	metaphysics	as	a	heuristic	category	leading	to	a	
fresh	 insight	 into	nature	of	Vermigli’s	 theology.	Before	 turning	 to	an	exposition	of	my	
methodological	approach,	however,	 I	 shall	 review	the	second	of	 the	above	mentioned	
debates.	
The	second	major	scholarly	debate	relating	to	the	philosophical	background	of	the	
Protestant	Reformation	is	concerned	with	the	influences	of	various	medieval	schools	on	
the	theology	of	the	Reformers.	Donnelly’s	book,	which	we	have	encountered	already,	is	a	
good	way	 into	 these	debates.	 Indeed,	 it	would	almost	 seem	that	Donnelly	 is	 implicitly	
more	interested	in	the	connection	between	the	philosophical	schools	of	the	Middle	Ages	
and	the	Reformation	and	its	historiographical	implications	than	he	is	in	the	question	of	
whether	or	not	Vermigli	is	a	Protestant	scholastic.	As	he	makes	explicit	in	the	final	chapter,	
Donnelly	is	throughout	at	pains	to	emphasise	Vermigli’s	affinities	with	Thomas	Aquinas	–	
as	well	as,	conversely,	the	relatively	minor	influence	exerted	on	him	by	nominalism.	He	
maintains	that	Vermigli’s	scholasticism	“stands	far	closer	to	Thomism	than	to	any	other	
major	school	of	the	Middle	Ages.”36	This	judgement	is	based	on	the	fact	that	Vermigli’s	
training	was	mainly	Thomistic	and	that	he	cited	Thomas	extensively.	Donnelly’s	extensive	
qualitative	research	into	the	number	of	times	Vermigli	explicitly	refers	to	certain	sources	
shows	that	Vermigli	cites	Aquinas	more	often	than	any	other	scholastic	except	Lombard,	
and	that	he	cites	more	individual	works	of	Thomas	than	of	any	other	theologian	(except	
some	of	the	Fathers).37		
The	reason	this	finding	matters	to	Donnelly	is	historiographical,	namely,	that	some	
Roman	Catholic	historiography	of	the	Reformation	has	seen	in	Reformation	thought	the	
influence	of	nominalism.	He	 refers	 to	a	number	of	Catholic	 theologians,	who	held	 the	
thesis	 of	 a	 nominalist	 influence	 on	 Luther,	 such	 as	 Heinrich	 Denifle	 around	 1900	 and	
Joseph	Lortz	sixty	years	later.38	A	similar	claim	was	made	more	broadly	of	the	Reformation	
by	Louis	Bouyer.39	In	contrast	to	what	these	theologians	have	assumed,	Donnelly	wishes	
																																																						
36	Donnelly,	Calvinism	and	Scholasticism	in	Vermigli’s	Doctrine	of	Man	and	Grace,	202.	
37	Ibid.	See	Donnelly’s	chapter	“The	Sources	of	Martyr’s	Thought,”	Ibid.,	13–41.	
38	Heinrich	Denifle,	Luther	und	Lutherthum,	 in	der	ersten	Entwickelung	quellenmässig	dargestellt,	2	vols.	
(Mainz:	Kirchheim,	1904);	Joseph	Lortz,	Die	Reformation	in	Deutschland	(Freiburg	i.	B.:	Herder,	1962).	
39	Louis	Bouyer,	Du	Protestantisme	à	l’Église	(Paris:	Éditions	du	Cerf,	1954);	translated	into	English	as	Louis	
Bouyer,	The	Spirit	and	Forms	of	Protestantism,	trans.	A.V.	Littledale	(London:	Scepter	Publishers,	2001).	
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to	“urge”	that	there	is	no	“tight”	connection	between	nominalist	thought	and	Protestant	
theology.	Indeed,	he	ventures	that	
The	thesis	that	Occam	is	the	foster	father	of	Protestantism	needs	revision	
in	 the	 light	 of	 Peter	 Martyr's	 theology.	 Martyr's	 teachings	 on	 the	
sacraments,	justification,	predestination,	and	God’s	sovereignty	yield	little	
in	vigor	to	Luther	and	Calvin.	Yet	Martyr	came	to	these	conclusions	out	of	
a	generally	Thomistic	rather	than	Occamist	background.40	
Donnelly	made	the	same	argument	and	developed	it	further	in	an	article	entitled	‘Calvinist	
Thomism.’41	Here,	he	insists	that		
the	theology	of	Vermigli	…	show[s]	that	when	Protestants	came	to	recast	
their	 theology	 into	 a	 scholastic	 form,	 they	 rather	 consistently	 avoided	
nominalism	as	a	base.	Insofar	as	the	roots	of	Protestant	scholasticism	go	
back	 to	 the	Middle	 Ages,	 they	 tend	 to	 go	 back	 to	 the	 via	 antiqua	 and	
Thomism.	Protestant	fruit	grows	well	on	the	Thomist	tree,	even	better	than	
on	 the	 nominalist	 tree.	 In	 this	 light	 the	 intrinsic	 connections	 between	
Protestantism	 and	 nominalism	 become	 less	 important	 or	 even	
questionable.42		
Louis	Bouyer	presents	the	most	elaborate	account	of	the	position	Donnelly	is	opposing	
here,	and	we	shall	consider	his	argument	 in	order	better	 to	situate	Donnelly’s	claim.43	
Bouyer’s	thesis	is	that	what	he	calls	the	“positive	principles	of	the	Reformation”	are	not	
necessarily	or	 intrinsically	connected	to	 its	negations.	He	goes	as	far	as	to	say	that	the	
positive	principles	of	Protestantism,	as	reformulations	of	biblical	Christian	truths,	must	be	
“held	 to	 be	 true	 and	 necessary	 in	 virtue	 of	 Catholic	 tradition	 itself.”44	 Nevertheless,	
Bouyer	maintains,	these	principles	were	narrowed	and	turned	‘negative’	in	the	context	of	
polemical	 demarcations.	 For	 example,	 the	 Reformers	 famously	 affirmed	 that	 human	
salvation	depends	fully	on,	and	is	granted	through	God’s	abundant	grace,	sola	gratia.	This	
affirmation,	however,	was	eventually	associated	with	a	denial	of	any	human	contribution	
to,	or	 even	 implication	 in	 salvation,	 to	 the	point	of	understanding	 salvation	as	merely	
extrinsic	to	human	beings.45	Bouyer	asserts	that	there	is	no	necessary	connection	between	
																																																						
40	Donnelly,	Calvinism	and	Scholasticism	in	Vermigli’s	Doctrine	of	Man	and	Grace,	204.	
41	John	Patrick	Donnelly,	“Calvinist	Thomism,”	Viator,	no.	7	(1976):	441–55.	
42	Ibid.,	454.	
43	 An	 extended	 version	 of	 the	 argument	which	 follows	 is	 forthcoming	 as	 Silvianne	 Aspray,	 “A	 Complex	
Legacy:	Louis	Bouyer	and	the	Metaphysics	of	the	Reformation,”	Modern	Theology,	2018.	
44	Bouyer,	The	Spirit	and	Forms	of	Protestantism,	166–67.	
45	Ibid.,	168.	
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the	affirmation	of	the	sola	gratia	and	the	denial	of	any	 implication	of	human	beings	 in	
their	 salvation,	 for	 one	 can	 arguably	 hold	 the	 former	 without	 the	 latter.	 In	 order	 to	
endorse	the	view	that	God’s	salvific	action	is	a	pure	gratuitous	gift,	it	is	not	necessary	to	
subscribe	to	an	understanding	of	grace	as	merely	extrinsic	to	human	beings.	Where	then,	
Bouyer	asks,	does	the	impetus	for	negations	like	this	one	originate?	What	was	present	in	
the	Reformation,	so	bound	up	with	its	positive	principles,	that	–	in	the	eyes	of	the	Catholic	
church	 –	 the	 Reformation	 turned	 heretical,	 despite	 its	 genuinely	 Christian	 principles?	
Bouyer’s	answer	 to	 this	question	 is	 ‘nominalism’.	 The	Reformation’s	negations	are,	he	
holds,	 the	 offspring	 of	 an	 unholy	 alliance	 of	 Reformation	 thinking	 with	 nominalist	
metaphysics.	The	Reformers	unconsciously	inherited	a	nominalist	understanding	of	how	
God	and	 the	world	 relate,	Bouyer	argues,	 and	 it	was	 this	 “vitiated	 framework”	which,	
when	used	to	expound	the	positive	 insights	of	 the	Reformation,	compromised	them.46	
Hence,	Bouyer	concludes,	if	anything,	the	Reformers	were	not	radical	enough.	They	did	
not	sufficiently	realise	their	own	captivity	to	a	nominalist	metaphysics.47		
What,	however,	is	the	nominalism	Bouyer	refers	to?	It	is,	he	says,	at	core	a	radical	
empiricism	which	reduces	all	being	to	what	is	perceived.	In	such	a	system,	every	being	is	
seen	as	a	monad,	impenetrable	by	any	other.	This	is	also	the	case	because	“being	is	no	
more	 than	 a	 word	without	 content”48	 –	 which	 in	 turn	means	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 an	
ontological	difference	between	God	and	creation	becomes	unintelligible.	God	has	to	be	
thought	as	part	of	the	same	ontological	order	as	human	beings,	distinguished	from	them	
mainly	 through	 his	 power.49	 In	 these	 circumstances,	 whatever	 action	 God	 carries	 out	
cannot	and	must	not	be	carried	out	by	human	persons,	and	vice	versa.	Human	actions	can	
be	 seen	as	 taking	 something	away	 from	what	 is	 rightfully	God’s	 in	a	 kind	of	 zero-sum	
game.50	That	the	positive	affirmations	of	the	Reformation	were	entangled	with	negations,	
and	 often	 presupposed	 ultimately	 unhelpful	 dichotomies,	 for	 Bouyer,	 is	 owing	 to	 the	
metaphysical	 framework	 in	which	 they	were	expressed.	Protestantism	 is	 for	him,	 right	
																																																						
46	Cf.	ibid.,	231.	
47	Cf.	ibid.,	184. 
48	Ibid.,	185f.	
49	Cf.	ibid.,	186.	
50	 For	 the	purpose	of	 the	 argument,	 I	merely	wish	 to	present	Bouyer’s	 notion	of	 ‘nominalism’,	without	
passing	judgement	on	whether	his	portrayal	of	nominalist	philosophy	or	theology	is	balanced	or	fair.	It	is	to	
be	noted	that	in	The	Spirit	and	Forms	of	Protestantism,	Bouyer	neither	gives	evidence	for	the	sources	of	his	
notion	of	nominalism,	nor	engages	with	primary	texts.	
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from	the	start,	a	complex	conglomerate	of	positive	affirmations	retrieving	genuine	Biblical	
and	traditional	truths,	on	the	one	hand,	and	a	detrimental	nominalist	metaphysics,	on	the	
other	hand,	which	the	Reformers	did	not	consciously	choose	to	embrace:	“Brought	up	on	
these	[viz.	nominalist]	lines	of	thought	…	the	Reformers	could	only	systematize	their	very	
valuable	insights	in	a	vitiated	framework.”51	
In	all	of	this,	Bouyer	is	a	representative	–	perhaps	the	fairest	and	least	polemical	–	
of	the	kind	of	argument	against	which	Donnelly	reacts.	Donnelly	holds,	as	we	have	seen,	
that	the	thesis	of	a	nominalist	(or	via	moderna)	influence	on	the	Reformation	needs	to	be	
dropped	because	Vermigli	is	a	Reformer	not	influenced	by	nominalism,	but	much	more	
by	Thomism	or	the	via	antiqua.		
There	is	a	considerable	body	of	scholarly	literature	on	the	influence	of	medieval	
and	late	medieval	philosophical	thought,	especially	the	via	antiqua	and	the	via	moderna,	
on	 the	 Reformers.	 This	 literature	 mostly	 enquires	 into	 direct	 influences	 of	 certain	
medieval	authors	on	Luther,	Calvin	and	others,	often	taking	explicit	references	in	the	work	
of	the	latter	as	their	starting	point.52	Such	a	method	is	certainly	valuable,	even	though	the	
use	 of	 ‘influence’	 as	 a	 category	 is	 not	 without	 its	 problems.	 For,	 to	 say	 that	 the	
Reformation	is	influenced	by	this	or	that	strand	of	medieval	thought	means	to	start	from	
the	perspective	of	the	Reformation	from	the	outset,	potentially	reducing	the	influencers	
to	their	latter-day	reception.	Moreover,	there	is	the	danger	of	tacitly	assuming	a	simplistic	
model	of	causality	in	history;	as	if	every	development	in	history	could	be	traced	to	and	
fully	explained	by	a	finite	number	of	influences.	Heiko	Oberman	–	one	of	the	most	notable	
researchers	on	the	relationship	between	the	Reformation	and	the	Late	Middle	ages,	and	
critic	of	 Louis	Bouyer’s	negative	assessment	of	nominalism53	–	understood	 this	danger	
well,	and	established	that	when	employing	the	category	of	“influence,”	one	ought	not	to	
																																																						
51	Bouyer,	The	Spirit	and	Forms	of	Protestantism,	231.	
52	 To	mention	only	 a	 few	 recent	 examples:	 Theodor	Dieter,	 “Luther	 as	 a	 Late	Medieval	 Theologian:	His	
Positive	 and	 Negative	 Use	 of	 Nominalism	 and	 Realism,”	 in	 The	 Oxford	 Handbook	 of	 Martin	 Luther’s	
Theology,	ed.	Robert	Kolb,	Irene	Dingel,	and	Lubomir	Batka	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2014),	31–48;	
Mark	 C	 Mattes,	 “Luther’s	 Use	 of	 Philosophy,”	 Lutherjahrbuch	 80	 (2013):	 110–41;	 B	 J	 Van	 der	 Walt,	
“Philosophical	and	Theological	Influences	in	John	Calvin’s	Thought:	Reviewing	Some	Research	Results,”	In	
Die	Skriflig	44,	no.	3	(2010):	105–27.	
53	 Heiko	 A.	 Oberman,	 The	 Harvest	 of	 Medieval	 Theology:	 Gabriel	 Biel	 and	 Late	 Medieval	 Nominalism	
(Cambridge	 MA:	 Harvard	 University	 Press,	 1963)	 see	 particularly	 the	 Postscript	 on	 “The	 Catholicity	 of	
Nominalism”,	p.	423-8.		
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enquire	 into	 “the	 nature	 of	 the	 cause	 but	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 change.”54	 However,	
Oberman	 still	 limits	 his	 enquiry	 to	 finding	 the	 forerunners	of	 notions	 and	 frameworks	
explicitly	employed	or	referred	to	by	the	Reformers.	This	method	potentially	 limits	the	
scope	of	what	he	can	perceive,	especially	in	the	‘forerunners’,	but	arguably	even	in	the	
Reformers.	An	example	from	another	field	of	study	might	help	to	illuminate	this:	The	art	
historian	Hans	Belting,	when	tracing	the	influences	between	the	use	of	perspective	in	the	
East	 and	 the	 West,	 holds	 that	 changing	 between	 different	 historical	 viewpoints	
(Blickwechsel)	helps	to	illuminate	a	certain	phenomenon	more	thoroughly	than	it	could	
have	 been	 from	 a	 single	 perspective.55	 In	 our	 present	 context,	mutatis	mutandis,	 this	
would	mean	that	a	medieval	perspective	on	the	metaphysics	of	the	Reformation	–	beyond	
what	the	Reformers	either	positively	or	negatively	referred	to	–	would	help	to	bring	to	the	
fore	certain	constellations	in	Reformation	thought	which	otherwise	might	not	be	seen.		
Another	methodological	difficulty	of	the	debates	about	the	 influence	of	various	
medieval	 schools	 on	 the	 philosophical	 commitments	 of	 the	 Reformers	 concerns	 the	
difficulty	of	defining	some	of	 its	categories.	Especially	‘nominalism’	is	a	highly	disputed	
category,	 fraught	 with	 at	 least	 two	 conceptual	 and	 historiographical	 difficulties.	 First,	
nominalism	 is	 a	 notoriously	 under-defined	 term.	 This	 can	 be	 seen,	 for	 instance,	 in	
Bouyer’s	work,	where	he	seemingly	takes	it	to	be	a	self-explanatory	category.	The	only	
hint	 he	 provides	 for	 what	 he	 means	 by	 it	 is	 that	 he	 seems	 to	 use	 nominalism	
interchangeably	with	William	of	Ockham’s	 thought.56	Historians	of	 the	period	disagree	
over	whether	this	equation	is	appropriate,	given	both	the	convergences	and	divergences	
between	Ockham	and	other	thinkers	of	the	time,	such	as	Gabriel	Biel	and	Pierre	d’Ailly,	
and	 given	 also	 that	 none	 of	 Ockham’s	 contemporaries	 would	 have	 called	 him	 a	
nominalist.57	It	is	moreover	contested	whether	and	how	nominalism	as	a	concept	reaches	
beyond	 epistemology	 into	 ontology.58	 Bouyer	 clearly	 assumes	 the	 latter,	 taking	 it	 for	
granted	that	the	univocity	of	being	is	a	characteristic	of	nominalism.59	All	of	this	suggests	
																																																						
54	 Heiko	 A.	 Oberman,	 Forerunners	 of	 the	 Reformation:	 The	 Shape	 of	 Late	 Medieval	 Thought	 (London:	
Lutterworth	Press,	1967),	39	(italics	in	the	original).	
55	Hans	Belting,	Florenz	und	Bagdad:	eine	westöstliche	Geschichte	des	Blicks	(München:	Beck,	2008).	
56	Bouyer,	The	Spirit	and	Forms	of	Protestantism,	184.	
57	William	J.	Courtenay,	“Nominalism	and	Late	Medieval	Religion,”	in	The	Pursuit	of	Holiness	in	Late	Medieval	
and	Renaissance	Religion,	ed.	Charles	Trinkaus	and	Heiko	A.	Oberman	(Leiden:	Brill,	1974),	26–59.	
58	 Fritz	 Hoffmann,	 “Nominalismus,”	 Historisches	 Wörterbuch	 der	 Philosophie,	 VI	 (Darmstadt:	
Wissenschaftliche	Buchgesellschaft,	1984),	874–88.	
59	Bouyer,	The	Spirit	and	Forms	of	Protestantism,	185–86.	
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that	 –	 in	 contrast	 to	Bouyer’s	 seemingly	 self-evident	 use	of	 the	 concept	 –	 defining	or	
understanding	nominalism	is	far	from	evident.60	
Secondly,	 and	 somewhat	 independently	 of	 how	 one	 wishes	 to	 understand	
nominalism,	it	is	not	clear	how	it	is	to	be	assessed	–	both	regarding	its	place	in	the	history	
of	theology	and	that	of	modernity.	As	we	have	seen	above,	Bouyer	assesses	‘nominalism’	
in	unambiguously	negative	 terms.	 It	 is,	 for	him,	 the	root	of	highly	problematic,	 indeed	
heretical,	developments	in	theology;	and	he	was	not	alone	with	this	appraisal.	Among	the	
Nouvelle	Théologie	thinkers	of	Bouyer’s	time,	it	was	common	to	deplore	the	decay	of	the	
realist	synthesis	of	reason	and	faith	in	the	Late	Middle	Ages,	with	Étienne	Gilson	leading	
the	way.61	Others,	 by	 contrast,	wished	 to	 defend	 the	 ‘catholicity’	 of	 nominalism.62	 To	
make	matters	more	 complicated	 still,	 scholars	 of	 the	 history	 of	 ideas	 have	moreover	
repeatedly	 associated	 ‘nominalism’	 and	 the	 univocity	 of	 being	 with	 the	 genesis	 of	
modernity63	 –	 thereby	 further	 refracting	 and	 entangling	 anyone’s	 assessment	 of	 it	 by	
means	of	their	respective	stance	on	modernity.		
French	historians	of	the	Middle	Ages	have	recently	contributed	to	these	debates	
by	dating	the	shifts	in	modal	logic	and	metaphysics	which	eventually	paved	the	way	for	
modernity	 further	back	 than	Ockham	or	 ‘nominalism’.	André	de	Muralt,	 Jean-François	
Courtine,	Olivier	Boulnois	and	others	have	argued	that	Ockham	is	to	be	seen	as	part	of	a	
tradition	 which	 originated	 earlier,	 merely	 making	 more	 explicit	 certain	 metaphysical	
configurations	 which	 appeared	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	 the	 thirteenth	 century,	 most	
prominently	 in	 the	 work	 of	 John	 Duns	 Scotus.64	 The	 argument	 goes	 that	 these	
																																																						
60	This	is	moreover	highlighted	by	the	fact	that	scholars	have	only	recently	substantially	revisited	some	core	
concepts	 associated	with	 it,	 like	 God’s	 potentia	 absoluta	 and	 ordinata.	 See	William	 J.	 Courtenay,	 “The	
Dialectic	of	Divine	Omnipotence	 in	 the	Age	of	Chaucer:	A	Reconsideration,”	 in	Nominalism	and	Literary	
Discourse :	New	Perspectives,	ed.	Hugo	Keiper,	Christoph	Bode,	and	Richard	 J.	Utz	 (Amsterdam:	Rodopi,	
1997),	111–21.	
61	Étienne	Gilson,	History	of	Christian	Philosophy	in	the	Middle	Ages	(London:	Sheed	and	Ward,	1955),	487–
520.	
62	 Oberman,	 The	 Harvest	 of	 Medieval	 Theology:	 Gabriel	 Biel	 and	 Late	 Medieval	 Nominalism;	 Heiko	 A.	
Oberman,	 “The	 Shape	of	 Late	Medieval	 Thought:	 The	Birthpangs	 of	 the	Modern	 Era,”	 in	The	Pursuit	 of	
Holiness	in	Late	Medieval	and	Renaissance	Religion,	ed.	Charles	Trinkaus	and	Heiko	A.	Oberman	(Leiden:	
Brill,	1974),	3–25.	
63	See	the	accounts	of	scholars	as	different	as,	for	example:	Louis	K.	Dupré,	Passage	to	Modernity:	An	Essay	
in	the	Hermeneutics	of	Nature	and	Culture	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	1993);	Michael	A.	Gillespie,	
The	Theological	Origins	of	Modernity	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2008);	Thomas	Pfau,	Minding	
the	Modern:	Human	Agency,	Intellectual	Traditions,	and	Responsible	Knowledge	(Notre	Dame	IN:	University	
of	Notre	Dame	Press,	2013).	
64	Olivier	Boulnois,	Être	et	représentation:	Une	généalogie	de	la	métaphysique	moderne	à	l’époque	de	Duns	
Scot,	 XIIIe-XIVe	 siècle	 (Paris:	 PUF,	 1999);	 André	 de	 Muralt,	 Néoplatonisme	 et	 Aristotélisme	 Dans	 La	
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configurations	–	especially	 the	univocity	of	being	–	will	 eventually	determine	not	only	
‘nominalism’,	but	also	modernity.	John	Milbank	and	Catherine	Pickstock	have	drawn	on	
this	French	debate	and	furthered	it	by	relating	it	to	politics	and	postmodern	theoretical	
developments.65	 Together	with	 Eric	Alliez66	 they	moreover	 argue	 that	 the	univocity	of	
being	ought	be	seen	as	a	metaphysical	thesis,	and	not	a	merely	logical	one,	as	some	have	
claimed.67	Olivier	Boulnois	has	indirectly	concurred,	by	arguing	that	not	only	the	univocity	
of	being,	but	also	nominalism	has	a	metaphysical	dimension;	it	is	more	than	a	linguistic	
thesis,	but	rather	generalises	the	univocity	of	being	to	the	micro	level.68	Daniel	Horan	has	
sought	 to	 critique	 this	 discourse	 by	 suggesting	 that	 Duns	 Scotus,	when	 proposing	 the	
univocity	of	being,	did	not	 intend	for	 it	to	have	metaphysical	consequences.69	He	does	
not,	however,	engage	with	 the	question	of	whether	 the	consequences	which	Milbank,	
Pickstock	and	others	draw	from	the	univocity	of	being	are	implied	by	what	Scotus	wrote.	
Yet	another	approach	is	taken	by	Ludger	Honnefelder,	who	agrees	with	the	metaphysical	
nature	of	the	thesis	of	the	univocity	of	being,	and	that	it	 is	significant	in	the	genesis	of	
modernity.	 In	 contrast	 to	 Pickstock	 and	 Milbank,	 however,	 he	 welcomes	 the	
development.70	The	role	of	the	Reformation	in	this	genealogy	has	not	been	considered	so	
far,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 Brad	 Gregory,	 who	 holds	 that	 the	 univocity	 of	 being	 was	
intensified	in	the	Reformation,	such	that	the	religious	renewal	unintentionally	became	a	
motor	of	secular	and	fragmented	modernity.71	
																																																						
Métaphysique	 Médiévale:	 Analogie,	 Causalité,	 Participation	 (Paris:	 Vrin,	 1995);	 Jean-François	 Courtine,	
Inventio	Analogiae:	Métaphysique	et	Ontothéologie	(Paris:	Vrin,	2005).		
65	John	Milbank,	Beyond	Secular	Order:	The	Representation	of	Being	and	the	Representation	of	the	People	
(Chichester:	Wiley-Blackwell,	2013);	Catherine	Pickstock,	After	Writing:	On	the	Liturgical	Consummation	of	
Philosophy	(Malden	MA:	Blackwell	Publishers,	1998);	Catherine	Pickstock,	“Duns	Scotus:	His	Historical	and	
Contemporary	Significance,”	Modern	Theology	21,	no.	4	(2005):	543–74.	
66	Eric	Alliez,	Capital	Times:	Tales	from	the	Conquest	of	Time,	trans.	Georges	Van	Den	Abbeele	(Minneapolis:	
University	of	Minnesota	Press,	1996).	
67	See	e.g.	Thomas	Williams,	“The	Doctrine	of	Univocity	Is	True	and	Salutary,”	Modern	Theology	21,	no.	4	
(2005):	 575–85;	 Richard	 Cross,	 “‘Where	 Angels	 Fear	 to	 Tread’:	 Duns	 Scotus	 and	 Radical	 Orthodoxy,”	
Antonianum	LXXVI,	no.	1	(2001):	7–41.	
68	Olivier	Boulnois,	Métaphysiques	rebelles:	genèse	et	structures	d’une	science	au	Moyen	Âge	(Paris:	PUF,	
2013).	
69	Daniel	P.	Horan,	Postmodernity	and	Univocity:	A	Critical	Account	of	Radical	Orthodoxy	and	 John	Duns	
Scotus	(Minneapolis:	Fortress	Press,	2014).		
70	 Ludger	 Honnefelder,	 Ens	 inquantum	 ens:	 Der	 Begriff	 des	 Seienden	 als	 solchen	 als	 Gegenstand	 der	
Metaphysik	nach	der	Lehre	des	Johannes	Duns	Scotus	(Münster:	Aschendorff,	1979);	Ludger	Honnefelder,	
Johannes	Duns	Scotus:	Denker	auf	der	Schwelle	vom	mittelalterlichen	zum	neuzeitlichen	Denken	(Paderborn:	
Schöningh,	2011).	
71	Brad	S.	Gregory,	The	Unintended	Reformation:	How	a	Religious	Revolution	Secularized	Society	(Cambridge	
MA:	Belknap	Press,	2012).	
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We	can	conclude	that	the	debate	about	the	relationship	between	the	theology	of	
the	Protestant	Reformation	and	the	various	(late)	medieval	schools	remains	disputed	on	
many	 levels.	 It	 is	 not	 served	 well	 by	 the	 methodological	 difficulties	 involved	 in	 the	
category	of	‘influence’	and	by	the	problems	involved	in	defining	some	of	its	central	terms	
like	‘nominalism’.	Those	who	consider	the	legacy	of	medieval	theology	and	metaphysics	
as	decisive	for	the	development	of	modernity	have	moreover	largely	sidestepped	the	role	
of	the	Reformation	in	these	developments.	
My	own	methodological	approach	below	aims	to	sidestep	both	the	fraught	nature	
of	 the	 term	 nominalism	 and	 the	 danger	 of	 assuming	 an	 all-too	 tight	 cause-effect	
relationship	between	medieval	philosophical-theological	schools	and	the	theology	of	the	
Reformation.	I	equally	wish	to	learn	from	Bouyer’s	approach,	the	main	import	of	which	is	
to	consider	the	metaphysical	commitments	of	Reformation	theology.	In	particular,	I	wish	
to	go	beyond	approaches	which	limit	metaphysics	to	whatever	is	directly	referred	to	by	
the	Reformers	as	such,	or	can	be	traced	backwards	by	way	of	direct	historical	‘influences’.	
This	more	general	attention	to	broader	metaphysical	frameworks	lends	itself,	as	we	have	
seen,	 to	 gaining	 a	 deeper	 understanding	 of	 the	 internal	 logic	 and	 complexity	 of	 the	
Reformation.	
	
2)	Implicit	Metaphysics:	On	the	Method	and	Architecture	of	this	Study	
The	methodological	approach	which	I	propose	for	the	present	study	is	inspired	by	Bouyer,	
insofar	 as	 I	 propose	 to	 consider	 the	 metaphysical	 framework(s)	 sustaining	 Vermigli’s	
thought.	 Instead	 of	 using	 ‘nominalism’	 as	 a	 hermeneutic	 foil	 against	 which	 to	 read	
Vermigli’s	thought,	however,	I	take	my	cue	from	the	debates	around	the	beginnings	of	
modernity	mentioned	above.	In	particular,	I	proceed	from	the	assumption	that	two	of	the	
most	crucial	metaphysical	innovations	of	the	middle	ages	were	a	univocal	understanding	
of	being,	and	an	ensuing	new	notion	of	causality.	I	propose	that	understandings	of	being	
and	 of	 causality	 constitute	 a	 useful	 heuristic	 lens	 through	which	 to	 read	 Reformation	
thought	with	a	view	for	understanding	its	implied	metaphysical	frameworks.	
Applying	this	lens	means	to	pose	the	following	question	to	any	author	or	body	of	
thought:	 is	 ‘being’	 thought	 to	be	a	neutral	category,	applying	 to	both	God’s	as	well	as	
created	being,	or	is	there	a	pre-eminent	Divine	Being	in	which	all	other	being	participates?	
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In	the	case	of	the	latter,	created	being	is	fundamentally	and	ontologically	dependent	on	
God’s	 being,	 and	 there	 are	 no	 pockets	 of	 reality	 where	 created	 beings	 stand	 or	 act	
autonomously.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 former,	 God’s	 being	 and	 the	 being	 of	 creation	 are	
envisaged	to	be	on	the	same	‘plane’.	Either	of	these	options	affect	the	way	in	which	the	
relation	 between	 Divine	 and	 human	 causation	 is	 understood,	 as	 Jacob	 Schmutz	 has	
shown.72	It	will	be	useful	briefly	to	review	Schmutz’	argument,	as	it	provides	some	of	the	
historical	and	conceptual	background	of	the	hermeneutical	lens	I	propose	to	employ	in	
studying	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli.		
Schmutz	delineates	how	a	new	way	of	understanding	God’s	influence	in	the	world	
gradually	emerged	from	the	last	decades	of	the	thirteenth	century	onwards.	Previously,	
Schmutz	argues,	actions	of	secondary	causes	were	described	under	the	aspect	of	their	
ontological	dependence	on	the	first	cause.	Thomas	Aquinas,	for	instance,	held	that	“in	all	
things	 God	 Himself	 is	 properly	 the	 cause	 of	 universal	 being	 which	 is	 innermost	 in	 all	
things,”	and	that	because	of	this	“in	all	things	God	works	intimately.”73	This	idea,	viz.	that	
God	 acts	 immediately	 in	 and	 through	 creatures,	 has	 also	 been	 described	 as	 a	 divine-
human	 synergy.	 However,	 this	 synergy	 was	 gradually	 challenged	 and	 replaced	 by	 a	
concept	 of	 God’s	 mediated	 concurrence:	 “actions	 of	 secondary	 causes	 are	 no	 longer	
described	under	the	aspect	of	their	dependence	on	the	first	cause,	but	under	the	aspect	
of	 their	own	proper	order,	 to	which	the	divine	 first	causality	will	be	able	 to	come	and	
freely	join.”74	This	constitutes,	according	to	Schmutz,	the	emergence	of	a	new	model	of	
causality,	which	is	based	on	the	reciprocal	concurrence	of	two	causes	called	partial.	The	
earlier	model,	by	contrast,	was	based	on	to	two	subordinated	but	total	causes.		
“A	decisive	 characteristic	 of	 this	 shift,”	 Schmutz	 expounds,	 “is	 the	denial	 of	 an	
ontological	determination:	God	acts	in	a	permanent	manner	by	conserving	the	action	of	
secondary	causes,	but	the	being	of	the	effect	does	not	depend	any	longer	on	his	own	gift	
of	being.”75	An	important	step	towards	de-ontologising	Divine	causality	was	John	Duns	
																																																						
72	 Jacob	 Schmutz,	 “The	Medieval	 Doctrine	 of	 Causality	 and	 the	 Theology	 of	 Pure	 Nature	 (13th	 to	 17th	
Centuries),”	in	Surnaturel:	A	Controversy	at	the	Heart	of	Twentieth-Century	Thomistic	Thought,	ed.	Serge-
Thomas	Bonino	(Ave	Maria,	Florida:	Sapientia	Press	of	Ave	Maria	University,	2009),	203–50,	here	249.	In	
what	follows,	I	will	refer	to	this	translation	of	the	original	article	which	appeared	in	the	Revue	Thomiste:	
Jacob	Schmutz,	“La	doctrine	mediévale	des	causes	et	 la	théologie	de	 la	nature	pure	(XIIe-XVIIe	siècles),”	
Revue	Thomiste	101	(2001):	217–64.	
73	Thomas	Aquinas,	Summa	Theologiae	I,	q.	105,	a.	5.		
74	Schmutz,	“The	Medieval	Doctrine	of	Causality,”	213.	
75	Ibid.	(highlights	in	the	original).	
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Scotus’	 critique	of	Thomas	Aquinas’	position	mentioned	above.	 In	direct	opposition	 to	
Aquinas’	 teaching,	 that	 being	 is	 an	 effect	 of	 God,	 Scotus	 affirmed	 that	 since	 every	
composite	effect	can	be	generated	by	a	created	cause	only	by	passing	through	the	action	
of	creatures,	these	creatures	have	to	be	considered	themselves	“givers	of	being.”76	For	
Scotus,	 the	 first	cause	 therefore	no	 longer	has	any	ontological	priority	over	 the	action	
performed	by	the	secondary	cause;	rather	the	two	enjoy	a	being	that	can	be	described	
univocally.	 Almost	 two	 decades	 before	 Schmutz,	 André	 de	 Muralt	 highlighted	 the	
importance	of	 this	 seemingly	 small	move.77	 Its	 ramifications	 for	 the	various	models	of	
metaphysics	 as	 a	 discipline	 as	 developed	 in	 the	 Middle	 Ages	 have	 moreover	 been	
underlined	by	Olivier	Boulnois.78	
Nevertheless,	 the	 fact	 that	 Scotus	 and	 his	 heirs	 considered	 primary	 and	 the	
secondary	causes	to	operate	on	the	same	ontological	level	should	not	lead	us	to	conclude	
that	 they	 regarded	 the	 two	 orders	 as	 completely	 equal.	 The	 primacy	 of	 the	 divine	
influence	was	still	affirmed.	Similarly,	it	was	still	asserted	that	the	first	cause	produces	the	
effect	 more	 universally	 than	 the	 secondary	 cause.	 According	 to	 Schmutz,	 the	 crucial	
difference	between	the	older	and	the	newer	system	of	causal	explanation	is	that	in	the	
newer	framework,	God’s	primary	influence	on	the	world	is	seen	as	‘general’,	in	the	sense	
that	it	is	necessary	for	the	conservation	of	the	powers	of	human	beings.	As	such,	God’s	
influence	 is	 moreover	 “strictly	 co-present	 or	 simultaneous”	 (simul)	 and	 without	 any	
“priority	…	over	the	action	performed	by	the	secondary	cause.”79	God	as	the	first	cause	
now	lends	his	concurrence	to	the	secondary	causes	that	act	in	the	world,	thereby	working	
as	a	simultaneous,	concurring	cause.80		
In	short,	the	new	order	of	causal	explanation	traced	by	Jacob	Schmutz	and	others	
is	made	manifest	by	a	new	guiding	difference:	while	the	main	difference	was	previously	
between	 the	giving	 of	 being	 by	 the	 first	 cause,	 and	 its	 specification	 by	 the	 secondary	
																																																						
76	Cf.	John	Duns	Scotus,	Opus	oxoniense	IV,	dist.	1.	Q.	1	§	7.	
77	 André	 de	 Muralt,	 L’enjeu	 de	 la	 philosophie	 médiévale:	 études	 thomistes,	 scotistes,	 occamiennes	 et	
grégoriennes	 (Leiden:	Brill,	1991),	32–36	et	passim;	André	de	Muralt,	 “La	causalité	aristotélicienne	et	 la	
structure	de	pensée	scotiste,”	Dialectica	47,	no.	2–3	(1993):	121–41.	
78	Boulnois,	Métaphysiques	rebelles,	cf.	part	II	“structures.”	
79	Schmutz,	“The	Medieval	Doctrine	of	Causality,”	214.	
80	This	new	understanding	of	God’s	influence	in	the	world	which	led	to	the	assertion	that	human	beings	can	
perform	good	acts	by	 their	own	power,	 thereby	only	needing	 the	general	 concurring	help	of	God.	This,	
moreover,	was	“the	source	of	what	has	often	been	seen	as	the	‘Pelagianism’	of	certain	followers	of	Scotus	
and	Ockham.”	(Cf.	Ibid.,	217;	225.)	
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cause,	“the	new	difference	is	between	the	order	of	general	influence	which	necessarily	
and	 universally	 accompanies	 every	 natural	 action,	 and	 the	 order	 of	 special	 influence,	
unlinked	 from	 the	 former.”81	 The	 new	 split	 was	 therefore	 between	 God’s	 general	
influence	as	that	which	accompanies	every	act	of	his	creatures,	on	the	one	hand,	and	his	
special	influence	as	that	which	he	must	voluntarily	grant	to	go	beyond	what	is	naturally	
possible	for	human	beings,	on	the	other	hand.	This	means	that	God’s	influence	is	no	longer	
seen	as	 related	 to	 the	being	of	 the	 secondary	cause	 (so	 that	God	works	 in	 them),	but	
rather	as	concurring	with	them,	in	such	a	way	that	Divine	and	secondary	agency	both	work	
alongside	each	other,	contributing	different	but	seamless	elements	to	the	same	effect.		
The	 same	 development	 happened	 in	 theories	 of	 knowledge.	 Henry	 of	 Ghent	
distinguished	a	“knowledge	for	which	only	the	general	influence	is	needed”	from	the	kind	
of	knowledge	which	needs	“other	lights:	that	of	faith	first	of	all,	then	the	lumen	speciale	
that	allows	only	certain	elect	to	see	things	in	the	divine	exemplars	but	not	in	God	himself,	
and	finally	the	lumen	gloriae	to	see	God	himself.”82	According	to	Schmutz,	Henry	thereby	
established	a	dissociation	between	the	natural	order	sustained	by	a	general	influence,	and	
the	supernatural	order	sustained	by	a	special	influence.	This	moreover	implies	that	in	the	
framework	of	the	natural	order,	a	knowledge	ex	puris	naturalibus	becomes	possible.	From	
this,	it	is	obvious	why	Schmutz’	thesis	is	relevant	for	the	debate	around	whether	there	is	
anything	 like	 a	 purely	 natural	 desire	 for	God,	which	was	 sparked	 by	Henri	 de	 Lubac’s	
Surnaturel.83	
In	the	present	study,	I	will	focus	on	structures	of	being	and	causality,	like	the	ones	
just	described,	as	they	present	themselves	in	the	work	of	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli.	Each	of	
the	following	chapters	will	analyse	a	relevant	area	of	Vermigli’s	thought	(his	doctrine	of	
God	in	relation	to	his	anthropology,	his	soteriology,	his	doctrine	of	the	Eucharist,	and	his	
political	theology),	enquiring	into	the	nature	of	these	structures	at	work	in	them.	Through	
this	 approach,	 I	 hope	 to	 unearth	 the	 metaphysical	 structures	 present	 in	 Vermigli’s	
																																																						
81	Ibid.,	218.	
82	Ibid.,	219.	
83	For	a	good	overview	of	the	debate,	see:	Serge-Thomas	Bonino,	Surnaturel:	A	Controversy	at	the	Heart	of	
Twentieth-Century	Thomistic	Thought	(Ave	Maria,	Florida:	Sapientia	Press	of	Ave	Maria	University,	2009).	
Two	notable	recent	contributions	to	the	debate	(which	is	still	ongoing)	are:	Lawrence	Feingold,	The	Natural	
Desire	to	See	God	according	to	St.	Thomas	Aquinas	and	His	Interpreters	(Rome:	Apollinare,	2001);	Steven	A.	
Long,	Natura	Pura:	On	the	Recovery	of	Nature	in	the	Doctrine	of	Grace	(New	York:	Fordham	University	Press,	
2010).	
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thought.	This	means	that	my	approach	proceeds	not	so	much	by	studying	direct	historical	
influences	 on	 Vermigli,	 but	 is	 primarily	 interested	 in	 the	 underlying	 metaphysical	
structures	manifest	in	his	thought.		
However,	what	do	I	mean	by	‘metaphysical	structures’?	Metaphysics,	as	Aristotle	
has	defined	it,	is	the	science	of	being	qua	being.84	Put	in	a	theological	context,	we	might	
say	that	it	is	the	study	of	how	God’s	being	and	the	being	of	the	world	relate.	I	proceed	
from	the	assumption	that	there	are	two	fundamental	ways	in	which	this	relationship	can	
be	envisaged:	either	there	is	a	qualitative	difference	between	God’s	and	the	world’s	being,	
or	 there	 is	 no	 such	qualitative	difference,	 and	being	 is	 understood	univocally.	 Each	of	
these	alternatives	gives	rise	to	or	manifests	itself	in	a	different	metaphysical	framework.	
The	 former	 is	 a	 framework	where	 there	 are	 different	 intensities	 of	 being	 in	 a	 kind	 of	
hierarchy,	with	God’s	pre-eminent	being	at	the	top;	he	gives	being	to	everything	else,	and	
everything	else	in	turn	participates	in	him.	The	latter,	a	metaphysical	framework	based	on	
the	 univocity	 of	 being,	 knows	 no	 hierarchy	 of	 being,	 and	 does	 not	 conceive	 of	 the	
relationship	between	God	and	the	world	in	terms	of	participation.	In	such	a	framework,	
God	is	not	present	in	everything	through	its	very	being,	and	this	is	why	his	relationship	to	
the	world	 is	 framed	 not	 in	 ontological	 terms,	 but	 in	 terms	 of	 his	 ‘general’	 versus	 his	
‘special’	 influence,	 as	 we	 have	 seen	 above,	 where	 he	 sustains	 everything	 generally	
through	his	power,	and	then	 ‘breaks	 in’	 for	special	deeds.	Historically,	a	 framework	of	
metaphysical	 participation	 has	 been	 associated	 with	 various	 forms	 of	 Christian	 Neo-
Platonism,	 whereas	 a	 univocal	 framework	 has	 been	 said	 by	 many	 to	 characterise	
modernity.85	However,	for	the	purpose	of	this	study,	I	wish	to	employ	the	slightly	stylised	
frameworks	just	described	as	a	heuristic	lens	through	which	to	study	the	metaphysics	of	
Peter	 Martyr	 Vermigli.	 The	 historical	 nuances	 and	 backgrounds	 of	 each	 of	 them	 are	
therefore	 somewhat	 secondary.	 I	 will	 demonstrate	 how	 each	 of	 these	 metaphysical	
frameworks	 manifests	 itself	 in	 different	 conceptions	 of	 agency,	 gift,	 presence	 and	
authority.	The	chapters	of	this	study	will	focus	on	each	of	these	in	turn.		
I	 will	 enquire	 whether	 Vermigli’s	 theology	 implicitly	 understands	 ‘being’	 as	 a	
neutral	category,	applying	equally	and	univocally	 to	God’s	being	and	created	being,	or	
																																																						
84	Aristotle,	Metaphysics	IV	1.	
85	E.g.	Gillespie,	The	Theological	Origins	of	Modernity;	Milbank,	Beyond	Secular	Order;	Pfau,	Minding	the	
Modern:	Human	Agency,	Intellectual	Traditions,	and	Responsible	Knowledge.	
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whether	 it	 conceives	 of	 Divine	 being	 as	 transcendent	 and	 pre-eminent,	with	 all	 other	
being	participating	in	it.	These	two	basic	metaphysical	alternatives	manifest	themselves	
in	 different	 respective	 formulations	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 Divine	 and	 human	
agency,	the	character	of	Divine	gifts,	the	way	in	which	God	is	thought	to	be	present	in	the	
Church,	and	the	way	his	power	is	envisaged.	
It	 is	 the	 argument	 of	 each	 of	 the	 four	 chapters	 which	 follow,	 that	 Vermigli	
simultaneously	 inhabits	 and	exhibits	 aspects	of	both	 the	metaphysical	 frameworks	we	
have	just	described.	We	will	see	how	this	is	the	case	with	regard	to	(1)	Vermigli’s	view	of	
the	relation	between	Divine	and	human	agency	as	developed	in	his	lectures	on	Aristotle’s	
Nicomachean	Ethics	and	the	Old	Testament	books	of	Samuel,	(2)	his	understanding	of	the	
gift	of	grace	in	justification,	(3)	his	understanding	of	presence	in	the	Eucharistic	debates,	
and	(4)	his	understanding	of	power	and	authority	in	his	political	theology.	
In	chapter	one,	I	demonstrate	that	in	his	commentary	on	Aristotle’s	Ethics	and	in	
selected	 scholia	 from	 his	 Old	 Testament	 commentaries,	 Vermigli	 sometimes	 thinks	 of	
Divine	 agency	 as	 in	 synergy	 with	 human	 agency.	 This	 presupposes	 a	 participatory	
metaphysics,	insofar	as	God	is	present	in	and	through	the	creature’s	actions	as	the	giver	
of	existence.	By	contrast,	other	elements	of	Vermigli’s	thought	–	in	the	same	sources	–	
indicate	that	he	construes	God’s	influence	as	concurring	with	human	actions,	 in	such	a	
way	that	Divine	and	human	agency	both	work	on	the	same	ontological	plane,	contributing	
different	but	seamless	elements	to	the	same	effect.	
In	chapter	two,	I	contend	that	another	upshot	of	this	metaphysical	plurality	can	be	
seen	in	Vermigli’s	theology	of	justification,	specifically	in	the	way	he	envisages	the	gift	of	
grace	to	be	given.	If	it	is	given	in	such	a	way	that	it	intrinsically	transforms	human	beings,	
then	this	presupposes	a	 framework	of	metaphysical	participation.	The	same	 is	not	 the	
case	when	gifts	are	given	extrinsically.	I	demonstrate	that	Vermigli	holds	both	theses.	He	
insists	 that	 human	 beings	 can	 receive	 the	 gift	 of	 grace	 only	 extrinsically	 (through	
imputation),	while	he	equally	maintains	that	this	gift	transforms	them	intrinsically.		
Chapter	 three	 considers	 Vermigli	 at	 his	most	 polemical:	 in	 the	 debates	 on	 the	
Eucharist.	 I	 argue	 that	 in	 this	 context,	 Vermigli’s	 fundamental	 category	with	which	 to	
describe	 the	 relationship	 between	 God	 and	 the	world	 is	 that	 of	 spatial	 nearness	 and	
distance.	The	fact	that	he	takes	recourse	to	spatial	terms	in	order	to	set	apart	God	from	
the	world	(rather	than	different	qualities	of	being)	indicates	a	univocal	understanding	of	
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Divine	and	created	being.	Nevertheless,	Vermigli’s	conception	of	the	believer’s	union	with	
Christ,	which	is	at	the	heart	of	his	teaching	on	the	Eucharist,	presupposes	that	the	believer	
participates	in	Christ.	
The	 fourth	 and	 final	 chapter	 argues	 that	 the	 two	 focal	 points	 of	 authority	 in	
Vermigli’s	political	theology	–	the	magistrate	and	the	word	of	God	–	do	not	function	in	the	
same	way,	 rather	 that	each	presupposes	a	different	metaphysical	 framework.	Vermigli	
teaches	that	magistrates	mediate	God’s	power	and	authority.	This	mediation	 implies	a	
hierarchical	metaphysics	in	which	God	is	not	only	the	pre-eminent	giver	of	power	but	also	
of	being.	However,	this	stands	in	contrast	to	the	way	Vermigli	envisages	the	authority	of	
the	Word	of	God.	 In	 the	 case	of	his	Word,	Vermigli	maintains,	God’s	power	needs	no	
mediation.	This	denial	of	mediation	conveys	that	God	and	the	world	are	seen	on	the	same	
ontological	plane.		
The	 approach	 of	 this	 study	 is	 therefore	 based	 on	 studying	 the	 metaphysical	
framework	implicit	in	Vermigli’s	work,	insofar	as	it	does	not	study	works	which	explicitly	
deal	with	the	nature	of	being	qua	being	–	simply	because	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli’s	oeuvre	
does	not	comprise	any	explicit	metaphysical	reflections.	This	approach	opens	the	novel	
possibility	to	analyse	the	metaphysics	of	theologians	such	as	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli,	who	
have	written	much	concerning	classically	 ‘doctrinal’	problems,	but	have	not	addressed	
metaphysics	in	the	abstract.		
However,	 one	 might	 object	 to	 such	 an	 approach	 that	 it	 forcefully	 imposes	
categories	on	the	Reformation	which	are	foreign	or	extraneous	to	its	discourse.	Rarely	did	
the	Reformers	overtly	engage	in	metaphysical	questions,	after	all.	Indeed,	it	is	well	known	
that	Luther,	for	instance,	explicitly	disapproved	of	anything	that	smacked	of	scholasticism,	
with	what	he	would	call	metaphysical	 speculation	certainly	 falling	under	 this	verdict.86	
Some	might	therefore	say,	as	David	C.	Steinmetz	did	in	the	case	of	Calvin,	that	“historians	
who	 attempt	 to	 reconstruct	 Calvin’s	 metaphysics	 from	 his	 collected	 works	 have	 set	
themselves	a	nearly	 impossible	task”	because	he	“set	out	to	write	a	theology	that	was	
wholly	exegetical.”87		
																																																						
86	Most	 famously	perhaps,	Luther,	 in	his	1517	Disputation	against	Scholastic	Theology,	goes	as	 far	as	 to	
argue	that	no	syllogistic	form	is	valid	in	theology	(WA	1.222-228).	
87	David	C.	Steinmetz,	“The	Scholastic	Calvin,”	in	Protestant	Scholasticism:	Essays	in	Reassessment,	ed.	Carl	
R.	Trueman	and	R.	Scott	Clark	(Carlisle:	Paternoster	Press,	1999),	25.	
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However,	to	say	that	the	Reformers	had	no	metaphysics	at	all	because	their	work	
was	wholly	exegetical,	would	be	to	close	our	eyes	to	one	dimension	of	their	work.	A	similar	
argument,	namely	 that	genuinely	 ‘biblical’	or	 ‘theological’	 reflection	can	do	away	with	
metaphysics,	has	sometimes	been	made	in	theology,	especially	after	Adolf	von	Harnack’s	
thesis	of	an	‘undue’	Hellenization	of	Christianity.88	There	are	important	and	varied	voices	
who	have	 spoken	up	against	 this,	 and	 their	 arguments	 apply	mutatis	mutandis	 to	our	
study	as	well:	Hans	Boersma	has	held	that	most	of	the	Christian	Tradition	has	been	“quite	
conscious	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 no	 such	 thing	 as	 a	 universally	 accessible,	 neutral	
ontology	[or	metaphysics]	separate	from	the	very	particular	convictions	of	the	Christian	
faith.”89	Together	with	others,90	he	has	therefore	called	for	more	conscious	attention	to	
the	 metaphysics	 implicit	 in	 contemporary	 (Protestant)	 theology,	 because	 theological	
reflection	 perforce	 involves	 assumptions	 about	 knowledge,	 language	 and	 the	
transcendent,	which,	unless	made	explicit,	are	likely	to	be	‘modern’	or	‘nihilist’	rather	than	
Christian.91	A	similar	case	for	the	importance	of	metaphysics	has	been	made	in	Catholic	
theology	in	John	Paul	II’s	encyclical	Fides	et	Ratio.	Metaphysics,	John	Paul	II	insisted,	“plays	
an	essential	role	of	mediation	in	theological	research,”	since	it	allows	theology	to	move	
beyond	an	analysis	of	religious	experience,	and	“give	a	coherent	account	of	the	…	value	
of	revealed	truth.”	Indeed,	it	is	the	“path	to	be	taken	in	order	to	move	beyond	the	crisis	
pervading	large	sectors	of	philosophy	at	the	moment,”	such	as	nihilism.92		
This	would	mean	that	for	theologians	to	investigate	historical	sources,	they	ought	
to	go	beyond	limiting	their	enquiry	to	texts	called	‘De	metaphysica’	(or	similarly)	only.	For	
even	 if	 one	 does	 limit	 one’s	 enquiry	 to	 such	 texts,	where	 they	 exist,	 the	metaphysics	
implicit	 in	 them	 is	 almost	equally	 as	 important	as	 the	metaphysical	 tenets	which	 they	
explicitly	affirm	or	deny.	A	good	example	for	this	is	an	article	by	Richard	Muller,	in	which	
																																																						
88	Adolf	von	Harnack,	Lehrbuch	der	Dogmengeschichte,	3	vols.	(Freiburg	i.B.:	J.	C.	B.	Mohr	(Paul	Siebeck),	
1886).	
89	 Hans	 Boersma,	 Heavenly	 Participation:	 The	 Weaving	 of	 a	 Sacramental	 Tapestry	 (Grand	 Rapids	 MI:	
Eerdmans	Publishing,	2011),	21.	
90	Cf.	e.g.	Paul	Tyson,	Returning	to	Reality:	Christian	Platonism	for	Our	Times	 (Eugene	OR:	Wipf	&	Stock,	
2014);	James	K.	A.	Smith,	Desiring	the	Kingdom:	Worship,	Worldview,	and	Cultural	Formation	(Grand	Rapids,	
Mich:	Baker	Academic,	2009).	
91	Cf.	Boersma,	Heavenly	Participation,	20.	
92	John	Paul	II,	“Fides	et	Ratio,”	September	14,	1998,	section	83,	http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-
ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_14091998_fides-et-ratio.html	(10.02.2017). 
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he	argues	that	early	modern	Reformed	thought	was	“not	Scotist.”93	He	makes	this	claim	
by	drawing	on	Reformed	metaphysical	treatises	of	the	second	half	of	the	sixteenth	and	
the	 seventeenth	 century.	 He	 convincingly	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	
Reformed	metaphysical	treatises	of	the	second	half	of	the	sixteenth	and	the	seventeenth	
century	 did	 not	 subscribe	 to	 the	 univocity	 of	 being.	 He	 shows	 that	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	
positions	 was	 being	 held,	 from	 an	 explicitly	 analogical	 doctrine	 of	 the	 names	 of	 God	
(Zanchi,	Hyperius),	to	assertions	that	God	is	“supra	ens”	(Keckermann)	and	concomitant	
denials	 of	 univocity,	 up	 to	 a	 number	 of	 theologians	 opting	 in	 favour	 of	 an	 outright	
equivocity	of	being	(Crankanthorpe,	Maresius,	Revius).	All	this	leads	Muller	to	conclude	
pace	John	Milbank,	Catherine	Pickstock	and	Brad	Gregory,	that	it	“cannot	be	sustained”	
that	“early	modern	Protestant	thought	evidenced	a	‘shift’	away	from	a	‘metaphysics	of	
participation’.”94	However,	the	evidence	Muller	himself	presents	is	far	from	clear	on	this	
issue.	Muller	demonstrates	that	the	interest	behind	the	early	modern	Reformed	denial	of	
the	 univocity	 of	 being	 is	 to	 distinguish	 between	 “the	 disciplines	 of	 theology	 and	
metaphysics.”	Indeed,	“Reformed	writers	of	the	sixteenth	and	seventeenth	centuries	…	
rather	strictly	separated	‘general	metaphysics’	from	‘special	metaphysics’.”95	Therefore,	
they	denied	the	univocity	of	being	in	order	to	“exclude	discussion	of	God”	from	general	
metaphysics,	“on	the	ground	that	God	ought	not	to	be	considered	as	‘being	in	general’.”96	
As	Oliver	Boulnois	has	shown,	however,	the	distinction	between	a	general	and	a	special	
metaphysics	was	introduced	by	John	Duns	Scotus.	It	was	through	Scotus	that	a	general	or	
transcendental	metaphysics	became	a	necessary	pre-condition	for	thinking	about	God	in	
the	metaphysica	specialis.97	Moreover,	the	distinction	between	theology	and	metaphysics	
–	or	between	God’s	being	and	being	 in	general	–	bespeaks	a	metaphysical	 framework	
which	is	certainly	not	based	on	all	things	participating	in	God’s	being.	Muller’s	claim	that	
early	modern	Reformed	writers	were	“not	Scotist”	 is	 therefore	not	as	straightforward.	
True,	 they	 denied	 the	 univocity	 of	 being.	 This	 does	 not	 mean,	 however,	 that	 they	
																																																						
93	 Richard	 A.	 Muller,	 “Not	 Scotist:	 Understandings	 of	 Being,	 Univocity,	 and	 Analogy	 in	 Early	 Modern	
Reformed	Thought,”	Reformation	and	Renaissance	Review	14,	no.	2	(2012):	127–50.	
94	Ibid.,	146.	
95	Ibid.,	139.	
96	Ibid.	
97	 ““Surtout,	 chez	 lui	 [Scot],	 la	 metaphysica	 transcendens	 est	 devenue	 une	 démarche	 antérieure	 et	
nécessaire	 à	 la	metaphysica	 specialis,	 c’est-à-dire	 que	 l’ontologie	 est	 une	 condition	 de	 possibilité	 de	 la	
théologie	transcendantale.	Cette	articulation	restera	la	structure	porteuse	de	l’histoire	de	la	métaphysique,	
de	Suarez	à	Kant.”	(Boulnois,	Métaphysiques	rebelles,	310.)	
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necessarily	 inhabited	 a	 metaphysics	 of	 participation.	 Quite	 to	 the	 contrary,	 their	
distinction	between	a	general	and	a	special	metaphysics	 indicates	 that	 they	were	very	
much	part	of	a	tradition	which	began	with	Scotus	and	culminated	in	Kant.		
All	of	 this	goes	 to	show	that	even	when	studying	explicitly	metaphysical	 tracts,	
what	is	implicit	in	them	is	at	least	as	important	as	what	they	explicitly	say.	I	am	therefore	
convinced	that	in	order	to	do	justice	to	the	question	of	what	metaphysics	a	person	holds,	
one	must	cast	the	net	wider	than	a	consideration	of	only	explicitly	metaphysical	treatises,	
and	enquire	into	the	metaphysics	implied	in	their	thought.	This	also	makes	it	possible	to	
investigate	the	metaphysical	framework	of	thinkers	who	did	not	leave	behind	explicitly	
metaphysical	 treatises,	 such	 as	 Peter	 Martyr	 Vermigli.	 However,	 before	 starting	 our	
exegesis,	it	will	be	useful	to	touch	briefly	on	who	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli	was,	on	what	and	
how	 he	 wrote.	 To	 this	 task	 I	 now	 turn,	 leaving	 a	 review	 of	 secondary	 literature	 on	
Vermigli’s	theology	for	the	relevant	chapters	of	the	main	body	of	this	study	below.	
	
3)	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli:	Life	and	Work	
Much	 is	 known	 about	 Vermigli’s	 life,	 not	 least	 because	 of	 the	 work	 of	 Josiah	 Simler,	
Vermigli’s	successor	as	professor	of	Old	Testament	in	Zurich.	Simler	gave	the	eulogy	at	
Vermigli’s	funeral	and	later	expanded	and	published	it.98	More	recently,	Philip	McNair	has	
researched	the	 first	 forty-two	years	of	Vermigli’s	 life	 in	great	detail,	mostly	confirming	
Simler’s	 account.99	What	 follows	 is	 based	 on	 these	 two	 sources,	 as	 well	 as	 on	 other	
biographical	research	on	Vermigli’s	life.100	
																																																						
98	 Josiah	 Simler,	Oratio	 de	 vita	 et	 obitu	 viri	 optimi,	 praestantissimi	 Theologi	 D.	 Petri	 Martyris	 Vermilii,	
Sacrarum	literarum	in	Schola	Tigurina	Professoris	(Zurich:	Froschauer,	1563).	For	a	modern	translation,	see	
Peter	Martyr	Vermigli,	Life,	Letters,	and	Sermons,	trans.	John	Patrick	Donnelly,	The	Peter	Martyr	Library	5	
(Kirksville	MO:	Sixteenth	Century	Journal	Publishers,	1999),	9–62.	
99	McNair,	Peter	Martyr	in	Italy:	Anatomy	of	Apostasy.	
100	Marvin	W.	Anderson,	Peter	Martyr,	A	Reformer	in	Exile	(1542-1562):	A	Chronology	of	Biblical	Writings	in	
England	and	Europe	(Nieuwkoop:	De	Graaf,	1975);	W.	J.	Torrance	Kirby,	The	Zurich	Connection	and	Tudor	
Political	 Theology	 (Leiden:	 Brill,	 2007),	 12–21;	 Joseph	 C.	 McLelland,	 “Italy:	 Religious	 and	 Intellectual	
Ferment,”	in	A	Companion	to	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli,	ed.	W.	J.	Torrance	Kirby,	Emidio	Campi,	and	Frank	A.	
James	(Leiden/Boston:	Brill,	2009),	25–33;	R.	Gerald	Hobbs,	“Strasbourg:	Vermigli	and	the	Senior	School,”	
in	A	 Companion	 to	 Peter	Martyr	 Vermigli,	 ed.	W.	 J.	 Torrance	 Kirby,	 Emidio	 Campi,	 and	 Frank	 A.	 James	
(Leiden/Boston:	Brill,	2009),	35–69;	Charlotte	Methuen,	“Oxford:	Reading	Scripture	in	the	University,”	in	A	
Companion	 to	 Peter	 Martyr	 Vermigli,	 ed.	 W.	 J.	 Torrance	 Kirby,	 Emidio	 Campi,	 and	 Frank	 A.	 James	
(Leiden/Boston:	 Brill,	 2009),	 71–93;	 Emidio	 Campi,	 “Zurich:	 Professor	 in	 the	 Schola	 Tigurina,”	 in	 A	
Companion	 to	 Peter	 Martyr	 Vermigli,	 ed.	 W.	 J.	 Torrance	 Kirby,	 Emidio	 Campi,	 and	 Frank	 A.	 James	
(Leiden/Boston:	 Brill,	 2009),	 95–114.	 On	 Vermigli’s	 last	 years	 in	 Zurich,	 Baumann’s	 work	 is	 moreover	
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Vermigli	was	born	8	September	1499	into	the	senatorial	aristocracy	of	Florence.	
Given	that	his	birthday	coincides	with	the	Feast	of	the	Birth	of	the	Virgin	Mary,	he	was	
called	Piero	Mariano.	His	mother	taught	him	Latin	from	an	early	age,	and	at	age	15,	the	
young	Vermigli	was	sent	a	short	distance	up	the	hill	 from	his	home	to	the	Augustinian	
canons	of	Fiesole.	Four	years	later,	he	took	his	vows	in	the	same	order,	choosing	the	name	
Pietro	Martire	after	Saint	Peter	Martyr	of	Verona,	who	was	allegedly	killed	defending	the	
orthodox	 faith	 against	Manicheans	 in	 1252.	 Soon	 after,	 he	 went	 to	 the	 University	 of	
Padua,	where	he	was	immersed	in	studies	of	Greek	and	the	liberal	arts.	Around	1525	he	
was	ordained	to	the	priesthood,	before	being	elected	a	public	preacher	of	the	Lateran	
Congregation.	 This	 led	 him	 to	 travel	 all	 over	 Italy.	 Being	 required	 to	 preach	 on	 the	
scriptures	of	both	Testaments,	 he	 applied	himself	 to	 the	 study	of	Hebrew,	 aided	by	 a	
Jewish	physician.	In	1530,	he	was	appointed	Deputy	Prior	of	his	order	of	S.	Giovanni	in	
Monte	 in	 Bologna.	 Three	 years	 later,	 he	was	 promoted	 to	 become	 Abbot	 of	 Spoleto,	
before	being	transferred	to	be	Prior	of	the	College	of	S.	Pietro	ad	Aram	in	Naples	in	1537.	
In	Naples,	he	met	the	Spanish	mystic	Juan	de	Valdés,	and	it	was	there	that	he	also	began	
reading	works	by	Martin	Bucer,	Huldrych	Zwingli,	and	Desiderius	Erasmus.	In	1541,	he	was	
named	prior	of	the	monastery	of	San	Frediano	in	Lucca.		
However,	 in	1542,	accusations	of	heresy	were	 levelled	directly	against	Vermigli	
from	Rome.	His	situation	became	so	untenable	that	left	Italy	in	the	same	year.	His	first	
stop	was	Zurich,	where	Heinrich	Bullinger	 received	 the	 refugee	warmly,	but	 could	not	
offer	him	a	position.	Shortly	thereafter,	Martin	Bucer	invited	him	to	become	professor	of	
Hebrew	at	Strasbourg.	Over	the	next	five	years	of	his	stay	at	Strasbourg,	he	lectured	on	
the	Twelve	Minor	Prophets,	Genesis,	Exodus,	much	of	Leviticus	and	Lamentations.	Based	
on	 these	 lectures,	 he	 later	 published	 commentaries	 to	 the	 books	 of	 Genesis	 and	
Lamentations.		
In	Strasbourg	Vermigli	moreover	met	Catherine	Dammartin,	a	 former	nun	from	
Metz.	 Following	 the	 example	 of	 Luther	 and	 Martin	 Bucer,	 he	 took	 the	 position	 that	
marriage	was	an	honourable	position	for	a	priest,	and	the	two	got	married.	After	five	years	
as	professor	at	Strasbourg,	Vermigli’s	reputation	as	a	teacher	and	leading	theologian	of	
																																																						
excellent:	Michael	Baumann,	“Petrus	Martyr	Vermigli	in	Zürich	(1556-1662):	Dieser	Kylchen	in	der	heiligen	
gschrifft	professor	und	laeser”	(PhD	thesis,	University	of	Zurich,	2010).	
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the	 reform	had	grown	 to	 such	an	extent	 that	both	he	and	his	host	Bucer	were	 jointly	
invited	by	King	Edward	VI	through	the	offices	of	Archbishop	Thomas	Cranmer	to	take	up	
senior	 positions	 at	 Oxford	 and	 Cambridge	 respectively.	 Both	 were	 appointed	 to	 the	
prestigious	Regius	chairs	in	Divinity.	
Once	 installed	 in	Oxford	 in	early	1548,	Vermigli	began	 to	 lecture	on	Paul’s	 first	
letter	to	the	Corinthians,	and	soon	became	embroiled	in	a	bitter	dispute	over	the	doctrine	
of	the	Eucharist.	His	initial	opponent	was	the	conservative	Richard	Smith,	who	had	been	
sacked	from	the	Regius	chair	to	make	way	for	Vermigli.	Smith,	however,	was	not	part	of	
the	 formal	debate	which	ensued.	The	so-called	Oxford	disputation	on	 the	Eucharist	of	
1549	became	an	event	of	national	 significance,	and	Vermigli	was	 formally	declared	 its	
winner.	He	continued	his	teaching	in	Oxford	by	lecturing	on	Romans,	from	which	would	
eventually	 ensue	his	Romans	 commentary.	Vermigli	 counselled	Cranmer	on	 important	
aspects	of	the	1552	Book	of	Common	Prayer,	and	was	also	made	part	of	the	working	group	
which	was	 to	 revise	 the	Canon	Law	of	England.	Together	with	 the	Oxford	disputation,	
these	are	perhaps	the	most	important	theological	contributions	Vermigli	made	during	his	
time	on	the	British	Isles.		
Vermigli’s	wife	 Catherine	 died	 after	 eight	 years	 of	marriage	 and	was	 buried	 in	
Oxford.	Her	 remains	 subsequently	 became	 subject	 of	 confessional	 animosities.	 During	
Mary’s	reign,	Cardinal	Pole	had	her	body	exhumed	and	cast	on	a	dung	heap.	After	1558,	
an	ecclesial	 commission	had	her	 remains	 reinterred	 in	 the	 same	grave	as	 the	 relics	of		
St.	Frithuswith	 in	Christ	Church	Cathedral,	 in	a	move	which	aimed	both	at	suppressing		
St.	Frithuswith’s	cult,	and	at	preventing	any	further	disturbance	of	Catherine’s	remains.	
To	this	day,	the	two	unlike	women	still	share	one	grave.	
At	 the	death	of	 Edward	VI,	Vermigli	 had	 to	 leave	 the	 country,	 and	 returned	 to	
teaching	in	Strasbourg	in	late	1553.	He	lectured	on	the	book	of	Judges	during	this	second	
stay	in	Strasbourg,	lectures	which	he	would	eventually	publish	a	year	before	his	death.	He	
equally	lectured	on	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics.	Moreover,	he	wrote	a	lengthy	reply	
on	Cranmer’s	behalf	 to	Stephen	Gardiner’s	attack	on	 the	Archbishop’s	Treatise	on	 the	
Lord’s	 Supper.	 But	 even	 within	 Strasbourg,	 there	 were	 now	 quarrels	 about	 how	 to	
understand	 the	 Eucharist,	 namely	 between	 the	 Lutheran	 established	 party	 and	 a	
Reformed	minority	–	the	side	of	which	Vermigli	took.	When	he	received	an	invitation	to	
teach	as	a	professor	of	Hebrew	at	the	Schola	Tigurina,	this	controversy	made	it	easy	for	
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Vermigli	to	accept.	He	arrived	in	Zurich	in	July	1556.	This	was	going	to	be	his	last	move,	
for	 even	 though	 he	 was	 invited	 by	 Calvin	 to	 take	 up	 an	 appointment	 at	 the	 Geneva	
Academy,	and	by	Elizabeth	I	to	return	to	his	Regius	Chair	at	Oxford,	he	declined.		
During	 these	 years	 in	 Zurich,	 he	 lectured	 on	 the	 books	 of	 Samuel	 and	 Kings	 –	
lectures	which	were	posthumously	published	as	commentaries.	He	also	married	a	second	
time:	 Catharina	 Merenda,	 a	 young	 Italian	 lady	 from	 a	 wealthy	 family	 who	 –	 being	 a	
Protestant	–	had	lived	in	the	Genevan	exile	before.	In	the	three	years	of	their	marriage,	
Catharina	bore	Vermigli	 three	 children,	 two	of	which	died	as	 infants.	 The	 third,	Maria	
Vermilia,	was	born	only	after	the	death	of	her	father,	and	was	Vermigli’s	only	surviving	
offspring.	
	Vermigli	 represented	 the	 Zurich	 church	 at	 the	 Colloquy	 of	 Poissy	 in	 1561,	
convoked	by	Catherine	de	Medici,	the	regent	of	France,	in	the	hope	of	bringing	about	a	
peaceful	resolution	to	the	religious	differences	 in	France.	 In	the	key	disputation	of	the	
Colloquy,	 once	 again	 concerning	 the	 Eucharist,	 Vermigli	 took	 the	 lead	 among	 the	
Protestant	 representatives.	 The	 Colloquy	 did	 not	 reach	 its	 intended	 result,	 and	 after	
returning	 to	 Zurich,	Vermigli’s	health	 started	 to	deteriorate.	He	died	on	12	November	
1562	and	was	buried	in	the	cloister	of	the	Grossmünster.	
The	most	 impressive	 index	of	Vermigli’s	 influence	as	a	 theological	writer	 is	 the	
wide	diffusion	of	his	books.	Donnelly	counted	that	in	the	hundred	years	after	Vermigli	left	
Italy,	there	were	about	110	separate	printings	of	his	writings.101	By	far	the	most	influential	
of	Vermigli’s	works	was	the	Loci	Communes,	which,	however,	he	did	not	directly	compose	
himself.	 The	 Loci	 Communes	 are	 a	 posthumously	 completed	 compilation	 of	 the	more	
systematic	passages	of	Vermigli’s	Biblical	commentaries,	so-called	scholia	or	 loci.	These	
scholia	are	the	most	striking	feature	of	Vermigli’s	biblical	commentaries.	Whenever	the	
biblical	text	raised	–	for	him	–	a	theological	or	ethical	subject,	he	would	digress	from	the	
verse-by-verse	exegesis	 into	a	scholium.	They	are	systematic	tracts,	some	of	which	are	
merely	a	paragraph	long,	while	others	develop	into	full	treatises	(such	as	the	treatises	on	
justification	and	predestination	in	the	Romans	commentary).	
Robert	 Masson	 (Robert	 le	 Maçon,	 1534/5–1611),	 the	 minister	 of	 the	 French	
congregation	in	London,	collected	the	scholia	from	all	of	Vermigli’s	biblical	commentaries	
																																																						
101	Donnelly,	Calvinism	and	Scholasticism	in	Vermigli’s	Doctrine	of	Man	and	Grace,	171.	
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and	some	of	his	more	polemical	works,	arranged	them,	and	published	them	as	the	Loci	
Communes.	He	took	Calvin’s	Institutes	as	a	model	for	his	compilation.102	The	first	edition	
of	the	influential	Loci	Communes	appeared	in	1576.103	In	the	fifty	years	following	the	first	
edition,	there	were	thirteen	more	printings	of	the	Loci	at	London,	Basel,	Zurich,	Geneva,	
and	 Heidelberg.	 The	 final	 printing	 came	 at	 Amsterdam	 in	 1656.104	 In	 his	 Epistola	
Nuncupatoria	of	the	first	edition	of	the	Loci,	Masson	writes	that	Vermigli	was	not	averse	
to	 the	 idea	 of	 gathering	 a	 commonplace	 book	 out	 of	 his	 commentaries	 when	 it	 was	
suggested	to	him	during	his	lifetime,	but	he	replied	that	he	might	do	it	when	he	got	the	
time.105	Vermigli’s	Loci	Communes	are	of	paramount	importance	for	understanding	the	
history	of	his	influence.106	Given	that	he	did	not	compose	this	work	himself,	however,	in	
what	follows,	I	will	refer	to	the	scholia	in	their	context	of	the	biblical	commentaries,	rather	
than	citing	the	Loci	Communes.		
As	Donnelly	rightly	observes,	the	scholia	in	Vermigli’s	commentaries	represent	a	
desire	 for	 systematic	 development	 that	 was	 impossible	 in	 his	 usual	 line-by-line	
exegesis.107	Like	Luther,	Vermigli	thought	that	the	text	of	the	Scriptures	should	replace	
Lombard’s	Sentences	or	the	various	Summae	as	the	prime	source	from	which	theology	
should	 be	 taught.	 Yet,	 as	Donnelly	 puts	 it,	 Vermigli’s	 “introduction	 of	 the	 scholia,	 the	
massive	interjection	of	systematic	theological	tracts	into	the	exegesis	of	the	biblical	text,	
																																																						
102	Christoph	Strohm	has	analysed	 the	 similarities	 in	great	detail.	 See	Christoph	Strohm,	 “Petrus	Martyr	
Vermiglis	Loci	Communes	und	Calvins	Institutio	Christianae	Religionis,”	in	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli:	Humanism,	
Republicanism,	Reformation,	ed.	Emidio	Campi	(Genève:	Droz,	2002),	77–104.	The	argument	has	been	made	
that	Calvin’s	 Institutes	 themselves	are	a	compilation	of	 theological	 loci	and	disputationes,	which	goes	to	
show	the	prevalence	of	this	form,	cf.	Elsie	Anne	McKee	and	Brian	G.	Armstrong,	“Exegesis,	Theology,	and	
Development	 in	 Calvin’s	 Institutio:	 A	 Methodological	 Suggestion,”	 in	 Probing	 the	 Reformed	 Tradition:	
Historical	Studies	in	Honor	of	Edward	A.	Dowey	(Louisville,	Ky:	Westminster/John	Knox	Press,	1989),	154–
72.	
103	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli,	Loci	Communes	(London:	John	Kingston,	1576).	
104	Donnelly,	Calvinism	and	Scholasticism	in	Vermigli’s	Doctrine	of	Man	and	Grace,	172.	
105	 “Sic	 enim	ab	 Ioanne	Gravella,	 vire	 integerrimo,	 fidelissimo	Ecclesiae	Dei	 pastore,	 et	mihi	 amicissimo	
homine,	accepi:	quo	tempore	D.	P.	Martyris	domesticus,	una	cum	aliis	multis	eius	consuetudine	et	colloquiis	
frueretur,	ab	illo	quaesitum	aliquando	fuisse,	quare	locos	communes	uno	volumine	collectos,	edendos	non	
curaret:	hoc	enim	Ecclesiae	Dei	fore	utilius,	et	a	piis	quibusque	magnopere	desiderari.	Tum	iis	quae	dicta	
fuerant	annuisse,	idque	si	per	otium	liceret,	se	aliquando	facturum	recipisse.”	(Vermigli,	Loci	Communes,	
epistola	nuncupatoria,	sine	pagina.)	
106	Cf.	 Joseph	C.	McLelland,	“A	Literary	History	of	the	Loci	Communes,”	 in	A	Companion	to	Peter	Martyr	
Vermigli,	ed.	W.	J.	Torrance	Kirby,	Emidio	Campi,	and	Frank	A.	James	(Leiden/Boston:	Brill,	2009),	479–94;	
Donnelly,	Calvinism	and	Scholasticism	 in	Vermigli’s	Doctrine	of	Man	and	Grace,	esp.	chapter	seven	“The	
Influence	of	Martyr’s	Thought.”	
107	Donnelly,	Calvinism	and	Scholasticism	in	Vermigli’s	Doctrine	of	Man	and	Grace,	60.	
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was	basically	 subversive	of	Luther’s	program	for	 theological	education.”108	 Indeed,	 the	
scholia	essentially	amount	to	“an	implicit	confession	that	the	theological	process	must	go	
beyond	 an	 exposition	 of	 the	 Bible	 text.”109	 They	 manifest	 both	 Vermigli’s	 desire	 for	
systematic	exposition	of	theological	questions	raised	by	the	text	of	the	Scriptures,	and	his	
wish	 to	 give	 his	 lectures	 greater	 relevance	 to	 the	 ministerial	 students	 before	 him.	
Especially	 in	 the	 case	 of	 his	Old	 Testament	 commentaries,	 this	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 case.	
There,	 he	 frequently	 addresses	 theological,	 ethical,	 or	 pastoral	 questions,	which	 arise	
from	the	Old	Testament	narratives.	A	good	example	for	all	three	of	these	categories	 is	
found	in	the	second	book	of	Samuel,	when	David’s	son	Absalom	publicly	sleeps	with	his	
father’s	wives	(2	Sam	16:22).	Here,	Vermigli	raises	the	fundamental	question	whether	God	
can	be	said	the	author	of	this	sin.	For	not	only	had	David	been	cursed	in	the	name	of	the	
Lord	just	before	this	incidence	(2	Sam	16:5-12)	and	recognised	that	the	curse	came	from	
God	(2	Sam	16:10);	the	prophet	Nathan	had	also	predicted	the	debasement	of	David’s	
wives,	stating	that	it	was	the	Lord’s	will	as	a	punishment	for	Uriah’s	murder	(2	Sam	12:11).	
All	this	leads	Vermigli	to	a	lengthy	excursus	about	the	origin	of	sin,	and	whether	God	is	
causally	implied	in	it	(we	will	return	to	this	scholium	in	chapter	one).		
Having	 introduced	 Peter	 Martyr	 Vermigli,	 and	 the	 method	 and	 scope	 of	 this	
dissertation,	let	us	now	turn	to	our	examination	of	the	metaphysical	structures	implied	in	
his	work.	We	shall	begin	by	focussing	on	Vermigli’s	view	of	the	interplay	between	Divine	
and	human	agency.	
																																																						
108	Ibid.,	63.	
109	Ibid.,	64.	
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Chapter	 One:	 Divine	 and	 Human	 Agency	 and	 the	 Workings	 of	
Causality	
	
The	subject	matter	of	this	chapter	 is	the	way	in	which	Vermigli	envisages	the	interplay	
between	 Divine	 and	 human	 causality,	 and	 the	 metaphysical	 implications	 which	 this	
carries.	As	seen	in	the	introduction,	this	topic	is	pertinent	to	the	various	ways	in	which	
God’s	influence	in	the	world	can	be	envisaged.	However,	because	Vermigli	never	reflected	
on	this	issue	in	the	abstract	or	in	a	single	treatise,	I	will	not	start	out	from	a	clearly	defined	
set	of	 texts	of	his	oeuvre	–	 in	contrast	 to	the	three	following	chapters.	 Instead,	 I	have	
chosen	to	focus	mainly	on	two	of	his	commentaries,	namely	on	the	books	of	Samuel,	and	
on	 Aristotle’s	 Nicomachean	 Ethics.1	 They	 both	 stem	 from	 lectures	 delivered	 late	 in	
Vermigli’s	life	(between	1553	and	1558).	From	the	Samuel	commentary,	we	will	focus	on	
two	 kinds	 of	 scholia:	 Vermigli’s	 reflections	 on	 providence,	 and	 his	 comments	 on	 the	
question	 of	 how	 God	 is	 –	 or	 rather,	 is	 not	 –	 implicated	 in	 sinful	 actions.	 Both	 these	
theological	 loci	 are	 pertinent	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 Vermigli	 believes	 God	 to	 work	 in	
creatures,	and	how	human	and	Divine	agency	relate.	The	Ethics	commentary	lends	itself	
to	our	 topic	because	of	 its	 characteristic	 comparisons	between	 “philosophy”	 and	 “the	
Scriptures”	in	which	Vermigli	is	explicit	about	the	way	he	believes	God	to	work	in	the	world	
and	in	human	beings.	Where	appropriate,	I	will	moreover	draw	on	scholia	from	Vermigli’s	
1-2	Kings	commentary	(dating	from	lectures	delivered	in	Zurich	between	1556	and	1558)2	
and	the	Romans	commentary,	which	Vermigli	finished	for	publication	in	the	same	period	
(it	was	first	printed	in	1558),	even	though	he	lectured	on	it	while	in	Oxford.3		
Vermigli’s	commentary	on	the	two	books	of	Samuel	was	published	posthumously,	
appearing	in	1564.	It	dates	from	lectures	which	he	delivered	between	his	arrival	in	Zurich	
in	mid-1556	and	mid-1558.4	The	first	and	the	last	of	 its	scholia	are	concerned	with	the	
																																																						
1	Pietro	Martire	Vermigli,	 In	duos	 libros	Samuelis	prophetae	qui	 vulgo	priores	 libri	Regum	appellantur	 ...	
commentarii	...	(Zurich:	Froschauer,	1564);	Pietro	Martire	Vermigli,	In	primum,	secundum,	et	initium	tertii	
libri	Ethiocorum	Aristotelis	ad	Nicomachum	...	commentarius	(Zurich:	Froschauer,	1563).	
2	 Pietro	Martire	 Vermigli,	Melachim,	 id	 est,	 Regum	 libri	 duo	 posteriores	 cum	 Commentariis	 (Zurich:	 Ch.	
Froschauer,	1566).	
3	 Pietro	Martire	Vermigli,	 In	 Epistolam	S.	 Pauli	 Ad	Romanos	 ...	 Commentarii	Doctissimi	 (Basel:	 P.	 Perna,	
1558).	
4	Baumann,	“Petrus	Martyr	Vermigli	in	Zürich	(1556-1662),”	178.	
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same	theme,	namely,	the	question	as	to	whether	God	is	the	author	of	sin.	This	is	hardly	a	
coincidence,	and	shows	how	central	this	topic	is	to	Vermigli’s	thinking	in	this	commentary.	
We	shall	see	how	this	question	arises	naturally	 from	his	thinking	on	God’s	providence,	
which	features	in	another	scholium	of	the	same	commentary.	These	scholia	will	in	turn	be	
the	topic	of	the	first	section	below.	
Vermigli’s	commentary	on	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics	originates	from	lectures	
he	held	during	his	second	stay	in	Strasbourg	(1553-1556).	After	the	second	chapter	of	the	
third	book,	Vermigli’s	commentary	ends,	due	to	his	relocation	to	Zurich.	In	all	probability,	
he	did	not	intend	for	these	lectures	to	be	published,	and	it	was	not	until	1563,	one	year	
after	 his	 death,	 that	 they	 were	 printed.5	 Vermigli’s	 former	 colleagues	 in	 Zurich	 had	
arranged	 for	 their	 publication,	 because	 they	 deemed	 the	 commentary	 –	 though	
unfinished	–	to	be	“an	almost	perfect	example	of	interpreting	philosophy.”6	Luca	Baschera	
has	dedicated	an	entire	monograph	to	this	commentary,	its	context	and	its	sources.7	We	
will	focus	on	selected	passages	from	this	commentary	in	the	second	section	below.	
We	 shall	 see	 that	 the	 relevant	 questions	 with	 regard	 to	 understanding	 the	
relationship	between	Divine	and	human	agency	converge	on	whether	God	acts	in	human	
beings	through	a	kind	of	synergy,	or	whether	He	works	alongside	human	beings.	More	
specifically,	is	God’s	influence	seen	as	ontological	in	character,	to	the	extent	that	God	as	
the	giver	of	existence	 is	present	with	 the	creature’s	actions	 insofar	as	 they	exist;	or	 is	
God’s	 influence	seen	as	concurring	with	human	actions,	 in	such	a	way	that	Divine	and	
human	agency	both	contribute	different	but	 seamless	elements	 to	 the	same	effect?	A	
variation	of	this	question	arises	in	noetics,	which	will	be	the	focus	of	section	three:	is	God’s	
work	in	human	acts	of	insight	to	be	understood	as	God	acting	in	human	understanding,	
																																																						
5	A	contemporary	edition	of	this	text	is	available:	Pietro	Martire	Vermigli,	Kommentar	zur	Nikomachischen	
Ethik	des	Aristoteles,	ed.	Luca	Baschera	and	Christian	Moser	(Leiden:	Brill,	2011).	I	will	refer	to	this	edition	
for	all	Latin	references.	For	the	benefit	of	the	reader,	I	will	equally	refer	to	the	following	English	translation:	
Pietro	Martire	Vermigli,	Commentary	on	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics,	ed.	Emidio	Campi	and	Joseph	C.	
McLelland	(Kirksville	MO:	Truman	State	University	Press,	2006).	
6	From	Giulio	Santerenziano’s	Praefatio:	“Addebant	haec	commentaria	imperfecta	praebere	nihilo	minus	
pene	perfectum	exemplar	 interpretandi	philosophiam.”	(Vermigli,	Kommentar	zur	Nikomachischen	Ethik,	
40.)	
7	Luca	Baschera,	Tugend	und	Rechtfertigung:	Peter	Martyr	Vermiglis	Kommentar	zur	Nikomachischen	Ethik	
im	Spannungsfeld	von	Philosophie	und	Theologie	(Zürich:	TVZ,	2008).	Similarly:	Luca	Baschera,	“Aristotle	and	
Scholasticism,”	in	A	Companion	to	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli,	ed.	W.	J.	Torrance	Kirby,	Emidio	Campi,	and	Frank	
A.	James	(Leiden/Boston:	Brill,	2009),	133–60.	
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enlightening	their	reason	from	within,	or	is	he	rather	thought	to	add	another	piece	to	the	
puzzle	of	insight,	hence	working	alongside	human	understanding?		
The	aim	of	this	chapter	is	to	demonstrate	that	there	are	crucial	tensions	in	the	way	
in	which	Vermigli	envisages	the	interplay	of	Divine	and	human	agency	and	the	workings	
of	 complex	 causalities.	 As	 we	 shall	 see,	 Vermigli’s	 notion	 of	 providence	 implies	 a	
relationship	between	God	and	creation	which	is	determined	ontologically,	and	is	based	
on	 a	 framework	 of	 metaphysical	 participation,	 according	 to	 which	 God	 works	 in	 his	
creatures.	This	unified	picture	is	broken,	however,	in	the	context	of	his	reflections	on	the	
effect	of	the	Fall,	such	as	for	instance	in	the	Ethics	commentary.	Here,	Vermigli	envisages	
a	two-tiered	model	of	Divine	agency	in	its	interplay	with	human	action	in	which	one	can	
distinguish	God’s	general	influence	from	his	special	influence.	When	taken	together,	both	
of	 these	 frameworks	 suggest,	 as	 I	 shall	 argue,	 that	 Vermigli	 inhabits	 two	 different	
metaphysical	frameworks.	
	
1)	Providence	and	God’s	Work	in	the	World	in	the	Samuel	Commentary	
1	Samuel	9	and	10	narrates	how	Samuel	anoints	Saul,	and	how	he	gives	him	a	series	of	
signs	which	will	be	fulfilled	before	he	is	made	king:	he	will	meet	two	men	near	Rachel’s	
tomb,	who	will	tell	him	about	lost	donkeys	(1	Sam	10:2),	before	meeting	three	men	at	the	
great	tree	of	Tabor	who	will	offer	him	two	loaves	of	bread	(1	Sam	10:3).	These	signs	are	
fulfilled	exactly,	and	this	leads	Vermigli	to	interject:	“since	these	events	are	said	to	be	so	
certain,	surely	we	can	see	that	even	the	smallest	works,	as	well	as	our	decisions,	depend	
on	the	providence	of	God	and	are	guided	and	arranged	by	him,	although	to	us	they	often	
seem	to	be	mere	chance.”	This	is	the	start	of	a	longer	scholium	on	God’s	providence.8		
First	of	all,	Vermigli	argues	that	there	is	such	a	providence.	His	main	reason	for	this	
is	that	God	is	“author	and	creator	of	all,	and	can	do	nothing	without	deliberation;	he	has	
his	own	certain	and	firm	reasons	in	himself.”9	If	any	artisan	has	a	plan	by	which	to	fashion	
																																																						
8	““Iam	vero,	quoniam	haec	ita	certo	dicuntur	eventura,	videre	possumus	omnia	etiam	minutissima	opera	
et	consilia	nostra	pendere	a	providential	Dei,	et	ab	eo	regi	et	ordinary,	quamvis	nobis	saepe	fortuita	esse	
videantur.”	(Vermigli,	Samuelis,	56r.	The	scholium	has	been	translated	in	volume	four	of	the	Peter	Martyr	
Library:	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli,	Philosophical	Works:	On	the	Relation	of	Philosophy	to	Theology,	trans.	Joseph	
C.	McLelland,	The	Peter	Martyr	Library	4	(Kirksville	MO:	Sixteenth	Century	Journal	Publishers,	1996),	182.)	
9	“Cum	Deus	sit	author	et	conditor	omnium	rerum,	nihil	autem	possit	temere	facere,	sed	suas	habeat	apud	
se	certas	et	constitutas	rationes.”	(Vermigli,	Samuelis,	56v;	Vermigli,	Philosophical	Works,	184.)	
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his	or	her	creation,	how	much	more	has	the	creator	of	everything	a	reason	for	what	and	
how	 he	 is	 creating,	 Vermigli	 argues.	 Indeed,	 “the	 heavenly	 spheres,	 the	 stars,	 the	
firmament,	air,	water,	heat,	 cold	–	so	many	 forms	and	changes	of	 things	contrary	and	
hostile	to	one	another	–	would	fall	in	ruins	unless	sustained	by	some	ruler.”10	Therefore,	
Vermigli	defines	providence	as	“the	power	or	faculty	of	God	by	which	he	directs	all	things	
and	brings	them	to	their	ends.”11	Providence	is	therefore	God’s	guidance	of	all	things	to	
their	proper	ends,	both	in	that	God	knows	these	ends,	and	in	that	he	has	the	power	to	
bring	them	about.	Indeed,	the	final	cause	of	providence	is,	for	Vermigli,	“that	everything	
may	attain	its	own	end	and	redound	to	the	glory	of	God.”12	Vermigli	insists	that	all	things	
are	subject	to	providence,	for	“if	God	has	made	all	things,	nothing	can	be	outside	of	his	
providence.”	 Indeed,	 if	 something	 “were	 outside	 his	 providence	 it	 would	 be	 outside	
creation,	too.”13	It	is	therefore	the	doctrine	of	creation	which	leads	Vermigli	to	stress	the	
unity	of	God’s	providential	workings	in	the	world.		
Taking	one	step	back	from	this,	let	us	ask:	what	is	the	nature	of	God’s	agency	in	
the	world,	as	presupposed	by	Vermigli’s	doctrine	of	providence?	First,	 let	us	note	that	
God’s	 agency	 in	 the	world	 through	providence	 is	 all-encompassing.	Nothing	 is	 outside	
providence,	 for	Vermigli,	 precisely	 because	 there	 is	 nothing	 that	 is	 not	 created.	God’s	
governing	 providence	 applies	 undiscriminatingly	 to	 all	 of	God’s	 creation;	 there	 are	 no	
spheres	 to	 which	 it	 applies	 less	 intensely	 than	 to	 others.	 Secondly,	 this	 connection	
between	 creation	 and	 providence	 indicates	 that	 everything,	 by	 its	 very	 being,	 is	
dependent	on	God.	Put	differently,	this	means	that	there	is	an	ontological	dependence	of	
everything	on	God.	Both	 this	and	 the	all-encompassing	nature	of	providence	 indicates	
that	there	is	a	participatory	metaphysical	framework	at	work	here.	
This	is	moreover	confirmed	by	an	explicit	comment	Vermigli	makes	on	the	nature	
of	God’s	causality.	Vermigli	rejects	the	idea	that	“God	made	all	things	and	afterwards	cast	
																																																						
10	“Certe	coelestes	orbes,	sydera,	aether,	aer,	aqua,	calor,	frigus,	tot	vicissitudines	et	mutations	rerum	inter	
se	contrariarum	et	pugnantium,	nisi	ab	aliquot	 rectore	sustinerentur,	 ruerent.”	 (Vermigli,	Samuelis,	56v;	
Vermigli,	Philosophical	Works,	184.)	
11	“Est	enim	vis	seu	facultas	Dei,	qua	res	omnes	dirigit	et	adducit	ad	fines	suos.”	(Vermigli,	Samuelis,	56v;	
Vermigli,	Philosophical	Works,	185.)	
12	“Finalis	vero	causa	est,	ut	omnia	assequantur	fines	suos	et	cedant	in	gloriam	Dei.”	(Vermigli,	Samuelis,	
57r;	Vermigli,	Philosophical	Works,	186.)	
13	“Deus	omnia	condidit,	nihil	certe	ab	eius	providential	eximendum	est.	Nam	si	quid	ab	eius	providential	
eximeretur,	id	etiam	eximeretur	a	creatione.”	(Vermigli,	Samuelis,	57r;	Vermigli,	Philosophical	Works,	187.)	
Chapter	One:	Causality	
	 37	
them	aside.”14	He	equally	rejects	the	opinion	that	God	works	through	a	merely	“common”	
influence.	For	him,	this	would	seem	to	reduce	the	scope	of	God’s	governance.	The	passage	
is	worth	quoting	in	full:	
We	should	not	heed	those	who	say	that	while	it	is	true	that	God	rules	all	
things,	 it	 is	 nothing	 else	 but	 supplying	 that	 common	 influence	 which	
everything	draws	into	itself.	This	makes	God	the	ruler	and	governor	of	the	
universe	not	 in	reality	but	 in	name	only.	 If	everything	bends	and	applies	
that	common	influence	of	God	in	its	own	way,	then	God	follows	the	nature	
of	created	things.15	
The	 influxus	 communis,	 as	 Vermigli	 understands	 it,	 is	 God	 offering	 his	 direction	 to	 all	
things,	but	in	such	a	way	that	the	things	themselves	appropriate	it	in	their	own	way.	This,	
however,	is	not	enough	for	Vermigli.	He	is	not	willing	to	concede	that	God	has	only	this	
kind	of	influence,	as	he	believes	that	it	would	unduly	diminish	God’s	governance	of	his	
creation,	and	indeed	ascribe	too	much	to	creation.	(This	is	moreover	partly	why	Vermigli	
holds	such	a	strong	doctrine	of	predestination.	I	cannot	discuss	this	detail	in	the	present	
context.	Suffice	to	say	that	predestination	is	a	part	of	Vermigli’s	doctrine	of	providence,	
insofar	 as	 it	 touches	 salvation.16)	 Therefore,	 according	 to	 Vermigli’s	 doctrine	 of	
providence,	 God’s	 influence	must	 be	 envisaged	 as	more	 intimate	 than	 by	means	 of	 a	
general	 influence,	 which	 can	 be	 inflected	 and	 potentially	 overcome	 by	 the	 creatures	
receiving	it.	This	indicates	that	Vermigli	envisages	an	influence	of	God	that	is	stronger	than	
a	merely	 general	 one	 and	 that	 there	 are	 no	 pockets	 of	 reality	which	 are	 outside	 of	 a	
fundamental	dependence	on	him.		
More	detailed	reflections	on	the	interplay	of	Divine	and	human	causality	can	be	
found	in	the	Samuel	commentary	in	the	two	scholia	on	whether	God	is	the	author	of	sin.	
																																																						
14	“Quidam	somniant	Deum	omnia	quidam	condidisse	postea	vero	condita	reliquisse.”(Vermigli,	Samuelis,	
57r;	Vermigli,	Philosophical	Works,	186.)	
15	“Nec	audiendi	sunt,	qui	dicunt	Deum	omnia	quidem	regere,	verum	id	non	aliud	esse	quam	rebus	omnibus	
commune	influxum	suppeditare,	quem	res	singulae	ad	se	attrahant.	Hoc	enim	est,	Deum	non	re	ipsa,	sed	
tantum	nomine	orbis	rectorem	et	moderatorem	facere.	Nam	si	res	quaeque	pro	 ingenio	suo	 inflectat	et	
accommodet	 ad	 se	 commune	 illum	 influxum	 Dei,	 Deus	 squitur	 naturam	 rerum	 creatarum.”	 (Vermigli,	
Samuelis,	57r;	Vermigli,	Philosophical	Works,	186.)		
16	On	Vermigli’s	doctrine	of	predestination,	see	Pietro	Martire	Vermigli,	Predestination	and	 Justification:	
Two	 Theological	 Loci,	 ed.	 Frank	A.	 James	 (Kirksville	MO:	 Truman	 State	University	 Press,	 2003);	 Joachim	
Staedtke,	“Der	Zürcher	Prädestinationsstreit	von	1560,”	Zwingliana	9	(1949):	536–46;	James,	Peter	Martyr	
Vermigli	 and	 Predestination:	 The	 Augustinian	 Inheritance	 of	 an	 Italian	 Reformer;	 Luca	 Baschera,	
“Independent	Yet	Harmonious:	Some	Remarks	on	the	Relationship	between	the	Theology	of	Peter	Martyr	
Vermigli	(1499–1562)	and	John	Calvin,”	Church	History	and	Religious	Culture	91,	no.	1–2	(January	1,	2011):	
43–57. 
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This	question	 is	 intimately	 connected	 to	 the	doctrine	of	providence,	as	 it	 seems	 to	be	
raised	as	an	objection	against	it.	For	if	God’s	providence	governs	everything	in	the	way	we	
have	 just	 seen,	 then	does	 this	 not	mean	 that	 he	 also	 governs	 all	 sin?	Vermigli’s	 short	
answer	to	this	question	is	that	“God	is	not	by	himself	and	properly	the	cause	of	sin,”	but	
that	equally	“nothing	in	the	world	happens,	not	even	sins	themselves,	without	his	will	and	
choice	or	providence.”17	His	explication	of	this	thesis,	however,	is	intricate,	roundabout	
and	long-winded.	We	will,	in	what	follows,	focus	only	on	those	parts	of	it	which	are	most	
directly	concerned	with	the	interplay	between	Divine	and	human	agency	and	ask	what	
metaphysical	framework	they	imply.	
First	of	all,	Vermigli	distinguishes	between	God	as	the	first	cause	and	human	beings	
as	secondary	causes.	Vermigli	holds	that	God	is	“pure	act	(as	the	philosophers	say)	or	fire,	
as	it	is	said	in	the	scriptures”	and	that	he	therefore	“constantly	urges	everything,	moves	
and	arouses.”18	Whatever	happens	is	produced	not	only	by	inferior	or	secondary	causes,	
but	 also	 flows	 from	God,	 the	 first	 efficient	 cause.	 Still,	 God	 causes	 each	 object	 to	 act	
according	to	its	nature	and	preserves	the	integrity	of	secondary	causes:	“But	even	though	
the	motor	 of	 all	 things	 is	 in	God,	 nonetheless	 individuals	 are	moved	out	 of	 their	 own	
nature’s	principles.”19	This	distinction	serves	Vermigli	for	the	claim	that	God’s	moving	as	
the	first	mover	can	be	taken	up	differently:	when	God	causes	something	or	someone	good	
to	act,	they	move	with	a	good	act;	however,	when	the	nature	of	the	secondary	cause	is	
bad	or	depraved,	then	the	movement	that	God	prompts	leads	to	a	corrupt	act.	Crucially,	
however,	he	holds	that	“the	malice	of	[the	secondary	cause]	is	not	to	be	referred	to	the	
first	and	highest	cause,”	rather,	it	should	be	“applied	to	the	guilt	of	the	corruption	of	the	
principle	of	the	individual,	from	which	it	proceeds.”20	Whatever	evil	there	is	in	an	action,	
Vermigli	holds,	must	therefore	be	attributed	not	to	the	highest	cause	but	to	the	secondary	
causes	effecting	it.	Because	Vermigli	explicitly	holds	that	evil	is	a	privation,21	however,	this	
																																																						
17	“Deum	non	esse	per	se	et	proprie	causam	peccati	…	Nihil	in	mundo	fieri,	nec	etiam	peccata	ipsa,	praeter	
illius	voluntatem	et	arbitrium	seu	providentiam.”(Vermigli,	Samuelis,	277r.	The	longer	of	the	two	Samuel	
scholia	is	translated	in	volume	four	of	the	Peter	Martyr	Library,	cf.	Vermigli,	Philosophical	Works,	224.)	
18	 “Deum,	 cum	 sit	 (ut	 loquuntur	 philosophi)	 actus	 purus,	 vel	 ignis	 ut	 in	 sarcris	 literlis	 habetur	…	 omnia	
perpetuo	incitat,	movet	et	impellit.”	(Vermigli,	Samuelis,	20r.) 
19	“Sed	quamvis	motus	rerum	omnium	sit	a	Deo,	attamen	singula	etiam	ex	naturae	suae	principiis	movetur.	
“	(Ibid.)	
20	“Neque	ad	altissima	et	primam	causam	malitia	eius	motus	est	referenda,	verum	ad	singularia	principia	
corruptioni	obnoxia,	unde	profectus	est,	accommodabitur.”	(Ibid.) 
21	“Malum	est	privatio,	boni	inquam,	nec	boni	cuiusuis.”	(Ibid.,	276v.)	
Chapter	One:	Causality	
	 39	
does	 not	mean	 that	 secondary	 causes	 ‘introduce’	 anything	which	has	 an	 independent	
standing	outside	of	God’s	influence.	Rather,	they	somehow	insert	‘a	nothing’	into	those	
actions	which	are	evil.		
Nevertheless,	does	this	not	mean	that	God	still	works	seamlessly	with	the	work	of	
sinners?	 To	 this	 objection,	 Vermigli	 answers	 that	 the	 particular	 effect	 “comes	 quite	
differently	from	the	superior	good	cause	than	from	the	proximate	cause	which	is	corrupt.”	
Insofar	as	the	effect	is	“infected	by	the	depravity	of	the	devil	and	of	evil	men,”	it	is	evil.	
However,	 insofar	as	“God,	the	supreme	and	best	cause,	concurs	with	these	actions,	he	
does	them	with	righteousness	and	order.”22	Underlying	this	 is	Vermigli’s	view	of	 fallen	
human	 beings	 to	 which	 we	 will	 return	 in	 the	 next	 section.	 He	 believes	 that	 in	 their	
depravity,	human	beings	have	a	propensity	‘automatically’	to	do	the	wrong	thing,	unless	
God	 prevents	 them	 from	 sinning.23	 In	 short,	 Vermigli	 holds	 that	 God,	 as	 the	 superior	
cause,	remains	good	and	righteous,	even	if	the	corruption	of	the	secondary	cause	leads	
to	evil	acts.		
But	how	does	Vermigli	envisage	this	complex	interplay	between	the	two	causes?	
Does	he	conceive	of	a	competition	between	them,	such	that	the	secondary	cause	wins	
out	over	the	primary	cause?	It	does	not	seem	so,	for	Vermigli	goes	on	to	clarify	what	it	
means	that	an	act	is	brought	forth	by	two	sets	of	causes.	He	asks:	“When	we	say	that	the	
act	itself,	which	later	through	our	own	fault	is	evil,	is	produced	by	the	supreme	cause,	that	
is,	God,	and	by	us,	that	is,	our	will,	how	should	we	understand	it?	Is	it	completely	through	
God,	or	though	ourselves?	Is	partly	from	him	and	partly	from	us?”24	Vermigli	argues	that	
neither	the	human	will	to	action,	nor	God	can	be	said	to	be	full	or	whole	causes	of	the	
action:	
If	we	refer	the	whole	to	the	cause	so	that	we	understand	our	will	to	be	the	
entire	cause	of	the	action,	that	it	is	able	by	itself	to	work	without	God,	it	is	
not	 true.	 For	 unless	 God	 gives	 assent	 it	 cannot	 produce	 action.	 And	
																																																						
22	“Sed	longe	aliter	a	superiori	causa	bona	hoc	opus	proficiscitur	et	alia	ratione	a	proxima	causa	corrupta.	
Opus	hoc	u	test	diabolic,	et	malorum	hominum	malum	est.	Malitiam	trahit	a	pravitate	diaboli,	et	malorum	
hominum,	 qui	 cum	 sint	 arbores	malae,	 non	 possunt	 bonos	 fructus	 facere.	 Deus	 autem	 suprema	 causa	
optima,	ut	 concurrit	 ad	 istas	actiones,	eas	 recte	atque	ordine	 facit.”	 (Ibid.,	277v;	Vermigli,	Philosophical	
Works,	228.)	
23	In	this	sense,	Vermigli	holds	God	to	be	the	causa	removens	prohibens	of	evil.	Cf.	Donnelly,	Calvinism	and	
Scholasticism	in	Vermigli’s	Doctrine	of	Man	and	Grace,	119.	
24	“Sed	cum	dicimus	actum	ipsum,	qui	postea	vitio	nostro	malus	est,	a	causa	suprema	(id	est	Deo)	et	nobis	
(id	est	voluntate	nostra)	produci,	quomodo	id	accipiemus?	An	quod	Deus	totum	faciat,	et	nos	totum?	An	
quod	ille	partem,	et	nos	partem?	”(Vermigli,	Samuelis,	280v;	Vermigli,	Philosophical	Works,	240.)	
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although	God	by	his	absolute	power	could	perform	the	work	himself,	as	
the	course	of	things	stands	he	will	not	act	alone,	but	will	have	creatures	
work	with	him.	By	this	means	neither	the	will	nor	even	God	is	said	to	be	
the	whole	cause.25	
From	this	he	does	not	conclude,	however,	that	both	God	and	the	will	contribute	separate	
portions	to	the	action.	Rather,	they	are	“joined	together	in	action”	in	such	a	way	that	both	
of	them	are	the	“full	cause,”	each	cause	the	total	effect.	“Our	will	does	it	all,	and	God	does	
it	all,	but	one	is	the	first	cause	and	the	other	secondary.”26		
This	is	highly	relevant	for	our	present	subject,	as	it	indicates	that	the	way	Vermigli	
employs	the	distinction	between	first	and	secondary	causality	 is	not	such	that	the	two	
causalities	stand	in	competition	with	each	other	–	even	though	his	deliberations	about	
their	 respective	 involvements	 in	 evil	 actions	 that	we	 have	 seen	 above	might	 seem	 to	
purport	this.	By	contrast,	he	holds	that	each	of	them	are	full	causes,	and	not	in	such	a	way	
that	they	each	contribute	separate	elements	to	the	effect.	This	suggests,	moreover,	that	
Vermigli	envisages	Divine	causality	to	be	qualitatively	different	from	human	causality,	or,	
we	might	say,	for	the	two	to	be	ontologically	different.	This,	however,	implies	a	hierarchy	
of	causes	which	is	based	on	a	metaphysical	participation.		
However,	not	all	parts	of	Vermigli’s	oeuvre	display	such	a	unified	picture	of	God’s	
work	in	the	world.	As	we	shall	see	in	the	next	section,	Vermigli	implies	a	two-tiered	causal	
framework	 in	most	of	his	commentary	of	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics.	This	 is	to	say	
that	he	envisages	a	separation	between	God’s	general	and	his	special	 influence.	God’s	
general	influence	applies	to	those	who	stand	fully	under	the	effects	of	the	Fall,	whereas	
he	 gives	 a	 special	 and	more	 ‘intense’	 influence	 to	 those	who	 are	 regenerate	 through	
Christ.	
	
																																																						
25	“Si	totum	referamus	ad	causam,	ita	ut	intelligamus	voluntatem	nostrum	totam	causam	actionis	esse,	ut	
per	se	absque	Deo	possit	producere,	verum	non	est.	Quia	nisi	Deus	innueret,	non	posset	actionem	edere.	
Ita	Deus	etsi	absoluta	potentia	sua,	per	seipsum	opus	facere	posset,	tamen	ut	est	cursus	rerum,	non	vult	
solus	agere,	sed	vult	creaturam	coagentem	habere.	Hoc	pacto	nec	voluntas,	nec	Deus	dicuntur	tota	causa.”	
(Vermigli,	Samuelis,	280v;	Vermigli,	Philosophical	Works,	240.)	
26	“At	si	ad	effectum	ipsum	referantur,	Deus	et	voluntas	causa	sunt	plena.	Nam	Deus	et	voluntas	totum	
effectum	facit,	licet	coniugantur	in	actione.	…	Ita	est	de	voluntate	et	Deo:	ipsa	totum	facit	et	Deus	totum	
facit,	sed	una	causa	est	prima,	altera	secundaria.”	(Vermigli,	Samuelis,	280v;	Vermigli,	Philosophical	Works,	
240.)	
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2)	God’s	Work	and	the	Effects	of	the	Fall	in	the	Ethics	Commentary	
In	 his	 Commentary	 on	 the	 Nicomachean	 Ethics,	 Vermigli’s	 argumentative	 structure	
regularly	proceeds	as	follows:	he	first	quotes	a	passage	from	Aristotle,	then	clarifies	its	
terms,	before	analysing	its	arguments	and	noting	traditional	opinions	on	them.27	What	is	
more,	he	ends	each	of	these	sections	by	comparing	Aristotle	with	scripture.	This	is,	as	Luca	
Baschera	 and	 Christian	 Moser	 have	 shown,	 quite	 unique	 among	 early	 modern	
commentaries	of	the	Ethics.28		
In	 one	 of	 these	 theological	 assessments	 of	 Aristotle,	 where	 he	 deals	 with	 the	
Stagirite’s	understanding	of	virtue	 in	 its	relation	to	the	passions,	Vermigli	distinguishes	
between	two	different	ways	in	which	virtues	can	govern	the	passions.	The	first	is	the	“civil	
way,”	where	passions	are	brought	back	to	the	mean	through	moral	virtues.	These	virtues,	
Vermigli	 admits,	 “are	 sufficient	 if	we	consider	 the	present	 life.”	However,	 they	do	not	
suffice	“before	God	…	nor	does	civil	justice	suffice	before	his	judgment	seat.”29	Why	not?	
Vermigli	holds	that		
for	those	who	are	alienated	from	Christ,	moderate	passions,	whatever	their	
seemliness,	are	sins	-	not	indeed	by	their	nature,	but	by	virtue	of	our	inborn	
fault.	We	are	like	poisoned	jars	that	corrupt	the	wine	poured	into	them	no	
matter	how	good	it	may	be.30		
The	 metaphorical	 comparison	 of	 human	 beings	 and	 poisoned	 vessels	 is	 telling.	 The	
theological	background	for	this	is	Vermigli’s	belief	in	the	“corruption	and	ruin	caused	by	
original	 sin	 [originis	 peccatum],”	 which	 Vermigli	 finds	 affirmed	 in	 Paul’s	 letter	 to	 the	
Romans.31	In	his	commentary	on	Romans	5:12	(“sin	entered	the	world	through	one	man,	
and	death	through	sin”),	Vermigli	writes	that	original	sin	ought	to	be	distinguished	from	
																																																						
27	On	the	structure	of	the	commentary	and	its	various	levels	of	exegesis,	see	Luca	Baschera	and	Christian	
Moser,	“Einleitung,”	in	Kommentar	zur	Nikomachischen	Ethik	des	Aristoteles	(Leiden:	Brill,	2011),	15–19.	
28	Ibid.,	19.	
29	 “Superest	modo,	ut	 videamus,	quomodo	 ii	 affectus	 regi	atque	corrigi	possint.	Prima	via	 civilis	est	per	
morales	virtutes.	Illae	….	si	tantum	spectaremus	praesentem	vitam,	satis	essent,	at	revera	coram	Deo	non	
sunt	satis	neque	ad	eius	tribunal	ista	civilis	iustitia	sufficit.”	(Vermigli,	Kommentar	zur	Nikomachischen	Ethik,	
466;	Vermigli,	Commentary	on	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics,	319.)	
30	“Ideo	in	alienis	hominibus	a	Christo	ii	moderati	affectus,	utut	speciosi	fuerint,	peccata	sunt,	non	quidem	
sua	natura,	sed	nostro	nativo	vitio.	Sumus	enim	ut	infecta	dolia,	quae	vinum	quamvis	bonum	in	nos	infusum	
corrumpimus.”	 (Vermigli,	 Kommentar	 zur	 Nikomachischen	 Ethik,	 466–67;	 Vermigli,	 Commentary	 on	
Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics,	319.)	
31	 Vermigli,	 Kommentar	 zur	 Nikomachischen	 Ethik,	 418–19;	 Vermigli,	 Commentary	 on	 Aristotle’s	
Nicomachean	Ethics,	286.	
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concrete	sinful	actions.	The	latter	can	be	forgiven	in	Christ,	and	is	then	gone.32	By	contrast,	
the	“matter”	of	original	sin,	as	Vermigli	insists,	cannot	“pass	away.”	“For	every	one	of	us	
has	the	experience	in	themselves	that	the	corruption	of	nature	remains,	given	that	we	run	
headlong	continually	into	sin.	We	are	unapt	for	divine	things,	both	in	body	and	in	mind.”33	
Even	 though	 he	 affirms	 that	 the	 guilt	 which	 arises	 through	 original	 sin	 is	 forgiven	 in	
baptism	and	through	faith	in	Christ,	he	insists	that	“it	is	not	perfectly	true	that	original	sin	
is	abolished	 in	the	believers	and	 in	those	who	are	baptised”	for	“the	matter	of	sin	still	
remains”	afterwards.	Even	though	it	is	“broken	and	of	little	force”	in	the	godly,	Vermigli	
still	insists	that	they	will	not	perfectly	be	free	of	original	sin	before	they	die.34	If,	however,	
even	 those	 who	 are	 united	 with	 Christ	 are	 not	 entirely	 ‘pure’	 vessels	 (to	 remain	 in	
Vermigli’s	 metaphor),	 even	more	 so	 must	 those	 who	 are	 still	 in	 their	 fallen	 state	 be	
‘poisoned’.	 It	 is	 important	 to	note,	however,	 that	 the	metaphor	equally	 indicates	 that	
whatever	is	poured	into	fallen	human	beings	is	good	per	se,	like	the	wine	that	is	not	in	
itself	poisonous.	Rather,	its	goodness	is	destroyed	when	entering	the	corrupt	vessels.		
This	 is	 how	 Vermigli	 understands	 human	 reason	 and	 what	 he	 calls	 “human	
affections.”	They	are	in	themselves	good,	but	turn	bad	once	they	enter	the	human	soul.	
Considering	Aristotle’s	claim	that	“reason	always	invites	and	encourages	us	to	do	better	
things”	(NE	I,	13),	Vermigli	writes	that:	
We	accept	that	much	knowledge	of	honest	things	remains	in	the	human	
mind	 through	 the	 kindness	 of	 God.	 Hence	 we	 are	 able	 to	 concede	
synderesis,	which	 is	 simply	 the	preservation	of	 that	 knowledge.	We	will	
equally	 not	 exclude	 any	 honest	 storgas.	 Nevertheless,	 though	 they	 are	
good	things	by	nature,	they	are	still	sins	in	the	unregenerate.35		
																																																						
32	“Originale	autem	peccatum	eo	ab	illis	peccatis	distat,	quae	vocant	actualia	…	Quare	quuum	per	fidem,	et	
poenitentiam	 obligatio	 ad	 poenam,	 seu	 Dei	 offensa	 remittatur,	 facile	 concedemus,	 totum	 peccatum	
aboleri.“	(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	151.)	
33	“Sed	in	originali	peccato	est	alia	ratio.	Quia	materia	eius	non	transit.	Quisque	enim	nostrum	in	se	ipso	
experitur	naturae	corruptionem	esse	residuam:	quum	adhuc	quoque	in	peccata	perpetuo	ruamus.	Ad	reas	
autem	divinas	corpore	animoque	inepti	simus.“	(Ibid.)	
34	 “Reatus	 enim,	 et	 offensa	Dei	 per	 fidem	 in	Christum	 in	baptismo	 condonatur,	 quamvis	 adhuc	materia	
peccati	 supersit.	 Quae	 quamvis	 in	 hominibus	 sanctis	 fracta	 et	 debilitata	 sit,	 tamen	 perfectam	 eius	
expoliationem	non	nisi	in	morte	consequimur.“	(Ibid.)	
35	 “Damus	quidem	multas	adhuc	notitias	honestarum	rerum	Dei	beneficio	 in	mente	humana	conservari.	
Unde	ibi	possumus	in	hac	sententia	sunthrhsin concedere,	quae	non	sit	aliud	quam	istarum	notitiarum	
conservatio.	Neque	inde	aliquas	honestas	storgaj excludemus.	Quae	tamen,	ut	natura	suae	sint	bonae	
res,	 non	 regeneratis	 tamen	 sunt	 peccata.”	 (Vermigli,	 Kommentar	 zur	 Nikomachischen	 Ethik,	 417–18;	
Vermigli,	Commentary	on	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics,	285.)	
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The	 first	 thing	 to	note	here	 is	 Vermigli’s	 positive	 evaluation	of	 the	 capacity	 of	 human	
reason	 even	 in	 fallen	 human	 beings.	 He	 concedes	 that	 knowledge	 of	 honest	 things	
remains	 in	 the	 fallen	human	mind	and	hence	accepts	 the	 idea	of	synderesis,	 a	natural	
capacity	to	apprehend	the	first	principles	of	human	action.	All	these	things	are	good	by	
nature	[natura	suae	sint	bonae	res]	he	maintains.	It	is	the	effect	of	the	Fall	which	turns	
them	 into	 ‘sins’	 in	 the	 ‘unregenerate’.	Vermigli’s	argument	 is	 that	 reason	and	“honest	
things”	remain	good	by	nature,	but	that	they	are	somehow	robbed	of	their	strength	in	
those	 under	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 Fall:	 honest	 affections	 are	 “quite	 weak	 because	 [the	
unregenerate]	 are	 overwhelmed	 by	 wicked	 passions.”36	 As	 for	 reason,	 it	 may	 still	
encourage	these	people	“to	do	good	and	honest	things,”	yet	again	he	 insists	that	“the	
things	that	pagans	do	in	obedience	to	their	reason”	still	do	“not	cease	to	be	sins.”37	
Two	lines	of	argumentation	come	together	here:	on	the	one	hand,	reason	cannot	
be	good	in	the	‘unregenerate’,	for	Vermigli,	because	they	are	‘unapt’	for	godly	things.	Just	
as	he	explains	with	the	metaphor	of	the	poisoned	vessels,	he	believes	that	those	under	
the	effect	of	the	Fall	and	original	sin	will	necessarily	thwart	good	things	and	make	them	
bad.	On	the	other	hand,	Vermigli	is	keen	to	insist	that	human	beings	are	not	able	even	to	
contribute	 in	the	slightest	way	towards	their	own	salvation.	He	quotes	Jesus’	saying	 in	
John	15:5	that	without	God,	“you	can	do	nothing,”	which	sums	up	his	concern.38	It	is	the	
first	 of	 these	 two	 lines	 that	 is	 most	 interesting	 for	 our	 present	 consideration	 of	 the	
interplay	of	human	and	Divine	causality	–	 the	argument	about	God’s	good	wine	being	
poured	into	corrupt	and	corrupting	human	vessels.	What	does	this	imply	about	the	nature	
of	God’s	action	in	the	world?		
First,	it	implies	that	God’s	influence	on	those	who	are	under	the	effect	of	the	Fall	
is	merely	general	and	extrinsic.	Even	after	the	Fall,	God	still	offers	them	his	good	gifts,	but	
they	 can	only	 accept	 them	by	 thwarting	 them.	God	 therefore	 does	 not	 act	 directly	 in	
actions	 performed	 through	 the	 reason	 or	 affections	 of	 the	 ‘unregenerate’.	 The	 good	
reason	or	affection	which	God	offers	constitutes	only	one	element	of	a	‘compound’	action.	
																																																						
36	 “Illas	 in	 non	 regeneratis	 peccata	 ponimus	 et	 debiles	 admodum,	 ut	 qui	 a	 pravis	 affectibus	 vincantur.”	
(Vermigli,	Kommentar	zur	Nikomachischen	Ethik,	418;	Vermigli,	Commentary	on	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	
Ethics,	285.)	
37	“Ita	de	ratione	statuendum,	licet	ad	bona	et	honesta	interdum	hortetur,	attamen	non	…	peccata	non	sunt,	
quae	faciunt	ethnici,	dum	rationi	suae	obtemperant.”	(Vermigli,	Kommentar	zur	Nikomachischen	Ethik,	418;	
Vermigli,	Commentary	on	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics,	285–86.)	
38	Cf.	Vermigli,	Kommentar	zur	Nikomachischen	Ethik,	419.	
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The	other	element	of	it	is	the	‘poison’	contributed	by	human	beings.	Secondly,	the	fact	
that	human	vessels	are	not	always	corrupt	but	can	be	(at	least	partly)	cleansed	by	Christ,	
indicates	that	there	are	two	different	ways	in	which	God	works	in	human	beings,	and	that	
the	interplay	of	Divine	and	human	agency	works	differently	in	the	‘regenerate’.	To	remain	
within	 the	 metaphor,	 once	 the	 vessel	 of	 the	 human	 soul	 is	 no	 longer	 thought	 to	 be	
(entirely)	poisonous,	when	it	has	become	united	with	Christ,	God	works	in	it	differently	
than	he	did	before.	It	will	be	the	task	of	Chapter	Two	to	expound	Vermigli’s	theology	of	
grace	 and	 justification	 and	 to	 argue	more	 fully	 that	 his	 understanding	 of	 justification	
culminates	in	union	with	Christ;	and	that	he	conceives	of	this	union,	at	least	partly,	in	such	
terms	which	indicate	an	intrinsic	transformation	of	the	believer.	For	now,	let	us	note	that	
the	interplay	of	Divine	and	human	causality	is	governed	by	a	divide	between	the	way	God	
works	in	the	‘unregenerate’,	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	way	he	works	in	those	united	with	
Christ	on	the	other.		
This	can	be	seen	from	the	way	Vermigli	believes	God	to	work	in	and	through	the	
those	who	are	no	longer	under	the	full	effect	of	original	sin.	They	receive	God’s	special	
gifts	without	thwarting	them.	For	instance,	when	dealing	with	the	issue	of	virtue,	Vermigli	
insists	that	God	acts	in	and	through	their	godly	actions.	Pace	Aristotle,	he	holds	that	“God	
is	the	cause	that	impels	people	to	act	decently,	and	it	is	he	who	grants	that	those	who	are	
destined	 to	be	worthy	may	persevere	 in	 just	 actions.”39	 Those	who	are	 ‘destined’	will	
receive	God’s	 special	 influence	which	overcomes	 the	human	propensity	 to	 twist	God’s	
good	gifts.	This	means	that	their	actions	become	‘mixed’,	as	Vermigli	states,	such	as,	for	
instance,	the	decision	proverbially	to	bear	one’s	cross.	Outside	of	God’s	special	help	acting	
in	them,	no-one	would	do	this,	Vermigli	insists.40	This	does	not	amount	to	an	annihilation	
of	the	human	will,	Vermigli	argues,	despite	there	being	an	external	principle	at	work	in	
acts	like	these.	For	given	that	“our	wills,	changed	by	the	Spirit	of	God,	are	internal	to	us	
and	 by	 their	 command,	we	 are	moved	 to	 these	 actions,”	 actions	 of	 self-denial	 in	 the	
																																																						
39	“Neque	illud	recipimus,	virtutem	moralem	usu	atque	consuetudine	acquiri.	Deus	hic	praeteritur,	qui	est	
potissima	 et	 praecipua	 omnium	 virtutum	 causa	…	Deus	 enim	 causa	 est	 impellens	 ad	 honeste	 agendum	
idemque	largitur,	ut	perseverantia	probi	sunt	evasuri,	iustis	actionibus	insistant.”	(Ibid.,	434–35;	Vermigli,	
Commentary	on	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics,	296.)	
40	“Mixtae	sunt	hae	actiones,	quia	nemo	extra	casum	haex	eligeret	…	nisi	enim	Deus	in	nobis	ageret,	haec	
nullus	 nostrum	 faceret	 (Vermigli,	Kommentar	 zur	 Nikomachischen	 Ethik,	 577;	 Vermigli,	Commentary	 on	
Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics,	397.)	
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“regenerate”	are	truly	“mixed,”	as	“God	does	not	do	them	without	us.”41	Simon	Burton	
argues	therefore	that	for	Vermigli,	“in	the	sphere	of	special	grace	the	divine	and	human	
will	 can	 no	 longer	 be	 viewed	 as	 independent	 or	 semi-independent	 partial	 causes,	 but	
rather	the	divine	will	itself	moves	the	human	will	to	the	good	and	effects	its	operation.”42	
We	have	seen	so	far,	that	Vermigli	envisages	a	separation	between	God’s	general	
grace	which	can	be	thwarted,	on	the	one	hand,	and	God’s	special	grace,	which	works	in	
and	through	those	who	are	regenerate,	on	the	other	hand.	This	two-tiered	model	of	God’s	
influence	in	the	world	stands	in	contrast	to	the	unified	picture	we	have	seen	above	in	the	
Samuel	commentary.	There,	God’s	influence	in	the	world	is	characterised	ontologically,	
which,	as	we	have	seen,	points	to	an	implied	metaphysics	of	participation.	The	implied	
metaphysical	framework	of	the	Ethics	commentary,	as	we	have	seen	it	so	far,	stands	in	
tension	with	this.		
What	 are	 we	 to	 infer	 from	 this	 tension?	 Does	 it	 indicate	 different	 stages	 of	
Vermigli’s	thinking?	Or	does	it	flow	from	different	rhetorical	contexts?	The	latter	seems	
unlikely	 because	 both	 the	 Samuel	 commentary	 and	 the	 Ethics	 commentary	 were	
delivered	in	fairly	similar	settings,	to	an	audience	of	future	ministers.	As	for	whether	it	
represents	a	development	in	Vermigli’s	thinking,	I	will	argue	that	this	is	not	the	case	either,	
because	 there	 are	 elements	 in	 the	 Ethics	 commentary	 itself	 which	 imply	 the	 unified	
framework	which	we	have	seen	in	the	Samuel	commentary.	Let	us	focus	on	two	examples	
from	 Vermigli’s	 commentary	 on	 the	Nicomachean	 Ethics	 in	 particular,	 both	 of	 which	
assume	a	unified	metaphysical	framework	of	ontological	dependence	of	all	of	creation	on	
the	Creator.		
The	 first	 stems	 from	 Vermigli’s	 commentary	 on	 chapter	 6	 of	 the	 first	 book	 of	
Aristotle’s	Ethics,	where	the	Stagirite	critically	comments	on	Plato’s	theory	of	the	Forms.	
In	Vermigli’s	commentary,	this	sparks	off	a	lengthy	excursus	on	Plato.	“Plato	had	a	very	
clear	notion	of	God,”	Vermigli	postulates.	In	particular,	he	continues,	
Plato	knew	that	God	comprises	everything	and	at	the	same	time	exceeds	
everything	…	God	pervades	all	things	and	never	goes	outside	himself.	…	He	
																																																						
41	 “Fatemur	 principium,	 quo	 nostrae	 voluntates	 mutantur,	 extrinsecum	 esse.	 At	 nostrae	 voluntates	
immutatae	a	Spiritu	Dei	nobis	intrinsecae	sunt	et	illarum	iussu	ad	istas	actiones	movemur,	ideo	voluntariae	
dici	 debent.	 Non	 enim	 a	 Deo	 sine	 nobis	 fiunt.”	 (Vermigli,	 Kommentar	 zur	 Nikomachischen	 Ethik,	 577;	
Vermigli,	Commentary	on	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics,	397.)	
42	 Cf.	 Simon	 G.	 Burton,	 “Peter	 Martyr	 Vermigli	 on	 Grace	 and	 Free	 Choice:	 Thomist	 and	 Augustinian	
Perspectives,”	Reformation	and	Renaissance	Review	15,	no.	1	(2003):	37–52,	here	50.	
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produces	 everything	 and	 is	 prompted	 by	 no	 other	 reason	 than	 his	 own	
goodness.	…	And	all	things	not	only	owe	their	creation	to	God	but	also	tend	
toward	 him	 as	 to	 their	 ultimate	 goal.	 Therefore	 it	 is	 no	 wonder	 that	
everything	is	related	to	him,	since	the	perfection	of	all	things	depends	on	
him.	 Plato	 understood	 and	 explained	 in	 his	 writings	 very	 clearly	 those	
aspects	of	God’s	nature	that	 I	have	 just	 reviewed	as	well	as	many	other	
concepts.	The	same	concepts	are	contained	both	in	holy	scripture	and	in	
ancient	ecclesiastical	writers.43	
While	 this	 is	 not	 Vermigli’s	 own	 elaboration	 on	 the	 doctrine	 of	 God,	 but	 rather	 his	
theological	 reading	 of	 Plato,	 he	 clearly	 indicates	 that	 he	 approved	 of	 everything	 he	
ascribes	 to	 Plato	 in	 this	 regard,	 otherwise	 he	 would	 not	 have	 stated	 that	 Plato	
“understood	and	explained”	these	“aspects	of	God’s	nature”	“very	clearly.”	Remarkably,	
as	can	be	seen	from	the	 last	sentence	of	 the	above	quotation,	Vermigli	believed	all	of	
these	elements	of	Platonic	thought	to	be	biblical.	
Vermigli’s	main	interest	in	his	deliberations	on	the	nature	and	usefulness	of	the	
theory	of	Ideas	seems	to	be	that	the	concept	of	‘Ideas’,	as	used	by	Plato,	should	not	be	
misunderstood	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 blueprint	 of	 creation	 to	 which	 earthly	 artists	 could	 take	
recourse:	“From	among	the	fathers	of	our	religion	who	accepted	the	theory	of	Ideas,	as	
did	Augustine,	none	introduced	them	so	that	craftsmen	might	turn	to	them	and	learn	how	
to	perform	their	tasks,	but	rather	as	the	Ideas	toward	which	God	himself	looked	when	he	
formed	the	natures	of	different	things.”44	Vermigli	therefore	approves	of	Ideas	as	Divine	
Ideas,	insofar	as	they	are	not	an	‘add-on’	to	his	essence.	However,	if	the	divine	ideas	are	
“nothing	 other	 than	 the	 divine	 nature	 or	 essence”	 through	 which	 God	 understands	
himself	and	“through	which	his	creatures	imitate	him,”	then	Plato	cannot	be	accused	of	
																																																						
43	“Plato	de	Deo	utique	praeclarissima	cognovit.	…	Novit	adhaec	Plato	Deum	in	se	omnia	complecti,	sed	ita	
ut	omnia	identidem	excederet.	…	Omnia	penetrat	Deus	et	seipsum	nunquam	egreditur.	…	Produxit	omnia,	
non	alia	sane	causa	impulsus	quam	sua	ipsius	bonitate.	…	Nec	solum	omnia	creavit	Deus,	verum	in	ipsum	
omnia	tendunt	ut	in	extremam	finem.	Nec	mirum	si	ad	eum	omnia	referantur,	cum	ab	ipso	pendeat	omnium	
perfectio.	Haec,	quae	 recensui	et	alia	 complura	de	Deo	praeclarissime	 sensit	et	 scripsit.	Quae	partim	 in	
divinis	literis	habentur	expressa,	partim	vero	sunt	usurpata	ab	ecclesiasticis	scriptoribus	et	quidem	vetustis.”	
(Vermigli,	 Kommentar	 zur	 Nikomachischen	 Ethik,	 218–19;	 Vermigli,	 Commentary	 on	 Aristotle’s	
Nicomachean	Ethics,	136–37.)	
44	“Ex	patribus	nostrae	religionis,	qui	iudicarunt	ideas	concedendas,	ut	fecit	Augustinus,	illas	non	induxisse,	
ut	 artifices	 ad	 ipsas	 conversi	 docerentur,	 quomodo	 sua	 opificia	 essent	 facturi,	 sed	 ad	 quas	 Deus	 ipse	
respiciens	condiderit	 rerum	diversarum	naturam.”	 (Vermigli,	Kommentar	zur	Nikomachischen	Ethik,	265;	
Vermigli,	Commentary	on	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics,	172.)	
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error.45	Therefore,	Vermigli	holds	that	if	Plato	had	called	his	Ideas	“the	nature	and	essence	
of	God,”	any	of	Aristotle’s	accusations	against	him	“would	have	been	unfounded.”	Indeed,	
the	 sole	 “ground	on	which	he	deserves	 to	be	 criticised	 is	 that	 forms	are	distinct	 from	
things	and	that	he	failed	to	 identify	them	–	as	the	church	fathers	explain	–	with	God’s	
nature	and	essence.”46	
What	is	striking	about	the	doctrine	of	God	which	Vermigli	ascribes	to	Plato,	and	
which	 he	 believes	 to	 be	 biblical,	 is	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 it	 assumes	 an	 ontological	
dependence	of	all	of	creation	on	the	Creator,	without	mentioning	any	dichotomy	between	
before	and	after	regeneration.	“All	things”	were	created	by	God,	and	tend	toward	him	as	
their	 telos.	 “Everything”	 is	 related	 to	 God,	 and	 he	 is	 the	 pre-eminent	 source	 of	 the	
perfections	of	“all	things.”	This	repeated	emphasis	on	God’s	all-encompassing	work	in	the	
world,	regardless	of	the	Fall,	is	extraordinary,	especially	given	how	dominant	the	narrative	
of	the	Fall	has	been	in	what	we	have	seen	so	far.	Here,	only	one	mode	of	Divine	influence	
in	the	world	is	mentioned,	not	two.	Equally,	there	is	no	mention	of	a	‘sphere’	or	‘phase’	
of	 creation	 that	 has	 the	 capacity	 to	 twist	 God’s	 work	 as	 its	 efficient	 and	 final	 cause.	
Consequently,	all	of	the	foregoing	points	to	a	framework	of	metaphysical	participation,	
since	 if	God	 is	 the	source	of	all	perfections,	 then	 the	being	and	goodness	of	all	 things	
depend	on	their	participation	in	God’s	being	and	goodness.	So	we	find	that	in	this	context,	
Vermigli	does	not	conceive	of	a	sphere	of	creation	in	which	God’s	influence	is	less	intense	
or	direct	than	in	other	spheres.	
The	same	non-dualist	picture	of	God’s	influence	on	the	world	is	implied	in	the	first	
few	pages	of	Vermigli’s	commentary	on	the	Nicomachean	Ethics.	Here,	Vermigli	discusses	
desiring	the	Good,	and	the	nature	of	this	desire	in	all	things.	What	is	implied	by	the	fact	
that	all	things	desire	some	good,	he	holds,		
seems	 to	 be	 a	 sort	 of	 imitation	 of	 Almighty	 God,	 the	 generator	 of	 all	
creatures.	For	as	he	produced	each	individual	thing,	he	was	motivated	by	
some	good	end	as	is	said	in	the	book	of	Genesis:	‘God	saw	the	light	and	the	
																																																						
45	“Si	nil	aliud	sensit	ideas	esse	quam	Dei	naturam	seu	essentiam	ab	ipso	Deo	cognitam,	qua	illum	res	creatae	
imitentur	…	erroris	accusari	non	potest.”	(Vermigli,	Kommentar	zur	Nikomachischen	Ethik,	229;	Vermigli,	
Commentary	on	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics,	144.).	
46	 “Eas	 [ideas]	 vero	 si	 naturam	 aut	 essentiam	 Dei	 dixisset,	 iure	 reprehendi	 non	 posset,	 sed	 eo	 tantum	
traducitur,	quod	eas	disiunctas	a	rebus	affirmarit,	nec	plane	disserverit,	ut	christiani	patres	explicuerunt,	
eas	 idem	 atque	 naturam	et	 essentiam	Dei	 esse.”	 (Vermigli,	Kommentar	 zur	Nikomachischen	 Ethik,	 234;	
Vermigli,	Commentary	on	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics,	149.)	
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lights	of	the	heaven,	…and	that	they	were	good…’	Such	pursuit	of	goodness	
in	all	things	is	the	trace	and	mark	of	a	divine	quality.47		
Vermigli	maintains	that	all	things	tend	toward	some	good,	and	they	imitate	God	in	their	
very	 pursuit	 of	 and	 desire	 for	 goodness;	 if	 creatures	 strive	 towards	 some	 good,	 they	
display	 a	 “trace	 and	 mark	 of	 a	 divine	 quality.”	 That	 there	 is	 an	 analogy	 between	 a	
creaturely	desire	and	a	Divine	quality	is	based	on	the	fact	that	God	created	all	things.	It	is	
he,	the	creator,	who	ordained	the	desires	proper	to	each	creature:	a	“rational	desire”	in	
human	beings,	a	“beastly	desire”	in	animals	and	a	“natural	desire”	in	plants:		
God	 is	 the	 author	 and	 ruler	 of	 nature,	 for	 he	 is	 perfectly	 conscious	 of	
whatever	 ends	 he	 wishes	 all	 things	 to	 tend	 toward.	 When	 in	 his	 own	
consciousness	 he	 prescribed	 a	 given	 end,	 he	 added	 inclinations	 and	
properties	by	which	all	things	are	enticed	toward	their	own	proper	end.48	
Vermigli	holds	 that	because	God	 is	 the	creator	and	 ruler	of	all	 things,	he	has	 set	each	
creature	its	own	end,	and	has	given	them	the	appropriate	inclinations	to	reach	this	end.	
It	 is	worth	noting	that	Vermigli	sees	here	no	dichotomy	at	all	between	the	desires	and	
ends	of	things	which	are	under	the	full	effect	of	the	Fall,	and	others	which	are	not.		
From	 these	 two	 examples,	 we	 can	 conclude	 that	 the	 tension	 which	 we	 have	
observed	 between	 the	 workings	 of	 God’s	 influence	 on	 the	 world	 in	 the	 Samuel	
commentary	and	in	the	Ethics	commentary,	is	present	in	the	Ethics	commentary	by	itself.	
The	tension	concerns	the	fact	that	Vermigli	sometimes	conceives	of	God’s	influence	on	
the	world	 in	a	unified	way,	 implying	an	ontological	dependence	of	everything	on	God,	
while	at	other	 times	 implying	a	 two-tiered	model	of	God’s	 influence.	 In	 such	a	model,	
God’s	general	influence	is	distinguished	from	his	special	influence,	which	he	only	bestows	
on	those	who	are	regenerate.	As	we	will	argue	more	fully	in	the	last	section	below,	this	
tension	indicates	that	the	metaphysics	implicitly	sustaining	Vermigli’s	work	is	complex.	
	
																																																						
47	“Primum,	quod	omnia	bonum	expetant,	videtur	imitatio	quaedam	esse	Dei	Opt[imi]	Max[imi]	authoris	
creaturarum.	 Is	 enim,	 dum	 conderet	 singula	 quaeque,	 in	 bonum	 finem	 ferebatur,	 sicut	 libro	 Geneseos	
dicitur	Deum	vidisse	lucem,	luminaria	coeli	…	quod	essent	bona	…	Hoc	itaque	stadium	bonorum	in	omnibus	
rebus	vestigium	et	character	est	divinae	proprietatis.”	(Vermigli,	Kommentar	zur	Nikomachischen	Ethik,	72;	
Vermigli,	Commentary	on	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics,	26,	translation	adapted.)	
48	“Satis	est	Deum	naturae	authorem	atque	regem	illa	esse	praeditum;	nanque	optime	novit,	ad	quos	fines	
ista	velit	tendere,	atque	cum	finem	praescripserit	sua	noticia,	pondera	inclinationis	et	proprietates	adiecit,	
quibus	omnia	haec	ad	suos	fines	incitantur."	(Vermigli,	Kommentar	zur	Nikomachischen	Ethik,	66;	Vermigli,	
Commentary	on	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics,	22–23.)	
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3)	Knowing	the	Truth:	God’s	Work	in	Human	Minds	
So	 far,	 we	 have	 been	 focussing	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 God’s	 influence	 on	 his	 creation	 in	
Vermigli’s	 thought.	 This	 section	 will	 address	 a	 specific	 variation	 of	 this	 issue,	 namely	
human	insight,	and	especially	insight	that	surpasses	‘natural’	reason.	In	parallel	to	what	
we	have	seen	above,	the	fundamental	question	is	again	whether	God	acts	in	or	alongside	
human	minds.	If	God	works	in	human	beings,	leading	them	to	(higher)	understanding,	this	
is	an	indication	of	a	causal	framework	that	implies	an	ontological	hierarchy.	However,	if	
human	 beings	 are	 thought	 to	 gain	 higher	 insight	 through	 the	 infusion	 of	 a	 special	
supernatural	light,	which	is	“superadded	to	simple	general	influence	from	the	outside,”	
this	manifests	a	concurrence	causality	with	its	division	into	general	and	special	influence.	
In	this	latter	case,	furthermore,	the	influence	is	not	caused	by	God	in	an	immediate	way.	
Rather,	the	special	influence	is	mediated	by	a	supernatural	light,	which	is,	as	Schmutz	has	
observed,	“something	between	the	Godhead	and	the	human	capacity	to	understand.”49		
Again,	I	will	argue	that	there	is	a	fundamental	division	in	Vermigli’s	thought,	this	
time	between	insight	that	can	be	gained	by	reason	or	philosophy,	on	the	one	hand,	and	
insight	 relying	 on	 special	 revelation,	 especially	 through	 scripture,	 on	 the	 other	 hand.	
Nevertheless,	this	division	is	counterbalanced	by	a	strong	sense	that	all	truth	originates	in	
God	–	in	a	move	which	is	parallel	to	the	stress	on	creation	and	providence	seen	above.	
Once	more,	it	is	suggested	that	this	indicates	a	tension	in	the	causal	framework	sustaining	
Vermigli’s	theology.	
Let	us	begin	by	considering	a	scholium	 from	Vermigli’s	commentary	on	the	first	
and	second	book	of	Kings	which	originates,	like	his	Samuel	commentary,	from	his	lectures	
in	 Zurich	 between	mid-1556	 and	mid-1558.50	 This	 scholium,	 as	 Joseph	McLelland	 has	
pointed	 out,	 “deals	 explicitly	 with	 the	 relation	 between	 reason	 and	 revelation.”51	 Its	
subject	is	the	resurrection	of	the	dead,	and	in	particular	whether	there	will	be	a	new	union	
between	the	soul	and	the	body.	This	resurrection	of	the	body	as	professed	in	the	creeds	
“is	very	difficult	to	believe,”	Vermigli	admits,	“because	it	is	something	far	removed	from	
																																																						
49	Schmutz,	“La	doctrine	mediévale	des	causes	et	la	théologie	de	la	nature	pure	(XIIe-XVIIe	siècles),”	216;	
218.	My	translation.	
50	Vermigli,	Melachim,	214v–233r;	Vermigli,	Philosophical	Works,	47–131.	On	the	historical	background	of	
the	lectures,	see	Baumann,	“Petrus	Martyr	Vermigli	in	Zürich	(1556-1662)”,	esp.	178.	
51	In	“About	the	Translation”,	Vermigli,	Philosophical	Works,	34.	
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human	reason.”52	In	replying	to	the	question	whether	there	were	any	arguments	for	the	
resurrection	 of	 the	 body	 “which	 are	 natural	 and	 conclusive,”	 Vermigli	 concludes	 that	
“reasons	of	 that	kind	cannot	be	 found,”	 since	“the	 thing	 itself	 surpasses	 the	power	of	
nature.”53	Nevertheless,	Vermigli	gathers	many	arguments	why	the	resurrection	of	the	
body	is	still	“probable”	(but	not	conclusive)	when	“based	on	natural	reasoning.”54	These	
probable	arguments	are	moreover	“corroborated	by	 the	divine	writings”	 for	believers.	
They	can	therefore	nonetheless	employ	them	and	“find	comfort”	in	them,	especially	since	
the	 meticulously	 collected	 evidence	 from	 the	 Old	 and	 New	 Testaments	 serves	 to	
“confirm”	them	“with	the	word	of	God.”55	
Taking	a	step	back	from	the	main	argument,	what	does	the	resurrection	scholium	
tell	us	about	how	human	beings	acquire	insight,	and	about	God’s	influence	in	the	process?	
It	seems	clear	that	Vermigli	conceives	of	a	two	tier-system	noetic.	There	are	two	steps	
that	 lead	 to	 insight	 into	 the	 resurrection	 of	 the	 body,	 and	 they	 are	 not	 intrinsically	
connected.	First,	there	is	the	domain	of	rationes	naturales56	or	natural	reasoning,	thought	
of	as	neutral	and	accessible	to	everyone.	We	can	assume	that	Vermigli	would	affirm	that	
this	level	is	supported	by	God’s	general	sustaining	influence.	Secondly,	there	is	the	domain	
of	revelation.	It	builds	on	natural	reason	insofar	as	it	‘confirms’	and	‘corroborates’	what	
the	latter	had	already	ascertained.	Nevertheless,	it	is	not	as	if	God	is	thought	to	enlighten	
this	natural	reason	from	within.	The	strengthening	confirmation	does	not	come	from	a	
kind	of	 ‘higher	 reason’	 infused	 into	 the	 soul	by	God;	 rather,	 it	 is	 exclusively	mediated	
through	the	Scriptures,	thereby	coming	from	without.	The	Scriptures	as	the	word	of	God	
bear	the	brunt	–	if	not	all	–	of	this	revelatory	work.	They	mediate	between	God	and	human	
minds.	This	mediation	from	without,	as	well	as	the	sheer	division	of	the	process	of	insight	
into	 two	spheres,	 together	 indicate	 that,	underlying	and	sustaining	all	 this,	 there	 is	an	
																																																						
52	“Articulus	de	Resurrectione	carnis	difficillime	creditur,	quod	sit	res	ab	humana	ratione	 longe	remota.”	
(Vermigli,	Melachim,	214v;	Vermigli,	Philosophical	Works,	47.)	
53	“An	rationes	haberentur	de	resurrectione	mortuorum,	quae	naturales	essent	et	apodeiktikai,	hoc	pacto	
inquam,	 quandoquidem	 res	 ipsa	 totam	 vim	 naturae	 superat,	 rationes	 huius	 generis	 haberi	 non	
posse.”(Vermigli,	Melachim,	217r;	Vermigli,	Philosophical	Works,	58.)	
54	 “[N]aturalibus	 rationibus	 ...	 [sunt]	probabiles,	non	apodeicticae.”	 (Vermigli,	Melachim,	218v;	Vermigli,	
Philosophical	Works,	65.)	
55	“Fidelibus	autem	ratio	adducta	ex	divinis	literis	corroboratur,”	“Verum	fideles	eam	confirmando	ex	verbo	
Dei,	quo	animi	nostri	post	mortem	incorruptio	affirmatur,	et	unionis	eius	cum	corpore	facultas	libera	Deo	
conceditur,	illa	utuntur	et	sese	consolantur.”	(Vermigli,	Melachim,	217v;	Vermigli,	Philosophical	Works,	60–
61.)	
56	Cf.	Vermigli,	Melachim,	218v;	Vermigli,	Philosophical	Works,	65.	
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extrinsic	understanding	of	God’s	noetic	influence	on	human	understanding:	God	adds	his	
special	influence	to	aid	human	insight	in	some	cases,	but	he	does	not	act	in	and	through	
human	minds	in	general.		
Returning	 to	Vermigli’s	Aristotle	commentary	once	again,	an	examination	of	 its	
introduction	confirms	this	picture	–	at	least	initially.	The	reflection	here	is	more	abstract	
than	in	the	case	of	the	resurrection	locus;	it	concerns	the	very	notion	of	philosophy	and	
its	relationship	to	theology.	“All	our	knowledge	is	either	revealed	or	acquired,”	Vermigli	
writes.	“In	the	first	instance	it	is	theology,	in	the	other	philosophy.”57	Philosophy	should	
be	defined,	Vermigli	further	writes,	as		
a	 capacity	given	by	God	 to	human	minds,	developed	 through	effort	and	
exercise,	by	which	all	existing	things	are	perceived	as	surely	and	logically	as	
possible.	…	Clearly	God	is	the	author.	He	endowed	our	minds	with	light	and	
planted	the	seeds	from	which	the	principles	of	all	knowledge	arose.58		
The	categorical	distinction	between	acquired	and	revealed	knowledge	again	bespeaks	a	
causal	framework	in	which	God’s	influence	is	thought	to	work	either	generally	or	specially.	
In	the	above	quotation,	this	is	moreover	confirmed	by	the	fact	that	Vermigli	proceeds	on	
the	 assumption	 that	 philosophical	 knowledge	 is	 acquired	 independently	 of	 God’s	
immediate	 influence.	 Once	 he	 has	 bestowed	 the	 means	 for	 it,	 viz.	 the	 capacity	 for	
philosophising	 and	 the	 seeds	 of	 knowledge,	 God’s	 influence	 is	 no	 longer	 needed	 for	
acquiring	philosophical	knowledge.	The	kind	of	insight	that	can	be	attained	through	the	
practice	of	philosophy	appears	therefore	to	fall	entirely	within	the	sphere	of	God’s	general	
influence	on	human	minds.	
However,	a	few	pages	into	the	same	introduction,	Vermigli	is	more	ambiguous	in	
this	 regard.	 Indeed,	 as	we	 shall	 see,	 it	 is	 no	 longer	 entirely	 clear	whether	 knowledge	
acquired	by	philosophy	is	subject	to	God’s	influentia	generalis	only.	The	context	here	is	
Vermigli	addressing	the	saying	in	Colossians	2:8,	namely	that	Christians	ought	to	“beware	
lest	anyone	spoil	[them]	through	philosophy.”	Dispelling	any	of	his	students’	fears	about	
																																																						
57	“Omnis	nostra	noticia	vel	est	revelata	vel	acquisita:	in	primo	membro	theologia,	in	altero	philosophia.”	
(Vermigli,	Kommentar	 zur	 Nikomachischen	 Ethik,	 43;	 Vermigli,	Commentary	 on	 Aristotle’s	 Nicomachean	
Ethics,	7.)	
58	“Sed	videtur	definienda,	ut	sit	habitus	mentibus	humanis	a	Deo	concessus,	industria	et	exercitio	auctus,	
quo	comprehenduntur	omnia,	quae	sunt,	qua	certo	et	firma	ratione	comprehendi	possunt.	...	Deus	ponatur	
auctor:	is	enim	lucem	inservit	nostris	mentibus	et	semina	indidit,	quae	principia	sunt	omnium	scientiarum.”	
(Vermigli,	Kommentar	zur	Nikomachischen	Ethik,	43–44;	Vermigli,	Commentary	on	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	
Ethics,	7.)	
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the	potential	harmful	effects	of	the	lecture	series	he	was	about	to	embark	upon,	Vermigli	
holds:	
Since	true	philosophy	derives	from	the	knowledge	of	created	things,	and	
from	these	propositions	reaches	many	conclusions	about	the	justice	and	
righteousness	 that	 God	 implanted	 naturally	 in	 human	 minds,	 it	 cannot	
therefore	rightly	be	criticised:	for	 it	 is	the	work	of	God	and	could	not	be	
enjoyed	by	us	without	his	special	contribution.59	
What	 is	 remarkable	 about	 this	 quotation	 is	 that	 it	 combines	 a	 sense	 that	 philosophy	
proceeds	from	what	God	has	naturally	put	in	human	minds	–	assuming,	that	is,	no	special	
influence	of	God	beyond	his	initial	endowment	of	the	mind	with	the	necessary	capacities	
–	with	the	explicit	acknowledgement	that	philosophy	would	not	be	possible	without	God’s	
special	gift.	 Is	 it,	after	all,	 that	human	beings	reach	philosophical	 insights	due	to	God’s	
influentia	 specialis?	 If	 so,	 it	 would	 seem	 that	 philosophical	 insight	 is	 to	 some	 degree	
‘revealed’,	too.	
This	 means	 that	 Vermigli	 does	 not	 maintain	 throughout	 the	 hard	 boundary	
between	 revealed	 and	 acquired	 knowledge,	 which,	 as	 we	 have	 seen	 above,	 he	 had	
assumed	at	the	outset	of	the	introduction	to	the	Ethics.	Too	strong	is	his	concern	that	God	
is	the	author	of	all	truth	and	knowledge.	Another	example	where	this	concern	manifests	
itself	can	be	seen	in	Vermigli’s	commentary	on	Romans	1:19,	where	he	reflects	on	what	
can	be	known	of	God	from	creation.	In	this	context,	Vermigli	asks:	given	that	“all	truth	
comes	from	God”	–	something	he	never	questioned	for	a	second60	–	how	does	it	come	
from	God	to	human	beings?	His	preferred	answer	to	the	question	is	that		
God	has	planted prolepsis in	our	minds,	that	is,	anticipations	and	notions	
through	which	we	are	led	to	conceive	noble	and	exalted	opinions	about	the	
divine	 nature.	 These	 ideas	 of	 God	 naturally engrafted in	 us	 are	 daily	
confirmed	by	the	observation	of	created	things.61  
																																																						
59	“Vera	philosophia,	cum	ex	notitia	creaturam	colligatur	et	multa	concludat	ex	his	propositionibus	de	iustitia	
et	rectitudine,	quae	Deus	naturaliter	mentibus	hominum	inservit,	 iure	accusari	non	potest.	Est	enim	Dei	
opus	 et	 absque	 illius	 munere	 singulari	 ab	 hominibus	 haberi	 non	 potuit.”	 (Vermigli,	 Kommentar	 zur	
Nikomachischen	Ethik,	52;	Vermigli,	Commentary	on	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics,	13.)	
60	As	also	seen	for	 instance	 in	the	Ethics	commentary,	where	he	states:	“We	do	not	deny	the	sentiment	
hallowed	by	the	centuries,	which	says	that	any	truth	set	forth	by	an	author	proceeds	from	the	Holy	Spirit.”	
/	 “Non	 enim	 inficiamur	 sententiam	 illam	 vetustate	 tritissimam,	 qua	 dicitur	 a	 Spiritu	 sancto	 proficisci,	
quicquid	veri	ab	authore	cuiusque	modi	prolatum	fuerit.”	(Vermigli,	Kommentar	zur	Nikomachischen	Ethik,	
133–34;	Vermigli,	Commentary	on	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics,	71.)	
61	“Omne	verum	a	Deo	esse.	Non	enim	ex	nobis	nascitur.	Sed	quomodo	sit	a	Deo?	...	Deus	inserverit	animis	
nostris	prolhyeij,	hoc	est	anticipationes	et	informationes	per	quas	impellimur	ad	opinandum	praeclara	
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Vermigli	seems	to	refer	to	the	Stoic	doctrine	of	prolepsis,	but	his	main	focus	is	that	God	is	
the	author	of	anything	that	leads	human	beings	to	insight	into	higher	realities.	The	same	
is	 the	 case	 in	 the	 comparable	 expressions	 from	 the	Ethics	 commentary	we	have	 seen	
above	–	especially	 the	concept	of	 the	God-given	seeds	“which	are	 the	principles	of	all	
knowledge”	 and	 the	 “justice	 and	 righteousness	 that	 God	 planted	 naturally	 in	 human	
minds.”	As	their	creator	and	sustainer,	God	is	also	the	source	of	all	inchoate	or	potential	
knowledge	 in	 human	 beings,	 and	 this	 includes	 the	 knowledge	 of	 God	 himself.	 In	 the	
commentary	on	Romans	1:19,	Vermigli	explicitly	denounces	as	“proud	and	wicked”	those	
who	think	that	they	have	learned	truths	about	God	“from	Aristotle	or	from	Plato,	giving	
no	thanks	whatever	to	God	for	them.”	Even	though	these	philosophers	were	“agents	and	
instruments”	 of	 truth,	 whatever	 they	 say	 is	 ultimately	 given	 to	 them,	 Vermigli	 holds.	
Rather	than	its	“authors,”	they	are	“mediators	and	messengers”	of	the	truth,	comparable	
to	Moses	in	the	Old	Testament.62		
This	is	relevant	to	our	question	about	God’s	influence	in	philosophical	insight,	for	
it	again	abandons	the	strict	division	between	philosophical	or	acquired	knowledge,	on	the	
one	hand,	and	theological	or	revealed	knowledge,	on	the	other	hand,	and	replaces	it	with	
a	more	unified	model,	which	sees	God	as	the	source	of	all	knowledge	and	truth.	In	such	a	
model,	moreover,	God	does	not	necessarily	superimpose	his	influence	on	the	human	mind	
in	order	to	grant	it	greater	insight	into	supernatural	truths,	since	the	“anticipations”	or	
“seeds”	of	the	latter	are	already	given	to	the	mind	in	creation.	The	road	to	insight	into	
higher	truth	is	therefore	one	of	a	Divinely	aided	actualisation	of	what	is	already	granted.		
However,	there	is	one	crucial	demarcation	in	this	unified	model	where	God	is	the	
origin	of	all	truth,	whether	in	nuce	or	actualised.	Specifically,	it	is	the	division	between	the	
knowledge	of	the	faithful,	and	the	knowledge	any	neutral	observer	can	have:	
We	 should	 understand	 that	 knowledge	 of	 God	 is	 of	 two	 kinds.	 One	 is	
effectual,	by	which	we	are	so	changed	that	we	try	to	express	what	we	know	
																																																						
atque	 eximia	 de	 natura	 Dei.	 Atque	 haec	 notitiae	 de	 Deo	 nobis	 naturaliter	 insitae	 observatione	 rerum	
creatarum	in	dies	magis	ac	magis	confirmantur	et	expoliuntur.”	(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	29.)	
62	 “Inepte	nec	minus	 impie	 aliqui	 dicunt,	 has	 veritates	 ab	Aristotele	 aut	Platone	 se	didicisse,	 ita	ut	Deo	
nequanquam	propter	illas	gratias	agant.	Fuerunt	isti	quidem	organa	et	instrumenta,	non	tamen	authores.	
Isti	autem	perinde	dicunt,	ac	si	quis	Israelita	diceret,	se	veritates	legis	non	per	Deum	cognovisse,	sed	per	
Mosem.	Cum	is	mediator	tantum	fuerit	et	internuntius	Dei.”	(Ibid.)	
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in	works;	Scripture	ascribes	 this	knowledge	of	God	to	 the	 faithful	alone.	
The	other	is	frigid,	by	which	we	do	not	become	better	people.63	
Crucially,	the	difference	between	these	kinds	of	knowledge	does	not	lie	in	their	respective	
nature,	but	rather	in	their	‘effectivity’	–	whether	or	not	knowing	something	makes	a	real-
life	difference.	The	knowledge	of	God	that	can	be	had	in	faith	is	not	in	itself	fundamentally	
different	 from	other	kinds	of	knowledge	of	God.	For,	as	Vermigli	holds,	“truth	has	 the	
same	nature”	in	either	case.	Indeed,	the	fact	that	“the	truth	we	have	by	faith	is	stronger	
for	proceeding	to	action	than	the	truth	perceived	by	nature”	does	not	indicate	that	there	
are	two	different	truths.	Rather,	
the	difference	arises	 from	the	ways	and	means	by	which	 it	 is	perceived.	
Natural	strength	is	corrupt,	weakened	and	defiled	through	sin,	so	that	the	
truth	 which	 it	 grasps	 has	 no	 effect.	 But	 faith	 has	 joined	 with	 it	 the	
divine	inspiration	and	power	of	the	Holy	Spirit	so	that	it	apprehends	truth	
effectively.	Hence	the	difference	is	not	in	truth	itself,	but	in	the	means	by	
which	we	embrace	it.64	
What	is	noteworthy	about	this	quotation	is	that	it	affirms	that	human	beings	without	faith	
can	grasp	truth	by	their	creaturely	strength	–	even	 if	 it	“has	no	effect.”	This	 is	 in	 itself	
remarkable,	especially	given	that	this	strength	for	Vermigli	 is	debilitated	and	perverted	
through	sin,	as	we	have	seen	above.	In	contrast	to	the	poisoned-jars	motif	we	have	seen	
above,	it	is	not	that	the	‘wine’	of	truth	is	getting	poisoned	in	fallen	human	minds,	rather	
–	to	use	the	same	metaphor	–	that	this	wine	does	not	affect	them	when	they	drink	 it.	
What	Vermigli	circumvents	by	this	move	is	having	to	affirm	something	along	the	lines	of	
the	notoriously	problematic	notion	of	there	being	a	“double	truth,”65	all	while	maintaining	
–	 in	 good	 Augustinian	 fashion	 –	 that	 the	 Fall	 affects	 all	 aspects	 of	 human	 existence,	
including	the	ability	to	relate	to	truth.	
																																																						
63	“Postremo	sciendum,	duplicem	esse	Dei	notitiam:	unam	efficacem,	qua	immutamur,	ita,	ut	quae	novimus	
opere	 conemur	 exprimere,	 et	 hanc	 Dei	 notitiam	 solis	 piis	 scripturae	 sanctae	 concedunt.	 Alteram	 vero	
frigidam,	qua	nihilo	reddimur	meliores.”	(Ibid.,	30.)	
64	“Rogaveris	forsitan	qui	fiat,	ut	veritas	quam	habemus	ex	fide	fortior	sit	ad	erumpendum	in	actum	quam	
veritas	naturaliter	percepta?	Hoc	sane	minime	ex	eo	provenit	quod	una	veritas	per	 seipsam,	et	 seorsim	
accepta	fortior	sit	altera.	Eandem	utrobique	naturam	habet,	caeterum	discrimen	ex	medio	ac	instrumento	
provenit	 quo	 illa	 perciptur.	 Vires	 naturae	 corruptae	 sunt,	 infirmae	 ac	 vitiatae	 per	 peccatum.	 Ideoque	
veritatem	quam	apprehendunt	non	habent	efficacem.	At	fides	coniunctum	habet	divinum	afflatum	et	vim	
spiritus	sancti.	 Ideo	efficaciter	verum	apprehendit.	Diversitas	ergo	non	est	 in	 ipsa	veritate,	sed	 in	medio	
atque	instrumento	quo	illam	amplectimur.”	(Ibid.,	27.)	
65	On	 the	history	of	 the	notion	of	double	 truth,	 see	 Luca	Bianchi,	Pour	une	histoire	de	 la	double	 vérité,	
Conférences	Pierre	Abélard	(Paris:	J.	Vrin,	2008).	
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What	is	God’s	role	in	the	process	that	leads	human	beings	to	insight	into	the	truth?	
As	was	the	case	with	God’s	influence	on	or	in	human	actions,	we	find	again	that	there	is	
not	 one	 single	 metaphysical	 model	 that	 can	 accommodate	 Vermigli’s	 stance	 on	 this	
question.	Some	of	his	statements	assume	there	to	be	a	natural	reason,	on	the	one	hand,	
which	is	accessible	to	everyone	but	limited	in	its	reach	when	it	comes	to	divine	matters,	
and	special	revelations,	which	are	given	to	the	faithful	only,	on	the	other	hand.	This	two-
tier	model,	where	reason	and	revelation	 (and	philosophy	and	theology)	are	essentially	
disconnected,	 is	 however,	 implicitly	 challenged	 by	 other	 statements	 of	 his,	 which	
presuppose	 an	 inherent	 connection	 between	 all	 truth,	 and	 stress	 God	 as	 being	 its	
universal	origin.	The	coexistence	of	both	these	models,	is	indicative,	as	I	have	argued,	of	
a	non-unified	metaphysics.	Moreover,	one	strategy	by	which	Vermigli	attempted	to	hold	
all	 this	 together	 with	 reference	 to	 truth	 is	 by	 his	 emphasis	 on	 different	 levels	 of	 its	
effectivity.		
Finally,	let	us	briefly	consider	Stephen	Grabill,	who	has	recently	analysed	some	of	
the	same	sources	that	we	have	studied	above	in	a	book	urging	a	re-appraisal	of	natural	
theology.66	In	his	section	on	Vermigli,	who	is	one	of	his	key	witnesses,	Grabill	concludes	
that	for	Vermigli,	“God	is	revealed	in	nature,	and	that	this	revelation,	however	limited	and	
inadequate,	 is	 real	 knowledge.”67	 Grabill	 moreover	 states	 that	 Vermigli	 gives	 an	
“optimistic	 appraisal	 of	 the	 post-lapsarian	 natural	 human	 faculties.”68	 Against	 the	
background	of	our	findings,	this	last	judgement	needs	to	be	nuanced.	As	we	have	seen,	
Vermigli	indeed	holds	that	the	faculty	of	human	reason,	for	example,	is	good	in	itself.	Yet	
can	this	view	really	be	called	“optimistic,”	especially	given	that	Vermigli	equally	holds	that	
the	 faculty	will	 become	 twisted	 outside	 of	 God’s	 special	 influence?	 Similarly,	 the	way	
Grabill	assesses	Vermigli’s	view	of	God	as	revealed	in	nature	also	needs	nuancing	against	
the	background	of	my	argument.	We	have	seen	that	Vermigli	envisages	the	relationship	
between	Divine	and	human	causality	 in	two	different	ways.	One	model	distinguishes	a	
general	and	a	special	sphere	of	God’s	influence,	whereas	the	other	is	characterised	by	a	
continuously	 ontological	 determination	of	God’s	 causality.	 Either	of	 these	 two	models	
																																																						
66	Stephen	John	Grabill,	Rediscovering	the	Natural	Law	in	Reformed	Theological	Ethics	(Grand	Rapids	MI:	
Eerdmans	Publishing,	2006).	
67	Ibid.,	114.	
68	Ibid.,	121.	
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arguably	 leads	 to	a	different	 theological	appreciation	of	nature.	For	 in	 the	case	of	 the	
former	model,	 nature	by	 itself,	with	merely	 the	 general	 help	of	God,	 is	marked	by	 its	
fallenness.	While	it	is	not	entirely	devoid	of	God	because	he	sustains	it	with	his	general	
influence,	it	is	nevertheless	able	to	twist	God’s	influence	because	this	influence	is	seen	as	
extrinsic	 and	 non-ontological.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 more	 unified	 ontological	 model	 of	
influence,	 however,	 there	 is	 nothing	 which	 is	 not	 dependent	 on	 God	 in	 such	 a	
fundamental	way	that	it	also	refers	to	God.	This	opens	the	possibility	for	a	much	more	
positive	 appreciation	 of	 nature	 per	 se,	 and	 would	 indeed	 enable	 the	 kind	 of	 natural	
theology	that	is	based	on	nature	participating	in	God.	Vermigli’s	oeuvre	would	be	partly	
open	to	an	argument	for	such	a	natural	theology,	or	the	kind	of	natural	 law	that	flows	
from	seeing	God	as	the	source	of	everything.	However,	Grabill’s	argument	seems	to	be	
for	another	kind	of	natural	law,	one	which	does	not	flow	from	God	being	the	pre-eminent	
source	of	being,	but	which	reduces	God	to	an	extrinsic	cause	of	nature.	This	can	be	seen	
from	 the	 way	 he	 describes	 the	 notions	 he	 wishes	 to	 defend	 as	 “the	 idea	 that	 God	
promulgated	a	natural	law	that	directs	and	binds	human	creatures”	and	“that	conscience	
and	reason	serve	as	natural	lights	leading	people	to	act	in	accord	with	natural	law.”69	
	
4)	The	Implied	Metaphysics	of	the	Workings	of	Causality	in	Vermigli	
The	 subject	matter	of	 this	 chapter	has	been	 the	 interplay	between	Divine	and	human	
agency	as	envisaged	by	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli.	We	have	approached	this	topic	through	
two	 kinds	 of	 Vermigli’s	 commentaries	 (biblical	 and	 Aristotelian)	 and	 from	 two	
perspectives.	The	two	perspectives	were	(1)	God’s	influence	in	the	world	in	general,	and	
(2)	 his	 role	 in	human	 insight	 into	 the	 truth.	Both	perspectives	have	 revealed	 a	 similar	
picture,	namely	a	plurality.	In	answer	to	the	question	“how	does	God	work	in	the	world,	
according	to	Vermigli?”	we	have	to	say	“it	depends.”		
On	the	one	hand,	Vermigli	envisages	God’s	influence	on	human	actions	and	human	
insight	 to	 be	 governed	 by	 a	 two-step-process.	 In	 the	 first	 of	 these	 steps,	 Vermigli	
conceives	 of	 God’s	 influence	 as	merely	 general,	 such	 that	 he	works	 alongside	 human	
beings	who	contribute	‘their’	–	more	often	than	not	corrupt	–	part	towards	the	action.	In	
the	second	of	these	steps,	God	is	seen	to	work	more	specially	in	human	beings,	leading	
																																																						
69	Ibid.,	2.	
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them	to	good	works	and	higher	insight.	On	the	other	hand,	Vermigli	simultaneously	also	
holds	that	God’s	work	in	the	world	is	unified,	and	not	governed	by	the	two	steps	we	have	
just	described.	This	can	be	seen	in	Vermigli’s	theology	of	providence,	which	itself	is	based	
on	his	doctrine	of	creation	and	the	assertion	that	everything	is	created	by	God	and	given	
its	end	by	him.	It	can	equally	be	seen	in	his	understanding	that	all	truth	comes	from	God.	
The	fact	that	both	these	models	of	causality	are	present	 in	Vermigli’s	 theology,	
even	 in	 one	 and	 the	 same	 context	 (viz.	 his	 Ethics	 commentary)	 indicates	 that	 the	
metaphysical	 framework	 implicitly	 sustaining	Vermigli’s	 thought	 is	 not	uniform.	As	we	
have	 seen,	 the	 two-tier	 processes	 suggest	 that	 God’s	 influence	 in	 the	 world	 is	 not	
determined	by	a	qualitative	difference	between	his	and	the	world’s	being.	This	is	because	
God’s	influence	could	not	be	considered	merely	general	if	it	was	an	ontological	influence,	
and	 hence	 intrinsic	 to	 the	 secondary	 cause.	 The	 same	 is	 not	 the	 case	with	 Vermigli’s	
concern	for	the	all-encompassing	nature	of	providence,	and	his	affirmation	that	all	truth	
comes	from	God.	As	we	have	seen,	both	imply	a	metaphysical	framework	in	which	God	is	
the	pre-eminent	source	of	being	and	truth,	and	where	everything	participates	in	him.	
We	have	seen	the	importance	which	Vermigli	places	on	the	distinction	between	
those	who	are	“unregenerate”	and	those	who	are	“regenerate.”	In	the	next	chapter,	we	
will	focus	more	closely	on	how	he	envisages	individual	human	beings	to	pass	from	one	
state	to	the	other,	and	specifically	how	he	conceives	God’s	gift	of	grace	to	be	given	to	
them,	and	the	metaphysical	implications	this	bears.	
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Chapter	Two:	Justification	and	the	Workings	of	Gift	Giving	
	
In	the	present	chapter,	we	will	turn	to	what	is	perhaps	the	heart	of	Vermigli’s	theological	
thought:	the	justification	of	believers	and	their	union	with	Christ.	The	central	issue	here	
is	how	God	grants	his	grace	to	human	beings.	This	gift	is	interesting	because	its	giver	is	
the	 transcendent	 Creator	 of	 all	 things,	 whereas	 its	 recipients	 are	 created	 beings.	 The	
question	is	how	this	fundamental	dissimilarity	between	the	donor	and	the	beneficiaries	
affects	the	condition	of	the	possibility	of	the	gift,	both	with	regard	to	the	possibility	of	
God	 bestowing	 the	 gift	 of	 grace,	 and	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 human	 beings	 receiving	 it.	
Moreover,	 different	 answers	 as	 to	 how	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 give	 or	 receive	 this	 gift	 are	
sustained	by	different	metaphysical	frameworks,	or	ways	of	envisaging	the	relationship	
between	God	and	the	world.		
In	accordance	with	the	conceptual	alternatives	described	in	the	introduction,	and	
which	 we	 have	 encountered	 in	 the	 first	 chapter,	 God’s	 bestowal	 of	 grace	 can	 be	
conceptualised	in	two	ways:	God	works	either	in	or	alongside	human	beings.	Each	of	these	
two	 alternatives	 is	 indicative	 of	 a	 different	 way	 to	 conceive	 of	 the	 metaphysical	
relationship	between	God	and	the	world.		
In	the	first	case,	God	is	seen	to	work	through	his	grace	in	human	beings	(and	the	
world	at	 large).	His	gift	 touches	the	very	being	of	 those	who	receive	 it,	affecting	them	
from	the	inside,	as	it	were.	The	gift	therefore	is	ontological	in	character.	However,	this	is	
only	possible	 if	 there	 is	a	qualitative	difference	between	God’s	being	and	the	being	of	
creatures.	This	notion	is	therefore	based	on	the	idea	that	God,	as	the	giver	of	being,	gives	
being	to	his	creatures,	but	 ‘is’	more	fully	or	more	 intensely	than	they	‘are’.	When	God	
gives	his	creatures	additional	graces	beyond	their	being	–	above	all	the	grace	of	salvation	
–	 then	 this	 grace	 flows	 from	 and	 is	 in	 continuity	 with	 the	 creatures’	 ontological	
dependence	on	God.	The	precondition	of	God’s	‘intrinsic’	bestowal	of	grace	is	therefore	
the	creatures’	ontological	participation	in	God.		
In	the	second	case,	by	contrast,	the	workings	of	grace	are	extrinsic,	because	God,	
in	giving	his	grace,	is	thought	to	work	alongside	–	and	not	in	–	human	beings.	The	bestowal	
of	grace	is	nominal	in	this	case,	meaning	that	grace	is	given	to	human	beings	in	the	way	
that	a	name	is	given,	without	an	ontological	dimension	involved	in	the	gift.	This	alternative	
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is	 also	 sometimes	 termed	 ‘forensic’,	 insofar	 as	 it	 is	 understood	 that	 the	 gift	 of	 grace	
renders	human	beings	acceptable	in	God’s	judgement.	This	view	is	often	understood	to	
be	the	‘classically	Protestant’	view.	It	has	its	origin	in	a	strong	sense	that	the	gift	of	grace	
cannot	be	earned,	and	that	the	gift	must	remain	wholly	external	to	its	recipients	in	order	
for	it	to	be	a	‘pure’	gift.	Given	that	the	workings	of	grace	are	thus	thought	to	be	extrinsic,	
the	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 of	 this	 kind	 of	 bestowal	 of	 grace	 are	 detached	 from	 an	
ontological	 dependence	 of	 creatures	 on	 God,	 and	 there	 is	 no	 reason	 to	 suppose	 a	
qualitative	 difference	 in	 God’s	 being	 and	 the	 being	 of	 human	 persons.	 This	 kind	 of	
bestowal	of	grace	implies	a	univocal	understanding	of	being.		
This	chapter	will	argue	that	the	workings	of	grace	in	Vermigli’s	oeuvre	bear	the	
marks	of	two	different	metaphysical	frameworks.	As	we	will	see,	this	plurality	manifests	
itself	in	his	writings	on	justification	and	the	union	of	Christ	in	the	form	of	an	of	aporia.	This	
aporia	is	not	immediately	visible	in	Vermigli’s	writings;	rather,	one	lights	upon	it	only	by	
enquiring	into	the	conditions	of	integrating	his	teachings	on	justification,	faith,	and	union	
with	Christ.	The	first	two	sections	that	follow	will	therefore	consider	Vermigli’s	teaching	
on	justification	and	the	believer’s	union	with	Christ	respectively.	The	character	of	these	
sections	 is	mainly	descriptive.	 The	goal	of	 this	exposition	 is	 to	prepare	 the	ground	 for	
section	three,	where	 I	will	consider	 the	aporetic	element	 in	Vermigli’s	 teaching	on	the	
workings	of	grace.	As	we	shall	see,	Vermigli’s	conception	of	the	believer’s	“mystical	union”	
with	Christ,	when	 taken	 together	with	his	writings	 about	 justification,	 reveals	 that	 for	
Vermigli	the	crucial	moment	of	change	in	the	believer’s	status	is	aporetic.	This	is	because	
the	nature	or	character	of	this	change	seems	to	be	simultaneously	extrinsic	and	intrinsic.	
I	 shall	argue	 that	 this	aporia	 suggests	 that	Vermigli’s	 theology	of	grace	simultaneously	
inhabits	a	participatory	and	a	univocal	metaphysics.		
	
1)	Three	Times	Three:	Vermigli’s	Scholia	on	Justification	
Peter	Martyr	Vermigli	published	three	treatises	on	the	justification	of	the	believer,	each	
taking	the	form	of	a	theological	scholium	within	biblical	commentaries,	one	each	in	his	
commentaries	on	 the	book	of	Genesis,	 Paul’s	 first	 letter	 to	 the	Corinthians	 and	Paul’s	
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letter	 to	 the	 Romans.1	 As	we	 shall	 see,	 Vermigli	 distinguishes	 three	 senses	 of	what	 it	
means	for	God	to	bestow	grace	upon	the	believer,	or	“to	justify”	him,	in	each	of	these	
scholia.	In	what	follows,	I	will	present	the	scholia	one	by	one,	focussing	on	the	contours	
of	 Vermigli’s	 positive	 teaching	 (as	 opposed	 to	 his	 polemics),	 thereby	 presenting	 the	
textual	bases	for	the	aporetic	elements	which	I	will	bring	out	more	fully	in	the	third	section	
below.	
The	historical	theologian	Frank	James	has	devoted	a	doctoral	thesis	on	these	three	
scholia,	arguing	that	Vermigli’s	thought	underwent	substantial	development	between	the	
Genesis	scholium	and	the	Romans	scholium.2	Specifically,	James	contends	that	Vermigli,	
over	the	course	of	his	career	north	of	the	Alps,	gradually	moved	away	from	understanding	
justification	as	a	broad	and	multi-faceted	process	(including	not	only	the	forgiveness	of	
sins,	but	also	the	transformation	of	the	believer’s	life),	to	a	more	clear-cut	understanding	
in	which	he	defined	justification	“exclusively	as	forensic.”3	As	a	subplot	of	my	argument,	
this	section	will	demonstrate	that	James’s	thesis	needs	revision.	We	shall	see	that	there	
are	 significant	 continuities	 between	 the	 three	 scholia,	 even	 though	 James	 is	 right	 in	
observing	that	Vermigli	developed	his	thinking	between	his	three	scholia	de	iustificatione,	
especially	as	he	became	increasingly	engaged	in	polemical	debates.	Moreover,	while	the	
forensic	element	is	doubtlessly	present	in	Vermigli’s	thought,	all	of	the	scholia,	even	the	
most	polemic	one,	display	a	significantly	more	complex	picture	of	what	it	means	for	God	
to	justify	human	beings	than	its	being	a	merely	forensic	or	imputational	act.	
That	James’s	conclusion	should	be	met	with	caution	is	moreover	indicated	by	the	
way	in	which	it	seems	to	be	determined	by	the	main	thrust	of	his	thesis,	which	is	to	refute	
the	 argument	 that	 Vermigli’s	 doctrine	 of	 justification	 is	 “lacking	 full	 Protestant	
																																																						
1	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli,	In	primum	librum	Mosis,	qui	volgo	Genesis	dicitur	commentarii	doctissimi	(Zürich:	
Ch.	 Froschauer,	1569),	59r–61v;	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli,	 In	 selectissimam	S.	Pauli	priorem	ad	Corinth[ios]	
Epistolam	...	Commentarii	doctissimi	(Zürich:	Ch.	Froschauer,	1551),	29v–39r	;	(=	an	English	translation	of	
this	is	available	in	John	Patrick	Donnelly,	Frank	A.	James,	and	Joseph	C.	McLelland,	eds.,	The	Peter	Martyr	
Reader	[Kirksville,	Mo.:	Truman	State	University	Press,	1999],	133–50);	Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	517–75;	(=	
an	English	translation	of	this	lengthy	locus	has	been	made	available	in	the	Peter	Martyr	library:	Vermigli,	
Predestination	and	Justification).	
2	Frank	A.	James,	“De	Justificatione:	The	Evolution	of	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli’s	Doctrine	of	Justification”	(PhD	
thesis,	Westminster	Theological	Seminary,	2000).	
3	Ibid.,	330.	The	same	conclusion	is	also	drawn	in:	Frank	A.	James,	“Romans	Commentary:	Justification	and	
Sanctification,”	in	A	Companion	to	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli,	ed.	W.	J.	Torrance	Kirby,	Emidio	Campi,	and	Frank	
A.	James	(Leiden/Boston:	Brill,	2009),	305–17.	
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credentials.”4	 This	 can	 be	 seen	 on	 various	 levels:	 on	 a	 micro-level,	 James	 repeatedly	
stresses	that	Vermigli	uses	a	“distinctively	Protestant	terminology”	(163;	279),	that	he	is	
“in	accord	with	distinctively	Protestant	thought”	(164),	that	he	“firmly	takes	a	Protestant	
stance”	(167),	and	that	he	possesses	“full	Protestant	vigor”	(168),	to	name	only	a	few	of	
many	instances.	On	a	structural	level,	it	is	also	striking	how	James,	in	each	of	his	chapters	
discussing	 his	 three	 main	 source	 texts,	 first	 enquires	 about	 the	 texts’	 Protestant	
‘credentials’,	before	guiding	his	readers	through	their	actual	content.	James’s	assertion	
that	Vermigli	conceived	of	justification	in	forensic	terms	is	in	continuation	with	the	fact	
that	 he	 sees	 Vermigli	 as	 a	 “major	 Reformed	 theologian”5	 and	 that	 for	 him,	 being	
‘Protestant’	 (and	 especially	 ‘Reformed’)	 includes	 an	 affirmation	 of	 the	 purely	 forensic	
nature	of	justification.	The	methodological	difficulty	with	this	approach	is	that	it	measures	
Vermigli	 against	 the	yardstick	of	a	 stable,	universally	agreed-on	and	clearly	delineated	
notion	of	‘Protestantism’,	which	is	assumed	rather	than	defended	by	James.6	This	leads	
James	moreover	to	focus	one-sidedly	on	a	particular	set	of	issues,	while	not	taking	into	
account	the	full	range	of	topics	and	the	complexity	of	the	sources.	
THE	GENESIS	SCHOLIUM	
Vermigli’s	 first	 scholium	 on	 justification	 dates	 to	 lectures	 held	 during	 his	 first	 stay	 in	
Strasbourg,7	and	he	takes	his	cue	from	Genesis	15:6,	“Abraham	believed	the	LORD;	and	
the	LORD	reckoned	it	to	him	as	righteousness.”	What	is	the	nature	of	this	righteousness,	
Vermigli	asks?	He	answers	that	the	righteousness	conferred	on	human	beings	by	God	is	
threefold.8	It	is	worth	quoting	him	in	full	on	this:	
But	the	righteousness	conferred	on	us	by	God	has	three	parts.	The	first	is	
remission	of	sins,	regeneration	or	adoption	as	children	and	admission	to	
																																																						
4	James,	“De	Justificatione:	The	Evolution	of	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli’s	Doctrine	of	Justification,”	91.	
5	James,	“Romans	Commentary:	Justification	and	Sanctification,”	313.	
6	The	following	historical	caveat	intimates	that	James	implicitly	proceeds	from	the	assumption	that	it	there	
is	a	clear,	stable	and	agreed-on	notion	of	what	it	means	to	be	Protestant:	He	asks	his	readers	to	“bear	in	
mind	 that	 [Vermigli]	 does	 not	 write	 within	 the	 well-defined	 perimeters	 [!]	 of	 contemporary	 Reformed	
theology”	(35).	
7	Commentators	disagree	over	when	exactly	the	Genesis	lectures	were	held:	Klaus	Sturm	dates	the	lectures	
1544–45	(Klaus	Sturm,	Die	Theologie	Peter	Martyr	Vermiglis	während	seines	ersten	Aufenthalts	in	Strassburg	
1542–1547:	Ein	Reformkatholik	unter	den	Vätern	der	reformierten	Kirche	[Neukirchen-Vluyn:	Neukirchener	
Verlagsgesellschaft,	 1971],	 32–34).	 Frank	 James,	 however,	 argues	 that	 Vermigli	 delivered	 the	 lectures	
already	in	the	academic	year	1543–44:	James,	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli	and	Predestination:	The	Augustinian	
Inheritance	of	an	Italian	Reformer,	45–49.	
8	The	best	scholarly	treatment	of	this	scholium	is	Sturm,	Die	Theologie	Peter	Martyr	Vermiglis,	58–70.	
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eternal	 life.	 The	 second	 is	 to	 do	 good	 deeds	 and	 live	 rightly.	 From	 the	
frequent	 practice	 of	 these	 holy	 actions	 various	 most	 noble	 habits	 are	
acquired	and	 finally	 also	a	 certain	 inherent	 righteousness	which	pleases	
God.	The	third	is	recompense	and	rewards	both	in	our	present	life	and	in	
the	one	to	come.	These	are	said	to	be	our	righteousness	because	they	are	
signs	of	commendation	and	approval	since	they	are	said	to	be	given	to	us	
on	account	of	good	deeds.9	
In	accordance	with	these	three	meanings	of	righteousness,	continues	Vermigli,	“to	make	
righteous”	or	“to	justify”	equally	has	three	different	semantic	aspects,	examples	for	all	of	
which	can	be	found	in	the	Scriptures.	The	first	is	associated	with	not	counting	someone’s	
sins	 against	 them10	 –	 as	 when	 Israel’s	 judges	 declared	 someone	 to	 be	 just,	 thereby	
absolving	 them	 from	 their	 wrongdoing.11	 (It	 is	 worth	 noting,	 however,	 that	 in	 the	
programmatic	 statement	 quoted	 above,	 Vermigli	 goes	 beyond	 a	 purely	 declaratory	 or	
even	absolving	understanding	of	God’s	‘first’	righteousness,	for	he	holds	that	it	does	not	
only	entail	the	remission	of	sins,	but	also	a	regeneration	and	adoption	as	children.)		
The	second	aspect	of	the	righteousness	that	God	gives	to	human	beings	manifests	
itself	 in	 a	 holy	 life.	 Vermigli	 specifies	 therefore	 that	 “to	 justify	 sometimes	 also	means	
actually	 making	 just,	 or	 holy.	 [This	 happens]	 either	 through	 a	 renewal	 of	 nature,	 or	
through	habits	from	which	flow	holy	and	honest	actions.”12	As	a	scriptural	example	for	
this	use	of	the	term,	he	mentions	Revelation	22:11:	“Let	…	the	righteous	still	do	right,	and	
the	holy	still	be	holy.”	Here,	“to	justify”	means	more	than	a	declaration	on	the	part	of	the	
judge;	 rather,	 it	 involves	 the	 beneficiaries	 themselves	 becoming	 holy,	 and	 acting	
accordingly.	 In	 the	 quotation	 above,	 Vermigli	 associates	 this	 with	 an	 inherent	
righteousness	(iustitia	…	inhaerens)	which	is	built	up	through	the	repetition	of	good	acts,	
																																																						
9	“At	iustitia	nobis	collata	a	Deo,	tres	habet	partes.	Primam,	remissionem	peccatorum,	regenerationem	sive	
adoptionem	filiorum,	et	cooptationem	ad	vitam	aeternam.	Secundam,	benefacere,	recte	vivere,	ex	quibus	
frequentibus	 sanctis	 actionibus	 acquiruntur	 varii	 nobilissimi	 habitus,	 et	 demum	 iustitia	 quaedam	 nobis	
inhaerens	quae	Deo	placet.	Tertiam,	mercedes,	remunerationes	cum	in	praesenti	vita	tum	in	futura,	quae	
ideo	iustitia	nostra	dicuntur,	quod	sint	illius	indicia,	commendatio,	et	comprobatio,	cum	dicuntur	nobis	dari	
propter	benefacta.”	 (Vermigli,	 In	primum	librum	Mosis,	qui	volgo	Genesis	dicitur	commentarii	doctissimi,	
59r.)	
10	“Quare	iustificare	quandoque	sumitur	pro	eo	quod	est	peccata	condonare,	non	illa	peccantibus	imputare,	
imo	eos	pro	illis	habere	qui	non	peccarint.”	(Ibid.)	
11	The	scriptural	example	given	for	this	meaning	is	Deut	25:1:	“Suppose	two	persons	have	a	dispute	and	
enter	into	litigation,	and	the	judges	decide	between	them,	declaring	one	to	be	in	the	right	and	the	other	to	
be	in	the	wrong.”	In	Vermigli’s	words	it	means	“aliquem	iudicare	et	pronunciare	iustum,	illum	absolvendo.”	
Ibid.	
12	 “Aliquando	 iustificare	 idem	 significat,	 quod	 revera	 iustum	 facere,	 id	 est,	 sanctum,	 vel	 instaurando	
naturam,	vel	per	habitus	a	sanctis	et	rectis	actionibus	emanantes.”	(Ibid.)	
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which	again	lead	to	wholesome	habits.	Finally,	Vermigli	states	that	in	accordance	with	the	
third	 righteousness	 above,	 “to	 justify	 sometimes	 also	 means	 to	 adorn	 someone	 with	
rewards.”13		
In	the	remainder	of	the	Genesis	scholium,	Vermigli	defends	the	theses	(1)	that	the	
law	does	not	justify,	(2)	that	justification	cannot	be	had	through	works	of	the	law,	(3)	that	
Christians	are	justified	through	faith,	and	(4)	that	ceremonies	do	not	justify14	–	before	he	
returns	once	again	to	the	three	dimensions	of	God’s	bestowal	of	grace.	That	 it	 is	 faith	
which	 justifies	 “is	 to	 be	 understood	 from	 the	 first	 meaning	 of	 righteousness	 and	 of	
justifying,”	he	writes,	“because	surely	[it	is]	through	faith	[that]	we	understand	that	our	
sins	are	remitted	to	us	and	we	are	deemed	just	by	God	the	judge.”15	Vermigli	moreover	
specifies	that	by	this	we	should	not	understand	that	faith	itself	is	this	first	dimension	of	
righteousness.	 Rather,	 faith	 is	 that	 through	 which	 the	 Christian	 apprehends	 God’s	
righteousness.	Indeed,	Vermigli	repeatedly	associates	faith	with	the	power	to	apprehend	
God’s	gifts.16	Because	of	this,	he	argues,	faith	is	fundamental	for	all	three	dimensions	of	
God’s	justifying	action.	Insofar	as	all	three	ways	in	which	God’s	bestows	his	rightfulness	
on	human	beings	are	God’s	gifts	–	not	only	the	gift	of	forgiveness,	but	also	the	gift	of	a	
new	 life	of	holy	 living	and	 the	gift	of	divine	 rewards	–	 they	all	depend	on	 faith	as	 the	
human	capacity	to	apprehend	God’s	gifts.	“Therefore,”	Vermigli	reasons,		
if	you	consider	this	disposition	or	faculty,	through	which	we	are	capable	of	
any	of	these	three	kinds	of	righteousness	and	through	which	we	apprehend	
them,	[you	will	understand	that]	we	attribute	all	of	this	to	faith.	For	since	
they	are	God’s	gifts,	it	is	necessary	that	we	should	receive	them	through	
faith,	while	he	offers	them	to	us.17		
We	shall	 return	below	to	the	extraordinary	mediatory	significance	Vermigli	ascribes	 to	
faith	as	a	tool	of	apprehension,	and	especially	to	the	difficulties	which	this	entails,	such	as	
the	question	as	to	whether	this	faith	itself	is	in	danger	of	becoming	a	kind	of	work	(of	the	
																																																						
13	“Iustificare	significat	etiam	nonnunquam	…	praemiis	ornare.”	(Ibid.,	59v.)	
14	Ibid.,	59v–60v.	
15	“…hoc	intelligendum	est	de	prima	iustitiae	et	iustificandi	significatione,	quod	scilicet	fide	illud	assequimur,	
ut	nostra	nobis	remittantur	peccata	et	iusti	Dei	iudico	reputemur.”	(Ibid.,	60v.)	
16	“…	habet	vim	apprehendendi	misericordiam	et	promissionem	…	Ergo	fides	…	est	quo	à	Deo	rem	oblatam	
nobis	remissionem	peccatorum	et	regenerationem	apprehendiums.”	(Ibid.,	italics	mine.)	
17	 “Quare	 si	 dispositionem	et	 facultatem	 spectes,	 qua	 cuiuslibet	 iustitiae	 iam	expositae	 sumus	 capaces,	
illasque	apprehendimus,	totum	hoc	fidei	tribuiumus,	nam	cum	dona	Dei	sint,	ut	illa	fide	recipiamus	dum	ille	
nobis	ea	offert,	necesse	est.”	(Ibid.)	
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sort	Vermigli	rejects).	In	the	Genesis	scholium,	Vermigli	briefly	alludes	to	this	problematic,	
in	an	important	passage	following	the	above:	he	teaches	that	believers	ought	to	rely	on	
the	object	of	their	apprehension	–	God’s	mercy	and	his	promises	–	rather	than	putting	
their	 trust	 in	 the	power	and	excellence	of	 their	own	assent.	The	 latter	would	mean	to	
depend	 on	 one’s	 own	 powers	 and	 reason,	 which	 are	 so	 ridden	 with	 infirmities	 and	
temptations	that	one	“can	never	be	sure	that	it	has	everything	which	God	demands.”18		
This	passage	not	only	 testifies	 to	Vermigli’s	keen	awareness	of	 the	danger	 that	
faith	may	be	misunderstood	as	a	second-level	‘work’,	but	it	also	indicates	one	of	his	main	
concerns	 throughout:	 the	 conviction	 that	 no	 human	 act	 can	 ultimately	 satisfy	 God’s	
demands.	This	 is	particularly	evident	 in	his	 concluding	discussion	on	 the	nature	of	 the	
“second”	righteousness.	Here	Vermigli	stresses	that	believers	should	not	think	that	they	
can	subsist	in	the	divine	judgement	because	they	have	led	a	virtuous	life	of	holy	and	noble	
actions.	He	walks	 a	 tightrope	here,	 for	while	 stressing	 the	 insufficiency	of	 this	 second	
righteousness	of	good	human	actions,	he	nonetheless	at	the	same	time	teaches	that	it	is	
necessary	for	our	salvation	insofar	as	it	follows	the	first	righteousness.19	“So	even	though	
this	righteousness	cannot	satisfy	God,”	Vermigli	states,	
it	nonetheless	pleases	God	and	has	his	approval	…	It	equally	does	not	have	
to	disturb	us	that	no	action	which	we	can	do	as	long	as	we	live	here,	is	free	
from	uncleanness	and	fault	and	spoiled	by	guilt	…	for	through	Christ	we	
know	for	sure	that	our	father	will	accept	this	 inchoate	obedience	to	the	
law.20	
Vermigli	concludes	the	Genesis	scholium	with	a	further	explication	of	the	third	aspect	of	
God’s	bestowal	of	righteousness,	namely	the	rewards	that	the	faithful	are	given	by	God.	
They	indicate	that	someone	is	living	in	the	second	righteousness,	Vermigli	explains;	that	
is,	that	they	are	leading	a	holy	life.	A	twofold	relationship	is	possible	between	holy	works	
and	Divine	rewards:	either	holy	works	are	their	own	reward	already,	since	through	them	
																																																						
18	“In	qua	tamen	fidei	apprehensione	…	tibi	prorsus	ad	eius	obiectum	recurrendum	esse	a	te	apprehensum,	
scilicet	ad	Dei	misericordiam	et	promissionem,	ita	ut	non	haereas	efficaciae	et	virtuti	actionis	assentiendi	
quae	ex	tua	mente	exprimatur:	nam	illa	suas	habet	infirmitates	et	sordes,	titubationem,	tentationes,	ita	ut	
de	illa	nunquam	tutus	esse	possis	quod	omnia	habeat	ibi	a	Deo	requisita.”	(Ibid.,	61r.)	
19	“Necessariam	nihilominus	dicimus	esse	haec	iustitiam	…	cum	ista	illam	consequatur.”	(Ibid.)	
20	“Et	licet	iustitiae	haec	Dei	iustitiae	non	possit	satisfacere	…	et	Deo	placet	et	suas	ab	illo	commendationes	
habet.	…	Nec	nos	movere	debet	quod	nihil	dum	hic	vivimus	agere	possumus,	non	sordidum,	mancum	et	
vitio	obnoxium	…	quia	per	Christum	iam	certo	scimus	hanc	legis	inchoatam	obedientiam	patri	nostro	fore	
acceptam.”	(Ibid.)	
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the	faith,	love,	and	hope	of	the	faithful	are	increased,	or	the	holy	works	are	“the	means	
through	which	we	vindicate	God’s	gifts.”21	Without	further	elaborating	on	the	possibility	
of	this	vindication,	Vermigli	stresses	again	that,	crucially,	holy	works	are	not	the	reason	
why	the	faithful	merit	God’s	rewards;	on	the	contrary,	the	“foundation	and	root”	of	these	
rewards	are	faith	and	God’s	mercy.22	
THE	1	CORINTHIANS	SCHOLIUM	
After	 this	 overview	 of	 the	 constructive	 teaching	 in	 Vermigli’s	 first	 scholium	 “de	
iustificatione,”	let	us	now	turn	to	the	next	instance	where	he	treats	the	topic	in	a	similar	
context,	focusing	especially	on	continuities	and	discontinuities	with	what	we	have	seen	
so	far.	Vermigli’s	‘middle’	justification	scholium	is	part	of	his	lectures	on	1	Corinthians.23	
He	began	lecturing	on	this	epistle	soon	after	he	had	arrived	in	Oxford	in	early	1548.24	The	
systematic	reflection	of	the	scholium	 is	triggered	by	1	Cor	1:30,	where	Christ	 is	said	to	
have	been	made	righteousness	“for	us.”		
As	 in	 the	 Genesis	 scholium,	 here	 Vermigli	 also	 distinguishes	 three	 different	
semantic	aspects	of	what	it	means	for	God	to	confer	his	righteousness.	The	first	aspect	is	
again	related	to	the	activity	of	the	judges	in	the	Old	Testament	who	were	commanded	to	
‘justify’	 the	 innocent.	 A	 newly	 articulated	 distinction	 between	 human	 and	 Divine	
righteousness	makes	it	possible,	moreover,	for	Vermigli	to	connect	this	aspect	not	only	to	
the	remission	of	sins,	but	also	to	a	kind	of	exchange	in	righteousness,		
so	that	the	sins	we	have	committed	against	the	divine	law	are	not	imputed	
to	us	unto	death,	but	rather	the	obedience	of	Christ	and	his	righteousness,	
which	he	provided	by	living	and	by	dying,	are	imputed	to	us	in	such	a	way	
that	 whatever	 in	 our	 actions	 has	 fallen	 short	 of	 full	 and	 perfect	
righteousness	may	be	restored	fully	by	it.25		
																																																						
21	“Possunt	deinde	facultates	haberi	quibus	Dei	dona	et	praemia	nobis	vendicamus.”	(Ibid.)	
22	Cf.	“…non	ut	ipsa	spectemus	opera	solum	quibus	haec	dona	Dei	mereri	dicimur,	sed	illorum	fundamentum	
ac	radicem	fidem	inquam	et	Dei	misericordiam.”	(Ibid.)	
23	Vermigli,	Ad	Corinthios,	29r–38v.	An	English	translation	of	this	scholium	has	been	made	available	in	The	
Peter	Martyr	Reader	(Donnelly,	James,	and	McLelland,	The	Peter	Martyr	Reader,	133–50.)	
24	James,	“De	Justificatione:	The	Evolution	of	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli’s	Doctrine	of	Justification,”	207–9;	Philip	
M.	McNair,	“Peter	Martyr	in	England,”	in	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli	and	Italian	Reform,	ed.	Joseph	C.	McLelland	
(Waterloo:	Wilfried	Laurier	University	Press,	1980),	100–105.	
25	“Iustitia	dei,	quando	nobis	ab	eo	confertur	...	affert	remissionem	peccatorum,	ut	nobis	quae	commisimus	
in	divinam	legem	ad	mortem	non	imputentur,	sed	potius	e	diverso	obedientia	Christi	eiusque	iustitia,	quam	
hic	vivendo	et	moriendo	praestitit,	ita	nobis	imputetur,	ut	ex	ea	quicquid	actionibus	nostris	ad	plenam	atque	
perfectam	iustitiam	defuerit,	resarciatur.”	(Vermigli,	Ad	Corinthios,	29r-v;	Donnelly,	James,	and	McLelland,	
The	Peter	Martyr	Reader,	135.)	
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As	James	rightly	notes,	the	language	of	imputation	is	much	more	pronounced	here	than	
in	the	Genesis	scholium.26	
The	second	aspect	of	justification	–	leading	an	upright	and	holy	life	–	is	described	
in	terms	very	similar	to	the	ones	in	the	Genesis	scholium.	Vermigli’s	understanding	of	the	
‘third’	righteousness,	however,	has	undergone	a	transformation.	The	focus	is	no	longer	
on	 God’s	 rewards	 to	 the	 faithful,	 even	 though	 Vermigli	 still	 mentions	 them	 in	 the	
conclusion	of	 the	 scholium	 (expressing	 the	 same	ambivalence	 towards	 the	 concept	 as	
noted	above27).	Instead,	Vermigli	now	suggests	that	this	aspect	of	righteousness	consists	
in	a	righteousness	inherent	to	the	soul	of	the	righteous,	from	the	habit	of	good	works.28		
After	 this	 initial	 overview	 of	 the	 different	 aspects	 of	 how	 God	 confers	
righteousness	on	human	beings,	Vermigli	consciously	narrows	his	investigation:	“For	the	
present	we	wish	to	set	aside	the	other	kinds	of	righteousness	and	examine	only	the	first	
one	listed.”29	Let	us	note,	pace	James,	that	this	by	no	means	indicates	that	the	other	two	
aspects	should	not	–	in	Vermigli’s	view	–	be	counted	as	part	of	God’s	justifying	action	or	
as	falling	under	the	heading	“de	iustificatione.”	Rather,	it	is	clear	from	how	he	introduces	
his	focus	that	he	still	keeps	within	his	purview	also	the	other	aspects	of	justification	as	
ways	in	which	God	justifies.	 
Much	of	the	remainder	of	the	scholium	replicates	his	Genesis	scholium.	Vermigli	
refutes,	for	instance,	the	same	errors	regarding	the	power	of	the	law	and	of	ceremonies,	
as	 mentioned	 above.	 However,	 his	 treatment	 of	 the	 role	 and	 character	 of	 faith	 is	
substantiated	in	greater	detail	than	before.	This	can	be	seen	from	what	he	calls	the	order	
of	the	causes	of	justification	(ordo	causarum	iustificationis),	which	runs	as	follows:	God,	
in	his	mercy,	is	its	first	cause.	Its	second	cause	is	Christ,	“who	merited	for	us	this	mercy	of	
God.”	In	the	third	place	comes	faith,	“as	the	tool	and	instrument	by	which	we	grasp	Christ,	
																																																						
26	James,	“De	Justificatione:	The	Evolution	of	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli’s	Doctrine	of	Justification,”	223.	
27	“Let	us	not	deny	that	many	rewards,	both	spiritual	and	temporal,	are	given	for	the	good	works	of	the	
faithful.	We	argue	only	that	eternal	life	is	given	quite	freely,	although	it	is	promised	to	those	who	lead	a	
good	 life.”	 /	 “Et	 bonis	 operibus	 fidelium	 non	 inficiamur	 permulta	 praemia	 reddi,	 cum	 spiritualia	 tum	
temporalia.	Tantum	vitam	aeternam	licet	repromittatur	bene	viventibus	omnino	gratis	dari	contendimus.”	
(Vermigli,	Ad	Corinthios,	38v;	Donnelly,	James,	and	McLelland,	The	Peter	Martyr	Reader,	149–50.)	
28	 “Postremo	 loco	 derivatur	 ex	 consuetudine	 bonorum	 operum	 quaedam	 iustitia	 in	 animis	 nostris	
inhaerens.”	(Vermigli,	Ad	Corinthios,	29v;	Donnelly,	James,	and	McLelland,	The	Peter	Martyr	Reader,	136.)	
29	“At	in	praesentia	caeteris	partibus	omissis	de	ea	tantum	volumus	agere,	quam	primo	loco	recensuimus.”	
(Vermigli,	Ad	Corinthios,	29v;	Donnelly,	James,	and	McLelland,	The	Peter	Martyr	Reader,	136.)	
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and	together	with	him	the	mercy	of	God	…,	whence	we	are	justified.”30	This	hierarchy	of	
causes	allows	Vermigli	to	argue	–	in	continuity	with	the	Genesis	scholium,	though	more	
explicitly	than	there	–	that	it	is	inappropriate	to	say	that	faith	justifies	in	the	same	way	as	
a	 human	 action,	 for	 “the	 source	 of	 justification	 comes	 from	 Christ,	 through	 God’s	
promises	and	mercy.”31		
THE	ROMANS	SCHOLIUM	
The	 third	 and	 final	 treatise	 on	 justification	 penned	 by	 Peter	Martyr	 forms	 part	 of	 his	
Romans	 commentary.	 This	 commentary	 dates	 from	 his	 time	 as	 Regius	 Professor	 of	
Theology	 in	 Oxford,	 where	 he	 lectured	 on	 the	 letter	 to	 the	 Romans	 in	 1550.	 After	
concluding	his	exposition	of	the	first	eleven	chapters	of	the	letter	to	the	Romans,	Vermigli	
chooses	 to	 “treat	 the	 topic	 of	 justification,”	 elaborating	 on	 the	 question:	 “are	 men	
justified	by	works	or	by	faith?”32	This	scholium,	when	compared	with	the	other	two,	 is	
significantly	more	polemical	in	tone.	Vermigli	openly	addresses	the	following	three	main	
opponents:	 Richard	 Smith,	 his	 Catholic	 predecessor	 in	Oxford;	 33	 the	Dutchman	Albert	
Pighius,	 in	 whom	 Vermigli	 sees	 one	 of	 the	 best	 defenders	 of	 the	 Catholic	 position,	
especially	because	he	tends	to	defend	it	on	the	basis	of	Scripture;34	and,	finally,	the	fathers	
of	 the	council	of	Trent.	This	 is	Vermigli’s	 first	extensive	 interaction	with	the	decree	on	
justification	that	the	Council	of	Trent	issued	in	January	1547.35		
																																																						
30	“Primum	sane	constituatur	deum	esse	qui	nos	iustificat,	suam	misericordiam	et	promissiones	clementer	
impartiendo.	 Occurrit	 deinde	 Christus,	 qui	 nobis	 hanc	 dei	 misericordiam	 et	 salutis	 promissionem	
commeritus	 est,	 dum	pro	 nobis	 poenas	 tulit,	 quas	 ipsi	 eramus	 perpessuri.	 Succedit	 fides	 tertio	 loco,	 ut	
organum	 et	 instrumentum	 quo	 Christum	 percipimus	 et	 pariter	 cum	 eo	 dei	misericordiam	 salutaresque	
promissiones	unde	iustificamur.”(Vermigli,	Ad	Corinthios,	34r;	Donnelly,	James,	and	McLelland,	The	Peter	
Martyr	Reader,	143.)	
31	 “Nec	 omittendum	 nequaquam	 fidei	 convenire	 ut	 nos	 iustificet	 qua	 nostra	 est	 actio.	 ...	 Sed	 caput	
iustificationis	a	Christo	est	promissionibus	atque	misericordia	dei.”	(Vermigli,	Ad	Corinthios,	34v;	Donnelly,	
James,	and	McLelland,	The	Peter	Martyr	Reader,	145.)	
32	 “...	 de	 iustificatione	 qua	 scopus	 est	 et	 finis	 omnium	 quae	 Paulus	 tractare.	 Quaestio	 vero	 his	 verbis	
proponetur:	 Iustificentur	 ne	 homines	 operibus,	 an	 fide?”	 (Vermigli,	 Ad	 Romanos,	 517;	 Vermigli,	
Predestination	and	Justification,	87.)		
33	On	the	relationship	between	Vermigli	and	Smith,	see	McNair,	“Peter	Martyr	 in	England,”	92;	104-5;	J.	
Andreas	Löwe,	“Peter	Martyr	Vermigli	and	Richard	Smith’s	De	votis	monasticis,”	in	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli:	
Humanism,	Republicanism,	Reformation,	ed.	Emidio	Campi	(Genève:	Droz,	2002).	On	Smith	more	broadly,	
see	 J.	 Andreas	 Löwe,	 Richard	 Smyth	 and	 the	 Language	 of	 Orthodoxy:	 Re-Imagining	 Tudor	 Catholic	
Polemicism	(Leiden:	Brill,	2003).	
34	Cf.	Frank	A.	James,	“The	Complex	of	Justification:	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli	versus	Albert	Pighius,”	in	Peter	
Martyr	Vermigli:	Humanism,	Republicanism,	Reformation,	ed.	Emidio	Campi	(Genève:	Droz,	2002),	47	n.	15.	
35	Cf.	Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	546–48.	
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Vermigli	opens	this	scholium	by	explaining	that	when	God	justifies	a	human	being,	
this	can	mean	either	of	two	things:	it	refers	to	the	act	of	causing	someone	to	be	just	either	
in	re	or	in	existimatione	(in	fact	or	in	judgement).	As	shorthand	I	shall	call	these	Rom	I	and	
Rom	II	respectively.	Rom	II	is	roughly	identical	to	the	‘first’	righteousness	of	the	Genesis	
scholium	and	(especially)	the	1	Corinthians-scholium.	Its	focus	is	on	forgiveness	of	sins	and	
on	 “ascribing	 and	 imputing	 righteousness,”	 so	 that	 to	 justify	 means	 “that	 through	
judgment,	words,	witness,	or	assertion	one	counts	the	person	just	(pro	iusto	habere).”36	
However,	Vermigli	further	subdivides	Rom	I	(justification	in	re)	into	two	separate	aspects:	
when	God	justifies	“in	reality,”	he	endows	human	beings	with	his	Spirit	and	renews	them	
fully.	God’s	righteousness	therefore	is	within	their	souls	and	adheres	to	them	by	God’s	
goodness	through	Christ	(Rom	IA).	Thus,	this	bestowal	of	God’s	righteousness	intrinsically	
affects	the	believers,	indeed	effecting	a	change	in	their	very	being.	Secondly,	when	God	
has	renewed	human	beings	in	this	way,	Vermigli	explains,	he	also	grants	them	right	and	
holy	works.	By	their	frequent	use,	there	is	born	in	human	beings	a	habit	by	which	they	are	
“inclined	to	right	and	holy	living”	(Rom	IB).37		
The	 most	 significant	 innovation	 of	 this	 scholium	 when	 compared	 to	 the	 two	
previous	ones	is	the	introduction	of	Rom	IA.	The	idea	that	Christ’s	righteousness	is	given	
to	human	beings	through	the	Spirit	in	such	a	way	that	they	are	intrinsically	transformed,	
is	new,	depending	on	how	one	reads	the	multi-faceted	first	righteousness	of	the	Genesis	
scholium.	Vermigli	now	proposes	a	way	of	understanding	God’s	justifying	action	as	more	
than	merely	forensic;	namely,	as	a	gift	that	has	the	power	to	transform	its	recipient.	This	
kind	of	justification	is	prior	to,	or	more	fundamental	than	the	justification	that	manifests	
itself	in	good	works	(Rom	IB).	It	is	therefore	Rom	IB	(and	not	Rom	IA)	that	is	the	equivalent	
of	the	second	righteousness	of	the	Genesis	scholium,	as	well	as	both	the	second	and	the	
third	righteousness	in	the	1	Corinthians	scholium.		
Vermigli	 continues	 by	 asking:	 since	 there	 are	 these	 two	 significations	 of	 being	
justified,	namely	either	in	re	or	in	existimatione,		
																																																						
36	 “Interdum	 vero	 iustificat	 Deus	 absolvendo	 a	 peccatis,	 adscribendo	 et	 imputando	 iustitiam.	 ...	 Estque	
iustificare	 iudicio,	 verbis,	 testimonio	 et	 assertione	 aliquem	 pro	 iusto	 habere.“	 (Ibid.,	 517;	 Vermigli,	
Predestination	and	Justification,	87–88.)	
37	“Haec	prima	est	iustitia,	quae	animis	nostris	Dei	beneficio	per	Christum	inest	et	adhaeret.	Deinde	cum	
iam	 ipsos	 sic	 restituit	 ac	 refinxit,	 opera	 largitur	 recta	et	 sancta,	quorum	usu	atque	 frequentia	paritur	 in	
animo	 nostro	 qualitas,	 vel	 ut	 dicunt	 habitum,	 quo	 propensi	 efficimur	 ad	 probe	 sancteque	 vivendum.”	
(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	517;	Vermigli,	Predestination	and	Justification,	517.)	
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and	 since	 the	 same	God	 is	 author	of	 both,	which	of	 the	 two	 should	we	
follow	 in	 the	 proposed	 discussion?	 The	 latter,	 precisely	 because	 the	
renewal	infused	by	the	Spirit	of	God	and	our	righteousness,	insofar	as	[it	is]	
a	habit	acquired	from	good	works,	are	imperfect	and	lacking	as	long	as	we	
live	here,	so	that	if	it	was	to	be	arbitrated,	we	would	not	at	all	be	able	to	
stand	before	the	divine	judgement	seat	by	virtue	of	them.38	
This	passage	is	crucial,	and	two	things	about	it	should	be	noted.	First,	Vermigli	limits	the	
scope	of	his	examination	to	justification	in	existimatione.	As	we	have	seen	above,	he	does	
the	same	in	the	1	Corinthians	scholium.	As	is	the	case	there,	however,	so	here	too	it	is	not	
clear	that	this	narrowing	is	more	than	a	rhetorical	choice	to	focus	on	the	one	instead	of	
the	 other.	 Pace	 James,	 there	 is	 no	 indication	 that	 Vermigli	 no	 longer	 “incorporate[s]	
regeneration	 and	 sanctification	 under	 the	 rubric	 of	 justification.”39	 As	 we	 have	 seen	
above,	Vermigli	writes	that	there	are	two	scriptural	meanings	of	“to	 justify,”	and	even	
though	he	gives	priority	to	forensic	justification	“in	the	proposed	discussion,”	he	clearly	
affirms	 that	 God	 is	 the	 author	 of	 both	 a	 forensic	 and	 a	 real	 (infused	 and	 formative)	
justification.40	The	same	can	be	seen	from	the	way	in	which	Vermigli	introduces	the	two	
options:	he	holds	that	God	sometimes	brings	forth	actual	righteousness	in	human	beings,	
and	 sometimes	 he	 justifies	 by	 imputing	 righteousness	 (interdum	 …	 interdum).41	 This	
construction	demands	that	justification	in	re	is	an	actual	possibility	for	Vermigli,	despite	
his	 not	 focussing	 on	 this	 in	 the	 scholium.	 In	 sum,	 Vermigli	 holds	 that	 God	 does	 his	
justificatory	work	 in	both	ways:	 through	counting	human	beings	 just,	but	also	 through	
making	them	just	intrinsically.	
Nonetheless	–	and	this	is	the	second	point	to	note	–	Vermigli	raises	a	clear	caveat	
in	the	quotation	above:	justification	in	the	sense	of	Rom	II	has	a	priority	over	what	we	
have	called	Rom	IA	and	Rom	IB	with	regard	to	its	‘value’	in	the	Divine	judgement.	In	order	
for	human	beings	to	stand	firm	in	God’s	judgement,	God	must	forensically	hold	them	to	
																																																						
38“Cumque	sint	duo	haec	significata	iustificandi,	scilicet,	aut	re,	aut	existimatione,	ac	utriusque	Deus	idem	
sit	 author,	 utrum	 ex	 duobus	 in	 disputatione	 proposita	 sequemur?	 Posterius,	 idque	 propterea	 quod	
renovatio	Dei	spiritu	afflata,	et	iustitia	nostra	quoad	habitum	ex	bonis	operibus	acquisitum,	adeo	sunt	dum	
hic	 vivimus	 imperfecta	 et	 manca	 ut	 per	 ea,	 si	 disceptandum	 sit,	 at	 tribunal	 divinum	minime	 possimus	
persistere.”	(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	517;	Vermigli,	Predestination	and	Justification,	88.)	
39	James,	“De	Justificatione:	The	Evolution	of	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli’s	Doctrine	of	Justification,”	330.	
40	Note	that	James	himself	concedes	this	when	he	states	later	on	that	“Vermigli	continues	to	maintain	that	
the	biblical	meaning	of	righteousness	should	be	understood	in	two	ways:	sometimes	it	means	‘to	produce	
righteousness	in	people’	and	at	other	times	it	can	mean	to	‘regard	one	as	righteous.’”	Ibid.,	339.	
41	Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	517.		
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be	 just.	The	crux	of	Vermigli’s	argument	here	 is	closely	related	to	his	discussion	of	the	
Council	of	Trent’s	decree	on	justification.	When	discussing	the	causes	of	justification	as	
enumerated	by	the	Council	of	Trent,	he	finds	nothing	to	object	to	in	its	definition	of	the	
final,	efficient	and	meritorious	causes	of	justification.	He	agrees	that	its	final	cause	is	the	
glory	of	God	and	the	salvation	of	human	beings,	its	efficient	cause	God	with	respect	to	his	
mercy,	and	the	meritorious	cause	Jesus	Christ	and	his	death	and	resurrection.	“So	far	this	
is	not	bad,”	Vermigli	judges.42	However,	he	takes	issue	with	the	Council’s	assertion	that	
(in	Vermigli’s	own	words)	“the	formal	cause	is	the	justice	of	God,	not	that	justice	by	which	
he	himself	 is	 just,	but	 that	which	he	 communicates	 to	us,	by	which	we	are	both	 truly	
counted	 just	 and	 are	 just	 in	 fact.”43	 Vermigli	 states	 that	 he	 does	 not	 deny	 that	 the	
communication	of	God’s	 righteousness	happens	“in	one	already	 justified,”	but	 that	he	
cannot	accept	that	justification	itself	should	“consist	in	that	righteousness	and	renewal	by	
which	we	are	created	anew	by	God.	For	it	is	imperfect	because	of	our	corruption,	so	that	
we	are	not	able	to	stand	before	the	judgement	of	Christ.”44	It	would	seem,	therefore,	that	
when	justification	in	re	is	given	to	the	believer,	it	needs	to	be	supplemented	by	an	imputed	
righteousness,	in	order	for	human	beings	to	avoid	condemnation.	The	core	of	the	matter	
seems	 to	 be	 not	 so	much	 in	 the	 reality	 of	God’s	 gifts,	 but	 in	 the	 human	 capability	 of	
accepting	 them.	 What	 Vermigli	 seems	 to	 be	 saying	 is	 that	 the	 Spirit-infused,	
transformative	 righteousness	 given	 by	God	 to	 human	beings	 cannot	 fully	 take	 hold	 in	
them	because	of	their	fallen	state.	This	echoes	the	imagery	of	the	poisoned	jars	that	we	
have	encountered	in	Chapter	One.		
What,	however,	is	the	role	of	faith?	In	the	Romans	scholium,	Vermigli	defines	faith	
as	a	“firm	and	assured	assent	of	the	mind	to	the	words	of	God,	an	assent	inspired	by	the	
Holy	 Spirit	 to	 the	 salvation	of	 believers.”45	As	he	often	does	with	definitions,	Vermigli	
																																																						
42	“Atque	huc	quidem	usque	non	male.”	(Ibid.,	548;	Vermigli,	Predestination	and	Justification,	159.)	
43	“Causam	formalem	dicunt	esse	iustitiam	Dei,	non	eam,	qua	ipse	iustus	est,	sed	quam	nobis	communicat,	
qua	 ipsi	 vere	 et	 habeamur,	 et	 simus	 iusti.”	 (Vermigli,	 Ad	 Romanos,	 548;	 Vermigli,	 Predestination	 and	
Justification,	159.)	
44	 “Quae	 nos	 fieri	 in	 homine	 iam	 iustificato	 non	 negamus.	 ...	 Idcirco	 autem	 dicimus,	 in	 ea	 iustitia	 et	
instauratione	qua	reformamur	a	Deo	non	posse	esse	 iustificationem	quod	ea	nostro	vitio	 imperfecta	sit,	
neque	possimus	cum	ea	ad	tribunal	Christi	consistere.”(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	548;	Vermigli,	Predestination	
and	Justification,	159.)	
45	“Est	itaque	firmus	certusque	animi	assensus	verbis	Dei	a	spiritu	divino	afflatus	ad	salutem	credentium.”	
(Vermigli,	 Ad	 Romanos,	 518;	 Vermigli,	 Predestination	 and	 Justification,	 90.)	 Eric	 Parker	 situates	 this	
definition	of	 faith	 in	 the	 context	of	 its	 various	medieval	understandings,	 especially	 in	 its	 relationship	 to	
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expounds	this	definition	according	to	the	four	Aristotelian	causes.	The	material	cause	of	
faith,	he	says,	is	the	word	of	God,	its	formal	cause	is	our	assent,	its	efficient	cause	God’s	
inspiration	through	the	Spirit,	and	its	final	cause	the	salvation	of	believers.	What	is	most	
remarkable	about	this	four-fold	distinction	is	that	Vermigli	holds	one	of	the	four	causes	of	
faith	–	the	formal	cause	–	to	be	exclusively	human:	“We	need	not	doubt	its	formal	cause	
because	it	is	defined	to	be	an	assent.”46	This	introduces	the	possibility	of	there	being	an	
element	of	faith	that	is	purely	human	(even	if	only	theoretically	so,	because	presumably	
all	four	causes	are	always	present	at	the	same	time).	Does	he	not	risk	being	at	the	brink	
of	slipping	into	a	kind	of	semi-Pelagianism	with	this?	If	at	least	one	element	of	faith	can	
theoretically	stand	independently	of	God,	would	this	not	make	it	into	a	kind	of	work?	And	
are	 fallen	human	beings,	 through	unable	 fully	 to	receive	God’s	gifts,	capable	of	having	
such	faith?		
As	if	to	reply	to	such	questions,	Vermigli	adds:		
If	faith	itself	is	considered	our	work,	we	cannot	be	justified	by	it,	since	as	a	
work	it	is	imperfect	and	flawed,	far	beneath	what	the	law	requires.	But	we	
are	 said	 to	 be	 justified	 by	 it	 [faith]	 because	 through	 it	 we	 take	 hold	
(apprehendimus)	of	the	promises	of	God	and	the	righteousness	and	merits	
of	Christ	and	apply	them	to	ourselves.47		
Despite	this	relativisation,	however,	the	subject	of	this	apprehension	remains	the	human	
being,	the	‘we’	in	the	quote	given.	Insofar	as	faith	is	therefore	something	human,	there	is	
a	potential	tension	between	faith	as	the	crucial	prerequisite	for	justification,	on	the	one	
hand,	and	Vermigli’s	strong	assertion	that	there	is	nothing	human	beings	can	do	to	further	
their	justification,	on	the	other	hand.	I	will	return	to	this	tension	in	section	three	below.		
Another	tension	that	emerges	from	the	Romans	scholium	is	the	following:	Vermigli	
maintains	that	God’s	gift	of	justification	cannot	be	fully	received	by	human	beings,	as	we	
																																																						
virtue.	See	Eric	M.	Parker,	“Fides	Mater	Virtutum	Est:	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli’s	Disagreement	with	Thomas	
Aquinas	on	the	‘Form’	of	the	Virtues,”	Reformation	and	Renaissance	Review	15,	no.	1	(2013):	54–67.	
46	 “De	 forma	 etiam	 non	 ambiguitur,	 quia	 definitur	 esse	 assensus.”	 (Vermigli,	Ad	 Romanos,	 518;	 James,	
“Romans	Commentary:	Justification	and	Sanctification,”	90.)	
47	“Quin	etiam	si	fides	ipsa	qua	nostrum	opus	est	consideretur,	ea	iustificari	non	possumus,	cum	opus	sit	et	
mancum	et	imperfectum,	longe	deterius	quam	lex	recquirat.	Sed	illa	iustificari	dicimur,	qua	promissiones	
Dei	et	Christi	iustitiam	meritaque	per	ipsam	apprehendimus	et	nobis	applicamus.”	(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	
521;	Vermigli,	Predestination	and	Justification,	96.)	The	notion	that	faith	is	the	power	to	apprehend	God’s	
gifts	is	present	in	Vermigli’s	thought	already	in	his	Genesis	scholium,	where	–	as	seen	above	–	he	calls	faith	
the	 “disposition	 or	 faculty,	 through	 which	 we	 are	 capable	 of	 …	 righteousness	 and	 through	 which	 we	
apprehend”	it	(“dispositionem	et	facultatem	cuiuslibet	iustitiae	...	sumus	capaces,	illasque	apprehendimus”	
(Vermigli,	In	primum	librum	Mosis,	qui	volgo	Genesis	dicitur	commentarii	doctissimi,	60v.)	
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have	seen;	yet	he	nonetheless	claims	that	there	is	a	legitimate	place	for	justification	in	re,	
an	 intrinsic	 justification.48	 Put	 differently:	 Vermigli	 endorses	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	
justification	 in	 re	 and	 yet	 is	 hesitant	 towards	 it	 insofar	 as	 he	 emphasizes	 that	 it	 is	
imperfect,	which	 calls	 for	 grace	 to	be	 given	 through	an	 imposition.	Both	of	 this	 taken	
together	 suggests	 that,	 for	 him,	 God’s	 grace	 is	 somehow	 given	 both	 intrinsically	 and	
extrinsically.		
Christopher	 Castaldo	 has	 concluded	 from	 this	 that	 Vermigli’s	 doctrine	 of	
justification	can	be	summarised	as	a	duplex	iustitia	or	a	double	justification.49	According	
to	Alister	McGrath,	this	doctrine,	which	has	become	associated	with	the	views	of	Gasparo	
Contarini	 (1483-1542)	 and	 the	 Regensburg	 Colloquy	 of	 1541,	 essentially	 proposes	 a	
double	formal	cause	of	justification,	a	iustitia	imputata	and	a	iustitia	inhaerens.50	But	it	
seems	 that	 Castaldo	 does	 not	 agree	 with	 this	 definition,	 because	 he	 also	 holds	 that	
“Vermigli	would	fervently	protest”	against	the	“inclusion	of	internal	renewal	along	with	
forensic	 imputation	 in	the	formal	cause	of	 justification.”51	Castaldo	thus	relativizes	the	
value	of	the	concept	of	a	double	 justification	when	describing	Vermigli’s	theology.	The	
usefulness	of	describing	Vermigli’s	doctrine	of	justification	by	means	of	duplex	iustitia,	it	
seems,	depends	entirely	on	one’s	definition	of	duplex	iustitia.	Moreover,	from	what	we	
have	 seen	 of	 Vermigli’s	 position	 in	 the	 Romans	 scholium,	 Castaldo’s	 assertion	 that	
Vermigli	 would	 fervently	 protested	 against	 anything	 other	 than	 a	 forensic	 cause	 of	
justification	is	not	entirely	warranted.	What	is	warranted,	however,	is	to	see	in	Vermigli’s	
theology	of	justification	a	certain	plurality	–	the	plurality	which	Castaldo	tried	to	express	
																																																						
48	Not	even	Frank	A.	James	can	escape	this	complexity.	He	writes:	“On	the	one	hand,	regeneration	is	the	
direct	 cause	 of	 sanctification	 and	 the	 doing	 of	 good	 deeds.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 regeneration,	 although	
logically	 prior,	 is	 not	 the	 basis	 for	 forensic	 justification.	 The	 ground	 for	 forensic	 justification	 is	 the	
righteousness	of	Christ	alone.	Thus,	the	relationship	between	regeneration	and	justification	is	not	exactly	
the	 same	 as	 the	 relationship	 between	 regeneration	 and	 sanctification.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 sanctification,	
regeneration	may	be	said	to	be	the	basis	and	cause	for	good	deeds.	But	as	for	justification,	regeneration	
functions	as	the	context	(not	cause)	for	the	divine	acquittal.”	(James,	“De	Justificatione:	The	Evolution	of	
Peter	Martyr	Vermigli’s	Doctrine	of	Justification,”	345	[emphasis	mine]).	This	attempt	at	smoothing	over	
the	tension	 is	 less	than	convincing,	 for	how	can	something	be	 logically	prior	while	at	the	same	time	not	
being	the	basis	(however	understood)	for	what	follows?	What	exactly,	moreover,	is	meant	by	“context	(not	
cause)”	for	the	Divine	acquittal?	This	clarification	obscures	the	matter	rather	than	illuminating	it.	
49	Christopher	A.	Castaldo,	“The	Grammar	of	Justification:	The	Doctrines	of	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli	and	John	
Henry	Newman	and	Their	Ecumenical	Implications”	(PhD	thesis,	Middlesex	University	/	London	School	of	
Theology,	2015),	80–84.	
50	 Cf.	 Alister	 E.	 McGrath,	 Iustitia	 Dei:	 A	 History	 of	 the	 Christian	 Doctrine	 of	 Justification	 (Cambridge:	
Cambridge	University	Press,	1989),	231–32.	
51	Castaldo,	“The	Grammar	of	Justification,”	189.	
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through	the	term	duplex	iustitia.	I	will,	in	what	follows,	offer	a	more	precise	definition	of	
this	plurality.	In	particular,	I	will	propose	that	there	is	an	aporia	in	Vermigli’s	notion	of	the	
way	God	bestows	his	gifts	 to	human	beings.	The	aporetic	nature	of	 this	gift-giving	will	
come	to	the	fore	more	clearly,	however,	through	an	examination	of	what	Vermigli	writes	
about	the	believer’s	union	with	Christ.	To	this	we	shall	now	turn.		
	
2)	A	Secret	Middle:	Vermigli’s	Teaching	on	Union	with	Christ	
In	The	Visible	Words	of	God,	the	first	twentieth-century	monograph	devoted	to	Vermigli’s	
theology,	Joseph	McLelland	writes	that	“the	doctrine	of	union	with	Christ	is	the	dynamic	
of	 Peter	 Martyr’s	 theology.”52	 This	 assessment	 still	 holds	 true,	 especially	 for	 his	
understanding	of	justification.	As	we	shall	see,	Vermigli’s	notion	of	how	human	beings	can	
be	united	to	Christ	lies	at	the	heart	of	his	understanding	of	the	workings	of	grace.	Indeed,	
his	 writings	 concerning	 the	 justification	 of	 human	 beings	 cannot	 be	 adequately	
understood	unless	they	are	set	in	the	context	of	what	he	writes	about	the	different	unions	
that	are	possible	between	human	beings	and	Christ.	
We	can	take	a	first	cue	from	a	more	recent	interpreter,	J.	V.	Fesko,	who	has	argued	
that	for	Vermigli,	justification	(of	a	kind	that	is	not	further	specified)	is	to	be	understood	
as	part	of	the	believer’s	“mystical	union”	with	Christ.53	What,	however,	 is	this	mystical	
union?	Vermigli	presents	his	thought	on	the	various	kinds	and	degrees	of	union	with	Christ	
comprehensively	 in	 two	 letters	 stemming	 from	 1555,	 written	 to	 Calvin	 and	 to	 Beza	
respectively.54	
																																																						
52	Joseph	C.	McLelland,	The	Visible	Words	of	God:	An	Exposition	of	the	Sacramental	Theology	of	Peter	Martyr	
Vermigli	(Edinburgh:	Oliver	&	Boyd,	1957),	142.	
53	J.	V.	Fesko,	Beyond	Calvin:	Union	with	Christ	and	Justification	in	Early	Modern	Reformed	Theology	(1517–
1700)	(Göttingen:	Vandenhoeck	&	Ruprecht,	2012),	200–206.	
54	The	letter	to	Calvin,	written	from	Strasbourg	on	8	March	1555	can	be	found	in	the	appendix	to	the	1583	
Latin	edition	of	the	loci	communes.	See	Pietro	Martire	Vermigli,	Loci	Communes	(1583),	ed.	Robert	Masson	
(London:	Th.	Vautrollerius,	1583),	1094–96.	A	translation	can	be	found	 in	Joseph	C.	McLelland	and	G.	E.	
Duffield,	eds.,	The	Life,	Early	Letters	and	Eucharistic	Writings	of	Peter	Martyr	 (Oxford:	Sutton	Courtenay	
Press,	1989),	343–48.	The	other	letter,	written	shortly	afterwards	to	Theodore	Beza	(a	friend	and	student	
of	Calvin’s,	and	a	Reformer	of	Lausanne),	is	equally	part	of	the	appendix	to	the	1583	Latin	edition	of	the	loci	
(Vermigli,	Loci	Communes	(1583),	1108–9.)	A	translation	of	this	letter	can	be	found	in	Vermigli,	Life,	Letters,	
and	Sermons,	134–37.	–	For	a	commentary	on	the	letters	see	also	Christian	Moser,	“Epistolary:	Theological	
Themes,”	in	A	Companion	to	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli,	ed.	W.	J.	Torrance	Kirby,	Emidio	Campi,	and	Frank	A.	
James	(Leiden/Boston:	Brill,	2009),	433–55;	(and	on	the	letter	to	Calvin	only)	W.	Duncan	Rankin,	“Calvin’s	
Correspondence	on	Our	Threefold	Union	with	Christ,”	in	The	Hope	Fulfilled:	Essays	in	Honor	of	O.	Palmer	
Robertson,	ed.	Robert	L.	Penny	(Phillipsburg:	P	&	R,	2008),	232–50.		
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Vermigli	distinguishes	between	three	degrees	of	union	with	Christ.	He	terms	the	
first	of	them	“natural,”	following	Hebrews	2:14	(“Since,	therefore,	the	children	share	flesh	
and	blood,	he	himself	likewise	shared	the	same	things”).55	This	first,	natural	union	with	
Christ	 is	 “not	 restricted	 to	 Christians”;	 indeed,	 Vermigli	 thinks	 that	 “Jews,	 Turks	 and	
everyone	included	in	a	census	of	human	beings	are	joined	with	Christ	in	this	way.”56	As	
McLelland	notes,	this	 indicates	that,	for	Vermigli,	“the	incarnation	was	the	preparation	
for	communicating	a	new	humanity	to	men.”57	The	fact	that	he	includes	this	dimension	in	
his	teaching	on	union	with	Christ	testifies	to	the	importance	of	the	notion	of	Christ	as	an	
exemplar	 for	 humanity,	 which,	 as	 Klaus	 Sturm	 has	 shown,	 is	 a	 central	 aspect	 of	 his	
Christology.58	
However,	this	‘natural’	union	is	only	a	step	towards	a	more	intensified	union	with	
Christ,	which	only	believers	can	attain,	a	union	which	Vermigli	calls	‘spiritual’.	The	telos	of	
this	 spiritual	 union	 is	 the	 restoration	 of	 human	 beings	 to	 their	 original	 dignity.	 This	
regeneration	 finds	 its	 ultimate	 fulfilment	 in	 the	 eschaton.	 It	 is	 evident	 that	 Vermigli	
associates	 this	 spiritual	 union	 with	 a	 progressive	 process	 of	 actual	 regeneration	 that	
already	begins	in	this	life,	as	he	writes	in	the	letter	to	Beza:	“We	begin	while	living	here	to	
have	 that	 nature	developed	 and	we	will	 have	 it	more	 restored	day	by	day	 and	 finally	
perfected	when	we	reach	the	blessed	resurrection.”59	It	is	worth	quoting	a	passage	on	this	
spiritual	union	from	Vermigli’s	letter	to	Calvin	in	full:	
Thus	are	[the	elect]	not	only	forgiven	their	sins	and	reconciled	to	God	(in	
which	the	true	and	solid	method	of	justification	consists)	but	further	there	
is	added	a	renewing	power	of	the	spirit,	by	which	our	bodies	also	–	flesh,	
blood	and	nature	–	are	made	capable	of	 immortality,	and	become	daily	
more	and	more	in	Christ's	form	(Christiformia)	as	I	may	say.	Not	that	they	
cast	aside	the	substance	of	their	own	nature	and	pass	into	the	very	body	
and	flesh	of	Christ,	but	that	they	no	less	approach	him	in	spiritual	gifts	and	
																																																						
55	Vermigli,	Loci	Communes	(1583),	1094.	
56	“Coniunctio	eiusdem	naturae	...	non	tamen	Christianis	est	propria,	sic	enim	Iudaei,	Turcae	et	quotquot	
hominum	censu	compraehenduntur	cum	Christo	coniunguntur.”	(Ibid.,	1108.)		
57	McLelland,	The	Visible	Words	of	God,	143.	
58	“Christus	hat	durch	seine	Menschwerdung	die	Natur	aller,	die	mit	ihm	im	Glauben	verbunden	sind,	rein	
gemacht.	Er	hat,	sich	unter	der	menschlichen	Natur	verbergend,	in	seinem	Leben	Beispiele	vollkommener	
Gerechtigkeit	gegeben.	Ein	Muster	(exemplar)	von	Reinheit	hat	er	durch	das	Anziehen	der	menschlichen	
Natur	…,	die	er	dadurch	rein	machte,	dargestellt.”	Sturm,	Die	Theologie	Peter	Martyr	Vermiglis,	133. 
59	 “Donis	 coelestis	 quae	 credendo	 sumus	 assequuti	 excultam	 habere	 hic	 vivendo	 incipimus	 et	 magis	
instauraram	 indies	 habebimus,	 ac	 denique	 perfectam	 cum	 ad	 beatam	 resurrectionem	 pervenerimus.”	
(Vermigli,	Loci	Communes	(1583),	1109.)	See	on	this	also	Sturm,	Die	Theologie	Peter	Martyr	Vermiglis,	209–
10.	
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properties	 than	at	birth	 they	naturally	 communicated	with	him	 in	body,	
flesh	and	blood.60	
This	spiritual	union	takes	place	when	believers	are	“made	holy,	 just,	and	adorned	with	
divine	properties”	through	their	union	with	Christ,	as	Vermigli	puts	it	in	the	other	letter.	
They	stand	no	longer	in	their	“unsteady	and	weak	flesh,”	but	“are	clothed	in	Christ’s	flesh”	
and	“live	and	move	in	the	soul	of	Christ.”61	In	short,	the	two	principal	unions	with	Christ	
that	Vermigli	recognises	are	(1)	a	natural	union	that	all	human	beings	receive	at	birth	and	
(2)	a	spiritual	union	that	believers	embrace	by	the	help	of	the	Holy	Spirit	and	that	signifies	
their	regeneration	into	the	image	of	Christ.		
Crucially,	 Vermigli	 posits	 also	 a	 third	 union	with	 Christ,	which	 shall	 be,	 for	my	
present	 purposes,	 the	 main	 focus.	 He	 teaches	 that	 there	 is	 an	 intermediate	 union	
between	the	two	unions	described	above;	indeed,	that	there	has	to	be	“a	middle,”	which	
is	secret,	“between	the	beginning	and	end	of	this	kind	of	communion.”62	He	refers	to	this	
middle	between	the	natural	and	spiritual	unions	with	Christ	not	only	as	“secret,”	but	also	
as	“mystical,”63	or	as	a	“union	…	of	a	hidden	mystery.”64	This	secret	and	mystical	union,	
is	the	fount	and	origin	of	all	the	heavenly	and	spiritual	likeness	which	we	
have	with	Christ.	It	is	that	by	which,	as	soon	as	we	believe,	we	obtain	Christ	
himself	as	our	true	Head,	and	are	made	his	members.	Whence,	from	the	
Head	 himself	 as	 Paul	 says	 [in	 Eph.	 4:16]	 his	 Spirit	 flows	 and	 is	 derived	
through	the	joints	and	ligaments	into	ourselves	as	his	true	and	legitimate	
members.	Wherefore	this	communion	with	our	Head	is	prior,	in	nature	at	
least	 though	 perhaps	 not	 in	 time,	 to	 that	 later	 communion	 which	 is	
introduced	through	regeneration.65	
																																																						
60	“Atque	illis	non	tantum	condonari	peccata	et	Deo	reconciliari,	qua	in	re	vera	et	solida	iustificationis	ratio	
sita	 est,	 sed	 etiam	 spiritus	 vim	 instaurantem	 addi,	 qua	 nostra	 quoque	 corpora,	 caro,	 sanguis	 et	 natura	
immortalitatis	 capacia	 fiunt	 et	 Christiformia	 (ut	 ita	 dixerim)	 indies	 magis	 ac	 magis	 evadunt.	 Non	 quod	
substantiam	 suae	 naturae	 abiiciant	 et	 reipsa	 in	 corpus	 atque	 carnem	 Christi	 transeant,	 sed	 quod	
spiritualibus	donis	atque	proprietatibus	notn	minus	ad	illum	accedant,	quam	corpore	carne	ac	sanguine	cum	
eo	iam	ab	ipsa	nativitate	naturaliter	communicaverint.”	(Vermigli,	Loci	Communes	(1583),	1095.)		
61	“[E]fficimur	sancti,	iusti,	proprietatibus	divinis	ornati	...	Unde	non	amplius	nostra	infirma	et	imbecilla	carne	
...	constamus,	verum	Christi	carne	vestimur,	...	Christi	animo	vivimus	et	movemur.”	(Ibid.,	1108.)	
62	“Caeterum	inter	initium	finemque	huiusmodi	communionis,	medium	est	necesse	...	quod	arcanum	est.”	
(Ibid.,	1109.)	
63	 “communionem	 ...	 mysticam;”	 “illum	 medium,	 arcanum,	 mysticumque”	 (Ibid.)	 “communionem	 ...	
mysticam”	(Ibid.,	1095.)	
64	“[H]anc	mediam	...	arcani	mysterii	dici	potest.”	(Vermigli,	Loci	Communes	(1583),	1109.)	
65	“[I]nter	has	duas	mediam	esse,	quae	sit	fons	et	origo	omnis	coelestis	et	spiritualis	similitudinis	quam	cum	
Christo	adipiscimur.	Et	ea	est	qua	statim	cum	credimus	Christum	ipsum	vere	caput	nostrum	nanciscimur	
efficimurque	ipsius	membra.	Unde	ab	ipso	capite	per	compagines	et	commissuras	(ut	inquit	Paulus)	spiritus	
eius	in	nos	tanquam	in	sua	vera	legitimaque	membra	fluit	ac	derivatur.	Proinde	communio	haec	nostra	cum	
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What	should	be	emphasised	about	the	character	of	this	secret	or	mystical	union	between	
the	 believer	 and	 Christ	 is	 that	 Vermigli	 consistently	 refers	 to	 it	 in	 terms	 of	 physical	
metaphors,	especially	the	head-and-members	metaphor.	The	passage	from	Paul’s	letter	
to	the	Ephesians	alluded	to	above	is	his	prime	reference	in	this	regard.	 In	the	letter	to	
Beza,	Vermigli	expressly	states	that	this	metaphor	of	Christ	as	the	head	and	the	believers	
as	his	members	 is	 the	way	 in	which	 the	Scriptures	hint	at	 the	mystery	of	 this	union	–	
together,	that	is,	with	the	metaphor	of	husband	and	wife	(here,	Vermigli	is	presumably	
referring	to	Eph	5:23:	“For	the	husband	is	the	head	of	the	wife	just	as	Christ	is	the	head	of	
the	church“).66		
What	 does	 the	 physicality	 of	 these	metaphors	mean	 for	 understanding	 of	 the	
mystical	union?	It	seems	that	for	Vermigli,	they	provide	a	means	of	envisioning	a	mystery	
that	otherwise	escapes	words.	We	may	nevertheless	infer	something	about	the	mystery	
from	the	metaphors.	The	head-and-members	metaphor	bespeaks	a	joining	of	the	faithful	
to	Christ,	who	 is	 their	head.	By	the	mystical	union,	Christ	 is	made	theirs,	and	they	are	
made	his,	as	Vermigli	teaches.	This	means	that	it	is	necessary	to	envisage	a	moment	when	
this	‘integration’	or	engrafting	happens.	In	fact,	there	are	strong	reasons	for	believing	that	
the	mystical	union	 is	the	very	moment	of	this	integration.	This	is	suggested	by	the	fact	
that,	for	Vermigli,	the	spiritual	union	with	Christ	becomes	possible	only	once	the	mystical	
union	 has	 been	 effected.	 Once	 the	 Christian	 is	 connected	 to	 Christ	 by	 this	 mystery,	
Vermigli	teaches,	a	connection	between	head	and	body	is	established:	the	believer	has	
become	–	as	Vermigli	repeatedly	phrases	it	–	“flesh	of	his	flesh	and	bones	of	his	bones.”67	
With	 this	 connection	established,	 from	 the	head	“various	gifts,	heavenly	benefits,	 and	
divine	properties	flow	down	into”	the	believers,	furthering	more	and	more	their	spiritual	
union	with	Christ.68		
Does	Vermigli	 also	envisage	a	 temporal	 sequence,	by	which	 the	 spiritual	union	
follows	the	mystical	union?	This	is	unlikely.	As	is	evident	from	the	quotation	above,	he	is	
hesitant	to	postulate	a	purely	temporal	‘before’	and	‘after’,	saying	that	the	mystical	union	
																																																						
capite	 prior	 est	 saltem	 natura	 licet	 fortasse	 non	 tempore,	 illa	 posteriori	 communione	 quae	 per	
instaurationem	inducitur.”	(Ibid.,	1095.)	
66	Ibid.,	1109.	
67	This	turn	of	phrase	is	used	in	both	letters:	Ibid.,	1095;	1109.	
68	“[V]aria	dona,	beneficia	coelestia,	divinaeque	proprietates	in	nos	derivantur.”	Ibid.,	1109.	
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“is	prior”	to	the	spiritual	union	“in	nature	…	though	perhaps	not	in	time.”69	This	means	
that	the	sequence	from	the	believers’	 ‘mystical’	engrafting	to	their	spiritual	union	with	
Christ	does	not	necessarily	have	to	be	envisaged	temporally.	The	one	is	indeed	prior	to	
the	other,	but	this	priority	can	be	a	priority	of	‘nature’	and	is	not	necessarily	one	of	time.	
This	suggestion	is	significant,	as	Vermigli	is	elsewhere	prone	to	temporal	sequences	in	the	
workings	of	grace.	In	the	Romans	scholium	on	justification,	for	instance,	he	sets	apart	the	
human	works	done	before	regeneration	(which	are	bound	to	be	sinful)	from	those	done	
after.70	 Similarly,	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 Chapter	 One	 how	 the	 main	 distinction	 between	
different	ways	 in	which	God	works	 in	human	actions	 functions	on	the	temporal	plane.	
Given	this,	Vermigli’s	comment,	that	the	relation	between	mystical	and	spiritual	union	is	
not	necessarily	one	of	temporal	succession,	is	remarkable.		
Vermigli’s	teaching	on	justification	and	his	conception	of	the	believer’s	union	with	
Christ	address	the	same	question:	how	God	bestows	his	grace	upon	human	beings.	As	we	
have	 just	 seen	 with	 regard	 to	 its	 relationship	 to	 a	 temporal	 sequence,	 however,	 his	
approach	 to	how	this	gift	 is	 given	differs	between	 the	 two	contexts.	More	differences	
emerge	 when	 one	 compares	 Vermigli’s	 answer	 to	 how	 God	 bestows	 his	 grace	 in	 the	
context	of	his	teaching	on	justification,	on	the	one	hand,	and	in	the	context	of	his	doctrine	
of	the	believer’s	union	with	Christ,	on	the	other	hand.	Indeed,	an	integration	of	Vermigli’s	
doctrines	 of	 justification	 and	 union	 with	 Christ	 will	 bring	 to	 the	 fore	 tensions	 in	 his	
teaching	on	 the	workings	 of	 grace.	 It	 is	 the	 task	 of	 the	next	 section	 to	 uncover	 these	
tensions.	
	
3)	The	Aporetic	Nature	of	Vermigli’s	Teaching	on	the	Workings	of	Grace	
What	is	the	relationship,	for	Vermigli,	between	the	believers’	union	with	Christ	and	their	
justification?	Given	that	he	distinguishes	different	kinds	of	justification,	and	three	kinds	
of	unions	with	Christ,	an	answer	to	this	question	ought	to	consider	these	subcategories.	
In	two	cases,	 it	 is	possible	to	align	one	kind	of	union	with	Christ	straightforwardly	with	
one	aspect	of	what	it	means	for	God	to	justify.		
																																																						
69	“Proinde	communio	haec	nostra	cum	capite	prior	est	saltem	natura	licet	fortasse	non	tempore.”	(Ibid.,	
1095.)	
70	 “Adhuc	 tempus,	 quo	 eduntur	 opera	 est	 distinguendum:	 nam	 quaedam	 fiunt	 antequam	 iustificemur,	
simusque	beneficium	regenerationis	consequuti,	alia	vero	sequuntur,	habenturque	ut	fructus	novae	vitae,	
atque	iustitiae	inchoatae.”	(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	520.)	
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First,	Vermigli’s	teaching	on	the	spiritual	union	of	the	elect	with	Christ	coincides	
with	the	kind	of	righteousness	through	which	the	faithful	bring	forth	good	and	holy	works,	
which	is	the	second	aspect	of	justification	in	the	Genesis	and	1	Corinthians	scholia,	as	well	
as	what	I	termed	Rom	IB.	The	gift	of	God’s	grace	is	in	both	these	cases	associated	with	an	
intrinsic	transformation	of	the	faithful,	which	bears	its	visible	fruit	in	the	holiness	of	their	
lives.	Moreover,	both	this	bestowal	of	righteousness	and	the	union	with	Christ	in	question	
have	the	character	of	a	dynamic	process	rather	than	 indicating	a	moment	 in	time	or	a	
stasis:	Vermigli	makes	clear	that	the	‘second’/Rom	IB	righteousness	can	be	augmented	
through	frequent	repetition,	eventually	 leading	to	a	habit.	Similarly,	the	spiritual	union	
with	Christ	is	processual,	gradually	leading	to	more	and	more	similarity	with	Christ.	There	
is,	however,	a	difference	in	how	much	this	process	is	oriented	towards	the	beatific	vision.	
This	orientation	is	made	more	explicit	in	the	case	of	the	spiritual	union	with	Christ	than	in	
the	context	of	the	second	(or	Rom	IB)	justification.	
Secondly,	 Vermigli’s	 mystical	 or	 secret	 union	 coincides	 with	 Rom	 IA,	 the	
justification	through	which	believers	are	endowed	with	the	Spirit	of	God.	This	can	be	seen,	
first,	from	the	way	in	which	Vermigli	describes	both	as	moments	in	which	the	believer	is	
partly	lifted	out	of	his	or	her	fallen	human	nature.	In	the	Romans	scholium,	Vermigli	states	
that	 through	 this	 justification,	God	 endows	human	beings	with	 his	 Spirit	 and	 “renews	
them	fully	by	restoring	the	strength	of	their	minds	and	by	retrieving	their	human	faculties	
from	the	greater	part	of	their	natural	corruption.”71	Similarly,	the	integration	in	Christ	that	
is	effected	through	the	mystical	union	means	for	Vermigli	that	“we	are	lifted	up	from	the	
level	of	nature	so	that	we	are	joined	to	Christ	even	as	members	are	joined	to	their	head.”72	
However,	it	is	not	only	the	language	of	an	elevation	out	of	the	fallen	human	nature	that	
indicates	 a	 parallel	 between	 Rom	 IA	 and	 the	mystical	 union,	 but	 also,	 secondly,	 their	
character	as	the	beginning	of	a	process.	We	have	seen	that	both	spiritual	union	and	Rom	
IB	 have	 a	 processual	 character.	 Accordingly,	mystical	 union	 and	 Rom	 IA	 are	 both	 the	
beginnings	of	these	processes,	even	if	not	necessarily	through	a	temporal	sequence:	Rom	
IA	is	the	condition	for	Rom	IB	(“second,	when	he	has	fashioned	and	renewed	them	in	this	
																																																						
71	“Cum	suo	spiritu	illos	refingit,	totosque	renovat,	instaurando	vires	animi	eorum	et	a	bona	parte	nativae	
labis	humanas	facultates	afferendo.”	(Ibid.,	517.)	
72	“A	naturae	itaque	gradu	per	fidem	attollimur,	ut	Christo	ceu	membra	capiti	suo	iungamur.”	(Vermigli,	Loci	
Communes	(1583),	1109.)	
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way,	 he	 gives	 right	 and	 holy	works	…”)73	 as	much	 as	 the	 secret	mystical	 union	 is	 the	
condition	for	the	spiritual	union	(it	is	“prior,	in	nature	at	least	though	perhaps	not	in	time,”	
as	seen	above).74		
In	 sum,	we	 can	 conclude	 that	 the	 two	 aspects	 of	 the	 justification	 in	 re	 of	 the	
Romans	scholium	parallel	the	mystical	and	spiritual	unions	with	Christ	both	regarding	their	
individual	 elements	 and	 concerning	 their	 respective	 relation	 or	 “proportion”	 to	 each	
other.	It	indeed	seems	warranted	to	say	that	when	Vermigli	writes	of	the	two	in	re	aspects	
of	God’s	bestowal	of	righteousness	in	the	Romans	scholium,	he	thinks	of	what	he	will	later	
call	two	different	degrees	of	the	believer’s	union	with	Christ:	mystical	and	spiritual.	
The	 question	 remains,	 however,	 how	 we	 are	 to	 understand	 the	 relationship	
between	the	mystical	union	with	Christ	of	Vermigli’s	letters,	and	the	forensic	counting-to-
be-just	of	Rom	II	(or	the	first	aspects	of	righteousness	in	the	Genesis	and	1	Corinthians	
scholia).	A	recent	debate	in	Calvin	scholarship	is	 illuminating	regarding	this	question.	A	
number	of	commentators	have	argued	that	the	doctrine	of	union	with	Christ	is	the	real	
core	of	Calvin’s	theology	of	grace,	in	contrast	to	the	more	traditional	view,	which	deemed	
that	forensic	justification	and	an	ensuing	clear-cut	order	of	salvation	–	first	justification,	
then	sanctification,	then	glorification,	etc.	–	was	of	primary	importance	to	Calvin.75	In	the	
more	traditional	view,	union	with	Christ	 is	secondary	in	importance	in	the	ordo	salutis.	
J.	V.	Fesko	has	recently	made	a	case	for	this	more	traditional	view	in	a	monograph	on	the	
doctrines	of	union	with	Christ	and	justification	in	early	modern	Reformed	theology.	In	a	
chapter	devoted	to	Vermigli,	he	takes	issue	with	Mark	Garcia	over	how	best	to	understand	
Vermigli’s	letters	on	union	with	Christ	in	relation	to	his	teaching	on	justification.76	Garcia	
argues	that	for	Vermigli,	the	mystical	union	with	Christ	is	an	engrafting	into	Christ	by	faith,	
from	which	then	flows	the	spiritual	union	which	has	the	twofold	blessing	of	justification	
																																																						
73	“Deinde	cum	iam	 ipsos	sic	 restituit	ac	refinxit,	opera	 largitur	recta	et	sancta.”	 (Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	
517.)	
74	“Proinde	communio	haec	nostra	cum	capite	prior	est	saltem	natura	licet	fortasse	non	tempore.”	(Vermigli,	
Loci	Communes	(1583),	1095.)	
75	Dennis	E.	Tamburello,	Union	with	Christ :	John	Calvin	and	the	Mysticism	of	St.	Bernard,	1st	ed.	(Louisville,	
Ky.:	Westminster	John	Knox	Press,	1994);	Mark	A.	Garcia,	Life	in	Christ:	Union	with	Christ	and	Twofold	Grace	
in	Calvin’s	Theology	 (Milton	Keynes:	Paternoster,	2008);	John	McClean,	“Perichoresis,	Theosis	and	Union	
with	Christ	in	the	Thought	of	John	Calvin,”	The	Reformed	Theological	Review	68,	no.	2	(2009):	130–41;	Julie	
Canlis,	Calvin’s	Ladder :	A	Spiritual	Theology	of	Ascent	and	Ascension	(Grand	Rapids,	MI:	Eerdmans,	2010).	
76	 Fesko,	Beyond	Calvin:	Union	with	 Christ	 and	 Justification	 in	 Early	Modern	Reformed	 Theology	 (1517–
1700),	esp.	188-206.	
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and	 sanctification.77	 This	 means	 that,	 for	 Garcia,	 justification	 and	 sanctification	 “are	
distinct	but	inseparable	graces	that	come	to	us	simultaneously	in	our	union	with	Christ.”78	
In	 contrast	 to	 this,	 Fesko	 argues	 that	 for	 Vermigli,	 the	 believer’s	 union	 with	 Christ	 is	
“dissected,”79	meaning	that	for	him	there	is	a	clear	sequence	in	the	ordo	salutis.	This	order	
starts	with	a	“predestinarian	union,”	followed	by	an	“incarnational	union,”	and	finally	a	
“mystical	union.”	As	a	subcategory	under	the	heading	of	mystical	union,	Fesko’s	Vermigli	
subsumes	first	“regeneration”	and	then	“justification.”	All	of	this	is	logically	succeeded	by	
the	 “spiritual	 union”	 that	 is	 comprised	 of	 “renovation,”	 “sanctification,”	 and	
“glorification.”80	Fesko	does	not	directly	specify	to	which	of	Vermigli’s	various	aspects	of	
justification	he	refers;	however,	it	is	implied	at	various	points	in	his	argument	that	what	
he	means	is	a	forensic	justification.81	
While	 this	 is	not	 the	place	 to	enter	directly	 into	 this	debate	among	scholars	of	
Calvin,	 let	us	nonetheless	note	one	consequence	of	Fesko’s	 interpretation	of	Vermigli.	
Fesko’s	argument	implies	that	Vermigli’s	mystical	union	may	not	only	be	associated	with	
the	bestowal	of	righteousness	of	Rom	IA	(as	we	have	argued	above),	but	also	with	the	
forensic	 understanding	 of	 Rom	 II.	 Fesko	 argues	 that	 the	moment	 of	 ‘integration’	 into	
Christ,	which,	as	we	have	seen,	characterises	the	mystical	or	secret	union,	really	 is	the	
moment	in	which	God	absolves	the	believers	from	their	sins	and	counts	them	just	through	
imputing	Christ’s	righteousness	to	them.	As	much	as	one	might	perhaps	want	to	question	
the	 fruitfulness	 of	 Fesko’s	 hermeneutics	 of	 “dissection”	 and	 his	 insistence	 on	 strictly	
temporal	sequences,	there	are	reasons	to	believe	that	his	interpretation	here	is	correct.		
On	the	one	hand,	both	the	mystical	union	and	forensic	justification	designate,	for	
Vermigli,	a	crucial	moment	of	fundamental	change	in	the	life	of	the	believer.	This	change	
takes	the	form,	in	one	case,	of	a	newly	found	conjunction	with	Christ	and,	in	the	other	
case,	of	a	newly	found	remission	of	sins.	It	seems	conceivable,	and	indeed	plausible,	that	
this	 refers	 to	 one	 and	 the	 same	 moment	 and	 one	 and	 the	 same	 change,	 not	 two	
independent	changes.	On	the	other	hand,	Vermigli	himself	suggests	such	a	coincidence,	
																																																						
77	Garcia,	Life	in	Christ,	273–87.	
78	Ibid.,	283.	
79	So	the	title	of	his	chapter	on	Vermigli:	“Union	with	Christ	Dissected”.	Fesko,	Beyond	Calvin:	Union	with	
Christ	and	Justification	in	Early	Modern	Reformed	Theology	(1517–1700),	188–206.	
80	Ibid.,	200.	
81	He	writes	for	instance	that	Vermigli	is	“very	careful	to	preserve	the	forensic	nature	of	justification	and	
fence	it	from	the	believer’s	good	works.”	Ibid.	(emphasis	mine).	
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in	 a	 passage	 that	we	have	 already	partly	 encountered	 in	 our	 exposition	 above.	When	
explaining	his	 threefold	distinction	 in	 the	unions	with	Christ,	 right	after	describing	 the	
natural	union,	he	adds:		
So	 besides	 that	 communion	 this	 is	 added,	 that	 in	 due	 season	 faith	 is	
breathed	into	the	elect	whereby	they	may	believe	in	Christ.	Thus	are	they	
not	only	forgiven	their	sins	and	reconciled	to	God	(in	which	the	true	and	
solid	method	of	justification	consists)	but	further	there	is	added	a	renewing	
power	of	the	spirit.82	
The	‘addition’	of	the	power	of	the	Holy	Spirit	refers	to	the	spiritual	union.	Therefore,	that	
which	precedes	 it	must	denote	the	‘opening’	of	this	spiritual	union,	which,	as	we	have	
seen,	is	the	mystical	union.	This	means	that	in	the	quotation	above,	Vermigli	maintains	
that	the	mystical	union	consists	in	“the	true	and	solid	method	of	justification.”	It	seems	
likely	that	he	refers	to	a	forensic	 justification	here	because	he	characterises	 it	a)	as	an	
extrinsic	bestowal	of	faith	(“breathed	into”),	and	b)	as	an	acquittal	of	sin	and	reconciliation	
with	God,	both	of	which	evoke	‘forensic’	connotations.		
However,	if	it	is	true	that,	for	Vermigli,	the	forensic	justification	of	Rom	II	coincides	
with	the	mystical	union,	and	if	it	is	equally	the	case	–	as	we	have	shown	above	–	that	the	
mystical	union	is	the	same	as	the	incipient	internal	justification	of	Rom	IA,	then	we	are	
faced	with	an	aporia.	For	this	means	that	the	believers’	change,	which	Vermigli	dubs	their	
“mystical	union”	with	Christ,	is	simultaneously	extrinsic	(as	Vermigli	insists	Rom	II	is)	and	
intrinsic	 (like	 Rom	 IA).	 As	 a	 result,	 understanding	 the	 Romans	 scholium	 is	 not	 as	
straightforward	as	it	might	seem,	for	‘through	the	detour’	of	their	respective	equations	
with	the	mystical	union,	Rom	IA	and	Rom	II	coincide.	The	same	is	true	for	Vermigli’s	notion	
of	a	“forensic”	justification,	which	now	paradoxically	coincides	with	a	justification	in	re.	
This	coincidence	of	an	intrinsic	and	an	extrinsic	gift	of	grace,	I	venture,	points	to	an	aporia	
at	the	heart	of	Vermigli’s	understanding	of	the	way	God’s	grace	is	given.	
Nota	bene,	this	gift	does	not	concern	whether	human	beings	are	“just”	in	the	sense	
that	they	will	not	commit	sinful	acts	after	they	have	been	justified	or	united	with	Christ.	
Vermigli	 could	not	be	 further	 from	suggesting	 that	 justified	human	beings	are	perfect.	
Rather,	the	gift	of	grace	that	we	have	found	to	be	aporetic	relates	to	a	more	fundamental	
																																																						
82	“Ideo	praeter	illam	hoc	accedit,	electis	destinato	tempore	fidem	adspirari,	qua	in	Christum	credant,	atque	
illis	non	tantum	condonari	peccata	et	Deo	reconciliari,	qua	in	re	vera	et	solida	iustificationis	ratio	sita	est,	
sed	etiam	spiritus	vim	instaurantem	addi.”	(Vermigli,	Loci	Communes	(1583),	1095.)	
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‘making	 right’	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 God	 and	 human	 beings.	 Another	 way	 of	
framing	this	would	be	to	say	that	it	concerns	original	sin,	and	the	way	this	sin	is	(or	is	not)	
taken	 away.	 As	we	 have	 seen	 in	 chapter	 one,	 however,	 Vermigli’s	 stance	 on	whether	
original	sin	is	taken	away	in	baptism	through	faith	somehow	wavers.	For	while	Vermigli	
holds	that	the	guilt	of	original	sin	is	forgiven	in	baptism	and	through	faith	in	Christ,	neither	
baptism	 nor	 faith	 do	 away	with	 the	 fact	 that	 human	 beings	 are	 ‘originally’	 sinful,	 for	
Vermigli.	Insisting	that	“it	is	not	perfectly	true	that	original	sin	is	abolished	in	the	believers	
and	 in	 those	who	 are	 baptised,”	 he	 holds	 that	 “the	matter	 of	 sin	 still	 remains,”	 even	
though	it	is	“broken	and	of	little	force.”83	This	wavering	in	Vermigli’s	position	on	whether	
original	sin	is	taken	away	in	baptism	foreshadows	the	aporia	we	have	now	encountered.	
Or,	to	put	this	differently:	the	aporia	concerns	the	fact	that	when	considering	God’s	gift	
of	‘making	right’	his	relationship	with	human	beings,	Vermigli	sometimes	–	but	not	always	
–	holds	that	this	gift	is	given	such	that	it	takes	away	original	sin.	The	reason	that	he	does	
not	always	hold	this,	is	that	he	shifts	the	focus	to	the	conditions	of	possibility	of	receiving	
the	gift.	His	reasoning	for	saying	so	–	as	seen	in	the	context	of	his	teaching	on	original	sin	
–	 is	 that	 experience	 teaches	 that	 “the	 corruption	of	 nature	 remains”	 and	 that	 human	
beings	hence	are	“unapt	for	divine	things,”	unable	to	receive	God’s	gifts.84		
The	crux	of	the	aporia	we	have	encountered	therefore	lies	in	the	question	whether	
God’s	 gift	 of	 grace	 can	 be	 received	 as	 such	 by	 human	 beings.	 Christopher	 Castaldo	
illustrates	this	by	contrasting	Vermigli’s	theology	of	justification	with	Cardinal	John	Henry	
Newman’s:85	On	the	one	hand,	there	is	the	belief,	which	Castaldo	(only	in	part	rightly,	as	
we	shall	see	below)	associates	with	Vermigli,	 that	human	beings	are	unable	to	receive	
God’s	grace	because	of	 their	 fallen	nature.	They	cannot	 receive	 the	gift,	because	 their	
fallenness	inescapably	corrupts	it.	Through	their	very	reception	of	the	gift,	they	defile	it.	
In	order	to	circumvent	this	problem,	God	has	to	bestow	his	grace	in	such	a	way	that	it	
remains	 extrinsic	 to	 human	 beings,	 at	 least	 in	 its	 ‘initial’	 justifying	moment.	 Castaldo	
																																																						
83	 “Reatus	 enim,	 et	 offensa	Dei	 per	 fidem	 in	Christum	 in	baptismo	 condonatur,	 quamvis	 adhuc	materia	
peccati	 supersit.	 Quae	 quamvis	 in	 hominibus	 sanctis	 fracta	 et	 debilitata	 sit,	 tamen	 perfectam	 eius	
expoliationem	non	nisi	in	morte	consequimur.“	(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	151.)	
84	“Quisque	enim	nostrum	in	se	ipso	experitur	naturae	corruptionem	esse	residuam:	quum	adhuc	quoque	
in	peccata	perpetuo	ruamus.	Ad	reas	autem	divinas	corpore	animoque	inepti	simus.“	(Ibid.)	
85	Castaldo,	“The	Grammar	of	Justification.”	I	am	aware	that	this	PhD	thesis	has	been	published	in	2017	as	
Justified	in	Christ,	but	I	have	not	had	the	chance	to	access	a	copy	of	this	monograph.	
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shows	that	Newman’s	approach	exemplifies	a	systematic	alternative	to	this	outlook.86	It	
consists	–	in	short	–	in	holding	that	the	gift	of	grace	is	God	himself	in	Christ.	This	gift	of	
Christ	to	the	believer	is	purely	gratuitous,	and	usually	given	in	baptism.	Christ	transforms	
whoever	receives	him	‘from	the	inside.’	This	gift,	moreover,	can	be	received	in	its	integrity	
precisely	because	it	is	a	real	presence	of	the	Divine	in	the	human	being,	a	shekinah.	The	
presence	of	Christ	cannot	be	corrupted	by	the	fallen	nature	of	human	beings.	
Against	the	background	of	these	alternatives,	we	can	now	describe	the	aporia	in	
Vermigli’s	understanding	of	the	workings	of	grace	more	precisely:	it	lies	in	the	fact	that	
Vermigli	both	affirms	that	fallen	human	beings	can	receive	God’s	gift	of	grace,	which	is	
intrinsically	transforming,	and	that	their	nature	has	the	power	to	corrupt	the	integrity	of	
this	gift.	That	he	affirms	the	former	is	evident	from	his	teaching	about	the	mystical	union	
with	Christ,	which	essentially	amounts	to	affirming	that	the	change	effected	by	grace	in	
human	beings	is	intrinsically	transforming:	when	“Christ	is	made	ours	and	we	his,”87	this	
hardly	 happens	merely	 forensically,	 or	 extrinsically.	 That	 Vermigli	 affirms	 the	 latter	 is	
particularly	 clear	 in	 the	 Romans	 scholium,	 where	 he	 writes	 that	 –	 unless	 it	 is	 given	
extrinsically	–	God’s	gift	of	grace	is	defiled	by	human	fallenness:	the	“righteousness	and	
renewal	 by	 which	 we	 are	 created	 anew	 by	 God”	 is	 “imperfect	 because	 of	 our	
corruption.”88	Therefore,	at	 its	 clearest,	 the	aporia	means	 that	 if	human	beings	are	so	
depraved	that	they	can	only	be	saved	by	extrinsic	grace,	how	can	this	 initially	extrinsic	
grace	really	change	them,	if	it	is	not	really	transformative	from	the	outset?	In	other	words,	
in	a	‘purely’	forensic	view	of	the	gift	of	grace,	there	is	always	the	problem	of	how	this	gift	
transforms	 and	 sanctifies	 human	 beings.	 Because	 if	 human	 beings	 have	 the	 power	 to	
resist	 God’s	 transformative	 grace,	 does	 this	 not	 imply	 that	 God’s	 grace	 is	 not	 really	
transformative?		
It	 might	 be	 objected	 that	 it	 is	 not	 fair	 to	 compare	 two	 different	 discourses	 –	
Vermigli’s	programmatic	and	polemical	scholia	about	justification	and	his	letters	to	friends	
about	union	with	Christ	–	and	detect	a	tension	between	them.	Could	the	differences	not	
be	explained	by	the	respective	contexts?	It	is	indeed	fair	to	say	that	the	genre	and	context	
																																																						
86	See	on	this	and	the	following	ibid.,	141–54.	
87	“Christus	...	efficitur	noster	et	nos	illius.”	(Vermigli,	Loci	Communes	(1583),	1095.)	
88	 “Idcirco	 autem	 dicimus,	 in	 ea	 iustitia	 et	 instauratione	 qua	 reformamur	 a	 Deo	 non	 posse	 esse	
iustificationem	 quod	 ea	 nostro	 vitio	 imperfecta	 sit,	 neque	 possimus	 cum	 ea	 ad	 tribunal	 Christi	
consistere.”(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	548.)	
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of	the	two	discourses	is	very	different.	Anyone	is	likely	to	articulate	his	or	her	thoughts	
differently	when	teaching	in	a	context	where	this	teaching	is	likely	going	to	be	met	with	
hostility,	or	at	least	stir	controversy	(as	was	the	case	for	Vermigli	in	Oxford),	on	the	one	
hand,	or	when	writing	personal	letters	to	companions	whom	they	know	will	agree	with	
them,	 on	 the	 other	 hand.	 Nevertheless,	 there	 is	 good	 reason	 to	 combine	 the	 two	
discourses.	First,	both	touch	on	how	God	bestows	his	grace	on	human	beings,	and	are	
therefore	conceptually	related.	But	what	is	more,	the	argument	for	the	aporia	I	have	been	
describing	could	be	made	even	if	the	two	letters	on	the	union	with	Christ	were	left	aside.	
It	could	be	made	on	the	basis	of	the	Romans	scholium	and	its	various	understandings	of	
justification	 only,	 if	 it	 is	 granted	 that	 Vermigli’s	 focus	 on	 Rom	 II	 rather	 than	 Rom	 I	 is	
motivated	by	didactic	or	rhetorical	reasons	rather	than	a	fundamental	objection,	as	I	have	
argued.		
As	 observed	 in	 section	 one	 above,	 there	 is	 a	 tension	 in	 the	 Romans	 scholium	
between	 Vermigli’s	 endorsement	 of	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 ‘real’	 justification	 which	
intrinsically	changes	its	beneficiaries,	on	the	one	hand,	and	his	teaching	that	God’s	gift	of	
justification	cannot	really	be	received	by	human	beings	due	to	their	 fallenness,	on	the	
other	hand.	This	tension	 is	a	manifestation	of	the	same	aporia	that	we	have	described	
through	the	integration	of	his	teachings	on	justification	and	on	union	with	Christ.	Again,	
the	crux	lies	in	the	issue	whether	and	how	God’s	gift	of	grace	can	be	received	by	human	
beings.		
Moreover,	and	more	importantly,	the	same	aporia	manifests	itself	in	the	Romans	
scholium	with	regard	to	the	way	Vermigli	describes	the	nature	of	the	gift	of	faith	in	 its	
relation	to	the	gift	of	righteousness	in	justification.	We	have	seen	above	how	faith,	for	
Vermigli,	is	the	capacity	to	grasp	God’s	promises	and	his	righteousness:	through	faith	“we	
take	hold	of	the	promises	of	God	and	the	righteousness	and	merits	of	Christ	and	apply	
them	to	ourselves.”89	The	importance	of	such	an	apprehension	is	in	direct	proportion	to	
Vermigli’s	emphasis	that	God’s	own	righteousness,	which	is	not	communicated	to	human	
beings,	is	the	sole	formal	cause	of	justification.	The	more	Vermigli	emphasises	that	God’s	
own	righteousness	is	not	communicated	to	human	beings,	the	greater	the	significance	of	
																																																						
89	“[P]romissiones	Dei	et	Christi	iustitiam	meritaque	per	ipsam	apprehendimus	et	nobis	applicamus.”	Ibid.,	
521;	Vermigli,	Predestination	and	Justification,	96.)	
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a	human	capacity	to	grasp	God’s	righteousness.	There	has	to	be	some	bridge	or	medium	
between	 God’s	 righteousness	 and	 the	 individual	 believer,	 or	 else	 the	 former	 is	
meaningless.	Faith	is	supposed	to	be	this	medium,	yet	its	origin	is	not	entirely	obvious,	as	
we	shall	see.		
The	question	is,	is	faith	given	by	God,	or	is	it	something	human	in	origin?	Vermigli	
holds	that	an	unregenerate	person	is	incapable	of	having	true	faith	and	that	the	Holy	Spirit	
must	 first	 restore	the	fallen	nature	of	human	beings	before	they	can	have	faith.90	This	
process	has	been	termed	“regeneration.”	Accordingly,	contemporary	commentators	have	
held	 that	 in	 the	 Romans	 scholium,	 “regeneration	 logically	 precedes	 forensic	
justification.”91	In	this	view,	it	is	the	Holy	Spirit	who	first	enables	human	beings	through	
regeneration	to	have	faith	in	God.	Once	they	have	faith,	however,	they	are	justified	by	
this	 faith.	According	 to	Vermigli,	 the	origin	of	 faith	 is	 therefore	God,	 through	 the	Holy	
Spirit.		
Again	we	may	ask:	in	what	way	does	the	Holy	Spirit	give	faith	to	human	beings?	
Does	he	give	it	in	such	a	way	that	they	are	intrinsically	changed?	Or	is	it	another	extrinsic	
gift?	We	have	seen	that	the	initial	premise	of	Vermigli’s	refutation	of	the	doctrine	of	the	
Council	of	Trent	was	that	nothing	in	human	beings	can	cause	or	assist	in	their	justification:	
their	works	are	corrupted	through	their	 fallenness,	and	God’s	righteousness	cannot	be	
communicated	to	 them	without	being	defiled	as	well.	Therefore,	what	God	recognizes	
when	 justifying	 human	 beings	 is	 not	 intrinsic	 but	 extrinsic	 to	 them,	 namely,	 Christ’s	
righteousness.	Individuals	can	apply	this	righteousness	to	themselves	through	faith.	If	this	
faith	 is	 given	 to	 human	beings,	 is	 it	 given	 to	 them	 in	 the	 same	way	 as	 righteousness,	
namely	extrinsically?	If	the	initial	premise	–	that	nothing	in	human	beings	can	cause	their	
justification	 –	 still	 applies,	 then	 it	 would	 have	 to	 be	 extrinsic,	 since	 faith	 causes	
																																																						
90	“The	faith	by	which	we	embrace	Christ	comes	from	the	Spirit	of	God,	through	whom	our	inward	man	is	
made	strong.”	And	again:	“So	there	is	no	doubt	that	faith	is	engendered	in	our	hearts	by	the	Holy	Spirit.	…	
he	suddenly	pours	faith	into	the	elect,	yet	insofar	as	he	is	the	cause	of	faith	he	is,	therefore,	before	it	both	
in	dignity	and	order.”	/	“[F]idem	eam,	qua	Christum	amplectimur,	proficisci	a	spiritu	Dei,	quo	interor	noster	
homo	confirmatur.	...	Quare	dubitandum	non	est,	fidem	pectoribus	nostris	ingenerati	per	spiritum	sanctum.	
...	 In	 electis	 fidem	 repente	 inserat,	 tamen	quoniam	 causa	 est	 fidei	 prior	 est	 illa	 et	 dignitate	 et	 ordine.”	
(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	562;	Vermigli,	Predestination	and	Justification,	190–91.)	
91	James,	“De	Justificatione:	The	Evolution	of	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli’s	Doctrine	of	Justification,”	331.	See	also	
J.	 V.	 Fesko,	 who	 claims	 that	 in	 the	 Romans	 scholium	 “regeneration	 …	 logically	 precedes	 justification,”	
because	“Vermigli	argues	that	justification	and	forgiveness	of	sins	can	in	no	way	be	attributed	to	anything	
in	 the	 believer.”	 (Fesko,	 Beyond	 Calvin:	 Union	 with	 Christ	 and	 Justification	 in	 Early	 Modern	 Reformed	
Theology	(1517–1700),	199.)	
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justification.	Faith	would	have	to	be	given	to	human	beings	in	such	a	way	that	it	remains	
external	to	them.	But	if	this	were	the	case,	how	could	human	beings	apprehend	the	faith	
that	 allows	 them	 to	 apprehend	 the	 promise	 of	 their	 justification	 in	 Christ?	 This	 could	
potentially	lead	to	an	infinite	regress,	since	each	gift,	insofar	as	it	would	have	to	remain	
extrinsic,	could	not	be	apprehended	unless	it	were	enabled	by	another,	yet	earlier	gift.	
Vermigli	avoids	such	an	infinite	regress,	and	this	indicates	that	he	believes	that	the	
gift	of	 faith	 is	one	that	 intrinsically	 transforms	human	beings.	This	means	that	when	 it	
comes	to	the	gift	of	faith,	he	does	not	retain	the	premise	that	God’s	gift	has	to	remain	
extrinsic	to	its	receiver	in	order	for	it	to	retain	its	integrity.	When	God	pours	faith	into	the	
elect,	 this	 faith	 is	 communicated	 to	 them	 in	an	 intrinsic	way,	 such	 that	 the	Holy	Spirit	
“changes	and	makes	a	new	heart	and	mind.”92	For	a	human	heart	will	“perpetually	resist”	
God’s	 gifts,	 unless	 it	 “has	 been	 renewed	 by	 the	 Spirit	 and	 the	 grace	 of	 God”	 and	 is	
“inwardly	changed.”93	At	this	point,	therefore,	Vermigli	not	only	allows	for	a	gift	of	God’s	
grace	 to	work	 intrinsically;	 his	 theology	 actively	 demands	 such	 an	 intrinsic	working	 of	
grace,	as	nothing	else	has	the	power	to	enable	faith	in	fallen	human	beings.		
Consequently,	even	though	Vermigli	asserts	that	the	formal	cause	of	justification	
must	be	extrinsic	to	human	beings,	he	maintains	that	the	formal	cause	of	faith	is	intrinsic	
to	them.	Indeed,	he	asserts	that	faith	is	a	gift	that	intrinsically	changes	human	beings,	and	
it	is	through	this	assertion	that	he	avoids	the	infinite	regress	I	mentioned.	In	the	case	of	
the	gift	of	faith,	Vermigli	therefore	changes	the	premise	that	human	nature	has	the	power	
to	corrupt	the	integrity	of	a	Divine	gift	–	a	premise	that	he	maintains	with	regard	to	the	
gift	of	righteousness	in	justification.	In	the	case	of	faith,	he	affirms	that	God’s	gift	can	be	
received	by	human	beings,	inhere	in	them,	and	intrinsically	change	them.	It	is	not	evident	
that	 he	 should	 conceive	 the	 gift	 of	 faith	 so	 differently	 from	 the	 gift	 of	 righteousness,	
especially	since	he	asserts	that	justification	is	by	faith	and	that	therefore	the	two	gifts	are	
most	intimately	related.	Indeed,	the	fact	that	he	makes	this	distinction	in	the	way	they	
are	received	is	a	manifestation	of	the	aporia	we	have	encountered	above.	For	in	doing	so,	
Vermigli	 both	 affirms	 that	 fallen	 human	 beings	 can	 receive	 a	 Divine	 gift	 such	 that	 it	
																																																						
92	“[A]b	afflatu	spiritus	sancti	profectum	qui	cor	atque	animum	immutet	et	refingat.”	(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	
563;	Vermigli,	Predestination	and	Justification,	193.)	
93	“Sed	animus	humanus	nisi	innovetur	spiritu	et	gratia	Dei	...	nisi	penitus	immutetur,	ea	perpetuo	respuet.”	
(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	547;	Vermigli,	Predestination	and	Justification,	157.)	
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intrinsically	 transforms	them,	while	also	holding	that	their	nature	 is	such	that	 it	would	
corrupt	the	integrity	of	the	gift	unless	it	is	given	to	them	only	extrinsically.		
We	can	conclude,	therefore,	that	the	aporia	we	first	observed	when	combining	
Vermigli’s	teaching	on	justification	with	his	views	on	the	union	with	Christ	is	present	even	
in	the	polemical	context	of	the	Romans	scholium	alone.	Even	here,	Vermigli	 retains	an	
element	 which	 cannot	 be	 subsumed	 under	 a	 forensic	 understanding	 of	 God’s	 gift,	
especially	through	his	understanding	of	the	nature	of	faith.	Therefore,	the	aporia	I	have	
been	 describing	 merely	 manifests	 itself	 more	 clearly	 through	 combining	 Vermigli’s	
teaching	on	justification	with	his	doctrine	of	the	union	with	Christ,	but	the	argument	for	
it	is	not	dependent	on	this	combination.	
	
4)	The	Implied	Metaphysics	of	the	Workings	of	Grace	and	Gift	in	Vermigli	
We	have	shown	that	there	is	an	aporia	inherent	in	Vermigli’s	theology	of	the	workings	of	
grace.	 What	 does	 this	 mean,	 especially	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 metaphysical	
framework	 underlying	 Vermigli’s	 thought?	 As	 we	 will	 see	 in	 this	 section,	 the	 aporia	
indicates	that	this	framework	is	not	uniform.	More	specifically,	the	disjunction	of	the	two	
elements	that	form	the	aporia	is	caused	by	the	fact	that	each	of	them	is	sustained	by	a	
different	metaphysical	 understanding	 of	 how	God’s	 being	 and	 the	 being	 of	 the	world	
relate.	
The	first	of	the	two	conflicting	assertions	that	led	to	the	aporia	comes	down	to	the	
fact	 that	human	beings	can	be	 intrinsically	 transformed	by	a	divine	gift.	This	assertion	
demands	 a	metaphysical	 framework	 in	which	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 conceptualise	 that	 God	
works	within	human	beings.	Moreover,	God’s	work	in	human	beings	must	not	obliterate	
their	own	‘work’;	their	faith	is	theirs	as	a	gift,	after	all,	even	though	it	is	inspired	in	them	
by	the	Holy	Spirit.	Consequently,	a	metaphysical	framework	sustaining	this	must	allow	for	
a	 non-competitive	 relationship	 of	 divine	 and	 human	 agencies.	 This	 is	 only	 possible,	
however,	where	there	is	a	qualitative	difference	between	the	way	God	acts,	and	the	way	
in	which	human	beings	act.	And	this	in	turn	is	only	possible	where	God’s	being	is	thought	
to	be	qualitatively	different	from	the	way	human	beings	are.	For	if	they	acted	or	existed	
in	the	same	way	or	on	the	same	‘plane’,	they	would	necessarily	be	in	a	sort	of	tug-of-war:	
more	Divine	action	would	mean	less	human	action;	more	of	God’s	gift	would	mean	less	of	
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the	human	receiver.	This,	however,	is	explicitly	not	the	case	with	faith	for	Vermigli.	Quite	
to	the	contrary,	the	more	God	inspires	faith	in	human	beings,	the	more	fully	they	become	
themselves	in	communion	with	Christ.		
This	 element	 of	 Vermigli’s	 theology	 of	 grace	 therefore	 presupposes	 different	
qualities	of	being	of	God	and	of	creation.	Because	only	in	such	a	metaphysical	framework	
does	it	make	sense	for	God	to	work	intrinsically	in	human	beings	–	as	is	presupposed	in	
the	secret	or	mystical	union	with	Christ.	The	intrinsic	working	of	God’s	grace	might	not	
presuppose	a	fully	developed	metaphysics	of	participation,	yet	it	could	not	be	envisaged	
without	some	form	of	metaphysical	participation.	Because	only	if	God	is	pre-eminently,	
giving	being	to	the	world,	can	he	give	gifts	in	such	a	way	that	they	touch	the	very	being	of	
the	receiver.	Put	differently:	if	God	sustains	the	being	of	all	things	at	any	point	anyway,	
his	gift	of	grace	can	fundamentally	transform	those	who	receive	it.	One	form	this	gift	takes	
is	faith.	We	have	seen	how	Vermigli	conceives	of	faith	as	something	which	is	given	in	such	
a	 way	 that	 it	 changes	 the	 way	 human	 beings	 are,	 not	 just	 extrinsically,	 but	 also	
intrinsically.	 This	 kind	 of	 gift-giving	 is	 in	 continuity	with	 the	way	God	 gives	 being	 in	 a	
participatory	framework,	as	in	such	a	framework,	all	God’s	gifts	are	in	continuity	with	each	
other.	
This	contrasts	with	the	metaphysics	implied	in	the	second	of	the	two	conflicting	
assertions	that	lead	to	the	aporia	that	I	have	described	above.	This	assertion	amounts	to	
the	notion	that	God’s	gift	 to	human	beings	can	only	be	a	 ‘pure’	gift,	 if	 it	 is	given	 in	an	
extrinsic	way.	This	understanding	of	gift,	as	we	have	seen,	is	present	in	the	way	Vermigli	
envisages	the	gift	of	righteousness	to	be	given	in	justification.	Here,	the	Divine	gift	is	not	
initially	 thought	 to	 transform	 human	 beings	 from	 the	 inside.	 Rather,	 what	 is	 initially	
transformed	is	only	God’s	judgement	of	them.	Put	differently:	God’s	first	gift	to	human	
beings	is	that	they	are	counted	just.	This	means,	however,	that	God	initially	acts	in	himself,	
not	in	human	beings.	Only	once	this	pure	first	gift	is	given,	will	human	beings	themselves	
be	transformed.	Behind	this	assertion	is	the	understanding	that	 if	God	acted	in	human	
beings	and	gave	them	something	that	was	‘theirs’,	which	then	somehow	contributed	to	
his	acceptance	of	them,	this	would	take	away	something	from	his	purely	gratuitous	act.	
Indeed,	Vermigli	rules	out	every	human	involvement	in	this	first	moment	of	justification,	
as	this	would	constitute	the	dangerous	seed	of	Pelagianism	for	him.	Human	beings	might	
be	led	to	believe	–	wrongly	–	that	they	can	contribute	something	to	their	salvation.	This	is	
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the	reason	why	the	gift	of	righteousness	must	be	given	to	human	beings	first	and	foremost	
in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 does	 not	 affect	 their	 own	 being.	 Such	 a	 gift	 is	 necessarily	 non-
ontological.	It	is	given	to	human	beings	in	the	same	way	that	a	new	dress	might	be	given	
to	them,	and	not	in	such	a	way	that	it	makes	them	new	from	the	inside	out.		
This	kind	of	Divine	gift-giving,	however,	is	indicative	of	a	metaphysical	framework	
in	which	the	relationship	between	God	and	the	world	 is	not	characterised	by	different	
qualities	of	being.	If	the	“unregenerate”	have	the	power	to	resist	and	spoil	God’s	gift,	then	
this	suggests	that	God’s	work	in	the	world	is	fundamentally	two-tiered,	and	defined	by	a	
general	influence	which	sustains	the	world,	and	a	special	influence	which	overcomes	this	
resistance.	As	we	have	seen	in	chapter	one,	however,	this	model	of	causality	points	to	a	
univocal	metaphysical	framework.	Moreover,	the	idea	that	something	human	could	take	
away	from	God’s	gratuitous	act,	which	is	part	of	Vermigli’s	rationale	for	envisaging	the	gift	
of	righteousness	in	the	way	he	does,	is	typical	of	a	univocal	metaphysics.	After	all,	only	
when	 God	 and	 human	 beings	 are	 envisaged	 on	 the	 same	 ontological	 level,	 can	 their	
mutual	agencies	ever	be	in	competition	with	each	other.		
Another	instance	where	the	aporia	which	I	have	been	describing	manifests	itself	
lies	in	the	importance	Vermigli	assigns	to	a	temporal	sequence	in	his	theology	of	grace.	
On	the	one	hand,	when	he	discusses	justification	in	polemical	contexts,	he	insists	that	the	
workings	of	grace	are	determined	by	a	temporal	sequence.	As	we	have	seen,	there	is	one	
‘phase’	 that	 gives	 way	 to	 another	 in	 a	 necessarily	 temporal	 sequence:	 only	 after	
justification	can	there	be	an	intrinsic	transformation	of	the	believer.	On	the	other	hand,	
this	temporal	determination	of	the	workings	of	grace	is	less	central	in	the	way	Vermigli	
characterises	the	relationship	between	the	mystical	and	spiritual	union	with	Christ.	As	we	
have	seen	above,	Vermigli	makes	clear	that	the	former	has	priority	over	the	latter,	but	he	
is	 hesitant	 to	 determine	 this	 priority	 as	 temporal.	 The	 fact	 that	 Vermigli	 insists	 on	 a	
temporal	sequence	in	the	way	he	envisages	God’s	gift	of	grace	to	be	given	in	one	context	
and	deprioritises	it	in	another,	again	indicates	a	tension	in	his	notion	of	gift.	It	moreover	
indicates	 that	 this	 tension	 goes	 all	 the	 way	 down	 to	 the	 level	 of	 the	 metaphysical	
framework	it	inhabits,	because	it	is	difficult	to	envisage	a	strict	temporal	sequence	of	one	
Divine	gift	being	given	after	another	in	a	framework	of	metaphysical	participation.	This	is	
because	such	a	metaphysical	framework	proceeds	from	the	conviction	that	nothing	would	
have	its	being	unless	it	participated	in	God.	There	can	therefore	be	no	‘first’	moment	in	
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which	God	is	‘outside’	the	world,	or	in	which	human	beings	are	entirely	untouched	by	him	
in	such	a	metaphysics.	On	the	other	hand,	if	the	relationship	between	God	and	the	world	
is	 not	 seen	 as	 determined	 by	 such	 a	 fundamentally	 ontological	 dependence,	 then	 it	
becomes	 possible	 to	 distinguish	 between	 ‘before’	 and	 ‘after’	 God’s	 gift.	 Therefore,	
Vermigli’s	ambivalence	about	whether	or	not	it	is	important	to	envisage	the	process	of	
salvation	 in	a	 temporal	 sequence	 confirms	 the	 thesis	 that	his	 theology	 simultaneously	
inhabits	two	different	metaphysical	frameworks.	
	In	 sum,	 we	 have	 seen	 that	 the	 workings	 of	 God’s	 gift	 of	 grace	 in	 Vermigli’s	
theology	 are	 aporetic.	 This	 aporia	 moreover	 indicates	 that	 Vermigli	 does	 not	 have	 a	
uniform	understanding	of	how	God’s	being	and	the	being	of	the	world	relate.	Instead,	his	
understanding	of	God’s	gift	of	grace	simultaneously	displays	the	marks	of	a	participatory	
metaphysics	 and	 of	 a	 univocal	 metaphysics	 sustaining	 it.	 As	 we	 shall	 see	 in	 the	 next	
chapter,	 a	 similar	 plurality	 emerges	 from	 studying	 the	 underlying	 metaphysics	 of	
Vermigli’s	theology	of	the	Eucharist.	
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Chapter	Three:	The	Eucharist	and	the	Workings	of	Divine	Presence	
	
Peter	 Martyr	 Vermigli	 invested	 most	 of	 his	 academic	 energy	 in	 the	 question	 of	 the	
Eucharist,	 as	 he	 was	 prominently	 involved	 in	 the	 notoriously	 polemical	 Eucharistic	
controversies	 of	 the	 sixteenth	 century.	Not	 only	 did	 he	debate	with	 exponents	 of	 the	
Catholic	view,	both	in	person	and	in	writing,	but	he	was	also	engaged	in	controversy	with	
certain	 Lutheran	views	and	writers,	 and	 increasingly	 so	over	 the	 course	of	his	 life.	His	
extensive	familiarity	with	the	work	of	the	Church	Fathers	meant	that	among	his	friends	
and	allies,	he	acquired	the	reputation	of	being	the	definitive	expert	on	the	Eucharist.1	He	
was	especially	known	for	mastering	the	art	of	defending	the	Reformed	stance	by	means	
of	appealing	to	the	Church	Fathers.	Calvin	famously	praised	Vermigli’s	skill	in	this	regard,	
writing	 that	 the	 task	 of	 demonstrating	 that	 the	 Early	 Church	 did	 not	 believe	 in	
transubstantiation	was	“crowned	by	Peter	Martyr	who	has	left	nothing	more	to	be	done.”2	
Vermigli’s	reputation	as	a	learned	champion	of	the	Reformed	view	on	the	Eucharist	with	
a	comprehensive	knowledge	of	the	tradition	of	the	Church	was,	moreover,	manifest	at	
the	Colloquy	of	Poissy	(1561),	which	was	arguably	one	of	the	last	historical	moments	when	
the	divide	between	Catholics	and	Protestants	could	have	still	been	brought	to	an	end.	At	
this	colloquy,	Vermigli	was	effectively	the	 leader	of	the	Protestant	party,	exercising	his	
authority	to	turn	down	a	compromise	formula	on	the	Eucharist	that	Cardinal	Lorraine	had	
proposed,	even	though	some	of	the	Protestants	would	have	been	willing	to	accept	it.3	
There	 is	no	need	to	present	Vermigli’s	view	on	the	Eucharist	extensively	 in	this	
chapter,	since	this	task	has	been	performed	excellently	and	comprehensively	by	Salvatore	
Corda	in	his	Veritas	Sacramenti.	The	first	section	will	give	a	brief	overview	of	Vermigli’s	
contributions	 to	 the	 Eucharistic	 controversies,	 as	 well	 as	 of	 the	 extant	 secondary	
literature.	It	is	worth	noting	that	in	the	Eucharistic	controversies,	we	find	Vermigli	at	his	
																																																						
1	 For	 instance,	 in	August	 1561,	 Theodore	Beza	wrote	 to	 John	Calvin	 expressing	his	 desire	 for	Vermigli’s	
participation	in	the	forthcoming	Colloqy	of	Poissy,	stating	that	Martyr	had	the	mastery	of	patristic	literature	
that	the	Protestant	cause	needed.	Cf.	Théodore	de	Bèze,	Correspondance	de	Théodore	de	Bèze.	Tome	3,	
(1559-1561),	ed.	Hippolyte	Aubert,	Henri	Meylan,	and	Alain	Dufour	(Genève:	Droz,	1963),	143.	
2	 “Cumulum	addidit	Petrus	Martyr,	ut	nihil	prorsus	desiderari	queat.”	 Jean	Calvin,	 Ioannis	Calvini	Opera	
Quae	Supersunt	Omnia,	ed.	Edouard	Cunitz,	Johann-Wilhelm	Baum,	and	Eduard	Reuss,	vol.	9	(Brunswick:	
Schwetschke,	1870),	490.	
3	Donald	Nugent,	Ecumenism	in	the	Age	of	the	Reformation:	The	Colloquy	of	Poissy	(Massachusetts:	Harvard	
University	Press,	1974),	145–46.	
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most	polemical.	 In	accordance	with	the	overall	aim	of	this	study,	the	remainder	of	this	
chapter	will	then	focus	on	the	‘cracks’	in	the	picture	of	Vermigli’s	Eucharistic	thinking.	I	
will	argue	that	these	cracks	point	to	a	complex	metaphysics	sustaining	this	picture.		
As	 I	 will	 argue,	 there	 is	 an	 unspoken	 but	 crucial	 presupposition	 in	 Vermigli’s	
Eucharistic	theology	concerning	the	relationship	between	God	and	the	world,	namely	that	
it	is	conceived	of	in	terms	of	spatial	distance,	rather	than	by	means	of	different	quality	of	
their	 being.	 As	 we	 shall	 see,	 this	 means	 that	 Vermigli’s	 standard	 understanding	 of	
presence	is	related	to	spatial	nearness,	or	indeed	denotes	the	enclosure	of	one	thing	in	
another.	 Simultaneously,	 however,	 it	 is	 the	 main	 thrust	 of	 his	 arguments	 against	
transubstantiation	to	deny	the	need	for	this	very	spatial	presence.	As	I	will	show,	this	leads	
to	 the	 paradox	 that	 Vermigli,	 in	 the	 very	 attempt	 to	 overcome	 the	 spatial	 distance	
between	God	and	the	world	that	he	tacitly	presupposes,	cements	this	very	distance.	In	
what	follows,	I	shall	gradually	develop	this	thesis	and	its	implications	for	Vermigli’s	implied	
metaphysics,	before	considering	George	Hunsinger’s	use	of	Vermigli	as	a	source	in	The	
Eucharist	 and	 Ecumenism.4	 To	 begin	with,	 a	 brief	 review	 of	 the	 sources	 and	 available	
secondary	literature	is	in	order.	
	
1)	Situating	Sources	and	Secondary	Literature	
Peter	Martyr	Vermigli’s	main	works	contributing	to	the	Eucharistic	controversies	are	the	
following.	First,	there	are	the	minutes	of	the	so-called	Oxford	Disputation	on	the	Eucharist	
(1549),	 in	which	he,	the	newly	appointed	Regius	Professor,	disputed	with	three	Oxford	
dons	who	opposed	the	his	views	on	the	Eucharist:	William	Tresham	(1495-1569),	a	fellow	
of	Christ	Church,	William	Chedsey	 (1510-1574),	a	 fellow	of	Corpus	Christi	College,	and	
Morgan	 Phillips	 (died	 1570)	 of	 St.	 Mary’s	 Hall.	 5	 Richard	 Cox,	 the	 chancellor	 of	 the	
university,	declared	Peter	Martyr	as	the	winner	of	this	four-day	disputation.	Usually	the	
																																																						
4	George	Hunsinger,	The	Eucharist	and	Ecumenism:	Let	Us	Keep	the	Feast	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	
Press,	2008).	
5	Pietro	Martire	Vermigli,	Tractatio	de	sacramento	Eucharistiæ,	habita	in	celeberrima	Universitate	Oxoniensi.	
Ad	 hec	 Disputatio	 de	 eadem	 Universitate	 habita	M.D.	 XLIX	 (London:	 [R.	Wolfe],	 1549).	 The	 pagination	
restarts	with	the	disputatio,	which	is	why	I	will	refer	to	only	either	the	Tractatio	or	the	Disputatio	in	what	
follows,	even	though	they	are	found	in	the	same	volume.	An	English	translation	of	both,	together	with	a	
helpful	 introduction	 by	 Joseph	 McLelland	 is	 available	 through	 the	 Peter	 Martyr	 Library:	 Peter	 Martyr	
Vermigli,	The	Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation	on	the	Eucharist,	1549,	trans.	Joseph	C.	McLelland,	The	Peter	
Martyr	Library	7	(Kirksville	MO:	Sixteenth	Century	Journal	Publishers,	2000).	
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minutes	 of	 the	 Oxford	 Disputation	 are	 published	 together	 with	 the	 so-called	 Oxford	
Treatise,	 in	which	Vermigli	 expounds	 the	 stance	 he	 took	 in	 the	 disputation	 in	 a	more	
systematic	manner.	Secondly,	Vermigli	wrote	the	“longest	monograph	on	the	sacrament	
of	the	entire	Reformation,”6	the	1559	Defensio	against	Stephen	Gardiner	with	a	total	of	
821	folio	pages.7	It	had	been	one	of	Thomas	Cranmer’s	last	wishes	for	Vermigli	to	issue	a	
rebuttal	 of	 Gardiner’s	 apology	 of	 transubstantiation,	 which	 the	 latter	 had	 published	
attacking	Cranmer’s	doctrine	of	the	Eucharist.8	Vermigli’s	third	published	work	which	is	
exclusively	engaged	 in	Eucharistic	 controversies	 is	his	Dialogue	on	 the	Two	Natures	of	
Christ.9	 This	 is	 both	 his	 last	 publication	 and	 his	 first	 open	 polemic	 against	 a	 fellow	
Protestant,	namely	the	Lutheran	Johannes	Brenz.	This	work	takes	the	form	of	a	virtual	
dialogue	between	Orothetes	(Vermigli)	and	Pantachus	(Brenz)	and	the	issue	at	stake	is	the	
ubiquity	of	Christ	–	a	topic	that	became	notorious	through	the	Lutheran	doctrine	of	the	
Eucharist.	 Other	 than	 these	 three	 works,	 Vermigli	 wrote	 on	 the	 Eucharist	 in	 his	
commentary	on	the	first	letter	to	the	Corinthians,	as	well	as	in	many	smaller	writings	and	
letters.10	In	what	follows,	I	will	primarily	draw	on	Vermigli’s	three	main	books	on	the	issue.	
Given	the	prominence	of	the	Eucharistic	controversies	in	Vermigli’s	oeuvre,	it	does	
not	come	as	a	surprise	that	a	relatively	large	proportion	of	the	small	field	of	modern-day	
Vermigli	scholarship	is	devoted	to	the	Eucharist.	Apart	from	a	few	shorter	contributions,11	
																																																						
6	Joseph	C.	McLelland,	“Translator’s	Introduction,”	in	The	Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation	on	the	Eucharist,	
1549,	The	Peter	Martyr	Library	7	(Kirksville	MO:	Sixteenth	Century	Journal	Publishers,	2000),	xxxv.	
7	Pietro	Martire	Vermigli,	Defensio	Doctrinae	Veteris	et	Apostolicae	de	Sacrosancto	Eucharistiae	Sacramento	
...	Adversus	Stephani	Gardineri	...	Librum	(Zurich:	C.	Froschauer,	1559).	This	work	has	been	neither	edited	
not	translated.	
8	 For	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 bibliography	 of	 the	 Cranmer-Gardiner-Vermigli	 dispute,	 see	 McLelland,	
“Translator’s	Introduction,”	xxxiv–xxxvi.	
9	Pietro	Martire	Vermigli,	Dialogus	de	Utraque	in	Christo	Natura	(Zurich:	C.	Froschauer,	1561).	John	Patrick	
Donnelly’s	translation,	together	with	a	helpful	introduction,	has	been	published	as	part	of	the	Peter	Martyr	
Library:	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli,	Dialogue	on	the	Two	Natures	in	Christ,	trans.	John	Patrick	Donnelly,	The	Peter	
Martyr	Library	2	(Kirksville	MO:	Thomas	Jefferson	University	Press,	1995).	
10	 For	 a	 comprehensive	 overview	 of	 the	 sources	 see	 Salvatore	 Corda,	 Veritas	 Sacramenti:	 A	 Study	 in	
Vermigli’s	Doctrine	of	the	Lord’s	Supper	(Zürich:	TVZ,	1975),	part	I.	
11	Peter	Opitz,	“Eucharistic	Theology,”	in	A	Companion	to	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli,	ed.	W.	J.	Torrance	Kirby,	
Emidio	Campi,	and	Frank	A.	James	(Leiden/Boston:	Brill,	2009),	387–400;	J.	Andreas	Löwe,	“The	Bodie	and	
Bloud	of	Christ	Is	Not	Carnallie	and	Corporallie	in	the	Bread	and	Wine:	The	Oxford	Disputation	Revisited,”	
in	 Die	 Zürcher	 Reformation:	 Ausstrahlungen	 Und	 Rückwirkungen,	 ed.	 Alfred	 Schindler	 and	 Hans	
Strickelberger	 (Bern:	 Peter	 Lang,	 2001),	 317–26;	 Nick	 Needham,	 “Peter	 Martyr	 and	 the	 Eucharistic	
Controversy,”	Scottish	Bulletin	of	Evangelical	Theology	17	(1999):	5–25;	David	C.	Steinmetz,	“Peter	Martyr	
Vermigli	 (1499-1562):	The	Eucharistic	Sacrifice,”	 in	Reformers	 in	 the	Wings	 (Philadelphia:	Fortress	Press,	
1971),	151–61;	Benjamin	F.	Paist,	“Peter	Martyr	and	the	Colloquy	of	Poissy,”	Princeton	Theological	Review,	
no.	20	(1922):	212-231-447-646.	
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no	fewer	than	four	full	monographs	have	been	published	on	Vermigli’s	sacramental	and	
especially	Eucharistic	theology:	Joseph	McLelland’s	pioneering	The	Visible	Words	of	God	
in	 1957,12	 Salvatore	 Corda’s	 Veritas	 Sacramenti	 in	 1975,13	 and	 more	 recently	 Jason	
Zuidema’s	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli	and	the	Outward	Instruments	of	Divine	Grace14	and	Jin	
Heung	Kim’s	Scripturae	et	Patrum	Testimoniis.15		
McLelland’s	and	Corda’s	works	are	of	lasting	importance.	They	complement	each	
other,	 since	McLelland	 focusses	 on	 the	 systematic	 contours	 of	 Vermigli’s	 sacramental	
theology	and	on	how	it	relates	to	the	reformer’s	entire	work,	whereas	Corda’s	emphasis	
is	 on	Vermigli’s	 theology	of	 Eucharist	 exclusively.	Corda	 carefully	presents	 and	 studies	
everything	 Vermigli	 has	 ever	 written	 on	 this	 topic,	 including	 sources	 that	 are	 rarely	
examined,	 such	 as	 the	 Defensio	 against	 Stephen	 Gardiner.	 In	 what	 follows,	 I	 will	
repeatedly	draw	on	his	fine	study.	
Zuidema’s	and	Kim’s	books,	however,	are	 less	helpful	and	 for	different	 reasons	
quite	flawed.	Zuidema’s	Outward	Instruments,	on	the	one	hand,	could	serve	as	a	handy	
introduction	to	the	main	themes	in	Vermigli’s	theology,	yet	it	neither	presents	the	reader	
with	source	material	that	has	not	been	studied	before,	nor	does	it	present	a	thesis	that	
deserves	its	name.	The	book’s	main	thesis	is	that	Vermigli	was	“one	which	seeks	to	steer	
the	middle	road	between	an	over-carnalization	and	an	over-spiritualization.”16	Apart	from	
it	 being	 doubtful	 whether	 the	 terms	 “carnalization”	 and	 “spiritualization”	 are	 useful	
categories	at	all,	it	is	also	far	from	clear	by	what	standard	Zuidema	judges	something	to	
be	 “overly”	 carnal	 or	 spiritual.	 Indeed,	 the	 description	 of	 the	 middle	 position	 is	 best	
understood	as	Vermigli’s	declaration	of	intent	in	his	Eucharistic	theology.	When	seen	as	
such,	 however,	 it	 is	 likely	 to	 apply	 to	 every	 theologian	 working	 within	 the	 Reformed	
tradition,	as	Luca	Baschera	has	pointed	out.17		
Kim’s	 project,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 is	 fraught	 with	 fundamental	methodological	
difficulties.	He	compares	 the	way	 in	which	Vermigli	and	his	opponents	use	the	Church	
																																																						
12	McLelland,	The	Visible	Words	of	God.	
13	Corda,	Veritas	Sacramenti.	
14	 Jason	 Zuidema,	 Peter	 Martyr	 Vermigli	 (1499-1562)	 and	 the	 Outward	 Instruments	 of	 Divine	 Grace	
(Göttingen:	Vandenhoeck	&	Ruprecht,	2008).	
15	Jin	Heung	Kim,	Scripturae	et	Patrum	Testimoniis:	The	Function	of	the	Church	Fathers	and	the	Medievals	in	
Peter	Martyr	Vermigli’s	Two	Eucharistic	Treatises	(Apeldoorn:	Instituut	voor	Reformatieonderzoek,	2009).	
16	Zuidema,	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli	(1499-1562)	and	the	Outward	Instruments	of	Divine	Grace,	10.	
17	Luca	Baschera,	“Review:	Jason	Zuidema,	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli	(1499–1562)	and	the	Outward	Instruments	
of	Divine	Grace,”	Zwingliana	36	(2009):	174–75.	
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Fathers	as	part	of	their	argumentation	in	their	Eucharistic	debates.	His	aim	is	thereby	to	
find	“a	useful	way	to	evaluate	the	validity	of	their	doctrines	of	the	Lord’s	Supper.”18	He	
thus	tries	to	determine	who	is	more	‘orthodox’	in	the	Dialogus	–	the	Lutheran	theologian	
Johannes	Brenz	or	Vermigli	–	by	judging	how	“correctly”	and	“rightfully”19	they	employ	
citations	of	the	Fathers	as	part	of	their	argument	(Vermigli	emerges	as	the	winner	of	this	
contest).20	This	procedure	is	of	course	deeply	problematic,	for	it	is	far	from	clear	how	one	
determines	 the	“correct”	 interpretation	of	 the	Church	Fathers,	 let	alone	why	any	such	
interpretation	should	be	the	measure	for	orthodoxy.	In	a	tradition	without	a	magisterium,	
there	 is	 no-one	 to	 determine	 any	 one	 “correct”	 interpretation	 of	 the	 Fathers,	 and	 an	
academic	approach	cannot,	by	definition,	tacitly	assume	the	place	of	a	magisterium.	In	
what	 follows,	we	will	 therefore	neither	draw	on	nor	 further	engage	with	Zuidema’s	or	
Kim’s	books.21	
	
2)	Meant	to	be	Merely	a	Matter	of	Method	
In	 the	 words	 of	 a	 recent	 commentator,	 Vermigli	 has	 an	 “obsession	 with	 refuting	
transubstantiation.”22	Arguing	against	transubstantiation	is	indeed	Vermigli’s	key	concern	
in	all	of	his	Eucharistic	writings,	with	the	exception	of	the	Dialogus.	In	this	section,	I	will	
demonstrate	 that	 the	 rejection	of	 transubstantiation	 is	Vermigli’s	 foremost	 concern	 in	
Eucharistic	 writings	 and	 explain	 what	 this	 does	 and	 does	 not	mean.	 As	 we	 shall	 see,	
Vermigli’s	 attacks	 on	 transubstantiation	 were	 intended	 to	 be	 first	 and	 foremost	 an	
argument	about	theological	method.	
That	Vermigli’s	Eucharistic	writings	revolve	around	transubstantiation	can	be	seen,	
for	instance,	in	the	first	of	the	three	propositions	of	the	Oxford	disputation:	“There	is	no	
																																																						
18	Kim,	Scripturae	et	Patrum	Testimoniis,	285.	
19	Ibid.,	286.	
20	 In	Kim’s	own	words:	“The	validity	of	Peter	Martyr’s	use	of	 the	Fathers	against	 that	of	Brenz	…	 is	also	
significant	for	the	orthodoxy	of	the	Reformed	doctrine	of	the	Lord’s	Supper.	…	Peter	Martyr’s	…	validity	in	
the	 use	 of	 the	 Fathers	 for	 the	 support	 of	 his	 doctrines	 ought	 to	 be	 regarded	 as	 the	 orthodoxy	 of	 the	
Reformed	camp	in	this	matter	[sic].”	(Ibid.,	321.)	
21	 Another	 contribution,	 which	 does	 not	 deserve	 closer	 attention	 because	 it	 is	 replete	 with	 untenable	
generalisations,	 is	Donald	 Fuller,	 “Sacrifice	 and	 Sacrament:	Another	 Eucharistic	 Contribution	 from	Peter	
Martyr	Vermigli,”	in	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli	and	the	European	Reformations,	ed.	Frank	A.	James	(Leiden:	Brill,	
2004),	 215–37.	 Fuller	 writes	 for	 instance	 that	 “Vermigli's	 difficulty	 with	 real	 ‘flesh’	 in	 the	 Eucharistic	
elements	is	not	only	due	to	the	un-intelligibility	of	that	notion	but	also	is	a	function	of	his	concern	for	the	
biblical	view	of	personhood.	Vermigli's	 idea	of	man	is	derived	more	from	the	Hebrew	idea	of	wholeness	
than	from	the	abstract	theological	anthropology	of	the	platonici.”	(227).		
22	McLelland,	“Translator’s	Introduction,”	xxxiii.	
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transubstantiation	 of	 the	 bread	 and	 wine	 into	 the	 body	 and	 blood	 of	 Christ	 in	 the	
sacrament	of	the	Eucharist.”	23	Effectively,	the	whole	debate	centres	on	this	proposition,	
for	despite	their	agreement	to	turn	to	the	second	proposition	at	the	end	of	the	third	day,	
the	disputants	went	back	to	discussing	transubstantiation	on	the	fourth	and	final	day.	This	
is	not	surprising	given	that	the	second	proposition	(“The	body	and	blood	of	Christ	are	not	
in	the	bread	and	wine	carnally	and	corporeally,	nor	as	others	say,	under	the	species	of	
bread	and	wine”)24	is	effectively	a	general	expression	of	what	is	said	more	specifically	in	
the	first	proposition,	meaning	that	its	discussion	will	almost	necessarily	redound	upon	the	
precise	disagreement	named	in	the	first	proposition.	Robert	Persons	(1546-1610),	a	Jesuit	
priest,	observed	this	in	1604,	claiming	that	the	order	in	which	these	two	propositions	were	
discussed	made	a	 real	discussion	about	 the	matter	 impossible.25	The	 third	proposition	
(“The	body	and	blood	of	Christ	are	united	with	the	bread	and	wine	sacramentally”)26	was	
omitted	altogether	at	the	request	of	William	Tresham,	who	was	one	of	the	three	people	
debating	 with	 Vermigli.	 This	 is	 unfortunate,	 given	 that	 this	 was	 the	 only	 constructive	
rather	than	negatively	polemical	proposition.27		
Given	this	sequence	of	discussions	 in	the	disputation,	 it	 is	unsurprising	that	the	
Oxford	Treatise	–	Vermigli’s	formal	explication	of	the	disputation	–	is	equally	focused	upon	
transubstantiation.	No	fewer	than	five	sixths	of	 it	are	devoted	to	arguing	against	“that	
union	through	which,	as	they	generally	state,	the	bread	and	wine	are	transubstantiated	
into	 the	 body	 and	 blood	 of	 Christ.”28	 In	 essence,	 the	 treatise	 is	 an	 examination	 of	 all	
arguments	 Vermigli	 is	 aware	 of,	 both	 in	 favour	 of	 and	 against	 transubstantiation.	 He	
																																																						
23	“In	sacramento	Eucharistiae	non	est	panis	et	vini	transubstantiatio	in	corpus	et	sanguinem	Christi.”	(Pietro	
Martire	Vermigli,	Disputatio	de	de	sacramento	Eucharistiæ	(London:	[R.	Wolfe],	1549),	1v;	Vermigli,	Oxford	
Treatise	and	Disputation,	133.)	
24	 “Corpus	 et	 sanguis	 Christi	 non	 est	 carnaliter	 aut	 corporaliter	 in	 pane	 et	 vino,	 nec	 ut	 alii	 dicunt,	 sub	
speciebus	panis	et	vini.”	(Vermigli,	Disputatio,	1v;	Vermigli,	Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	133.)	
25	“This	manifest	fraud	was	used,	that	whereas	the	first	[proposition]	about	transubstantiation,	dependeth	
of	the	second	of	the	reall	presence,	it	should	have	byn	handled	in	the	second	place,	and	not	in	the	first	…	it	
is,	as	if	the	question	being,	first	whether	gold	were	in	a	purse,	and	then	whether	yt	were	there	alone	or	els	
togeather	 with	 led,	 tynne,	 or	 some	 such	 baser	 mettall.”	 (Robert	 Parsons,	 A	 Review	 of	 Ten	 Publike	
Dispvuations	 or	 Conferences	 Held	 within	 the	 Compasse	 of	 Foure	 Yeares,	 under	 K.	 Edward	 &	 Qu.	Mary,	
Concerning	Some	Principall	Points	in	Religion,	Especially	of	the	Sacrament	&	Sacrifice	of	the	Altar	...	([Saint-
Omer]:	F.	Bellet,	1604),	37.)	
26	 “Corpus	 et	 sanguis	 Christi	 uniuntur	 pani	 et	 vino	 sacramentaliter.”	 (Vermigli,	Disputatio,	 1v;	 Vermigli,	
Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	133.)	
27	Cf.	McLelland,	“Translator’s	Introduction,”	xxvii.	
28	“[D]e	ea	coniunctione	qua	panem	et	vinum	dicunt	vulgo	transubstantiari	in	corpus	et	sanguinem	Christi.”	
(Pietro	Martire	 Vermigli,	 Tractatio	 de	 sacramento	 Eucharistiæ	 (London:	 [R.	Wolfe],	 1549),	 1r;	 Vermigli,	
Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	22.)	
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knows	of	twenty	arguments	for	transubstantiation,	and	–	after	enumerating	them	all	–	
refutes	 them	 one	 by	 one.	 He	 also	 lists	 a	 total	 of	 forty-seven	 arguments	 against	
transubstantiation,	taken	from	the	Scriptures,	Church	Fathers	and	reason.		
The	Defensio	against	Bishop	Gardiner,	written	almost	a	decade	after	the	Oxford	
Treatise,	is	equally	essentially	an	argument	against	transubstantiation:	While	its	first	and	
longest	part	is	Vermigli’s	direct	reply	to	no	fewer	than	255	arguments	that	Gardiner	put	
forward	 in	 his	 last	 contribution	 to	 the	debate	with	 Cranmer,	 29	 either	 for	 the	Catholic	
doctrine	or	against	Cranmer’s	stance,30	its	second,	third	and	fourth	parts	refer	back	to	the	
arguments	of	the	Oxford	Treatise	and	disputation	respectively,	defending	and	elaborating	
on	them.31		
The	bulk	of	Vermigli’s	Eucharistic	writings	is	therefore	focused	on	denying	transub-
stantiation.	It	is	notable	that	what	he	rejects	is	only	a	certain	“mode	of	union	of	the	Lord’s	
body	and	blood	with	the	symbols	of	bread	and	wine.”32	This	is	significant	because	Vermigli	
insists	that	he	only	disagrees	with	his	Catholic	contemporaries	about	the	mode	of	Christ’s	
presence	in	the	Eucharist.	It	was	in	no	way	his	intention	to	promote	a	Eucharistic	theology	
that	would	diminish	or	deny	Christ’s	presence	in	the	sacrament	or	the	union	with	Christ	
that	 the	 faithful	 can	 enjoy	 through	 partaking	 in	 it.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	 Vermigli’s	 most	
fundamental	 tenet	 in	 his	 debates	 with	 Roman	 Catholics	 that	 the	 theory	 of	
transubstantiation	 is	 simply	 not	 needed	 in	 order	 to	 claim	 Christ’s	 presence	 in	 the	
Eucharist.	His	argument	–	at	least	in	its	intention	–	is	therefore	merely	a	methodological	
one.	 This	 can	 be	 seen,	 first,	 in	 the	 way	 Vermigli	 vehemently	 defends	 Christ’s	 ‘real’	
presence	in	the	Eucharist,	and,	secondly,	in	how	he	rejects	transubstantiation.	
																																																						
29	Stephen	Gardiner,	Confutatio	cavillationum	quibus	sacrosanctum	...	Eucharistiae	Sacramentum	ab	impiis	
Capernaitis	impeti	solet	(Leuven:	P.	Colonaeum,	1552).	
30	Vermigli,	Defensio,	1–594.	
31	In	the	case	of	the	second	part	(Ibid.,	595–643.)	Vermigli	once	again	discusses	the	ten	hermeneutical	“Rules	
for	understanding	the	Church	Fathers”	that	he	had	proposed	in	the	Treatise	(see	Vermigli,	Tractatio,	35v–
37v.)	–	however	newly	grouping	them	into	twelve	rules	–	and	defends	them	against	Gardiner’s	critique.	In	
the	 third	 part	 (Vermigli,	Defensio,	 644–716.),	 Vermigli	 defends	 the	 solutions	 he	had	offered	 to	Catholic	
critiques	at	the	Oxford	disputation,	and	which	had	been	subsequently	challenged	by	Gardiner.	The	same	
structure	is	followed	in	the	fourth	part,	which	specifically	focuses	on	the	right	interpretation	of	sayings	of	
the	Church	Fathers	(Ibid.,	717–821.).		
32	“[M]odus	coniunctionis	corporis	et	sanguinis	domini	cum	symbolis	panis	et	vini.”	(Vermigli,	Tractatio,	1r;	
Vermigli,	Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	22.)	
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Regarding	 the	 first	 point,	 Vermigli	 consistently	 claims	 that	 the	 body	which	 the	
faithful	receive	in	the	Eucharist	is	Christ’s	true	body.33	Vermigli	consistently	agrees	with	
Gardiner	and	his	Oxford	disputants	that	the	body	and	blood	of	Christ	are	in	the	Eucharist.	
When	 pressed	 by	William	 Chedsey	 on	 the	 fourth	 day	 of	 the	 disputation	 whether	 he	
thought	“the	body	of	Christ	[was]	in	the	sacrament	or	not?”,	Vermigli	replied,	“I	do	not	
deny	that	in	the	sacrament	the	true	body	of	Christ	is	present	sacramentally	…	and	I	affirm	
with	confidence	that	he	is	truly	offered	to	us	and	received.”34		
The	contentious	issue	for	Vermigli	does	not	 lie	 in	the	quid	of	what	 is	presented	
through	and	received	in	the	sacrament	of	the	altar	–	he	agrees	that	it	is	Christ’s	body	and	
blood	–	but	in	the	quomodo	of	how	he	is	present	and	received.	Vermigli	asserts	that	the	
difference	between	himself	and	his	Catholic	opponents	concerns	“the	mode	of	presence”	
only.35	 He	 repeatedly	 declares	 in	 the	 Defensio	 against	 Gardiner	 that	 the	 controversy	
concerns	solely	the	way	in	which	Christ	is	present	in	the	Eucharist	and	is	received	by	the	
communicants:36	“We	do	not	dispute	that	the	body	[of	Christ]	is	given,	but	the	mode	in	
which	it	is	given.”37	Or	again:	“The	whole	controversy	is	about	the	mode	in	which	the	body	
of	Christ	is	accepted.38	
There	 is	 not	 the	 slightest	 ambiguity	 in	 how	Vermigli	 understands	 the	words	 of	
institution	here;	corpus	for	him	means	Christ’s	body.39	In	order	to	appreciate	Vermigli’s	
reasoning	on	the	mode	in	which	Christ’s	body	is	present	in	the	bread,	however,	it	is	useful	
to	consider	his	understanding	of	what	constitutes	a	sacrament.	As	Corda	has	shown,	for	
Vermigli,	a	sacrament	is	defined	through	a	particular	relationship	that	is	formed	between	
two	distinct	realities:	the	Eucharistic	elements	as	they	are	perceived	by	the	senses,	on	the	
one	hand,	and	the	invisible	and	heavenly	res	sacramenti	–	which	is	Christ’s	body	and	blood	
																																																						
33	On	this	and	the	following,	see	Corda,	Veritas	Sacramenti,	123–25.	
34	“In	sacramento,	est	ne	corpus	Christi	an	non?	Martyr:	Non	nego	in	sacramento	verum	corpus	Christi	esse	
sacramentaliter	 ...	 et	 nobis	 vere	 exhiberi,	 et	 accipi	 asseveranter	 affirmo.”	 (Vermigli,	 Disputatio,	 89v;	
Vermigli,	Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	280.)	
35	 “Differentia	 est	 inter	 nos	 quo	 ad	 modum	 praesentiae.”	 (Vermigli,	 Disputatio,	 89v;	 Vermigli,	 Oxford	
Treatise	and	Disputation,	280.)	
36	Cf.	Corda,	Veritas	Sacramenti,	123.	
37	“Non	de	corpore	dato	contendimus,	sed	de	modo,	quo	detur.”	(Vermigli,	Defensio,	81.)	
38	“Omnis	controversia	est	de	modo,	quo	corpus	Christi	recipiatur.”	(Ibid.,	816.)	
39	When	interpreting	Jesus’	words	“This	 is	my	body”,	Vermigli	states:	“The	term	‘body’	 in	this	statement	
means	the	true	body	of	Christ.”	/	“Corpus	enim	in	ea	propositione	verum	Christi	corpus	significat.”	(Ibid.,	
80.)	
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in	the	case	of	the	Eucharist	–	on	the	other	hand.40	This	is	what	Vermigli	means	when	he	
says,	as	we	have	seen	above,	that	the	body	of	Christ	is	“present	sacramentally”	–	namely	
that	there	is	a	specific	and	unique	relationship	between	the	body	of	Christ	as	he	sits	at	the	
right	hand	of	God	the	Father,	and	the	Eucharistic	elements.	This	sacramental	relationship	
is	moreover	defined	through	what	Vermigli	calls	”signification.”	He	believes	that	the	body	
of	Christ	is	joined	with	the	symbols	“through	signification”41	and	that	the	body	of	Christ	is	
in	the	symbols	“through	sacramental	signification,”	insofar	as	they	“signify,	represent,	and	
offer	us	the	body	and	blood	of	Christ.”42		
Vermigli	does	not	specify	the	nature	of	this	relationship	by	signification	between	
the	Eucharistic	elements	and	the	body	of	Christ.	McLelland	argues	that	Vermigli	relates	
the	two	by	recourse	to	analogy,	yet	McLelland	seems	to	misunderstand	the	concept	of	
analogy	and	he	overstates	the	case.	Insisting	that	there	is	an	analogical	relationship	at	the	
heart	 of	 Vermigli’s	 theology	 of	 revelation,	 McLelland	 holds	 that	 Vermigli’s	 “mode	 of	
relating	two	disparate	or	disjunctive	terms	is	neither	simple	univocity	nor	pure	equivocity,	
nor	yet	analogy	or	a	determinate	(arithmetical)	relationship,	but	analogy	as	 likeness	of	
proportion.”43	This	distinction	is	odd,	for	it	seems	to	separate	two	things	that	really	are	
one	and	the	same.	Most	commentators	would	agree	that	in	medieval	theories	of	analogy,	
the	analogy	of	proportion	is	precisely	characterised	by	a	comparison	of	two	proportions	
–	the	most	straightforward	of	which	is	arithmetical	–	and	that	if	there	was	said	to	be	an	
analogical	relationship	between	God	and	creatures,	then	it	was	an	analogy	of	attribution	
or	participation.44	It	is	therefore	even	more	curious	that	McLelland	seems	to	believe	that	
a	“relationship	of	proportionality”	is	the	way	Thomas	Aquinas	understands	the	analogy	of	
being	between	God	and	creatures,	and	on	this	basis	he	asserts	that	there	is	a	“striking	
similarity”	 between	 Vermigli’s	 and	 Thomas	 Aquinas’s	 thought.45	 McLelland’s	 text	 and	
																																																						
40	Cf.	e.g.	“The	sacrament	is	the	relation	between	the	external	symbols	which	we	seize	upon	with	our	eyes	
and	senses,	at	the	things	signified,	which	are	eternal,	heavenly	and	invisible.”	/	“Sacramentum	autem	est	
quaedam	 relatio,	 inter	 illa,	 videlicet,	 externa	 symbola,	 quae	 oculis	 et	 sensibus	 usurpamus,	 et	 res	
significatas,	quae	sunt	aeternae,	coelestes	et	invisibiles.”	(Ibid.,	534.)	Cf.	Corda,	Veritas	Sacramenti,	101–4.	
41	“Credimus	enim	coniungi	corpus	Christi	symbolis	per	significationem.”	(Vermigli,	Disputatio,	73v;	Vermigli,	
Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	255.)	
42	 “Est	 per	 significationem	 sacramentalem	 in	 symbolis	 quia	 nobis	 significant,	 representant	 et	 exhibent	
corpus	et	sanguinem	Christi.”	(Vermigli,	Disputatio,	90v;	Vermigli,	Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	282.)	
43	McLelland,	The	Visible	Words	of	God,	80.	
44	Cf.	E.	Jennifer	Ashworth,	“Medieval	Theories	of	Analogy,”	ed.	Edward	N.	Zalta,	The	Stanford	Encyclopedia	
of	Philosophy,	Fall	2017.	
45	McLelland,	The	Visible	Words	of	God,	81.	
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footnotes	convey,	however,	that	his	reading	of	Aquinas	is	mediated	through	C.	B.	Phelan,	
who	reads	Aquinas	through	the	lens	of	Cajetan’s	De	Nominum	Analogia,	and	is	hence	at	
least	twice	removed	from	Aquinas.	His	subsequent	critique	of	Aquinas	should	therefore	
be	 treated	 with	 caution.	 He	 writes	 that	 Thomas	 and	 Roman	 Catholics	 since	 him	
“fundamentally	walk	by	sight,	by	their	creaturely	continuity	of	being	with	God.”46	To	speak	
of	 a	 “continuity	of	being,”	however,	 is	 to	 assume	a	univocity	of	being,	 rather	 than	an	
analogical	 participation	 in	God’s	 pre-eminent	 being.	Most	 commentators	would	 agree	
that	Thomas	Aquinas	understood	the	analogical	relationship	between	God	and	creation	
in	this	sense,	and	not	as	an	analogy	of	proportion.	However,	what	about	McLelland’s	claim	
that	 Vermigli	 conceives	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 God	 and	 the	 world	 through	 an	
analogy	of	proportion?	It	seems	similarly	hard	to	justify	this,	for	McLelland’s	claim	rests	
on	 very	 few	 references	 to	 Vermigli’s	 works,	 and	 these	 are	 more	 didactic	 than	
programmatic	in	nature.	Nowhere	does	Vermigli	propound	an	understanding	of	analogy	
as	 the	 basis	 of	 his	 theology,	 but	 he	 only	 gives	 overviews	 over	 classically	 Aristotelian	
distinctions	 in	 its	 understanding.47	 Therefore,	 as	 Klaus	 Sturm	 has	 intimated,	 the	
prominent	place	 that	McLelland	 assigns	 to	 analogy	 in	Vermigli’s	 thought	 is	 simply	not	
warranted.48	We	have	to	conclude,	pace	McLelland,	that	Vermigli’s	‘analogical’	reasoning	
is	relatively	limited,	and	that	it	cannot	serve	as	an	explanation	of	how	he	envisages	the	
sacramental	signum	and	the	res	significata	to	relate.		
The	precise	nature	of	this	relationship,	and	the	precise	nature	of	what	Vermigli	
calls	Christ’s	“sacramental”	union	with	the	Eucharistic	elements,	is	something	on	which	
he	never	elaborates.	One	reason	for	this,	as	we	have	seen,	is	that	proposition	three	of	the	
Oxford	disputation	(“The	body	and	blood	of	Christ	are	united	with	the	bread	and	wine	
sacramentally”)49	was	never	discussed.	Furthermore,	all	Vermigli’s	works	on	the	Eucharist	
																																																						
46	Ibid.,	83.	
47	Such	as	for	instance	in	his	commentary	on	the	Nicomachean	Ethics	I,6,	where	he	teaches	that	there	are	
three	forms	of	analogy,	with	the	first	two	being	forms	of	pros	hen	predication	(referring,	in	one	case,	to	the	
shared	 origin,	 and	 in	 another	 to	 a	 shared	 goal),	 and	 the	 third	 an	 analogy	 of	 proportion.	 (Cf.	 Vermigli,	
Kommentar	zur	Nikomachischen	Ethik,	259–60;	Vermigli,	Commentary	on	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics,	
168.)	
48	 “It	 seems	 doubtful	 that	 McLelland’s	 expositions	 on	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘analogy’	 contribute	 much	 to	 the	
characterization	of	Martyr’s	 understanding	of	 revelation	 in	 general.”	 Sturm,	Die	 Theologie	Peter	Martyr	
Vermiglis,	143	n.	173	(my	own	translation).	
49	 “Corpus	 et	 sanguis	 Christi	 uniuntur	 pani	 et	 vino	 sacramentaliter.”	 (Vermigli,	Disputatio,	 1v;	 Vermigli,	
Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	133.)	
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beyond	 the	 Oxford	 Disputation	 and	 Treatise	 are	 concerned	 with	 refuting	 Catholic	 or	
Lutheran	doctrines.	This	means	that	his	thinking	is	defined	by	the	terms	of	the	polemical	
debate;	 he	 never	 fully	 elaborated	 his	 own	 approach.	 What	 we	 know	 about	 his	 own	
approach	is	mostly	‘negative’;	we	know	for	sure	primarily	what	he	does	not	mean	by	the	
“sacramental”	union	of	Christ	with	the	elements.	Neither	are	the	elements	mere	aide-
mémoires	in	an	act	of	remembrance	for	him,	nor	does	he	think	they	are	transubstantiated.	
That	they	are	more	than	aide-mémoires	can	be	seen	from	the	way	in	which	he	criticises	
Zwinglians	in	the	Treatise:		
I	am	not	happy	that	they	mention	only	rarely	a	sacramental	mutation	of	
the	 bread	 and	wine,	 although	 this	 is	 no	 light	matter,	 and	 one	 that	 the	
Fathers	intend	...	Scripture	does	not	condemn	it,	because	in	his	treatment	
of	the	sacrament,	Paul	does	not	call	it	simply	cup,	but	cup	of	the	Lord.	…	
Therefore	they	have	no	right	to	say	that	this	change	is	a	little	thing,	since	it	
is	of	great	moment.50	
When	Vermigli	rejects	transubstantiation,	he	is	therefore	not	motivated	by	advocating	a	
symbolic	understanding	of	the	Eucharist.	He	does	not	wish	to	downplay	the	importance	
of	 the	elements.	Rather,	his	 rejection	of	 transubstantiation	 is	motivated	primarily	by	a	
methodological	concern.	This	is	evident,	as	we	have	seen	so	far,	from	his	insistence	that	
the	body	and	blood	of	Christ	are	present	in	the	Eucharist	“sacramentally”	and	“through	
signification”	–	which,	even	if	it	is	not	fully	developed	as	a	doctrine,	certainly	amounts	to	
more	than	a	symbolic	understanding	of	the	sacrament.	
The	 second	 reason	 why	 Vermigli’s	 rejection	 of	 transubstantiation	 is,	 in	 its	
intention,	essentially	about	theological	method,	can	be	seen	from	his	stated	reasons	for	
rejecting	the	doctrine	of	transubstantiation.	He	explicitly	holds	that	the	doctrine	is	simply	
not	necessary.	If	it	is	possible	to	conceive	of	the	real	presence	of	the	body	and	blood	of	
Christ	in	the	sacrament	“sacramentally,”	as	Vermigli	himself	does,	why	then	introduce	a	
complicated	 doctrine	 of	 transubstantiation?	 This	 argument	 has	 a	 functional	 twist;	
Vermigli	 is	convinced	that	believing	in	transubstantiation	is	of	no	additional	benefit	for	
																																																						
50	“[M]ihi	id	minus	placet	quod	raro	mentionem	faciunt	sacramentalis	mutationis	panis	et	vini,	quae	tamen	
non	levis	est,	et	patres	ubicunque	videntur	...	Scripturae	sanctae	illam	non	contempserunt,	etenim	Paulus	
in	ipsa	agitatione	sacramenti	non	simpliciter	nominat	poculum,	sed	poculum	domini.	...	Quare	non	est	quod	
dicant	mutationem	hanc	levem	esse	cum	magni	sit	momenti.”	(Vermigli,	Tractatio,	65v;	Vermigli,	Oxford	
Treatise	and	Disputation,	122.)	
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either	the	communicants	or	the	church.	In	the	dedicatory	letter	to	Thomas	Cranmer	with	
which	he	prefaced	the	Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	he	writes:		
Let	 them	 step	 forward	 and	 demonstrate	 what	 they	 have	 accomplished	
more	than	I	by	their	transubstantiations,	their	marvels	and	wonders,	what	
more	solid	fruit	and	genuine	profit	 they	have	brought	by	this	sacrament	
either	to	communicants	or	to	churches.	Will	they	speak	of	the	benefit	of	
our	dwelling	in	Christ	and	Christ	in	us?	So	will	I.	Will	they	speak	of	obtaining	
a	holy	life	and	heavenly	blessedness?	I	propose	that	too.	Will	they	speak	of	
receiving	the	body	and	blood	of	Christ?	No	less	do	I,	yet	such	as	is	had	by	
faith	and	the	soul.51	
Similarly,	 in	 one	 of	 his	 summarizing	 statements	 on	 the	 fourth	 day	 of	 the	 Oxford	
disputation,	Vermigli	claimed:		
The	purpose	of	eating	Christ	and	receiving	this	sacrament	is	that	we	should	
live,	that	we	should	have	everlasting	life,	that	we	should	not	die,	that	Christ	
should	dwell	in	us	and	we	in	him,	as	Christ	declared	in	John	chapter	6.	Yet	
these	benefits	and	goods	may	be	obtained	just	as	well	by	admitting	a	union	
of	 the	 Body	 of	 Christ	 with	 bread	 and	 wine	 through	 sacramental	
signification.52	
Not	only	did	Vermigli	deem	the	doctrine	of	transubstantiation	to	be	unnecessary	because	
it	 ‘does	not	do’	anything	beyond	his	own	understanding	of	the	sacrament,	but	he	also	
invoked	a	kind	of	‘Ockham’s	razor’	argument.	That	is:	the	doctrine	of	transubstantiation	
is	 too	 complicated	 a	 solution	 for	 a	 problem	 to	 which	 there	 exist	 other,	 and	 more	
straightforward	approaches.	In	particular,	Vermigli	holds	that	as	a	doctrine,	it	too	often	
demands	a	recourse	to	God’s	omnipotence.	This,	for	Vermigli,	is	a	flaw,	because	“it	is	a	
theological	doctrine	that	miracles	must	not	be	multiplied	without	necessity.”53	This	is	a	
methodological	point,	and	literally	the	bottom	line	of	Vermigli’s	argument,	as	can	be	seen	
																																																						
51	 “In	medium	 ipsi	 prodeant	 et	 ostendant	 suis	 transubstantionibus	portens	 atque	terwtologiaij quid	
amplius	 (quam	 ego	 statuerim)	 solidi	 fructus	 et	 iuste	 commoditatis	 [?]	 ex	 hoc	 sacramento	 vel	
communicantibus	 vel	 ecclesiis	 attulerint.	 Commemorabunt	 manendi	 in	 Christo,	 et	 ut	 Christus	 in	 nobis	
maneat,	 beneficium?	 Ego	 quoque	 illud	 statuo.	 Commemorabunt	 vitae	 divinae	 coelestis	 atque	 beate	
consequtionem?	Ego	etiam	illam	pono.	Commemorabunt	perceptionem	corporis	et	sanguinis	Christi?	Ego	
non	 minus	 quam	 ipsi	 eam	 astruo,	 sed	 quae	 fide	 ac	 animo	 habeatur.”	 (Vermigli,	 Tractatio,	 epistola	 ad	
lectorem,	sine	pagina	[p.	8];	Vermigli,	Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	13.)	
52	 “Finis	 comedendi	 Christum	 atque	 suscipiendi	 hoc	 sacramentum	 est	 ut	 vivamus,	 habeamus	 vitam	
aeternam,	non	moriamur,	Christus	maneat	in	nobis	et	nos	in	ipso,	quemadmodum	testatus	est	Christus	in	
Ioan.	Cap.	6.	Caeterum	haec	beneficia	atque	commoda	tam	bene	haberi	possunt	ponendo	coniunctionem	
corporis	Christi	cum	pane	et	vino	per	significationem	sacramentalem.”	(Vermigli,	Disputatio,	68r;	Vermigli,	
Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	253.)	
53	“Potissimum	cum	sit	dogma	theologicum	non	esse	multiplicanda	miracula	absque	necessitate.”	(Vermigli,	
Disputatio,	68r;	Vermigli,	Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	252.)	
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in	the	last	–	and	therefore	most	weighty	–	argument	Vermigli	gives	 in	a	speech	on	the	
fourth	day	of	the	Oxford	disputation:	
When	holy	Scripture	proposes	something	for	us	to	believe	universally,	 it	
usually	 requires	 that	 when	 something	 is	 to	 be	 chosen,	 we	 choose	 for	
ourselves	the	mode	that	is	easier	and	clearer,	one	that	does	not	call	away,	
but	rather	leads	us	by	the	hand	to	faith;	in	this	way	less	serious	and	fewer	
absurdities	will	follow,	and	miracles	will	not	be	multiplied.	But	you	[viz.	his	
Roman	 Catholic	 opponents]	 do	 not	 do	 this,	 you	 who	 have	 chosen	 for	
defence	ways	where	infinite	miracles	are	needed	and	absurdities	pile	up	
without	any	limits.54	
As	Corda	has	shown,	this	same	argument	can	be	found	repeatedly	in	the	Defensio.55	In	
short,	Vermigli	is	convinced	that	“the	Eucharist	is	a	whole	and	perfect	sacrament”	quite	
apart	from	what	he	calls	the	“fancied	devices”	of	the	doctrine	of	transubstantiation.56	His	
‘obsession’	with	refuting	transubstantiation	is,	therefore,	in	its	intention,	fundamentally	
a	methodological	matter.	What	Vermigli	means	to	achieve	positively	is	to	strengthen	the	
theological	 basis	 for	 Christ’s	 presence	 in	 the	 Eucharist	 through	 ridding	 it	 of	 ostensibly	
superfluous	ballast	while	 retaining	 the	 theological	 rationale	 for	Christ’s	 union	with	his	
faithful	in	the	Eucharist.	In	his	view,	his	proposed	changes	to	the	Catholic	doctrine	of	the	
Eucharist	 were	 not	 major,	 and	 he	 certainly	 saw	 himself	 not	 as	 an	 innovator,	 but	 as	
standing	in	the	orthodox	tradition	of	the	Church.	In	his	fictional	dialogue	with	the	Lutheran	
Johannes	Brenz,	for	instance,	the	whole	of	Vermigli’s	argument	amounts	to	an	argument	
from	 tradition.	 He	 programmatically	 states:	 “I	 will	 clearly	 prove	 my	 case	 from	 the	
statements	of	the	Fathers.”57		
																																																						
54	“Postremo,	quando	scriptura	sancta	nobis	aliquid	generaliter	credendum	proponit,	convenit	ut	nos	illum	
modum	nobis	deligamus	(si	quis	et	deligendus)	qui	sit	facilior	et	expeditior,	nec	avocet	homines	sed	potius	
manuducat	ad	fidem	atque	ad	eum	minora	paucioraque	consequantur	absurda,	nec	miracula	multiplicentur.	
Id	autem	vos	minime	praestatis	qui	modos	delegistis	ad	quos	tuendos	infinitis	opus	est	miraculis,	et	absurda	
concurrunt	sine	modo.”	(Vermigli,	Disputatio,	73v;	Vermigli,	Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	255.)	
55	Corda,	Veritas	Sacramenti,	179	n.	51.	
56	“Sine	his	figmentis	Eucharistia	est	 integrum	perfectumque.”	(Vermigli,	Tractatio,	epistola	ad	 lectorem,	
sine	pagina	[p.	9];	Vermigli,	Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	15.)	Salvatore	Corda	confirms	our	point,	writing	
in	the	summary	of	his	book,	that	“in	his	controversy	over	the	Lord’s	Supper	[Vermigli]	endeavoured	to	prove	
that	one	can	come	to	the	same	basic	results	without	postulating,	as	in	his	view	his	Catholic	and	extreme	
Lutheran	opponents	did,	a	physical	identification	or	conjunction	between	the	elements	and	Christ’s	body.	
With	 absolute	 conviction	 Vermigli	 constantly	 maintained	 that	 a	 sacramental	 understanding	 of	 this	
relationship	 not	 only	 avoids	 the	 absurdities	 of	 a	 physical	 or	 spatial	 presence	 of	 Christ’s	 body	 in	 the	
sacrament	…	but	also	does	not	detract	at	all	from	the	truth	and	power	of	the	Lord’s	Supper.	‘We	do	not	get	
less	through	our	spiritual	conjunction	with	Christ’,	he	repeats,	than	if	we	would	be	given	the	one	supposed	
by	the	Papists.’”	(Corda,	Veritas	Sacramenti,	179.	Quoting	Vermigli,	Ad	Corinthios,	305v.)	
57	“Ex	Patrum	sententiis	perspicue	demonstrabo.”(Vermigli,	Dialogus,	4r;	Vermigli,	Dialogue,	15.)	
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Vermigli’s	 perception	 of	 himself	 as	 standing	 within	 the	 orthodox	 Christian	
tradition,	 and	 his	 understanding	 of	 the	 doctrine	 of	 transubstantiation,	 however,	 are	
predicated	 on	 a	 few	 unspoken	 presuppositions	 on	 his	 part	 concerning	 the	 nature	 of	
Christ’s	body	and	its	presence	in	the	Eucharist.	In	the	next	section,	I	shall	examine	these	
presuppositions	in	more	detail.	I	will	thereby	elaborate	further	how	they	led	Vermigli	to	
believe	that	transubstantiation	was	an	erroneous	approach	to	framing	the	sacramental	
change	of	the	Eucharistic	elements.	
	
3)	Pivotal	but	Unspoken	Presuppositions	
In	his	prefatory	letter	to	the	Oxford	treatise,	Vermigli	writes	the	following:	“I	totally	reject	
their	opinion	who	contend	that	the	body	is	enclosed	and	covered	in	the	bread	and	wine,	
and	affirm	that	it	is	under	their	forms,	so	that	they	should	worship	and	adore	him	there;	
in	brief,	they	have	set	up	an	idol.”58	This	–	together	with	countless	other	similar	passages	
–	shows	how	he	conceives	of	the	position	he	rejects.	Proponents	of	transubstantiation,	
he	believes,	hold	that	Christ’s	historical	body	flies	down	from	heaven59	and	is	somehow	
physically	enclosed	in	the	transubstantiated	Eucharistic	host.	What	is	it	that	led	Vermigli	
to	this	belief?	
THE	ARISTOTELIANISM	OF	VERMIGLI’S	BODIES	
First,	 there	 is	 his	 Aristotelian	 conviction	 that	 a	 body	 cannot	 be	 conceived	 apart	 from	
possessing	quantity	and	locality.	This	principle	applies,	for	Vermigli,	to	Christ’s	body	in	the	
Eucharist	as	well,	which	means	that	Vermigli	takes	it	for	granted	that	if	Christ	is	to	be	in	
the	Eucharist	“truly,”	he	must	be	there	in	his	historical	body,	including	its	quantity	and	
locality.	This	is	the	reason	why	Vermigli	holds	that	transubstantiation	involves	a	kind	of	
displacement	or	multiplication	of	Christ’s	historical	body,	with	the	latter	being	at	the	same	
time	in	heaven	as	well	as	on	numerous	altars.	He	is	aware,	however,	that	proponents	of	
transubstantiation	hold	that	in	the	transubstantiated	host,	“the	body	of	Christ	is	there	…	
																																																						
58	“Ab	illorum	vero	sententia	maxime	abhorreo,	qui	corpus	Christi	clausam	et	opertum	in	pane	et	vino,	vel	
ut	contendunt	sub	harum	rerum	speciebus	afferunt,	idque	utipsum	ibi	colant,	adorent	et	in	summa	idolum	
erectum	 habeant.”	 (Vermigli,	 Tractatio,	 epistola	 ad	 lectorem,	 sine	 pagina	 [pp.	 10–11];	 Vermigli,	Oxford	
Treatise	and	Disputation,	16.)	
59	Vermigli	mockingly	holds	that	if	transubstantiation	were	true,	“Christ’s	body”	would	have	to	“fly	down	
and	fly	away	every	day“	from	his	place	in	heaven,	“especially	before	noon.”	/	“Qui	fit	ut	cum	cogant	quotidie	
et	potissimum	usque	ad	horas	meridianas	perpetuo	devolare	et	avolare.”	(Vermigli,	Tractatio,	16v;	Vermigli,	
Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	45.)	
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not	in	a	quantitative	manner.”60	If	they	–	as	is	likely	–	followed	the	teaching	of	Thomas	
Aquinas,	 then	 they	would	have	distinguished	between	 the	body	of	Christ	 in	 its	proper	
species,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 in	 the	 species	 of	 this	 sacrament,	 on	 the	 other	 hand.61	
Vermigli	does	not	accept	this	answer	–	and	it	is	not	entirely	clear	why.	Instead,	he	affirms	
once	again	the	necessarily	quantitative	and	locative	nature	of	bodies:		
Here	is	a	wonder,	how	can	they	have	a	body,	a	quantum,	truly	present	and	
yet	not	by	way	of	quantity!	Since	they	affirm	his	presence	truly,	corporeally,	
and	 carnally,	 as	 they	 say,	 yet	 not	 locally,	 who	 cannot	 see	 that	 these	
arguments	are	invented	to	deceive?62		
It	is	indisputable	for	Vermigli	that	if	the	body	of	Christ	is	to	be	present	in	the	Eucharist,	
then	this	presence	has	to	be	conceived	of	as	a	local,	quantitative	presence	of	the	historical	
body	of	Christ	–	the	body,	that	is,	with	which	Christ	sits	at	the	right	hand	of	the	Father.	
Time	and	again	he	emphasises	this:	“You	cannot	join	the	body	and	blood	of	Christ	bodily	
and	substantially	to	the	bread	and	wine	of	the	Lord’s	Supper	unless	you	pull	them	down	
from	heaven	because	they	cannot	be	in	many	places	simultaneously.”63		
It	is	equally	indisputable	for	Vermigli	that	accidents	–	such	as	quantity	and	location	
–	can	never	be	taken	away	from	a	body.	To	do	so	would	be	against	the	nature	of	things.	
“There	are	many	things	which	cannot	be	done,”	he	says,	“because	the	nature	of	things	
does	not	permit	it.”64	There	are	two	types	of	natural	laws,	he	holds,	some	of	which	cannot	
be	 transgressed	without	 falling	 into	 unbearable	 logical	 contradictions,	whereas	 others	
																																																						
60	 “...	 si	 ibi	 sit	Corpus	Christi,	non	 tamen	hoc	 sit	per	modum	quanti.”	 (Vermigli,	Tractatio,	10r;	Vermigli,	
Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	37.)	
61	ST	III	75,1	ad	2.	See	also	ST	III	75,1	ad	3:	“Christ’s	body	is	not	in	this	sacrament	in	the	same	way	as	a	body	
is	 in	a	place,	which	by	 its	dimensions	 is	commensurate	with	 the	place;	but	 in	a	special	manner	which	 is	
proper	to	this	sacrament	(speciali	modo	qui	est	proprius	huic	sacramento).	Hence	we	say	that	Christ’s	body	
is	upon	many	altars,	not	as	in	different	places,	but	sacramentally:	and	thereby	we	do	not	understand	that	
Christ	is	there	only	as	in	a	sign,	although	a	sacrament	is	a	kind	of	sign;	but	that	Christ’s	body	is	here	after	a	
fashion	proper	to	this	sacrament	(secundum	modem	proprium	huic	sacramento),	as	stated	above.”		
62	 “Hoc	 est	 mirandum,	 quomodo	 ponant	 Corpus	 et	 quantum	 et	 vera	 ad	 esse	 non	 tamen	 per	 modum	
quanti.Cumque	statuant	vere	adesse	et	corporaliter	et	carnaliter	ut	dicunt	sed	non	localiter.	Quis	non	videat	
ista	 conficta	 esse	 ad	 eludenda	 argumenta?”	 (Vermigli,	 Tractatio,	 10r-v;	 Vermigli,	 Oxford	 Treatise	 and	
Disputation,	37.)	
63	“Vos	non	posse	corpus	et	sanguinem	Christi	corporaliter	et	substantialiter	pani	ac	vino	coenae	dominicae	
coniungere,	 nisi	 e	 coelo	 ea	 detraxeritis,	 quoniam	 in	 pluribus	 locis	 simul	 esse	 non	 possunt.”	 (Vermigli,	
Dialogus,	96v;	Vermigli,	Dialogue,	148.)	
64	“Multa	sunt	quae	ideo	non	possunt	fieri	eo	quod	rerum	natura	non	patitur.”	(Vermigli,	Disputatio,	20v;	
Vermigli,	Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	164.)	
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can.	Transubstantiation	violates	a	 law	of	nature	of	the	first	type,65	for	 it	claims	to	take	
accidents	away	from	their	proper	subject.66	
It	 is	 fair	 to	 say	 that	 Vermigli	 was	 more	 Aristotelian	 than	 were	 his	 Catholic	
contemporaries	who	defended	transubstantiation.	Vermigli	was	no	isolated	case	since	–	
as	 Charles	 Schmitt	 has	 shown	 –	 from	 the	mid-sixteenth	 century	 until	 about	 the	mid-
seventeenth	century,	Protestants	were	generally	more	Aristotelian	than	were	Catholics.67	
The	only	direct	reason	Vermigli	gives	for	his	decision	to	adhere	to	the	“nature	of	things”	
as	understood	by	Aristotle	is	that	he	is	suspicious	of	appeals	to	God’s	omnipotence,	which	
seem	argumentatively	lazy	to	him.	“Why	not	throw	in	everywhere	the	argument	drawn	
from	divine	power,”	he	exclaims,	“as	an	invincible	argument?”68	At	one	point	in	the	Oxford	
disputation,	 he	 sarcastically	 declares:	 “It	 were	 an	 easy	 thing	 for	 anyone	 to	 play	 the	
theologian,	 if	 all	 arguments	 could	 be	 dissolved	 by	miracles.”69	 In	 contrast	 to	 this,	 he	
himself	wishes	to	maintain	that	“there	are	some	things	that	cannot	happen	even	with	the	
divine	power,	not	of	course	from	any	failure	of	it	but	from	the	nature	of	things.”70	Rather	
than	basing	his	argument	on	God’s	power	to	interrupt	the	present	order,	Vermigli	appeals	
to	the	integrity	and	necessity	of	things	as	they	are	–	and	it	Aristotle	who	is	his	point	of	
reference	for	defining	the	“nature	of	things.”	
So	far,	we	have	seen	that	the	first	presupposition	that	led	Vermigli	to	a	rejection	
of	 transubstantiation	 is	 his	 conviction	 that	 if	 Christ’s	 body	were	 really	 or	 substantially	
present	 in	 the	 Eucharist,	 as	 Catholics	 claim,	 then	 it	 would	 have	 to	 be	 present	 in	 the	
Eucharistic	elements	 in	 the	same	way	as	any	other	body	 is	present	at	any	other	given	
place;	that	 is,	 locally	and	quantitatively.	This	presupposition	 implies	that	Vermigli	does	
not	 accept	 classic	 defences	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 Christ’s	 presence	 under	 the	 Eucharistic	
species,	as	seen	for	instance	in	question	75	of	the	tertia	pars	of	Thomas	Aquinas’	Summa	
																																																						
65	Cf.	Corda,	Veritas	Sacramenti,	185.	
66	 “They	 pervert	 the	 nature	 of	 things,	 since	 they	 take	 accidents	 away	 from	 their	 substance	 and	 proper	
subject.”	 /	 “Pervertunt	 rerum	 naturam	 cum	 a	 substantia	 et	 proprio	 subiecto	 abstrahunt	 accidentia.”	
(Vermigli,	Disputatio,	66v;	Vermigli,	Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	251.)	
67	Charles	B.	Schmitt,	Aristotle	and	the	Renaissance	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	1983),	26–27.	
68	 “Cur	 illud	 argumentum	 a	 divina	 potentia	 ductum	 ubique	 tanquam	 invictum	 inculcatis?“	 (Vermigli,	
Dialogus,	17v–18r;	Vermigli,	Dialogue,	35.)	
69	“Verum	ita	unicuique	facile	esset	agere	theologum,	si	per	miracula	omnia	solvenda	essent	argumenta.”	
(Vermigli,	Disputatio,	67v;	Vermigli,	Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	252.)	
70	“Aliqua	sint	quae	fieri	non	possint	(ut	ostensum	est)	vel	divina	potentia,	non	quidem	ex	eius	defectu,	sed	
ob	rerum	ipsarum	naturam.”	(Vermigli,	Dialogus,	17v;	Vermigli,	Dialogue,	35.)	 
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Theologiae.	In	Article	1	of	this	question	(“Whether	the	body	of	Christ	be	in	this	sacrament	
in	very	truth	or	merely	as	in	a	figure	or	sign”),	Aquinas	suggests	four	objections	against	
Christ	being	in	the	sacrament	“in	very	truth”,	all	of	which	he	answers	by	distinguishing	
between	Christ’s	body	in	its	proper	species	(as	he	hung	on	the	cross	and	is	sitting	on	the	
right	 hand	 of	 the	 Father),	 and	 Christ’s	 body	 under	 the	 species	 of	 the	 sacrament.	
Interestingly,	the	four	objections	that	Aquinas	mentions	here	are	echoed	almost	literally	
by	 Vermigli	 and	 other	 reformers.71	 This	 shows	 that	 Vermigli’s	 critique	 is	 anything	 but	
novel;	 and	 indeed	 that	 it	 had	 been	 answered	 before.	 More	 importantly,	 however,	 it	
indicates	that	a	defence	of	transubstantiation	such	as	that	of	Aquinas	–	of	which	Vermigli	
had	been	no	doubt	aware	–	had	lost	its	appeal	by	the	sixteenth	century.	Specifically,	 it	
seems	 that	 for	 Vermigli	 (and	 some	 of	 his	 contemporaries),	 it	 had	 become	 difficult	 to	
imagine	or	accept	a	specific	mode	of	presence	of	Christ’s	body	unique	to	the	sacrament.	
It	is	important	to	emphasise	that	Aquinas	would	have	utterly	rejected	the	kind	of	“proper”	
presence	 of	 Christ	 in	 the	 elements	 that	 Vermigli	 presupposes	 transubstantiation	 to	
involve.	As	Anscar	Vonier	puts	it,	drawing	on	ST	III	q.	76,	for	Thomas	Aquinas,		
if	 the	priest	at	 the	altar	brought	down	Christ	 from	heaven	 in	his	natural	
state	as	a	full-grown	man,	this	would	not	be	a	sacrament	in	the	least,	as	it	
would	lack	the	very	essence	of	the	sacrament,	representative	signification.	
…	At	no	time	do	we	deal	with	Christ	in	the	Eucharist	in	his	natural	condition,	
in	propria	specie.	It	might	almost	be	said	that	if	at	any	moment	Christ	in	his	
natural	 condition	 were	 to	 step	 into	 the	 sacramental	 processus,	 the	
sacrament	at	once	would	be	made	meaningless.	He	must	be	there	in	specie	
aliena	in	order	to	safeguard	the	veracity	of	the	sacrament	as	a	sign.72		
Vermigli’s	Aristotelian	conviction	about	the	nature	of	bodies	rules	out	such	a	Thomistic	
distinction	 between	 Christ’s	 body	 in	 his	 natural	 condition	 and	 his	 body	 in	 a	 condition	
specific	 to	 the	 sacrament.	 In	 particular,	 his	 unspoken	 presupposition	 that	 all	 bodies	
without	exception	must	possess	the	accidents	of	quantity	and	locality,	makes	it	impossible	
for	Vermigli	 to	conceive	of	a	kind	of	a	presence	of	Christ’s	body	“in	very	 truth”	 in	 the	
sacrament	that	is	not	Christ’s	presence	in	propria	specie.	
																																																						
71	Cf.	ST	III,	q.	75,	1,	objections:	(1)	That	because	the	Spirit	gives	life,	the	body	of	Christ	is	in	the	sacrament	
as	in	a	figure,	(2)	that	because	the	body	of	the	risen	Christ	is	in	heaven,	it	is	in	the	sacrament	only	as	in	a	
sign,	(3)	that	Christ’s	true	body	cannot	be	on	the	altar	as	well	as	in	heaven	because	no	body	can	be	in	several	
places	at	the	same	time,	(4)	and	that	Christ	is	in	heaven	because	he	said	he	had	to	leave	in	order	for	the	
paraclete	to	come.	
72	Anscar	Vonier,	A	Key	to	the	Doctrine	of	the	Eucharist	(s.l.:	Assumption	Press,	2013),	26–27.	
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In	sum,	the	first	presupposition	that	led	Vermigli	to	believe	that	transubstantiation	
was	an	erroneous	way	to	conceive	of	 the	sacramental	change	 in	the	elements	was	his	
understanding	of	the	nature	of	bodies	in	general,	and	Christ’s	body	in	particular.	For	when	
applied	 to	 the	presence	of	 Christ’s	 body	 in	 the	 Eucharist,	 his	 understanding	of	 bodies	
involves	 positing	 a	 local,	 quantitative	 presence	 of	 the	 body	 of	 Christ	 in	 his	 natural	
condition	 on	 the	 altar.	 As	 we	 have	 seen,	 however,	 classic	 proponents	 of	
transubstantiation	such	as	Thomas	Aquinas	would	have	equally	denied	such	a	presence.	
THE	LOCALITY	AND	REMOTENESS	OF	VERMIGLI’S	HEAVEN	
The	second	presupposition	that	caused	Vermigli	to	reject	transubstantiation	relates	to	his	
understanding	of	heaven	as	 the	place	where	the	human	nature	of	Christ	dwells.	More	
specifically,	and	as	 I	 shall	develop	 in	what	 follows,	he	conceives	of	heaven	as	 spatially	
determined,	on	the	one	hand,	and	as	a	place	radically	separate	and	distant	from	earth,	on	
the	other	hand.	This	leads	Vermigli	to	conceive	of	the	relationship	between	Christ	and	the	
world	as	one	determined	by	spatial	distance.	
Vermigli	simply	assumes	–	rather	than	explicitly	acknowledging	or	even	arguing	for	
–	the	fact	that	heaven	is	spatially	determined.	A	striking	example	for	quite	how	spatially	
determined	Vermigli’s	thinking	on	heaven	is	can	be	seen	in	a	passage	of	the	Defensio.	He	
teaches	 that	God	 the	 father	“lives	 in	heaven,	as	 the	Lord’s	prayer	 indicates,”	and	 that	
Christ	 sits	 at	 the	 right	 hand	 of	 the	 father	 “in	 his	 human	 nature.”73	 Because	 of	 the	
presupposition	 we	 have	 already	 encountered	 above,	 namely,	 that	 Vermigli	 cannot	
conceive	of	a	body	without	spatial	locality,	this	moreover	means	that	heaven,	the	place	
of	the	human	nature	of	Christ,	has	to	be	envisaged	as	a	‘locality’.74	Indeed,	heaven	is	the	
exclusive	place	where	Christ’s	human	nature	dwells;	“it	cannot	be	anywhere	else	 than	
there.”75	When	pressed	by	his	opponents	with	the	charge	that	he	thereby	confined	Christ	
to	a	particular	place,	Vermigli	retorts	that,	quite	to	the	contrary,	Christ	in	heaven	“is	able	
to	walk,	to	sit,	to	lie	and	to	move	freely	through	the	spaces	of	heaven.”76	This	statement	
is	one	of	 the	most	 remarkable	expressions	of	quite	how	spatially	determined	Vermigli	
																																																						
73	“Pater	in	coelis	habitat,	ut	oratio	Dominica	testatur;	ergo	filius	etiam	quoad	naturam	humanam	ibidem	
habitat.	Quandoquidem	in	coelis	est	ad	dextram	patris.”	(Vermigli,	Defensio,	31.)	
74	“Corpus	enim	constitui	non	potest	extra	locum.”	(Ibid.,	552.)	
75	“At	cum	sit	in	coelis	…	cum	salva	corporis	unitate,	in	tam	diversis	locis	nequeat.”	(Ibid.,	31.)	
76	“Nomo	enim	nostrum	unquam	alligavit,	aut	affixit	Christum	ad	certum	aliquem	 locum.	Potest	sedere,	
iacere,	ambulare,	et	quocunque	velit	per	coeli	spatia	se	conferre.”	(Ibid.,	552.)	
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envisaged	heaven	to	be.	 If	Christ	can	walk	through	the	various	spaces	of	heaven,	then	
‘heaven’	is	a	three-dimensionally	extended,	spacious	place,	a	bit	like	a	stately	home.	
What	 is	 more,	 heaven	 can	 be	 further	 characterised	 as	 being	 far	 away	 from	
anything	on	earth.	That	this	 is	a	presupposition	of	Vermigli’s	thinking	can	be	seen	only	
negatively,	in	that	he	argues	that	the	distance	of	places	between	Christ’s	body	in	heaven	
and	the	faithful	on	earth	does	not	prevent	their	union	with	Christ.	Implicit	in	assertions	
like	these	is	a	construal	of	a	fundamental	distance,	a	spatial	chasm,	between	heaven	and	
earth.	This	is	significant	insofar	as	the	distinction	between	the	two	could	be	conceived	of	
in	terms	other	than	distance,	such	as	difference	in	quality	or	intensity,	which	would	not	
define	heaven	according	to	earthly	measurements.	
We	 find	 a	 very	 clear	 instance	 of	 Vermigli	 indirectly	 confirming	 the	 distance	
between	heaven	and	earth	in	his	official	written	statement	to	the	Colloquy	of	Poissy.77	
Indeed,	 this	 statement	 is	 an	 expression	 of	 Martyr’s	 mature	 Eucharistic	 theology	 in	 a	
nutshell.	Here	he	holds	that	the	body	and	blood	of	Christ	–	his	human	nature	–	are	“really	
and	substantially	only	in	the	heavens,”	where	he	sits	at	the	right	hand	of	the	Father	from	
his	ascension	until	his	last	coming.	However,	Vermigli	continues,	the	“distance	of	places”	
is	no	hindrance	to		
our	 conjunction	 with	 the	 body	 and	 blood	 of	 Christ,	 because	 the	 Lord’s	
Supper	is	a	heavenly	matter,	and	although	on	earth	we	take	bread	and	wine	
by	the	mouth	of	the	body,	sacraments	of	the	body	and	blood	of	Christ,	yet	
by	faith	and	by	the	work	of	the	Holy	Spirit,	our	souls,	to	which	this	spiritual	
and	 heavenly	 food	 pertains,	 are	 carried	 up	 into	 heaven	 and	 enjoy	 the	
present	body	and	blood	of	Christ.78	
Vermigli	therefore	asserts	that	spiritually,	the	distance	between	heaven	and	earth	can	be	
overcome,	because,	in	the	Eucharist,	the	souls	of	the	faithful	reach	up	into	heaven	and	
are	 nourished	 there	 by	 Christ’s	 body.	 Taken	 together	 with	 Vermigli’s	 definition	 of	 a	
sacrament	 as	 a	 relationship	 between	 two	 realities,	 as	 seen	 above,	 this	 means	 that	
																																																						
77	This	statement	can	be	found	in	some	of	the	materials	that	were	added	to	the	1583-edition	of	the	Loci	
Communes:	Vermigli,	Loci	Communes	(1583),	1170–71.	A	translation	is	available	in	McLelland,	The	Visible	
Words	of	God,	287.		
78	“Sentio	itaque	corpus	Christi	reale	atque	substantiale	tantum	in	coelis	esse.	 ...	Deinde	affirmo	nostrae	
coniunctioni	cum	corpore	ac	sanguine	Christi	locorum	distantiam	non	obstare,	quoniam	Coena	Domini	res	
est	coelestis,	et	 licet	ore	corporis	accipamus	 in	 terris	panem	et	vinum,	sacramenta	corporis	et	sanguinis	
Domini,	fide	tamen,	et	ope	Spiritus	sancti	animi	nostri	quorum	in	primis	est	hic	spiritualis	et	divinus	cibus	
ad	coelum	evecti,	praesenti	corpore	ac	sanguine	Christi	fruuntur.”	(Vermigli,	Loci	Communes	(1583),	1070;	
McLelland,	The	Visible	Words	of	God,	287.)	
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believers	receive	one	of	these	realities	–	the	bread	and	wine	–	here	on	earth,	whereas	
they	 receive	 the	 other	 reality,	 Christ’s	 body	 and	 blood,	 in	 heaven.	 Corda	 comments:	
“Exactly	here	faith	intervenes.	In	Vermigli’s	view,	faith	overcomes	distances,	though	not	
materially,	only	spiritually.	This	must	be	understood	in	the	sense	that	though	the	distance	
objectively	remains,	subjectively	it	has	been	abolished.”79	Vermigli	stresses	time	and	again	
that	through	faith,	Christ	is	seen	on	the	Eucharistic	table.80	This	moreover	means	that	he	
sees	no	difference	between	the	way	in	which	believers	apprehend	Christ	in	the	Eucharist	
and	the	way	in	which	the	Fathers	spiritually	consumed	the	body	and	blood	of	Christ	in	the	
sacrifices	of	the	old	covenant.81	In	both	cases,	faith	makes	present	“those	things	which	
are	furthest	away	from	us.”82	
What	is	significant	about	this	conception	of	the	role	of	faith	as	an	overcomer	of	
distance	(literally	a	ponti-fex,	as	it	were),	is	that	it	tacitly	takes	for	granted	that	there	is	a	
spatial	 distance	 between	 heaven	 and	 earth,	which	 needs	 to	 be	 bridged	 in	 some	way.	
McLelland	points	out	that	“the	spatial	terminology	used	by	Martyr,	whose	stress	is	on	the	
sursum	corda	…	is	not	adequate	for	the	reality	it	seeks	to	express.”83	It	is	indeed	doubtful	
whether	the	spatial	determination	of	the	relationship	between	God	and	the	world,	which	
Vermigli	presupposes	without	questioning,	provides	a	helpful	framework	for	expressing	
the	theological	points	he	cares	about	most.	The	reality	he	seeks	to	express,	as	we	shall	
see	 below,	 is	 the	 union	 between	 Christ	 and	 the	 faithful,	 and	 his	 conviction	 that	 it	 is	
increased	through	the	participation	in	the	Eucharist.	
We	have	so	 far	seen	that	 the	second	presupposition	that	 led	Vermigli	 to	 reject	
transubstantiation	relates	to	his	understanding	of	the	place	where	the	risen	Christ	dwells	
in	his	human	nature.	For	Vermigli,	this	place	–	“heaven”	–	is	both	spatially	determined	and	
radically	separate	and	distant	from	earth.	These	two	characteristics	of	Vermigli’s	heaven	
																																																						
79	Corda,	Veritas	Sacramenti,	145–46.	
80	E.g.	“Dicimus	autem	carnem	Christi	vi	fidei	non	substantialiter	aut	realiter,	sed	tantum	spiritualiter	nobis	
fieri	praesentem.	Quemadmodum	enim	cum	accedimus	ad	sacram	Mensam,	per	fidem	habeam	ante	oculos,	
et	in	conspectu,	atque	ita	praesentem	mortem	domini:	ita	per	fidem	animo,	ac	spiritu	vescimur	praesente	
carne	Christi.”	(Vermigli,	Defensio,	725.)	
81	Vermigli	is	explicit	about	this	in	his	commentary	on	I	Samuel	1:4,	where	he	writes:	“And	that	was	the	Holy	
Communion	of	those	times,	since	 in	these	victims	[of	their	sacrifices]	the	holy	Fathers	ate	the	body	and	
blood	of	Christ,	as	we	do	today	in	the	bread	and	wine	of	the	Eucharist.”	/	“Et	ea	fuit	illorum	temporum	sacra	
communio,	quandoquidem	in	illis	victimis	pii	patres	corpore	ac	sanguine	Christi	vescebantur,	ut	nos	hodie	
in	pane	ac	vino	Eucharistico	facimus.”	(Vermigli,	Samuelis,	4v.)	
82	“Nam	quae	longissime	remota	sunt	a	nobis,	fides	ea	facit	praesentia.”	(Ibid.,	5r.).	
83	McLelland,	The	Visible	Words	of	God,	165.	
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are	in	fact	mutually	dependent,	and	it	is	not	entirely	clear	which	of	them	came	first:	on	
the	one	hand,	insofar	as	he	thinks	of	heaven	in	quasi-geometrical	terms,	heaven	has	to	be	
distinguished	from	other	places	by	means	of	its	relative	distance	from	them.	Put	crudely:	
if	heaven	is	mapped	out,	then	its	coordinates	have	to	be	different	from	the	coordinates	
of	any	place	on	earth.	In	such	a	mapped-out	world,	there	cannot	be	a	mutual	inherence	
of	different	qualities	of	places,	for	instance.	On	the	other	hand,	one	can	inversely	say	that,	
insofar	 as	Vermigli	 conceives	 of	 heaven	 and	 earth	 as	 two	 spatially	 distant	 entities,	 he	
necessarily	 conceives	 of	 both	 in	 spatial	 terms.	 Whereas	 there	 has	 been,	 ever	 since	
Descartes,	an	appeal	in	thinking	of	our	earthly	surroundings	in	extended	spatial	terms,84	
spiritual	realities	such	as	“heaven”	need	not	be	conceived	of	in	spatial	terms	at	all.	The	
fact	 that	 Vermigli	 thinks	 of	 heaven	 in	 spatial	 terms	 is	 another	 crucial	 but	 unspoken	
presupposition	of	his	work.	
It	 is	 this	 presupposition	 about	 the	 character	 of	 heaven	 –	 in	 which	 the	 human	
nature	of	Christ	 is	to	be	found	–	together	with	the	presupposition	about	the	nature	of	
bodies	 we	 have	 seen	 above,	 that	 makes	 it	 impossible	 for	 Vermigli	 to	 conceive	 of	 a	
‘physical’	closeness	between	Christ	and	believers,	or	between	Christ	and	the	Eucharistic	
elements,	unless	Christ	is	in	some	way	physically	brought	down	from	heaven.	For	Vermigli,	
there	can	only	be	one	of	two	options:	either	there	is	a	physical	presence	of	the	body	of	
Christ	in	the	Eucharist,	but	then	this	body	has	to	be	miraculously	‘fly’	down	from	his	place	
at	the	right	hand	of	the	Father,	or	Christ	is	not	physically	or	substantially	present	in	the	
Eucharist	 at	 all,	 but	 the	 faithful	 communicate	with	 him	 in	 a	 different	way:	 spiritually,	
through	faith	and	the	sursum	corda.	It	is	because	he	finds	the	former	of	these	two	options	
absurd	and	unnecessarily	fanciful	(as	we	have	seen	in	the	previous	section)	that	Vermigli	
rejects	transubstantiation.	There	remains,	however,	the	basic	reality	of	this	either-or.	In	
the	next	section,	I	shall	further	elaborate	on	the	consequences	of	this	either-or.	
Taking	 a	 few	 steps	 back	 from	 Vermigli’s	 explicit	 argumentations	 about	 the	
presence	of	Christ	 in	the	sacrament,	 let	us	consider	what	kind	of	relationship	between	
God	and	the	world	is	implied	by	his	reasoning.	Underlying	both	presuppositions	we	have	
considered	 so	 far	 is	 the	 governing	 assumption	 that	not	only	 the	 relationship	between	
Christ	and	the	sacramental	elements,	but	more	generally	the	relationship	between	God	
																																																						
84	Cf.	Pickstock,	After	Writing:	On	the	Liturgical	Consummation	of	Philosophy,	57–74.	
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and	the	world,	is	conceived	of	in	spatial	terms.	Vermigli	envisages	the	standard	relation	
between	 the	 two	 to	be	a	kind	of	geographical	distance.	There	 is	a	 sense	 in	which	 this	
distance	has	to	be	overcome	first,	before	there	can	be	an	encounter	between	God	and	
the	world.	As	we	shall	see	in	the	next	section,	however,	Vermigli	paradoxically	cements	
this	spatial	distance	in	the	very	attempt	to	overcome	it.	
	
4)	(Not)	Overcoming	Spatial	Distance	
In	 his	 theology	 of	 spiritual	 communication	 between	 Christ	 and	 the	 faithful,	 Vermigli	
actively	presupposes	that	their	standard	relation	is	determined	through	a	spatial	distance	
that	lies	between	them.	At	the	same	time,	however,	he	argues	that	this	distance	is	of	no	
great	importance	because	it	can	be	overcome	spiritually.	In	this	section,	I	will	argue	that	
Vermigli’s	 theology	 does	 not	 in	 fact	 overcome	 this	 distance,	 because	 it	 in	 no	 way	
challenges	the	fundamental	assumption	of	a	distance	between	God	and	the	world.	In	his	
very	argument	that	the	faithful	can	be	united	with	Christ	without	there	being	a	“nearness	
of	places”	between	them,	he	 implicitly	cements	that	 the	relationship	between	them	is	
determined	spatially.	Put	differently:	Vermigli	argues	that	the	spatial	distance	between	
God	and	the	world	is	of	no	relevance	in	spiritual	matters.	He	does	not,	however,	critique	
the	idea	that	there	is	such	a	distance	in	the	first	place.	Quite	to	the	contrary,	he	takes	it	
so	much	for	granted	that	he	seems	to	be	able	to	conceive	of	an	intimacy	between	two	
entities	only	through	either	their	spatial	overlapping	or	through	bridging	the	real	distance	
between	 them	 spiritually.	 Presence,	 in	 an	 unqualified	 sense,	 straightforwardly	means	
spatial	presence	for	him.	
In	order	to	demonstrate	quite	how	Vermigli	cements	the	distance	between	Christ	
and	the	world	in	the	very	process	of	asserting	its	irrelevance,	let	us	focus	on	his	use	of	a	
number	 of	 similes,	 which	 he	 repeatedly	 uses,	 both	 in	 the	 Oxford	 treatise	 (and	 its	
dedicatory	 letter	to	Cranmer),	and	 in	the	fictive	dialogue	with	Brenz.	The	first	of	these	
similes	is	drawn	from	the	body	of	Christ.	Christians	are	not	only	united	with	Christ,	but	
also	with	their	fellow	Christians,	Vermigli	asserts,	forming	one	body	of	Christ.	Based	on	
this	he	rhetorically	addresses	his	opponents	in	his	letter	to	Cranmer	which	prefaces	the	
Oxford	treatise:		
Will	you	not	agree	that	the	faithful	in	Spain,	Italy,	Germany	and	France	are	
so	joined	with	us	as	to	be	(as	Paul	says)	members	with	us?	I	know	you	do	
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not	 deny	 that.	 Therefore,	 if	 separation	 of	 places	 and	 [lack	 of]	 physical	
contact,	which	are	impossibilities,	do	not	hinder	this	unity	by	which	we	are	
joined	together	in	one	through	Christ,	why	do	you	deny	that	we	are	truly	
joined	to	him	without	any	real	and	corporeal	presence?	And	if	you	do	not	
deny	 it,	 why	 do	 you	 insist	 on	 promoting	 such	 a	 presence	 [in	 the	
Eucharist]?85	
Because	neither	the	lack	of	physical	contact	between	the	faithful	in	various	parts	of	the	
world	 nor	 their	 local	 separation	 from	 each	 other	 prevents	 their	 unity	 in	 Christ,	 the	
“enormous	 stretch	 of	 distance”86	 between	 Christ’s	 human	 nature	 in	 heaven	 and	 the	
faithful	 on	 earth	 is	 equally	 insignificant.	 Arguing	 “from	 the	 greater	 to	 the	 less	 by	
negation,”	 no	 local	 presence	 of	 the	 body	 of	 Christ	 is	 needed	 in	 the	 elements	 of	 the	
Eucharist,	“for	the	union	of	Christ	with	us	and	those	who	communicate	is	greater	than	
with	the	symbols.“87		
Vermigli	 uses	 marriage	 as	 a	 second	 simile	 to	 make	 the	 same	 point	 about	 the	
needlessness	of	“physical	contact	or	nearness	of	places.”	Husband	and	wife	are	said	to	be	
one	 flesh,	 he	 argues.	 This	 “union	 of	 flesh”	 persists,	 however,	 even	 “if	 it	 sometimes	
happens	that	a	man	stays	in	London	while	his	wife	remains	at	Cambridge	or	Oxford.”88	
Vermigli	concludes:	
																																																						
85	“Nonne	fatebimini	eos	fideles	qui	sunt	in	Hyspania,	Italia,	Germania,	et	Gallia	nobis	coniunctos	ita	esse,	
ut	 sint	 nobiscum	 (quemadmodum	 Paulus	 dicit)	 invicem	 membras?	 Scio	 non	 negabitis.	 Quod	 si	 istam	
unitatem	qua	per	Christum	in	unum	connectimur,	 locorum	interstitium	et	contactus	physicus	(qui	nullus	
esse	potest)	nihil	 impediunt,	cur	absque	reali	praesentia	et	corporali,	negatis	Christo	nos	vere	coniungi?	
Quod	si	non	negatis,	quare	 istam	praesentiam	tam	 importune	urgetis?”	 (Vermigli,	Tractatio,	epistola	ad	
lectorem,	sine	pagina	[pp.	8-9];	Vermigli,	Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	14.)	
86	This	quote	stems	from	the	Dialogue,	where	Vermigli	makes	the	same	argument	as	we	have	just	seen:	
“Hence	if	a	distance	between	places	does	not	prevent	believers	who	live	in	England	from	being	intimately	
joined	to	their	brothers	who	dwell	in	both	France	and	in	Germany,	what	prevents	us	from	being	joined	to	
Christ’s	human	nature	…	even	though	he	is	far	from	us	by	an	enormous	stretch	of	distance.”	/	“Quare,	si	
locorum	distantia	non	obstat	quominus	fideles	qui	agunt	in	Anglia	sint	cum	illis	fratribus	qui	tam	in	Gallia	
quam	 in	 Germania	 versantur	 astrictissime	 coniuncti,	 quid	 impediet	 quin	 cum	 Christi	 natura	 humana	
iungamur	...	quamvis	a	nobis	longissimo	tractu	locorum	distet?”	(Vermigli,	Dialogus,	126v–127r;	Vermigli,	
Dialogue,	192.)	
87	“Argumentum	nostrum	…	est	a	maiori	ad	minus	per	negationem,	est	enim	maior	coniunctio	Christi	ad	nos	
et	 cum	 illis	 qui	 communicant	 quam	 sit	 cum	 symbolis.”	 (Vermigli,	 Tractatio,	 44v–45r;	 Vermigli,	 Oxford	
Treatise	and	Disputation,	90.)	
88	 “Quid	 hic,	 aut	 ullo	 contactu	 physico	 aut	 locorum	 propinquitate,	 opus	 est?	 ...	 Et	 tamen	 istam	 carnis	
unitatem	 inter	 coniuges	 nihil	 impedit	 si	 (ut	 fit)	 vir	 interdum	 Londini	 fuerit	 ad	 aliquod	 tempus	 et	 uxor	
Cantabrigiae	vel	Oxonii	manserit.”	(Vermigli,	Tractatio,	epistola	ad	lectorem,	sine	pagina	[pp.	8-9];	Vermigli,	
Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	14.)	
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Thus	in	order	to	enter	into	union	with	Christ,	there	is	no	need	for	you	to	
attempt	to	tie	his	body	and	blood	…	under	the	appearance	of	bread	and	
wine.	We	are	truly	joined	to	Christ	without	these	wonders.89	
Vermigli	re-iterates	this	argument	from	the	Oxford	treatise	 in	the	Dialogue,	which	was	
written	more	than	ten	years	later:	“If	a	husband	is	sometimes	separated	from	his	wife	on	
a	trip,	as	does	happen,	he	does	not	cease	being	one	flesh	with	her.”90	By	extension,	he	
argues,	
nobody	will	 deny	 that	 Christ	 is	 joined	 to	 the	 Church	 as	well	 as	 to	 each	
believer	by	a	marriage	that	is	very	solid	and	spiritual.	Wherefore	a	spatial	
distance,	however	 far,	cannot	split	us	 from	our	union	with	his	 flesh	and	
blood.91	
The	third	simile	that	Vermigli	employs	to	make	this	same	point	 is	that	of	the	sun	in	 its	
relation	to	the	world.	Although	the	sun	“seems	to	be	very	far	away	from	us	who	dwell	on	
earth	if	one	examines	spaces	and	local	distances”,	it	is	nonetheless	present	to	everyone	
living	on	earth,	through	its	light,	its	warmth,	and	its	“live-giving	influences.”92		
The	tertium	comparationis	between	Vermigli’s	Eucharistic	theology	and	all	three	
of	the	similes	he	employs	–	the	body	of	Christ,	marriage,	and	the	sun	–	is	that	two	things	
are	intimately	connected	without	there	being	a	corporeal	or	physical	presence	of	one	in	
or	next	to	the	other.	Crucially,	therefore,	the	similes	posit	a	spatial	distance	between	two	
entities:	between	a	Christian	in	Germany	and	another	Christian	in	Spain,	between	a	wife	
in	Cambridge	and	her	husband	in	London,	and	between	the	sun	in	the	firmament	and	a	
flower	in	my	garden,	for	instance.	Despite	this	spatial	distance,	Vermigli	argues,	there	is	a	
close	connection	between	the	two.	The	main	point	of	the	three	similes	is	therefore	that	
																																																						
89	“Idcirco	non	est	quod	unitatis	caussa	cum	Christo	ineundae	adeo	conemini	corpus	et	sanguinem	eius,	aut	
pani	 aut	 vino	 alligare	 vel	 (ut	 dicitis)	 sub	 speciebus	 panis	 et	 vini	 operire.	 Sine	 his	 portentis	 vere	 Christo	
adiungimur.”	 (Vermigli,	Tractatio,	 epistola	ad	 lectorem,	 sine	pagina	 [p.	9];	Vermigli,	Oxford	Treatise	and	
Disputation,	15.)	
90	“Vir	si	ab	uxore	(quemadmodum	fit)	aliqua	peregrinatione	interdum	abiungatur,	non	idcirco	desinit	esse	
cum	illa	una	caro.”	(Vermigli,	Dialogus,	127r;	Vermigli,	Dialogue,	192.)	
91	“Christum	vero	ecclesiae	nec	non	cuique	fideli	iunctum	esse	spirituali	iuxtaque	firmissimo	coniugio,	nemo	
inficiabitur.	 Quamobrem	 nostram	 unionem	 cum	 eius	 carne	 ac	 sanguine	 distantia	 locorum	 quantumvis	
longinqua,	non	potest	avellere.”	(Vermigli,	Dialogus,	127r;	Vermigli,	Dialogue,	192.)	
92	“Sol...a	nobis	videatur	abesse	qui	habitamus	terram,	si	spacia	et	locorum	distantiam	spectaveris.	Attamen	
ab	omnibus	dicitur	nobis	praesens,	quod	non	solum	calorem	et	lucem,	verum	etiam	dulces,	efficaces	atque	
vivificas	influentias	rebus	mortalibus	perpetuo	ac	largissime	suppeditet.”	(Vermigli,	Dialogus,	127r;	Vermigli,	
Dialogue,	192–93.)	
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they	serve	to	answer	Vermigli’s	rhetorical	question	“What	need	is	there	either	of	physical	
contact	or	of	nearness	of	places?”93	with	a	resounding	“None!”94	
Let	us	recapitulate	what	we	have	established	so	far.	We	have	seen	in	the	previous	
section	how	Vermigli	envisages	the	relation	between	the	human	nature	of	Christ	and	his	
faithful	 to	be	 characterised	by	a	 radical	 spatial	distance,	 to	 the	effect	 that	 “presence”	
without	further	qualification	means	spatial	presence	or	local	nearness	for	him.	This	notion	
of	 presence	 causes	 him	 to	 hold	 that	 the	 only	way	 separate	 entities	 can	 be	 intimately	
connected	to	each	other	is	through	one	of	them	being	delivered	into	or	enclosed	in	the	
other.	At	the	same	time,	however,	his	rejection	of	transubstantiation	is	essentially	based	
on	an	argument	against	the	need	for	such	a	presence,	as	exemplified	 in	his	use	of	the	
three	similes	discussed	above.	
	What	we	 find	 is	 that	Vermigli	 sets	up,	on	 the	one	hand,	a	very	place-focussed	
framework	in	which	the	relationship	between	different	entities	can	be	envisaged.	They	
are	either	physically	enclosed	one	into	the	other,	or	separated	by	a	spatial	distance.	He	
does	not	conceive	of	relationships	that	are	not	predicated	upon	space	and	place.	On	the	
other	hand,	however,	Vermigli	battles	the	very	spatial	structure	he	set	up	himself,	in	that	
he	argues	against	the	importance	of	spatial	nearness	in	spiritual	matters.	That	there	need	
not	be	a	physical	presence	of	 the	human	nature	of	Christ	enclosed	 in	 the	sacramental	
elements	 for	 the	 faithful	 to	 be	 deeply	 united	 to	 their	 Lord	 is	 in	 fact	 one	 of	 his	main	
arguments	against	the	doctrine	of	transubstantiation.		
Having	seen	how	unaware	Vermigli	is	in	general	of	his	own	place-	and	distance-
focussed	presuppositions,	it	seems	that	Vermigli	nevertheless	does	have	a	sense	for	their	
																																																						
93	“Quid	hic,	aut	ullo	contactu	physico	aut	locorum	propinquitate,	opus	est?”	(Vermigli,	Tractatio,	epistola	
ad	lectorem,	sine	pagina	[pp.	8];	Vermigli,	Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	14.)	
94	Even	though	all	 three	similes	share	the	same	tertium	comparationis,	 there	are	nonetheless	 important	
differences	between	them.	In	the	case	of	the	simile	of	the	sun,	what	overcomes	the	spatial	distance	is	sense	
perception.	Sense	perception	is	not,	however,	constant	or	ontological.	By	contrast,	in	the	marriage	simile,	
the	 local	separation	 is	only	a	temporal	condition	of	a	stable,	 indeed	arguably	ontological,	connection.	 In	
contrast	to	the	simile	with	the	body	of	Christ,	the	marital	bond,	which	–	as	Vermigli	maintains	–	holds	despite	
the	 local	 separation	 of	 husband	 and	 wife,	 could	 not	 have	 been	 forged	 if	 the	 two	 partners	 had	 never	
physically	met.	Physical	nearness	is	crucial	for	there	to	be	a	marriage	in	the	first	place	–	which	is	why	it	does	
not	seem	entirely	obvious	why	Vermigli	would	have	chosen	this	example	in	a	context	where	he	wishes	to	
downplay	the	importance	of	physical	nearness.	The	third	simile,	where	Vermigli	 likens	the	way	believers	
scattered	throughout	the	world	are	connected	with	each	other	to	the	unity	with	Christ	in	the	sacrament,	is	
perhaps	the	most	fitting	of	the	three	used	by	Vermigli	here,	as	it	presupposes	more	than	a	mere	looking-at	
from	afar	as	in	the	case	of	the	sun,	on	the	one	hand,	while,	on	the	other	hand,	taking	into	account	what	is	
not	possible	with	the	marriage	simile;	namely	that	I	can	be	one	in	Christ	with	someone	whom	I	will	never	
physically	meet.	
Chapter	Three:	Presence	
	 116	
limiting	character	in	the	present	context.	Any	kind	of	sacramental	presence	that	deserves	
the	name	–	and	certainly	the	kind	of	presence	Vermigli	is	arguing	for	–	transcends	notions	
of	mere	physical	enclosure.	Nonetheless,	Vermigli	does	not	seem	to	be	able	to	break	out	
of	the	space-centred	framework.	This	paradoxically	results	in	him	cementing	the	spatial	
nature	of	the	relationship	between	Christ	and	his	faithful,	and	in	particular	the	distance	
between	them.	For	the	more	he	stresses	the	power	of	faith	to	overcome	the	gulf	between	
the	faithful	on	earth	and	Christ	in	heaven,	the	more	he	entrenches	the	perception	of	this	
very	gulf.	
	
5)	 Which	 Change?	 Hunsinger,	 Vermigli	 and	 the	 Status	 of	 the	 Eucharistic	
Elements	
As	we	have	seen,	Vermigli	argues	that	Christians	can	be	intimately	connected	with	the	
human	nature	 of	 Christ	 despite	 there	 being	 a	 spatial	 gulf	 between	 them.	 Though	 this	
argument	 is	made	 in	 the	 context	of	 the	Eucharistic	 controversies,	 however,	 the	union	
between	Christ	and	his	faithful	that	it	promotes	is	in	fact	independent	of	the	sacrament.	
This	 section	 will	 argue	 that	 Vermigli’s	 effective	 circumventing	 of	 the	 sacramental	
elements	renders	problematic	George	Hunsinger’s	appeal	to	Vermigli	as	a	source	for	a	
proposal	 of	 a	 new	 ecumenical	 notion	 of	 the	 sacramental	 change.	 That	 Vermigli	
nonetheless	ascribes	importance	to	the	sacrament	and	its	physical	aspects	is	primarily	due	
to	its	role	with	regard	to	the	union	of	the	faithful	with	Christ.	
Vermigli’s	 effective	 bypassing	 of	 the	 sacramental	 elements	 is	 perhaps	 best	
illustrated	by	means	of	the	categories	established	by	Henri	de	Lubac	in	his	famous	study	
Corpus	Mysticum.	De	Lubac	distinguished	 three	aspects	of	 the	one	body	of	Christ:	 the	
historical	body	(the	body	born	of	the Virgin),	the Eucharistic body	(signified	by	bread	and	
wine),	 and	 the ecclesial body	 (the	 body	 of	 the	 church).95	 He	 studied	 the	 relationship	
between	these	three	bodies,	 indicating	how	the	Church	Fathers	and	theologians	of	the	
Middle	 Ages	 consistently	 emphasized	 the	 unity	 of	 the	 one	 body	 of	 Christ,	 while	
nonetheless	 distinguishing	 its	 three	 aspects.	 De	 Lubac	 moreover	 showed	 that	 these	
theologians	particularly	linked	the	Eucharistic	and	the	ecclesial	bodies	–	taking	their	cue	
																																																						
95	Henri	de	Lubac,	Corpus	Mysticum:	The	Eucharist	and	the	Church	in	the	Middle	Ages,	trans.	G.	Simmonds	
(Notre	Dame	IN:	University	of	Notre	Dame	Press,	2007).	
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from	1	Cor 10:16-17	 (“Is	not	…	the	bread	that	we	break	a	participation	 in	 the	body	of	
Christ?	Because	there	is	one	loaf,	we,	who	are	many,	are	one	body.”)	Based	on	a	change	
in	the	use	of	the	predicates	verum	and	mysticum	as	applied	to	the	body	of	Christ,96	De	
Lubac	shows	how	this	 special	 connection	between	the	Eucharistic	and	ecclesial	bodies	
gradually	 came	 to	 be	 replaced	 by	 a	 special	 association	 between	 the	 Eucharistic	 and	
historical	bodies: 
Of	the	three	terms:	historical	body,	sacramental	body	and	ecclesial	body	…	
that	it	was	a	case	of	putting	into	order	amongst	each	other,	that	is	to	say	
simultaneously	to	oppose	and	unite	them	to	one	another,	the	caesura	was	
originally	placed	between	the	first	and	the	second,	whereas	it	subsequently	
came	to	be	placed	between	the	second	and	the	third.97		
Describing	 Vermigli’s	 Eucharistic	 theology	 by	means	 of	 this	 framework	 shows	 that	 his	
doctrine	of	a	spiritual	communication	between	Christ	and	the	faithful	associates	the	two	
elements	 of	 the	 body	 of	 Christ	 that	 had	 not	 been	 hitherto	 associated,	 namely	 the	
historical	body	and	the	ecclesial	body.	If	the	body	of	the	church	can	be	built	up	directly	
through	a	spiritual	communion	with	the	historical	body	of	Christ,	however,	 this	means	
that	the	middle	of	the	three	terms	listed	above	–	the	sacramental	body	–	is	bypassed.	
This	does	not	mean,	however,	that	Vermigli	wished	to	abolish	the	bodily	aspect	of	
the	 breaking	 of	 the	 bread.	 As	 we	 shall	 see	 below,	 he	 has	 his	 reasons	 for	 ascribing	
importance	 to	 it.	 Still,	 the	 fact	 that	 Vermigli’s	 Eucharistic	 theology	 bypasses	 the	
sacramental	body	on	a	fundamental	level	nonetheless	indicates	a	problem	with	George	
Hunsinger’s	 use	 of	 Vermigli	 as	 a	 source	 in	The	 Eucharist	 and	 Ecumenism.98	 Hunsinger	
draws	on	Vermigli	precisely	to	argue	for	a	new	proposal	about	the	sacramental	body	of	
Christ.	Vermigli	is	one	of	the	core	sources	on	the	Protestant	side	in	his	project	to	propose	
a	doctrine	of	Christ’s	real	presence	in	the	Eucharistic	elements	that	can	be	accepted	by	
																																																						
96	Hans	Boersma	helpfully	summarises	these	shifts	and	how	de	Lubac	evaluated	them	as	follows:	“Over	time,	
in	the	High	Middle	Ages,	the	word	‘true’	(verum)	moved	from	the	ecclesial	body	to	the	eucharistic	body:	
Christ’s	body	 in	the	Eucharist	came	to	be	seen	as	 ‘the	true	body’.	At	the	same	time,	the	word	‘mystical’	
(mysticum)	moved	from	the	eucharistic	body	to	the	ecclesial	body:	the	church	as	the	body	of	Christ	came	
to	be	seen	as	‘the	mystical	body’.	To	be	sure,	de	Lubac	does	not	take	issue	with	the	use	of	the	term	‘mystical	
body’	to	describe	the	church,	but	he	does	believe	that	the overall shift	in	terminology	-	with	the	word	‘true’	
being	 used	 for	 the	 eucharistic	 body	 and	 the	 term	 ‘mystical’	 being	 reserved	 for	 the	 ecclesial	 body	 -	 is	
problematic.	For	de	Lubac,	these	linguistic	shifts	reflected	(1)	an	increasing	focus	on	the	real	presence	in	the	
Eucharist	(the	‘true’	body	of	Christ);	and	(2)	a	loss	of	the	sacramental	connection	between	the	eucharistic	
and	the	ecclesial	body	of	Christ.”	Boersma,	Heavenly	Participation,	117.	
97	De	Lubac,	Corpus	Mysticum,	256.	
98	Hunsinger,	The	Eucharist	and	Ecumenism.	
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the	Reformed	 tradition	while	not	being	 church-dividing	 from	a	Catholic	 point	of	 view.	
Hunsinger	deems	Vermigli	a	“weighty	thinker	whose	ideas	today	seem	full	of	ecumenical	
promise”99	because	he,	together	with	Bucer	and	Cranmer,	found	“nothing	objectionable”	
in	 a	 sacramental	 change	of	 the	elements	 along	 the	 lines	proposed	by	Hunsinger.100	 In	
particular,	 he	 argues	 that	 Vermigli	 was	 “open,	 more	 explicitly	 [than	 Calvin],	 to	 a	
relationship	of	Eucharistic	elevation,	conversion,	and	mutual	indwelling,	along	the	lines	of	
the	iron	in	the	fire.”101	The	image	of	an	iron	rod	thrust	into	the	fire	–	where	the	iron	is	
transformed	by	the	fire,	without	ceasing	to	be	iron	–	is	Hunsinger’s	favourite	illustration	
for	his	proposed	“transelementation”	of	the	bread	and	wine.	
In	 the	 context	 of	 his	 discussion	 of	 Theophylact’s	 statement	 “that	 bread	 is	
transformed,	converted,	and	transelemented,”	Vermigli	indeed	wrote	that	“if	these	words	
are	 taken	 sacramentally	we	do	not	mind.”102	 Similarly,	 during	 the	Oxford	Disputation,	
Vermigli	 stated	 that	 Theophylact’s	 terms	 “changing,”	 “transforming”	 and	
“transelementing”	as	applied	to	the	bread	were	admissible	“because	of	the	sacramental	
change.”103	 These	 two	 references,	 on	 which	 Hunsinger	 bases	 Vermigli’s	 alleged	
endorsement	 of	 transelementation,	 highlight	 not	 only	 that	 Vermigli	 was	 less	 than	
enthusiastic	about	 transelementation	than	Hunsinger	makes	 it	 seem,	but	also	 that	 the	
real	question	here	is	about	the	nature	of	what	Vermigli	calls	the	sacramental	change.	
For	what	is	it	that	is	changed	in	and	through	the	Eucharist?	Vermigli’s	answer	to	
this	 question	 features	 the	 Eucharistic	 elements	 at	 best	 only	 secondarily.	 Hunsinger	
himself	says	this	along	the	 lines	we	have	seen	above,	admitting	that	 for	Vermigli,	“the	
primary	 union	 and	 communion	 in	 the	 Eucharist	 were	 always	 between	 Christ	 and	 the	
communicants,	not	between	Christ	and	the	elements.”104	Any	change	of	the	elements	is	
always	 in	 view	 of,	 and	 therefore	 subordinated	 to,	 the	 union	 between	 Christ	 and	 the	
communicants.	Or,	as	Vermigli	phrases	it,	Christ	is	more	joined	with	his	faithful	than	with	
																																																						
99	Ibid.,	39.	
100	Ibid.,	45.	
101	Ibid.,	92.	
102	“Ait	panem	transformari,	converti	et	transelementari,	quas	locutiones,	si	accipiat	sacramentaliter,	non	
abhorremus.”	(Vermigli,	Tractatio,	45r;	Vermigli,	Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	90.)		
103	 “Et	 verba	 Theophylacti	 mutandi,	 transformandi	 atque	 transelementandi	 concedimus,	 propter	
conversionem	sacramentalem.”	(Vermigli,	Disputatio,	52r;	Vermigli,	Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	218.)	
104	Hunsinger,	The	Eucharist	and	Ecumenism,	40.	
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the	 Eucharistic	 symbols,	 “because	 the	 latter	 union	 was	 created	 on	 account	 of	 the	
former.”105		
As	we	will	see	in	what	follows,	the	primary	act	of	eating	or	manducatio	for	Vermigli	
is	spiritual:	believers	spiritually	partake	of	a	spiritual	reality,	thereby	furthering	their	union	
with	Christ.	Despite	this,	Vermigli	grants	that	the	Eucharist,	as	an	embodied	practice,	‘adds	
value’	to	the	spiritual	affairs.	First,	Vermigli	believes	that	the	physical	act	of	partaking	in	
the	sacrament	in	some	way	assists	the	spiritual	manducatio	and	its	ensuing	union	with	
Christ.	Secondly,	he	believes	with	the	Church	Fathers	that	partaking	in	the	Eucharist	is	not	
only	conducive	to	the	spiritual	renewal	of	human	beings,	but	also	to	the	renewal	of	their	
bodies.	 Let	 us	 consider	 Vermigli’s	 elucidation	 of	 each	 of	 these	 statements	 in	 turn,	
beginning	with	his	focus	on	the	spiritual	eating.	
As	Salvatore	Corda	has	shown,	Vermigli	bases	his	Eucharistic	 teaching	more	on	
John	6	than	on	any	of	the	synoptic	institution	narratives.106	This	is	telling,	as	he	does	not	
think	 that	 the	 bread	 of	 which	 Jesus	 speaks	 in	 John	 6	 has	 anything	 to	 do	 with	 the	
sacramental	 elements.	 Rather,	 Vermigli	 argues	 that	 Jesus	 refers	 to	 a	 spiritual	
appropriation	 of	 the	 salvific	 power	 of	 Christ’s	 death	 on	 the	 cross,	 when	 he	 says	 for	
instance	in	verse	51:	“I	am	the	living	bread	that	came	down	from	heaven.	Whoever	eats	
this	bread	will	live	forever.	This	bread	is	my	flesh,	which	I	will	give	for	the	life	of	the	world.”	
Jesus	is	the	bread	of	life,	and	to	eat	this	bread	means	to	believe	in	him	who	offered	himself	
to	be	broken	on	the	cross	for	the	salvation	of	the	world.107	
In	the	words	of	Corda,	this	means	that	for	Vermigli,	the	Johannine	account	of	a	
spiritual	eating	of	Christ’s	body	is	“prior	to,	and	in	a	sense	independent	of,	the	institution	
of	the	Lord’s	Supper.”108	This	is	seen	for	instance	in	the	Oxford	Treatise,	where	Vermigli	
writes	that	“in	John	6	Christ	promised	his	flesh	or	body	and	blood	for	food	and	drink”	and	
continues	that	“he	does	this	as	often	as	we	truly	believe	that	he	died	for	us.”	It	was	only	
																																																						
105	“...quia	ea	coniunctio	propter	istam	adinuenta	fuit.”	(Vermigli,	Tractatio,	45r;	Vermigli,	Oxford	Treatise	
and	Disputation,	90.)	
106	Corda,	Veritas	Sacramenti,	108–12.	
107	Ibid.,	108–10.	See	on	this	the	following	passage	from	the	Defensio:	“In	sexto	Johannis	nihil	aliud	tradit,	
nisi	simplicem	nodamque	doctrinam.	Ait	enim	corpus	suum,	et	sanguinem,	quae	daturus	erat	ad	salutem	
humani	generis,	tanto	fore	usui	fidelibus,	quanto	corpore	nostro	est	cibus,	et	potus.	…	Ita	corpus	et	sanguis	
Christi	oblata	in	cruce	pro	salute	nostra	debent	nobis	esse	in	omnem	vitam	pro	cibo,	et	potu.”	(Vermigli,	
Defensio,	563.)	
108	Corda,	Veritas	Sacramenti,	110.	
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after	Jesus	had	taught	his	disciples	about	this	promise	that	he,	in	Vermigli’s	view,	“added	
symbols	to	that	spiritual	eating”	through	the	institution	of	the	Eucharist.109		
One	consequence	of	this	 is	that	Vermigli	never	exclusively	equates	partaking	of	
Christ’s	body	with	the	participation	in	the	Eucharist.	As	Corda	has	demonstrated,	Vermigli	
holds	 that	 Christ’s	 flesh	 can	 be	 appropriated	 both	 per	 sacramentum	 and	 citra	
sacramentum.	 This	 means	 that	 Christ’s	 flesh	 and	 blood	 can	 also	 be	 eaten	 and	 drunk	
independently	from	the	use	of	the	sacrament.110	This	is	the	case,	for	instance,	every	time	
believers	hear	the	proclamation	of	God’s	word	with	faith.111	Vermigli	is	clear	that	believers	
receive	the	same	body	of	Christ	in	both	cases	–	by	hearing	God’s	word	or	by	participating	
in	 the	Eucharist.112	He	declares	 “we	are	 sanctified	by	 the	body	of	Christ	 insofar	as	we	
apprehend	through	faith	that	he	was	once	offered	on	the	cross	and	now	sits	at	the	right	
hand	of	God	the	father.”113	Corda	is	therefore	right	to	observe	that	“strictly	speaking,	in	
Vermigli’s	system	our	sanctification	is	not	only	independent	from,	but	also	prior	to	the	use	
of	the	sacraments.”114	
However,	what	 is	the	role	of	the	sacraments	“in	Vermigli’s	system”?	In	order	to	
answer	this	question,	we	need	to	return	once	more	to	Vermigli’s	doctrine	of	the	believer’s	
union	with	Christ.	In	the	two	letters	on	this	doctrine	that	we	have	considered	in	chapter	
two,	Vermigli	calls	the	sacraments	the	‘bonds’	that	connect	Christ	the	head	to	his	ecclesial	
body.	 These	 bonds	 are	 especially	 necessary	 in	 the	mysterious	 ‘middle’	 communion	 in	
which	believers	have	begun	to	be	fully	spiritually	united	with	their	Lord.	They	are	bound	
to	Christ,	Vermigli	writes	to	Calvin,	“by	certain	spiritual	knots	and	joints.”	These	“bonds	
or	fastenings,”	however,	depend	on	and	are	derived	from	the	head	himself.115	They	are	
																																																						
109	“Respondemus	Christum	promissione	suam	carnem	vel	suum	corpus	aut	sanguinem	in	cibum	et	potum	
idque	6	Ioan.	Quod	praestat	quoties	illum	vere	pro	nobis	mortuum	credimus,	praestiti	etiam	cum	in	coena	
hoc	sacramentum	institueret,	nam	illi	manducationi	spirituali	addidit	symbola.”	 (Vermigli,	Tractatio,	27r;	
Vermigli,	Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	62.)	
110	 Corda,	 Veritas	 Sacramenti,	 131.	 Cf.	 “Caro	 et	 sanguis	 Christi	 etiam	 extra	 sacramentum	 eduntur	 et	
bibuntur.”	(Vermigli,	Defensio,	291.)	
111	“Corpus	Christi	non	minus	in	verbis	percipi	quam	in	symbolis.”	(Vermigli,	Defensio,	683.)	
112	Cf.	Corda,	Veritas	Sacramenti,	153	n.	59.	
113	“Nos	autem	 ita	dicimus	nos	sanctificari	 corpore	Christi,	quatenus	 illud	oblatum	olim	 in	crucem,	nunc	
autem	sedens	ad	dextram	dei	patris	apprehenditur	a	nobis	per	fidem.	Hic	est	status	et	cardo	controversiae.”	
(Vermigli,	Defensio,	817.)	
114	Corda,	Veritas	Sacramenti,	169.	
115	 “Abunde	 satis	 est	 ut	 nexibus	 atque	 compagibus	 quibusdam	 spiritualibus	 illi	 nectamur.	 Quae	 tamen	
vincula	 seu	colligationes	ab	 ipso	capite	pendent	ac	derivantur.”	 (Vermigli,	Loci	Communes	 (1583),	1095;	
McLelland	and	Duffield,	The	Life,	Early	Letters	and	Eucharistic	Writings	of	Peter	Martyr,	347.)	
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faith,	the	word	of	God	and	the	sacraments:	“Through	them	the	Spirit,	flowing	from	our	
head	and	diffused	 throughout	 the	church,	quickens	and	shapes	his	members	by	a	 just	
proportion.”116		
In	the	same	letter,	Vermigli	argues	for	the	need	of	such	joints	or	bonds	precisely	
because	of	 the	spatial	distance	between	believers	and	Christ	–	confirming	our	analysis	
above.	Despite	the	“distance	of	place,”	he	writes,	believers	in	the	middle	communion	with	
Christ	“always	consider	this,	that	they	may	become	more	like	him.”	A	fuller	union	with	
Christ	“may	be	enjoyed	while	we	live	on	earth,	even	though	the	very	body	of	Christ	sit	and	
reign	 in	 heaven	 with	 the	 Father”	 precisely	 because	 there	 are	 the	 bonds	 of	 faith,	 the	
scriptures	and	sacraments	between	the	two.117	Vermigli	grants	that	the	sacraments	and	
the	word	 of	 God	 are	 “joints	 and	 fastenings	 through	which	 the	 spirit	 of	 God	 becomes	
effective.”	He	makes	 it	equally	clear,	however,	 that	 faith	 is	primary.	Nothing	else	 than	
faith	is	necessary	to	be	united	with	Christ	–	not	even	the	outward	word	or	the	sacraments:	
“The	only	link	and	fastening	necessary	in	adults	is	faith,	by	which	we	are	joined	with	Christ	
himself,	 inseparably.”118	 Whereas	 faith	 is	 therefore	 the	 primary	 channel	 for	
communication	between	Christ	and	his	faithful,	the	external	word	and	the	sacraments	are	
such	 channels	 in	 a	 derivative	 and	 secondary	 manner	 insofar	 as	 they	 are	 effective	
instruments	by	which	faith	is	kindled.	
What	is	clear	so	far	is	that	Vermigli	closely	relates	the	sacraments	to	the	middle	
union,	 that	 is,	 to	 the	union	between	Christ	 and	his	 faithful,	which	Vermigli	 also	 terms	
‘mystical’	and	‘secret’.	What,	however,	 is	the	exact	nature	of	the	relationship	between	
this	union	and	the	sacraments?	In	his	letter	to	Beza	on	the	same	issue,	Vermigli	is	more	
																																																						
116	 “Et	 ea	 sunt	 fides	 comprimis	 verba	Dei	 et	 Sacramenta.	Per	 ista	 spiritus	 a	nostro	 capite	dimanans	per	
Ecclesiam	divagatur	et	sua	membra	proportione	iusta	vegeat	et	assimilat.”	(Vermigli,	Loci	Communes	(1583),	
1095;	McLelland	and	Duffield,	The	Life,	Early	Letters	and	Eucharistic	Writings	of	Peter	Martyr,	347.)	
117	 “Nam	 membra	 Christi	 semper	 eo	 spectant,	 ut	 eius	 similiora	 evadant.	 Neque	 communionem	 hanc	
mysticam	impediunt	locorum	spatia,	sed	dum	in	terris	degimus	haberi	potest,	licet	spsum	Christi	corpus	in	
coelis	 cum	 patre	 sedeat	 atque	 regnet.	 Abunde	 satis	 est	 ut	 nexibus	 atque	 compagibus	 quibusdam	
spiritualibus	illi	nectamur.	Quae	tamen	vincula	seu	colligationes	ab	ipso	capite	pendent	ac	derivantur.	Et	ea	
sunt	 fides	comprimis,	verba	Dei	et	Sacramenta.”	 (Vermigli,	Loci	Communes	 (1583),	1095;	McLelland	and	
Duffield,	The	Life,	Early	Letters	and	Eucharistic	Writings	of	Peter	Martyr,	347.)	
118	“Sunto	etiam	compagines	et	commissurae	per	quas	spiritus	Dei	fiat	efficax.	 ...	Fidei	una	est	 in	adultis	
compago	 et	 commissura	 necessaria,	 qua	 Christo	 ipsi	 et	 quidem	 indivulse	 aptamur.”	 (Vermigli,	 Loci	
Communes	(1583),	1095;	McLelland	and	Duffield,	The	Life,	Early	Letters	and	Eucharistic	Writings	of	Peter	
Martyr,	348.)	
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specific	 about	 this,	writing	 that	 the	 sacraments	 both	 confirm	and	 increase	 the	middle	
union:	
Of	this	intimate	conjunction	[viz.	the	‘middle’	union]	both	Baptism	and	the	
Lord’s	 Supper	 are	 not	 idle,	 but	 most	 certain	 symbols.	 We	 are	 made	
partakers	of	this	kind	of	conjunction	the	moment	we	believe	in	Christ;	and	
because	 faith	 must	 be	 employed	 in	 the	 profitable	 reception	 of	 the	
sacraments,	 when	 we	 make	 use	 of	 the	 sacraments,	 this	 conjunction	 is	
confirmed	and	increased.119	
As	for	the	element	of	confirmation,	it	is	to	be	remembered	that	Vermigli	is	a	vehement	
opponent	 of	 any	 kind	 of	manducatio	 impiorum.	 Whoever	 has	 no	 real	 faith	 in	 Christ,	
according	to	Vermigli,	does	not	eat	the	body	of	Christ	in	the	Eucharist.120	The	“profitable	
reception”	of	the	Eucharist,	therefore	necessarily	implies	faith,	and	faith	in	turn	implies	a	
mystical	union	with	Christ.	Therefore,	Vermigli	can	say	that	the	Eucharist	–	when	received	
in	 faith	 –	 confirms	 the	 believer’s	 mystical	 union	 with	 Christ.	 When	 he	 says	 that	 the	
Eucharist	increases	the	middle	union,	then	he	equally	means	the	Eucharist	as	received	in	
faith.	For	those	who	have	already	begun	to	be	in	union	with	Christ,	the	Eucharist	can	spur	
their	 faith	 further.	 When	 someone’s	 faith	 grows	 stronger,	 however,	 an	 increasing	
abundance	of	God’s	 spirit	 flows	 into	 them,	which	means	 that	 they	become	more	 fully	
conjunct	with	the	mystical	body	of	Christ.121	
Given	 that	 both	 the	 confirmation	 and	 the	 increase	 of	 union	 with	 Christ	 that	
Vermigli	 ascribes	 to	 the	 sacrament	 are	 therefore	 derived	 from	 faith,	 is	 there	 any	
advantage	of	the	use	of	the	Eucharist	over	against	‘simply	believing’,	or	the	exercise	of	
unmediated	 faith?	One	advantage,	 in	Vermigli’s	view,	 is	 that	 the	physical	and	external	
dimension	of	the	sacrament	assists	the	spiritual	and	internal	‘main	event’.	So	even	if	the	
real	communion,	based	on	faith,	remains	wholly	spiritual,	human	beings	can	take	part	in	
																																																						
119	“Huiusque	intimae	coniunctionis,	cum	baptismus	tum	Coena	Domini	sunt	certissima	symbola,	eaque	non	
inania.	Etenim	communicationis	huiusmodi,	statim	ut	in	Christum	credimus,	participes	redditur,	et	quia	in	
sacramentis	 utiliter	 percipiendis	 fides	 adhibenda	 est,	 idcirco	 per	 eam	 coniunctio	 illa,	 dum	 Sacramentis	
utimur	 et	 confirmatur	 et	 augetur.”	 (Vermigli,	 Loci	 Communes	 (1583),	 1109;	 Vermigli,	 Life,	 Letters,	 and	
Sermons,	136	[translation	adapted].)		
120	On	Vermigli’s	 stance	 on	 the	manducatio	 impiorum,	 see	 Corda,	 Veritas	 Sacramenti,	 158–64.	 See	 also	
McLelland:	 “Martyr	 states	 that	 unless	 the	 communion	 with	 Christ	 is	 enjoyed	 before	 the	 eating	 of	 the	
Eucharist,	we	are	aliens	from	Him	since	we	lack	faith.”	(McLelland,	The	Visible	Words	of	God,	163.)	
121	“Non	tamen	inficiamur,	ex	usu	sacramentorum	excitari	in	nobis	fidem,	qua	maior	in	nos	derivetur	copia	
spiritus	ut	nos	in	mysticum	illud	Christi	corpus	magis	magisque	insinuemus.”	(Vermigli,	Defensio,	504–5.)	
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it	more	effectively	when	they	do	so	with	all	their	senses.	Vermigli	states	that	God	added	
the	symbols	to	words,		
so	 that	 we	 are	 urged	 to	 salvation	 not	 only	 through	 hearing,	 but	 also	
through	sight,	taste,	touch	and	smell.	For	he	is	our	maker,	no	one	knows	
better	than	him	how	feeble	we	are	with	regard	to	celestial	and	spiritual	
matters.	This	is	why	he	thought	of	so	many	modes	to	assist	us.122		
Vermigli	 therefore	argues	 that	 the	external	eating	of	 the	 sacrament	was	added	 to	 the	
internal	eating	of	the	flesh	of	Christ	because	of	a	kind	of	divine	pedagogy.	God	considers	
the	finite	and	fallen	state	of	human	beings	–	they	are	slow	to	perceive	spiritual	matters	
and	weak	in	learning	about	them	–	and	graciously	accommodates	to	it	by	adding	sensual	
elements	 to	spiritual	 realities	so	as	 to	render	 them	more	easily	understandable.	Or,	 in	
Vermigli’s	own	words:	“We	should	eat	his	flesh	and	blood	[in	believing	that	Christ	was	
delivered	to	death	for	us].	To	do	this	more	effectively,	symbols	of	bread	and	wine	were	
added,	moving	us	more	powerfully	than	mere	words.”123	So	even	though	there	are	other	
ways	 in	 which	 to	 eat	 Christ’s	 body	 and	 blood,	 this	 happens	 “most	 clearly”	 or	 “most	
illustriously”	 in	 the	 Eucharist,	 “because	 the	 sacraments	 of	 the	 body	 and	 blood	 are	
perceived	by	means	of	our	bodies.”124	
One	 raison	 d’être	 of	 the	 Eucharist	 as	 a	 practice,	 for	 Vermigli,	 is	 therefore	
pedagogical.	The	physical	reality	of	the	sacrament	exists	here	as	a	mere	function	of	the	
spiritual	connection	between	Christ	and	his	believers.	Because,	however,	he	wishes	his	
own	position	to	be	in	agreement	with	the	Church	fathers,	Vermigli	also	has	to	account	for	
sayings	of	the	Fathers	that	value	the	bodily	dimension	of	the	Eucharist	in	its	own	right.	In	
particular,	he	wants	to	explain	how	it	can	be	said	that	the	bodies	of	the	communicants	
are	transformed	through	partaking	of	the	body	of	Christ.	Is	the	fact	that	Vermigli	believes	
the	 Eucharist	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 transform	 not	 only	 the	 spirit	 but	 also	 the	 body	 of	
believers	 another	 reason	why	 he	wants	 to	 retain	 the	 sacrament	 as	 a	 practice?	 Is	 it	 a	
																																																						
122	 “Adiecit	 autem	 symbola,	 ut	 not	 tantum	 auribus,	 sed	 etiam	 oculis,	 gustu,	 tactu,	 olfactu	 ad	 salute	
incitaremur.	Ille	enim	est	factor	noster:	nemoque	illo	melius	novit,	ad	coelestia,	et	spiritualia	quanta	nostra	
sit	hebetudo:	ideoque	nobis	tot	modis	censuit	succurrendum.”	(Ibid.,	683.)	
123	 “Id	 credendo,	 manducaremus	 carnem	 et	 sanguinem	 eius.	 Quod	 ut	 efficacius	 fieret	 et	 panis	 et	 vini	
symbola	fuerunt	addita,	quae	vehementius	nos	permoverent	quam	simplicia	verba	conseverint.”	(Vermigli,	
Tractatio,	28v;	Vermigli,	Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	65.)	
124	“Christum	verum	corpus,	veram	carnem,	et	verum	sanguinem	habuisse,	per	quae	et	ille	nobiscum,	et	nos	
cum	 illo	 coniungamur,	 cum	 illa	 per	 fidem	 haurimus,	 et	 quodammodo	 in	 nos	 recipimus.	 Quod	 etsi	 alibi	
quoque	fieri	potest,	tamen	illustrissime	fit	in	Coena,	cum	nostri	corporis	ministerio	sacramenta	corporis	et	
sanguinis	percipiuntur.”	(Vermigli,	Defensio,	291.)	
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reason,	moreover,	that	takes	seriously	the	embodied	nature	of	the	Eucharist	for	its	own	
sake?	
As	part	of	his	engagement	with	 the	Fathers,	Vermigli	 repeatedly	holds	 that	 the	
saving	 power	 of	 Christ’s	 body	 passes	 into	 the	 believers’	 bodies.	 This	means,	 as	 Corda	
observed,	 that	 Vermigli	 is	 “able	 to	 accept,	 perhaps	 more	 than	 other	 Reformed	
theologians,	the	idea	expressed	by	several	Church	Fathers,	that	our	flesh	truly	receives	
Christ’s	flesh	and	that	we	are	united	with	Christ	corporaliter.”125	The	way	Vermigli	goes	
about	accepting	 this	patristic	 idea,	however,	 is	 through	a	strict	priority	of	 the	spiritual	
dimension,	which	governs	whatever	bodily	dimension	is	added	secondarily.	The	body	of	
Christ	 is	 received	 spiritually	 by	 faith,	 but	 because	 Christ	 thereby	 communicates	 his	
character	to	the	believers,	their	whole	nature	is	transformed,	including	their	bodies:	
The	 virtue	 and	efficacy	of	 the	body	of	 Christ	 does	not	 stop	 in	 the	 spirit	
(where	it	is	received	by	faith),	but	also	reaches	to	our	body	and	restores	
and	 spiritually	 transforms	 it.	 [Therefore]	 it	 is	not	absurd	 to	 say	 that	our	
flesh	receives	the	body	of	the	Lord.126	
The	language	used	by	Vermigli	in	this	context	is	often	one	of	in-	and	overflowing:	Christ	
pours	divine	qualities	such	as	immortality	and	happiness	into	the	believers’	souls	through	
their	 spiritual	 union	 (transfundere).	 From	 this	 spiritual	 union,	 the	 divine	 qualities	
secondarily	 also	 overflow	 to	 the	 bodies	 of	 the	 believers	 (redundare).127	 In	 short:	 true	
union	with	Christ	“is	related	first	to	the	soul,	and	then	overflows	to	the	body.”128	
The	fact	that	he	holds	that	the	grace	received	in	the	Eucharist	redounds	also	to	the	
body	 of	 the	 believer,	 does	 not	 mean,	 however,	 that	 Vermigli’s	 circumvention	 of	 the	
Eucharistic	elements	as	seen	above	really	is	attenuated.	Neither	does	it	counterbalance	
his	emphasis	on	spiritual	matters	through	a	more	embodied	approach.	He	makes	sense	of	
																																																						
125	Corda,	Veritas	Sacramenti,	177.	
126	“Primum	enim	caro	nostra	accipit	symbolum,	quod	appelatur	corpus	domini.	Deinde	etiam	cum	virtus,	
et	efficacia	corporis	Christi	non	sistat	 in	animo,	a	quo	recipitur	per	 fidem,	sed	etiam	ad	corpus	nostrum	
pertingat,	 illudque	 reficiat,	 et	 spiritualiter	 immutet,	 non	 absurde	 dicere	 possumus,	 carnem	 nostrum	
recipere	corpus	domini.”	(Vermigli,	Defensio,	298.)	
127	See	e.g.	“Transfundit	divinas	illa	qualitates,	et	dotes	suas	virtutum,	immoralitatis,	foelicitatis,	primum	in	
animum,	 cui	 spiritualiter	 unitur,	 deinde	 etiam	 in	 corpus	 nostrum.”	 (Ibid.,	 745.)	 “Nam	 cum	 animus	 fide	
particeps	fiat,	dum	communicamus,	corporis	et	sanguinis	Christi,	reddatque	mundus,	coelestis,	divinus,	ac	
sanctus,	redundant	etiam	eadem	proprietates	ad	carnem	et	sanguinem	nostrum.”	(Ibid.,	70.).	Similarly	also	
Ibid.,	728.	
128	“Vera	coniunctio	cum	Christo	…	quae	prima	ad	animam	pertinet,	deinde	ad	corpus	redundat.“	(Vermigli,	
Tractatio,	66v;	Vermigli,	Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	124.)		
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those	patristic	sources	that	prize	the	effect	of	the	eating	of	the	Eucharist	on	the	body	by	
conceiving	of	a	kind	of	detour	through	the	spirit	from	which	it	returns	to	affect	the	body.	
The	 fruit	 of	 the	 Eucharist	 unequivocally	 pertains	 to	 the	 spiritual	 world	 –	 the	 physical	
elements	are	merely	auxiliary	to	the	spiritual	union	of	the	faithful	with	Christ.	From	the	
heights	 of	 this	 spiritual	 union,	 the	 sacrament	 subsequently	 affects	 the	 bodies	 of	 the	
communicants	as	 if	 in	a	kind	of	 return	 (redire).129	Or,	 in	 the	words	of	Salvatore	Corda:	
“Christ’s	body	does	not	reach	and	sanctify	our	spirit	by	passing	through	our	bodies,	but	
just	the	opposite	is	true:	sanctification	reaches	our	spirit	first	and	from	there	it	spreads	to	
our	body.”130	
Whatever	effect	the	Eucharist	has	on	the	bodies	of	believers,	it	is	strictly	related	
to	 the	 union	 with	 Christ.	 As	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 the	 last	 chapter,	 union	 with	 Christ,	 for	
Vermigli,	 is	 oriented	 towards	 the	 eschaton.	 It	 is	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 new	 life	 of	 the	
resurrection,	even	if	this	has	to	remain	inchoate	while	here	on	earth.	This	is	why	Vermigli	
can	say	that	human	nature	“though	it	is	corrupt,	sinful	and	mortal	is	rendered	capable	of	
…	 holiness,	 incorruptibility	 and	 immortality”	 through	 the	 overflowing	 of	 the	 spiritual	
union	with	Christ	that	believers	enjoy.131		
The	challenge	remains:	if	the	true	eating	of	the	body	of	Christ	is	a	spiritual	matter,	
as	John	6	teaches,	can	the	sacramental	signs	mean	anything	more	than	a	means	by	which	
a	weak	Christian	calls	to	mind	the	death	of	Christ?	McLelland	argues	that	Vermigli	deals	
with	this	question	by	teaching	“a	sacramental	mutation	which	can	be	said	to	come	to	the	
element	because	of	the	change	in	believers	through	the	means	of	the	sacrament.”132	As	
we	 have	 seen	 above,	 however,	 the	 sacramental	 mutation	 described	 by	 McLelland	 is	
removed	at	least	three	times	over	from	the	actual	sacramental	signs:	the	signs	aid	and	
augment	faith,	faith	unites	believers	to	Christ	and	this	union	with	Christ	changes	believers	
to	become	more	Christ-like.	It	seems	therefore	at	least	a	stretch	to	hold,	with	McLelland,	
that	Vermigli	ascribed	much	of	a	mutation	to	the	elements	themselves.	It	is	even	more	of	
																																																						
129	“Fructus	vero,	et	saginatio	ita	pertinet	ad	animum,	ut	ab	eo	redeat	etiam	ad	corpus.”	(Vermigli,	Defensio,	
726.)	
130	Corda,	Veritas	Sacramenti,	177.	
131	“Nam	ea	licet	natura	corrupa	sint,	et	vitiola,	et	mortalia,	conditionum	tamen	longe	diversarum	redduntur	
capacia:	nimirum	sanctitatis,	incorruptionis	et	immortalitatis.”	(Vermigli,	Defensio,	70.)	
132	McLelland,	The	Visible	Words	of	God,	222.	
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a	stretch	to	postulate	that	one	could	base	an	ecumenical	proposal	about	the	presence	of	
Christ	in	the	Eucharistic	elements	on	Vermigli’s	theology,	as	Hunsinger	does.	
	
6)	The	Implied	Metaphysics	of	Vermigli’s	Eucharistic	Theology	
We	 have	 seen	 that	 Vermigli’s	 theological	 thinking	 in	 the	 polemic	 situation	 of	 the	
Eucharistic	debates	is	determined	by	a	kind	of	hyper-spatiality.	Even	heaven	is	a	space,	
though	 its	 place	 is	 far	 away	 from	 earth.	 He	 takes	 it	 for	 granted	 that	 the	 relationship	
between	God	and	 the	world	 is	one	of	 spatial	distance.	The	gulf	between	God	and	 the	
world,	 for	 Vermigli,	 can	 only	 be	 overcome	 between	 either	 a	 kind	 of	 spatial	
rapprochement,	 or	 through	 spiritually	 bridging	 the	 distance.	 Deeming	 the	 former	
impossible,	 he	opts	 for	 the	 latter,	 insisting	 that	 the	 spatial	 distance	between	Christ	 in	
heaven	and	believers	on	earth	is	not	relevant	because	it	can	be	overcome	spiritually.		
This	theological	move	to	overcome	the	distance	created	by	the	hyper-spatiality	of	
his	system,	however,	has	a	flipside	to	it,	for	it	entails	a	devaluation	of	the	physicality	of	
the	world.	This	manifests	itself	in	particular	in	Vermigli’s	understanding	of	the	materiality	
of	 the	 Eucharist,	 which	 he	 cannot	 value	 in	 its	 own	 right.133	 Put	 differently:	 because	
Vermigli	had	 to	 introduce	 faith	and	 the	power	of	 the	Holy	Spirit	as	central	 theological	
forces	 to	 bridge	 the	 spatial	 gap	 between	God	 and	 the	world,	 they	 become	 the	 prime	
media	of	experiencing	God.	This,	however	depreciates	the	value	of	the	Eucharist	as	an	
embodied	practice.		
What	does	all	of	this	mean	for	our	study	of	Vermigli’s	implied	metaphysics?	Others	
have	argued	 that	 a	new	and	dominant	 concept	of	 space	emerged	at	 the	beginning	of	
modernity,	and	that	this	concept	constructed	space	as	an	abstract	continuum,	with	no	
room	for	particularity.134	Vermigli’s	tendency	to	determine	the	relationship	between	God	
and	creation	spatially,	and	the	way	he	frames	this	spatiality,	can	be	seen	as	part	of	this	
																																																						
133	Brandy	equally	observed	that	in	Vermigli’s	work,	“spiritualizing	and	physical-objective	ideas	stand	next	
to	each	other,”	as	he	has	both	a	spiritualist	focus	in	his	Eucharistic	theology	and	a	local	understanding	of	
heaven.	(Hans	Christian	Brandy,	Die	späte	Christologie	des	Johannes	Brenz	[Tübingen:	Mohr-Siebeck,	1991],	
91,	my	own	translation.)	Brandy	moreover	reasoned	that	this	was	no	contradiction,	but	an	expression	of	
Vermigli’s	aim	to	retain	a	clear	distinction	between	God	and	man,	heaven	and	earth.	From	the	argument	
above	I	would	contend	that	he	thereby	misjudged	an	unspoken	presupposition	for	a	motive.	
134	Cf.	Henri	Lefebvre,	The	Production	of	Space,	trans.	Donald	Nicholson-Smith	(Oxford:	Blackwell,	1991);	
Pickstock,	After	Writing:	On	the	Liturgical	Consummation	of	Philosophy,	chapter	two;	Johannes	Hoff,	The	
Analogical	Turn:	Rethinking	Modernity	with	Nicholas	of	Cusa	(Grand	Rapids	MI:	Eerdmans	Publishing,	2013),	
part	two.	
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larger	development.	Moreover,	this	transformation	of	the	concept	of	space,	and	its	new	
prevalence	 has	 also	 been	 related	 to	 a	 univocal	 understanding	 of	 being.	 This	 seems	
plausible,	for	if	the	primary	category	in	which	to	understand	the	difference	between	God’s	
being	and	the	being	of	the	world	is	their	distance	from	each	other,	then	their	relationship	
is	not	determined	by	a	different	quality	of	their	respective	being.	This	means	that	we	can	
conclude	ex	negativo	 that	the	metaphysical	 framework	sustaining	the	reasoning	which	
envisages	the	relationship	between	God	and	the	world	to	be	determined	spatially	must	
be	based	on	a	univocal	understanding	of	being.	
Similarly,	 the	 way	 Vermigli	 envisages	 Christ’s	 presence	 in	 and	 through	 the	
Eucharistic	elements	also	points	to	a	univocal	understanding	of	divine	and	earthly	being.	
Vermigli	 could	have	 conceived	of	 an	 intensified	Divine	presence	 in	 the	elements	 if	 his	
thought	had	inhabited	a	metaphysical	framework	which	allows	for	real	inherence	through	
metaphysical	participation.	The	fact	that	he	is	unable	to	envisage	such	a	presence,	and	
that	any	‘presence’	of	Christ	 in	the	elements	is	tantamount,	for	him,	to	the	attempt	to	
spatially	conflate	two	distant	entities,	indicates	that	he	does	not	operate	in	a	metaphysical	
framework	which	allows	for	different	intensities	of	being.	Because	Vermigli	lacks	concepts	
of	real	inherence	which	are	not	based	on	spatiality,	we	can	again	conclude	negatively	that	
this	part	of	his	 theological	universe	does	not	 inhabit	 a	metaphysical	 framework	which	
allows	for	different	qualities	of	being,	where	a	transcendent	reality	can	be	at	the	heart	of	
a	created	reality	without	being	‘there’	in	the	same	way	as	the	latter.	
At	 his	 most	 polemical,	 in	 the	 Eucharistic	 controversies,	 Vermigli’s	 thought	 is	
therefore	 inhabiting	 a	 univocal	 metaphysics.	 Nevertheless,	 there	 are	 elements	 in	 his	
Eucharistic	 thinking	 which	 either	 indicate	 that	 he	 is	 aware	 of	 the	 limitations	 of	 this	
framework,	or	that	he	actively	aims	to	go	beyond	it.	The	former	can	be	seen	most	clearly	
in	the	way	in	which	Vermigli	criticises	his	opponents.	As	we	have	seen	above,	he	accuses	
his	Catholic	opponents	of	envisaging	Christ’s	presence	in	crudely	spatial	terms.	This	means	
that	when	analysing	his	opponents’	arguments,	Vermigli	is	aware	of	the	limitations	of	a	
spatial	and	univocal	determination	of	the	relationship	between	God	and	the	world.	As	we	
have	 equally	 seen,	 however,	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 he	 himself	 overcomes	 these	
shortcomings.		
Another	instance	where	Vermigli	seems	to	perceive	the	limitations	of	a	spatially	
determined	relationship	between	God	and	the	world	–	without,	however,	overcoming	it	
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–	 is	 his	 critique	 of	 the	 Lutheran	 theologian	 Johannes	 Brenz.	 In	 his	Dialogus,	 Vermigli	
criticises	Brenz’	understanding	of	the	ubiquity	of	both	natures	of	Christ	in	its	application	
to	 the	 doctrine	 of	 the	 Eucharist.	 Brenz	 claims	 that	 Christ	 is	 present	 in	 the	 Eucharist	
because	Christ,	in	his	human	nature,	is	ubiquitous.	As	we	have	seen,	Vermigli	draws	on	
the	Church	Fathers	to	refute	Brenz’	understanding	of	ubiquity,	and	instead	insists	that	in	
his	human	nature,	Christ	sits	at	the	right	hand	of	the	Father.	Vermigli	therefore	challenges	
Brenz’	understanding	of	Christ’s	presence	as	being	contained	in	a	finite	local	space	and,	
we	might	say,	by	implication	also	the	univocal	metaphysics	behind	it.	Yet	by	insisting	that	
Christ	is	in	heaven,	Vermigli	merely	argues	that	Christ	is	in	a	different	local	space.	Hence,	
he	does	not	fundamentally	call	into	question	the	spatialized	nature	of	Christ’s	presence	
or	replace	the	univocal	metaphysical	framework	sustaining	it.	
Nevertheless,	Vermigli	actively	aims	to	go	beyond	a	spatial	understanding	of	the	
relationship	between	God	and	the	world	in	his	teaching	about	the	union	with	Christ.	We	
have	seen	 in	chapter	 two	how	this	doctrine	 implies	a	real	 inherence	of	Christ	 in	 those	
united	 to	 him.	Given	 that	 the	 union	with	 Christ	 is	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 Vermigli’s	 ‘positive’	
teaching	of	the	Eucharist	–	he	thinks	that	the	Eucharist	fosters	and	fastens	this	union	–	
there	must	be	a	non-spatial	and	non-univocal	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	
God	and	the	world	in	his	Eucharistic	thinking,	too.	This	is	evident,	for	instance,	in	the	way	
Vermigli	 describes	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 union	 with	 Christ.	 We	 have	 seen	 how	 Vermigli	
considers	the	Eucharist	to	be	a	‘joint’	between	Christ	and	his	faithful,	through	which	Christ	
pours	his	 spirit	 into	 them.	He	also	 speaks	 about	how	Christ’s	 spirit	 overflows	 into	 the	
bodies	of	believers,	and	how	they	begin	to	take	on	Christ’s	nature.	This	language	arises	
from	and	is	motivated	by	Vermigli’s	literacy	in	the	patristics.	For	the	Church	Fathers,	the	
imagery	 of	 partaking	 in	 Christ	 was	 sustained	 by	 a	metaphysics	 of	 participation	 in	 the	
Divine.135	Vermigli’s	use	of	the	same	language	still	conveys	an	attempt	to	go	beyond	the	
space-focussed	 and	 metaphysically	 univocal	 terms	 set	 by	 a	 polemically	 entrenched	
debate.	Yet	the	attempt	is	not	carried	through	insofar	as	the	Patristic	language	he	uses	
remains	largely	severed	from	its	original	metaphysical	context.	Vermigli’s	fight	to	repress	
any	notion	of	a	(in	his	view)	crass	physical	intermingling	of	the	Divine	with	created	reality	
																																																						
135	For	Augustine,	see	e.g.	David	Vincent	Meconi,	“St.	Augustine’s	Early	Theory	of	Participation,”	Augustinian	
Studies,1996,	Volume	27,	Issue	2,	Pp.	79	-	96	27,	no.	2	(1996):	79–96.	
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thereby	 prevents	 the	more	mystical	 sides	 of	 his	 theology	 –	 as	 inspired	 by	 the	 Church	
Fathers	–	to	come	to	full	fruition.		
We	can	conclude	that	Vermigli’s	largely	polemical	Eucharistic	theology	is	mainly	
sustained	 by	 an	 implicit	 univocal	 metaphysical	 framework.	 Certain	 elements	 of	 his	
Eucharistic	 thinking	 nevertheless	 display	 to	 some	 extent	 an	 alternative	 metaphysical	
framework	 based	 on	 participation	 in	 the	 Divine.	 However,	 in	 Vermigli’s	 Eucharistic	
theology	as	a	whole,	the	balance	is	more	weighted	towards	the	univocal	framework.		
In	 the	 next	 chapter,	 we	 shall	 widen	 our	 focus	 from	 the	 Eucharistic	 table	 to	
Vermigli’s	 vision	 of	 the	whole	 commonwealth.	We	will	 see	 that	 in	 Vermigli’s	 political	
theology,	the	same	two	metaphysical	frameworks	as	those	which	we	have	encountered	
in	the	present	chapter	are	implicitly	at	work.	
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Chapter	Four:	Political	Theology	and	the	Workings	of	Authority	
	
An	extraordinarily	large	proportion	of	Vermigli’s	oeuvre	is	devoted	to	political	concerns.1	
This	is	not	surprising,	for	two	reasons.	First,	political	issues	had	urgency	and	an	existential	
dimension	for	a	man	who	fled	persecution	by	authorities	no	less	than	twice	in	his	life.	For	
instance,	 Vermigli’s	 answer	 to	 the	 question	 as	 to	 whether	 Christians	 ought	 to	 resist	
authorities	 that	 coerce	 them	 to	 act	 against	 their	 conscience	 in	 religious	matters,	 was	
partly	given	by	decisions	he	took	in	his	own	life.	While	still	in	his	native	Italy,	he	had	opted	
against	resistance	and	chosen	to	leave	the	country.	When	he	was	again	forced	into	exile	
after	the	ascent	to	the	throne	of	Mary	Tudor,	Vermigli	denied	his	support	to	fellow	exiles	
who	wanted	to	oppose	the	Catholic	queen	violently.2		
The	second	reason	it	does	not	come	as	a	surprise	that	Vermigli	wrote	much	on	
political	matters	is	the	fact	that	he	lectured	extensively	on	the	‘historical’	books	of	the	Old	
Testament,	which	gave	him	ample	occasion	to	reflect	on	the	nature	of	good	government.3	
He	taught	the	book	of	Judges	during	his	second	stay	at	Strasbourg	in	1554-1556,	and	1-2	
Samuel	and	1-2	Kings	in	Zurich	1556-1562.4	Most	of	the	‘political’	scholia	in	part	IV	of	the	
Common	Places	are	taken	from	one	of	the	commentaries	that	originate	in	these	lectures,	
such	as,	 for	example,	 the	scholia	on	the	authority	of	princes	and	magistrates,	 tyranny,	
rebellion,	exile	and	war.		
It	has	been	said	that	Vermigli’s	thought	cannot	be	appreciated	as	a	whole	unless	
one	attends	to	his	political	writings.5	Hence,	this	chapter	addresses	the	political	part	of	
																																																						
1	Robert	Kingdon	has	highlighted	this	through	comparing	the	space	devoted	to	political	topics	in	the	Loci	
Communes	 with	 other	 comparable	 reference	 works	 (like	 Calvin’s	 Institutes	 and	 Melanchthon’s	 Loci	
Communes).	 Cf.	 Robert	M.	 Kingdon,	The	 Political	 Thought	 of	 Peter	Martyr	 Vermigli:	 Selected	 Texts	 and	
Commentary	(Genève:	Droz,	1980),	iii.	
2	 Cf.	 Marvin	 W.	 Anderson,	 “Royal	 Idolatry:	 Peter	 Martyr	 and	 the	 Reformed	 Tradition,”	 Archiv	 Für	
Reformationsgeschichte	69	(1978):	174–75.	
3	For	a	new	and	fascinating	study	of	 the	phenomenon	of	 the	political	use	of	 the	Old	Testament	 in	early	
modern	 England,	 see	 Kevin	 Killeen,	The	 Political	 Bible	 in	 Early	Modern	 England	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	
University	Press,	2017).	
4	The	commentary	on	Judges	was	prepared	for	print	by	Vermigli	and	first	printed	in	1561:	Pietro	Martire	
Vermigli,	In	librum	iudicum	...	commentarii	doctissimi	(Zurich:	Ch.	Froschauer,	1561).	The	commentaries	on	
the	books	of	Samuel	and	Kings	appeared	posthumously,	based	on	 lecture	manuscripts	that	Vermigli	 left	
behind:	Vermigli,	Samuelis;	Vermigli,	Melachim.	
5	Cf.	W.	J.	Torrance	Kirby,	“Political	Theology:	The	Godly	Prince,”	in	A	Companion	to	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli,	
ed.	W.	J.	Torrance	Kirby,	Emidio	Campi,	and	Frank	A.	James	(Leiden/Boston:	Brill,	2009),	401.	
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Vermigli’s	work.	As	in	previous	chapters,	however,	I	will	outline	Vermigli’s	arguments	only	
insofar	 as	 it	 is	 pertinent	 to	 our	 main	 focus,	 which	 is	 to	 examine	 the	 underlying	
metaphysical	 frameworks	 of	 his	 work.	 In	 the	 first	 section,	 I	 will	 survey	 the	 existing	
secondary	literature	on	Vermigli’s	political	writings.	Sections	two	to	four	are	exegetical,	
focussing	on	the	two	foci	of	authority	in	Vermigli’s	ideal	political	commonwealth.	Section	
five	 returns	 to	 an	 engagement	with	 secondary	 literature,	 focussing	 specifically	 on	 the	
work	of	Torrance	Kirby.	Kirby	has	maintained	that	Vermigli’s	political	theology	displays	
complex	 interplay	between	the	ecclesiastical	and	civil	 jurisdictions,	made	possible	by	a	
sharp	distinction	between	the	outward	and	the	inward	realms.	While,	as	I	will	argue,	this	
second	part	of	his	argument	fails	to	convince	fully,	Kirby	is	nonetheless	right	in	observing	
a	tension	between	two	fundamentally	different	architectures	of	authority	 in	Vermigli’s	
work.	 This	 duality,	 I	 will	 argue,	 points	 to	 the	 much	 more	 fundamental,	 metaphysical	
duality	 that	we	have	encountered	before,	 and	which	 is	 so	 characteristic	 for	Vermigli’s	
work.	
I	will	argue	that	there	are	two	fundamentally	different	frameworks	of	authority	at	
play	in	Vermigli’s	thought.	The	difference	between	them	concerns	which	relationship	they	
imply	between	God	and	human	institutions	such	as	governments	and	the	church.	In	the	
one	framework,	princes	or	magistrates	have	authority	because	they	participate	in	God’s	
power.	God’s	authority,	in	this	case,	is	seen	at	work	in	human	structures	of	power.	The	
reason	Vermigli	partly	adheres	to	this	framework	is	that	it	is	conducive	to	the	formation	
of	a	peaceful	and	unified	community,	something	Vermigli	saw	as	the	ideal.	He	moreover	
deemed	 the	 people	 of	 Israel	 in	 the	 Old	 Testament	 to	 be	 a	 model	 of	 such	 a	 unified	
community.		
The	other	 framework	of	 authority,	which	 is	 equally	 present	 in	Vermigli’s	work,	
manifests	itself	in	his	understanding	of	the	word	of	God.	The	direct	authority	of	the	word	
of	God,	Vermigli	holds,	circumvents	worldly	institutions,	and	indeed	competes	with	them.	
This	structure,	as	we	shall	see,	is	non-hierarchical	and	its	focus	is	not	on	the	conditions	for	
creating	a	unified	commonwealth.		
The	aim	of	this	chapter	is	to	outline	each	of	these	frameworks	of	authority	that	
Vermigli	employs,	based	on	a	close	study	of	his	writings.	 I	will	moreover	show	in	more	
detail	how	the	two	frameworks	stand	in	tension	with	each	other.	First,	however,	I	shall	
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turn	to	a	brief	survey	of	how	scholars	have	engaged	with	Vermigli’s	political	theology	so	
far.	
	
1)	Engagements	with	Vermigli’s	Political	Theology	
The	role	Vermigli	plays	 in	Quentin	Skinner’s	seminal	work,	The	Foundations	of	Modern	
Political	 Thought,	 though	minor,	 is	 less	 than	 flattering.	 In	his	 chapter	on	 “The	Duty	 to	
Resist”,	Skinner	deems	Vermigli	 to	be	“far	 from	coherent.”	He	reached	this	conclusion	
based	on	his	reading	of	Vermigli’s	views	on	political	resistance,	asserting	that	the	“later	
Commentary	on	the	Book	of	 Judges	appears	 to	withdraw	much	of	what	 [Vermigli]	had	
earlier	allowed	in	his	commentary	on	Romans.”6	Skinner	refers	to	the	fact	that	Vermigli	
had	allowed	 for	 a	 “constitutional	 theory	of	 resistance”	 in	his	 commentary	on	Romans	
13:1-4.	He	taught	that	it	is	lawful	for	inferior	magistrates	–	such	as	electors	–	to	resist	a	
higher	magistrate	if	the	latter	abuses	his	office.7	As	for	the	commentary	on	Judges,	Skinner	
quotes	from	the	section	on	Judges	8:22-23	where	Vermigli	insists	that	God	alone	appoints	
kings,	and	that	the	present	state	ought	not	to	be	altered	without	him.8	Skinner	moreover	
refers	to	the	De	Magistratu	scholium	from	the	commentary	on	Judges	19,	where	Vermigli	
holds	that	subjects	ought	to	suffer	a	tyrant,	unless,	that	is,	he	forces	them	to	do	something	
that	goes	against	the	word	of	God.9	Skinner	concludes	from	these	two	quotes	that,	in	the	
Judges	commentary,	Vermigli	had	withdrawn	the	possibility	of	constitutional	resistance.	
Instead,	“passive	disobedience	rather	than	active	resistance	is	all	that	remains	open.”10	
This	 alleged	 development	 in	 Vermigli’s	 thought,	 however,	 meant	 for	 Skinner	 that	 he	
“signally	failed	to	achieve”	“consistency”.11		
																																																						
6	Quentin	Skinner,	The	Foundations	of	Modern	Political	Thought:	The	Age	of	Reformation,	vol.	2	(Cambridge:	
Cambridge	University	Press,	1978),	213.	
7	Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	603–9.	For	an	English	translation,	see:	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	1–15.	
8	Vermigli,	 In	 librum	 iudicum	commentarii,	 106v–108r.	 For	 an	English	 translation,	 see:	 Kingdon,	Political	
Thought,	16–26.	
9	Vermigli,	In	librum	iudicum	commentarii,	183r–191v,	here	183v.	For	an	English	translation,	see:	Kingdon,	
Political	Thought,	26–61.	
10	Skinner,	The	Foundations	of	Modern	Political	Thought,	2:216.	
11	Ibid.,	2:229.	It	is	only	in	the	thought	of	“Calvinist	Radicals“	such	as	John	Ponet,	Christopher	Goodman	and	
John	 Knox,	 where	 consistency	 in	 the	 question	 of	 tyrants	 is	 achieved,	 Skinner	 holds,	 because	 the	 latter	
suggest	 that	 a	 tyrannical	 ruler	 is	 not	 appointed	by	God.	Rather,	 “if	 the	people	 find	 themselves	with	 an	
idolatrous	or	tyrannical	ruler,	this	can	only	mean	that	they	made	a	mistake	in	selecting	him.	They	must	have	
failed	to	read	the	signs	and	follow	the	criteria	which	God	has	provided	in	order	to	enable	us	to	recognise	a	
truly	godly	prince.”	(Ibid.,	2:229–30.)	
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Is	Skinner’s	judgement	fair?	It	is	to	be	noted,	first	of	all,	that	whenever	Vermigli	
elaborates	 on	 political	 matters,	 his	 raw	materials	 are	 the	 biblical	 texts.	 Therefore,	 as	
Marvin	Anderson	has	noted,	Vermigli’s	elaboration	on	Judges	8:22-23	is	to	be	seen	not	as	
propounding	an	abstract	theory	of	sovereignty,	but	primarily	as	an	exposition	of	a	biblical	
text.12	Vermigli	proceeds	from	Gideon’s	refusal	to	become	king	of	Israel	even	though	the	
people	wanted	to	make	him	king.	In	Vermigli’s	understanding	of	the	text,	Gideon	acted	
rightly	because	 it	 is	God	alone	who	appoints	 kings.	What	 the	people	did,	 though	 they	
acted	out	of	gratitude,	was	thus	unlawful.	This	is	the	context	in	which	Vermigli	asserted	
that	political	states	ought	not	to	be	changed	without	God	–	a	context	that	does	not	per	se	
deal	with	a	theory	of	resistance,	even	though	it	may	have	implications	for	it.	The	same	is	
true	for	the	De	Magistratu	scholium	at	 the	end	of	 Judges	19,	where	Vermigli	primarily	
focuses	 on	 the	 respective	 roles	 of	 the	 civil	 magistrate	 and	 the	 church.	 The	 sentence	
quoted	by	Skinner	is	a	mere	aside	in	a	paragraph	on	the	different	kinds	of	government	
according	to	Aristotle’s	Politics.		
More	importantly,	however,	at	the	end	of	his	commentary	on	Judges	3,	Vermigli	
explicitly	 reflects	on	“Whether	 it	be	 lawful	 for	subjects	 to	rise	against	 their	princes”,	a	
passage	 that	 seems	 to	 have	 escaped	 Skinner’s	 attention.13	 Vermigli’s	 stance	 here	 is	
identical	to	the	one	which	he	took	in	the	Romans	commentary.14	He	holds	that	while	it	is	
unlawful	for	ordinary	subjects	to	rebel	against	their	princes,	those	who	elect	the	superior	
power	 (such	as	 the	electors	of	 the	emperor	 in	 the	Holy	Roman	Empire)	can	resist	and	
constrain	 it.	 If	 necessary,	 this	 resistance	 may	 even	 happen	 violently.	 This,	 however,	
essentially	undoes	Skinner’s	claim	that	Vermigli	was	incoherent	because	he	had	changed	
his	mind	between	the	Romans	and	Judges	commentaries.15	
																																																						
12	Anderson,	“Royal	Idolatry,”	183.	
13	Vermigli,	In	librum	iudicum	commentarii,	64v–65r.	
14	Robert	Kingdon	has	argued	that	in	both	his	commentaries	on	Romans	13	and	on	Judges	3,	“Vermigli	in	
effect	adopts	the	position	of	the	Saxon	lawyers”	who	convinced	Luther	in	1530	that	the	German	constitution	
allows	for	lower	magistrates	like	Electors	to	oppose	higher	powers.	(Robert	M.	Kingdon,	“The	Function	of	
Law	 in	the	Political	Thought	of	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli,”	 in	Reformatio	Perennis:	Essays	on	Calvin	and	the	
Reformation	in	Honor	of	Ford	Lewis	Battles,	ed.	B.	A.	Gerrish	(Pittsburgh:	Pickwick	Press,	1981),	159–172,	
here	169.)	
15	Gary	Jenkins	has	attempted	to	challenged	Skinner’s	verdict	of	Vermigli	 in	a	different,	yet	unsuccessful	
way.	Jenkins	held	that	because	“Vermigli	actually	lectured	on	both	books	in	Strasbourg	at	the	same	time”,	
Skinner’s	 argument	 about	 a	 development	 in	 Vermigli’s	 thought	 between	 the	 Romans	 and	 Judges	
commentaries	 was	 invalid	 (Gary	 Jenkins,	 “Citizen	 Vermigli:	 The	 Political	 Animal	 in	 Vermigli’s	
Commonwealth,”	Reformation	&	 Renaissance	 Review	 15,	 no.	 1	 (2013):	 84–98,	 here	 86.)	 It	 is,	 however,	
historically	 incorrect	 that	 Vermigli	 lectured	on	Romans	 and	 Judges	 at	 the	 same	 time.	He	 taught	 Judges	
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Nevertheless,	credit	must	be	given	to	Skinner	for	taking	Vermigli’s	contribution	to	
political	 thought	 seriously.	 This	 is	 especially	 remarkable	given	 that	 Skinner’s	book	was	
published	at	a	time	when	scholars	studying	Vermigli	had	not	yet	turned	to	his	political	
theology,	but	had	instead	mainly	focused	on	his	sacramental	contributions.	Interest	in	his	
political	theology	only	arose	in	the	late	1970s	through	the	work	of	Robert	Kingdon	and	
Marvin	Anderson.	The	 former	published	an	annotated	anthology	of	 some	of	 the	most	
important	of	Vermigli’s	political	writings,	in	the	Travaux	d’humanisme	et	Renaissance,16	
along	with	a	series	of	articles	on	the	issue,17	whereas	the	latter	contributed	an	article	in	
the	Archiv	 für	 Reformationsgeschichte.18	 Since	 then,	 a	 handful	 of	 other	 scholars	 have	
engaged	 with	 Vermigli’s	 political	 thought,	 19	 with	 the	 weightiest	 contribution	 from	
Torrance	Kirby,	who	has	published	no	fewer	than	three	versions	of	his	essay	on	Vermigli’s	
De	Magistratu	scholium.20		
Kirby	will	be	an	important	interlocutor	in	what	follows,	as	his	approach	offers	one	
way	of	making	sense	of	the	tensions	that	are	present	in	Vermigli’s	ideal	order	of	society.	
First,	however,	I	shall	turn	to	this	very	order,	outlining	the	architecture	of	Vermigli’s	ideal	
commonwealth.	I	will	focus	on	its	two	foci	of	authority	in	turn:	the	king	or	magistrate,	and	
the	Word	of	God.	
																																																						
during	his	second	stay	in	Strasbourg,	but	as	Marvin	Anderson	has	shown,	the	Romans	commentary	“was	
near	completion	before	Martyr	left	England”	in	late	1553,	where	he	had	taught	Romans	at	the	University	of	
Oxford.	 (Anderson,	Peter	Martyr,	 A	 Reformer	 in	 Exile	 (1542-1562):	 A	 Chronology	 of	 Biblical	Writings	 in	
England	and	Europe,	313.)	
16	 Kingdon,	 Political	 Thought.	 Kingdon	 reproduces	 English	 translations	 prepared	 by	 Vermigli’s	
contemporaries	and	published	in	the	Elizabethan	period,	mainly	Anthony	Marten’s	1583	translation	of	the	
Common	Places	(cf.	xxv).	
17	 Robert	 M.	 Kingdon,	 “Peter	 Martyr	 Vermigli	 and	 the	 Marks	 of	 the	 True	 Church,”	 in	 Continuity	 and	
Discontinuity	in	Church	History :	Essays	Presented	to	George	Huntston	Williams	on	the	Occasion	of	His	65th	
Birthday,	ed.	F.	Forrester	Church	and	Timothy	George	(Leiden:	Brill,	1979),	198–214;	Robert	M.	Kingdon,	
“The	Political	Thought	of	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli,”	in	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli	and	Italian	Reform,	ed.	Joseph	C.	
McLelland	(Waterloo:	Wilfried	Laurier	University	Press,	1980),	121–39;	Kingdon,	“The	Function	of	Law	in	the	
Political	Thought	of	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli.”	
18	Anderson,	“Royal	Idolatry.”	
19	Giulio	Orazio	Bravi,	“Über	die	intellektuellen	Wurzeln	des	Republikanismus	von	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli,”	
in	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli:	Humanism,	Republicanism,	Reformation,	ed.	Emidio	Campi	(Genève:	Droz,	2002),	
119–41;	Peter	Michael	Ackroyd,	“The	Unwelcome	Bridle:	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli,	the	Doctrine	of	the	Church,	
and	the	English	Reformation”	(PhD	thesis,	University	of	Edinburgh,	2002);	W.	Bradford	Littlejohn,	“More	
Than	a	Swineherd:	Hooker,	Vermigli,	and	an	Aristotelian	Defence	of	the	Royal	Supremacy,”	Reformation	and	
Renaissance	Review	15,	no.	1	(2013):	68–83.	
20	W.	J.	Torrance	Kirby,	“The	Charge	of	Religion	Belongeth	unto	Princes:	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli	and	the	Unity	
of	 Civil	 and	 Ecclesiastical	 Jurisdiction,”	Archiv	 Für	 Reformationsgeschichte,	 no.	 94	 (2003):	 131–45;	W.	 J.	
Torrance	Kirby,	“Vermigli	and	Pope	Boniface	VIII:	The	Difference	between	Civil	and	Ecclesiastical	Power,”	in	
Peter	Martyr	Vermigli	and	the	European	Reformations:	Semper	Reformanda,	ed.	Frank	A.	James	(Leiden:	
Brill,	2004),	291–304;	Kirby,	The	Zurich	Connection	and	Tudor	Political	Theology,	chapter	2.	
Chapter	Four:	Authority	
	 135	
	
2)	Authority	in	Vermigli’s	Ideal	Commonwealth	I:	The	Magistrate	
One	of	 the	crucial	cornerstones	of	Vermigli’s	 ideal	commonwealth	 is	what	he	calls	 the	
magistrate.	 To	 whom	 does	 he	 refer?	 Is	 he	 a	 royalist,	 for	 whom	 ‘the	 magistrate’	 is	
equivalent	to	‘the	king’,	or	should	he	rather	be	considered	a	republican?	Robert	Kingdon	
tended	to	believe	the	former,	noting	the	affinities	of	Vermigli’s	thought	to	a	“monarchical	
government.”21	Giulio	Bravi,	by	contrast,	emphasised	that	Vermigli	saw	the	time	of	the	
judges	 –	whose	 government	 Vermigli	 called	 republican	 –	 as	 the	 golden	 period	 of	 the	
history	of	Israel.22	Ultimately,	however,	as	Gary	Jenkins	has	rightly	noted,	it	is	idle	to	play	
off	Vermigli’s	‘monarchical’	against	his	‘republican’	insights,	as	he	does	not	see	them	as	
mutually	 exclusive.23	 Put	 differently,	 whatever	 Vermigli	 holds	 about	 the	 office	 of	 the	
magistrate	is	applicable	to	a	range	of	different	forms	of	government.	His	definition	of	a	
magistrate	is	simply	of	a	person	chosen	and	instituted	of	God,	who	defends	the	laws	by	
repressing	evildoers	and	who	supports	honest	people.24	This	person	might	equally	be	a	
king	or	another	representative	of	the	people.		
As	we	 shall	 see,	 three	elements	 characterise	Vermigli’s	 view	of	 the	magistrate:	
first,	 the	magistrate	 is	divinely	 instituted,	which	 in	turn	means	that	he	mediates	God’s	
power.	Secondly,	the	ideal	magistrate,	for	Vermigli,	is	to	his	or	her	subjects	what	a	father	
or	a	mother	is	to	their	family:	a	caring	role-model.	However,	even	when	magistrates	fall	
short	 of	 this	 ideal,	 Vermigli	 still	 maintains	 that	 they	 are	 instituted	 by	 God.	 The	 third	
characteristic	 of	 magistrates	 is	 that	 they	 are	 the	 keystone	 in	 Vermigli’s	 (Aristotelian)	
political	architecture,	binding	 the	whole	commonwealth	 together,	 thereby	ensuring	 its	
																																																						
21	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	iv.	
22	Bravi,	“Über	die	intellektuellen	Wurzeln	des	Republikanismus	von	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli,”	120–21.		
23	Jenkins,	“Citizen	Vermigli:	The	Political	Animal	in	Vermigli’s	Commonwealth,”	87.	For	a	similar	but	much	
broader	argument,	see	Patrick	Collinson,	The	Monarchical	Republic	of	Queen	Elizabeth	I	(Manchester:	John	
Rylands	University	Library	of	Manchester,	1987).	
24	Vermigli’s	two	definitions	of	"magistrate,”	from	the	Romans	commentary	and	the	De	Magistratu	scholium	
(Judges	commentary)	respectively,	are	the	following:	“The	magistrate	is	a	person	elected,	and	that	of	God,	
to	defend	the	laws	and	peace,	to	repress	vices	and	evils	with	punishments	and	the	sword,	and	to	advance	
virtues	 in	 every	 possible	way.”	 /	 “Est	 ergo	magistratus	 persona	 electa,	 idque	 a	Deo,	 ut	 leges	 et	 pacem	
tueatur,	et	vitia	atque	mala	poenis	et	gladio	reprimat	et	virtutes	omnibus	modis	promoveat.”	(Vermigli,	Ad	
Romanos,	603;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	1.)	A	Magistrate	is	“a	person	chosen	by	the	institution	of	God,	to	
keep	the	laws	regarding	outward	discipline	through	punishing	transgressors	with	bodily	punishments,	and	
to	defend	and	cherish	good	people.”	/	“Persona	divino	instituto	delecta,	ut	quo	ad	externam	disciplinam	
leges	custodiat,	poena	corporis	transgressores	plectendo	et	bonos	foveat	atque	amplectatur.”	(Vermigli,	In	
librum	iudicum	commentarii,	183r;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	26.)	
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stability	and	peace.	It	will,	moreover,	become	evident	that	this	has	significant	implications	
for	 the	 way	 in	 which	 Vermigli	 frames	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 Church	 and	 the	
magistrate.		
A	short	passage	from	Vermigli’s	preces	on	Psalm	82	illustrates	the	quasi-divinity	
that	is	attached,	for	Vermigli,	to	the	magistrates’	office.	Vermigli	asks	God	to	“be	willing	
to	direct”	the	meetings	of	magistrates	with	his	justice,	“as	you	have	deigned	to	honour	
[them]	with	the	name	and	title	of	gods.”25	That	God	honours	magistrates	with	“the	title	
of	gods”	stands	for	Vermigli’s	strongly	held	conviction	that	God	is	the	author	and	institutor	
of	magistrates.	How	can	human	beings	know	this	for	sure?	For	two	reasons,	according	to	
Vermigli:	 first,	 it	 is	 a	 natural	 insight,	 which	 God	 planted	 in	 human	 beings	 from	 their	
creation,	that	there	cannot	be	any	society	without	a	ruler.26	Secondly,	this	was	confirmed	
by	 the	 Scriptures.	 As	 Bradford	 Littlejohn	 points	 out,	 the	 order	 of	 this	 argument	 is	
remarkable:	 Vermigli	 first	 appeals	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 natural	 law,	 which	 is	 then,	
secondarily,	 confirmed	by	 the	 scriptures.	 27	 His	 central	 thesis	 rests	 on	 natural	 law.	He	
teaches	that		
it	is	impossible	that	peace	should	be	kept	if	all	are	equal,	for	contentions	
and	discord	arise	from	this.	Therefore	some	must	be	above	others,	so	they	
resolve	quarrels,	and	to	bring	matters	of	controversy	to	a	consensus.	God	
granted	 this	 to	 bees,	 cranes,	 and	 fishes,	 for	 these	 living	 creatures	 have	
their	kings	and	princes	...	Therefore,	given	that	human	beings	are	the	most	
excellent	 of	 all	 living	 creatures	 and	 communicate	 through	 the	 greatest	
amount	 of	 actions,	 it	 was	 even	 more	 necessary	 that	 they	 should	 be	
strengthened	by	God	through	the	help	of	such	leadership.28		
																																																						
25	“Quique	superiores	potestates	ac	magistratus	deorum	nomine	ac	titulo	dignatus	es	insignire	,	in	eorum	
senatu	velis	praesidere	tua	iustitia.”	(Pietro	Martire	Vermigli,	Preces	sacrae	ex	Psalmis	Davidis	desumptae	
(Zurich:	Froschauer,	1564),	89r;	Pietro	Martire	Vermigli,	Sacred	Prayers	Drawn	from	the	Psalms	of	David,	
trans.	John	Patrick	Donnelly,	Peter	Martyr	Library	3	(Kirksville,	MO:	Sixteenth	Century	Journal	Publishers,	
1996),	79.)	
26	“But	if	you	ask	when	these	powers	first	began,	or	when	they	were	first	ordained	of	God,	I	answer	that	the	
light	which	God	had	grafted	in	our	minds,	showed	human	beings	from	the	beginning	the	manner	of	being	
ruled.	Afterwards,	this	was	confirmed	by	numerous	words	of	God.“	/	“At	si	quaeras	quo	tempore	huiusmodi	
potestates	primum	coeperint	aut	quando	primum	a	Deo	 fuerint	ordinate,	 respondeo,	 lumen	 illud,	quod	
Deus	mentibus	 nostris	 indidit,	 iam	 inde	 ab	 initio	 hominibus	 rationem	 dominandi	 indicasse.	 Eam	 autem	
postea	variis	Dei	oraculis	fuisse	confirmatam.”	(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	604;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	3.)	
27	 Littlejohn,	 “More	 Than	 a	 Swineherd:	 Hooker,	 Vermigli,	 and	 an	 Aristotelian	 Defence	 of	 the	 Royal	
Supremacy,”	79–80.	
28	“Nam	in	aequalitate	fieri	non	potest	ut	pax	colatur.	Ex	ea	enim	pugnae	potius	et	dissidia	oriuntur.	Quare	
aliquos	oportet	caeteris	eminere,	qui	lites	dirimant	et	res	controversas	ad	consensum	adducant.	Hoc	Deus	
apibus,	gruibus,	piscibus	non	negavit.	Haec	enim	animatia	habent	suos	reges	et	principes	...	Quare	quum	
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Moreover,	the	same	is	“constantly”	affirmed	by	the	Scriptures.	The	Scriptures	teach,	says	
Vermigli,	that	God	is	“the	author	of	all	public	power,”	and	that	it	is	he	who	“distributes	
kingdoms	and	principalities,	when	and	to	whom	he	wills.“29	These	arguments	are	all	from	
the	 Romans	 commentary;	 however,	 they	 are	 mirrored	 almost	 one-to-one	 in	 his	
Magistrate-scholium	 in	 the	 Judges	 commentary.	 There,	 he	 concludes	 in	 no	 uncertain	
terms	that	“God	is	the	true	and	proper	cause	of	Magistrates.”30	
However,	 Vermigli	 goes	 further	 than	 asserting	 that	 magistrates	 are	 divinely	
instituted.	Commenting	on	Romans	13:4,	he	writes	that	the	magistrate	governs	as	God’s	
“vicar	on	 the	earth.“31	 Indeed,	 “the	Prince	 is	appointed	 to	 take	God’s	place	and	 to	be	
between	God	and	human	beings.“32	These	quotations	are	extraordinary	in	that	the	same	
terms	that	Vermigli	uses	to	describe	a	magistrate	could	have	been	used	–	pre-Reformation	
–	to	characterise	the	office	of	a	priest;	the	magistrate	represents	God	to	humanity,	and	as	
such	 stands	 between	 God	 and	 human	 beings.	 It	 is	 hard	 to	 overestimate	 just	 how	
mediatory	Vermigli	envisages	the	magistrate	to	be.	The	magistrate	stands	between	God	
and	human	beings,	precisely	because	he	mediates	God’s	power	and	authority	to	them.	
There	 is	 a	 sense	 of	 a	 hierarchical	 chain	 of	 authority	 here:	 God	 gives	 power	 to	 the	
magistrate,	whose	authority	in	turn	participates	in	Divine	authority.		
Indeed,	Vermigli	maintains	that	all	who	hold	power	participate	 in	God’s	power;	
hence	they	ought	to	be	respected:	“all	power	is	of	God.	And	if	all	power	is	of	God,	then	
we	doubtlessly	ought	 to	honour	and	 revere	 it.”33	 This	 remains	 true	even	 if	 persons	 in	
power	are	corrupt.	For	even	then,	magistrates	participate	in	God’s	authority.	This	leads	
Vermigli	to	affirm,	in	a	brief	discussion	of	Aristotle’s	typology	of	governments,	that	God	is	
the	 author	 even	 of	 tyranny,	 oligarchy	 and	 democracy	 (the	 degenerated	 versions	 of	
monarchy,	aristocracy	and	polity).	“For	there	is	in	them	a	power	and	strength	to	rule	and	
																																																						
homo	 sit	 omnium	 animatium	 praestantissimus	 et	 plurimis	 actionibus	 communicet,	 multo	 magis	 a	 Deo	
muniendus	erat	isto	praesidio	principatus.”	(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	604;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	4.)	
29	“Scripturae	etiam	sanctae	idem	constanter	affirmant.	Illae	enim	docent	non	solum	Deum	esse	autorem	
omnis	publicae	potestatis,	verum	etiam	illum	regna	et	principatus	distribuere	quando	et	quibus	velit	pro	
arbitrio	suo.”	(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	604;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	4.)	
30	“Deum	esse	veram	ac	propriam	causam	Magistratuum.”	(Vermigli,	In	librum	iudicum	commentarii,	183v;	
Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	28.)	
31	“Illius	in	terris	vicem	gerit.”	(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	609;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	12.)	
32	“Constituitur	princeps,	qui	inter	Deum	et	homines	Dei	vices	gerat.”	(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	609;	Kingdon,	
Political	Thought,	12.)	
33	 “Omnis	 potestas	 est	 a	 Deo.	 Quod	 si	 omnis	 potestas	 est	 a	 Deo,	 illam	 haud	 dubie	 debemus	 colere	 et	
venerari.”(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	607;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	8.)	
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to	restrain	human	beings,	which	it	could	have,	if	it	was	not	from	God.”34	This	is	to	say	that	
every	government,	even	when	it	is	corrupt,	is	sustained	by	God’s	power.	Whatever	power	
it	possesses,	it	has	it	in	and	through	God.		
No	government	could	possibly	exist,	or	have	any	authority,	if	it	were	not	through	
participating	in	God’s	supreme	authority:	this	portrays	in	nuce	the	first	characteristic	of	
the	magistrate	in	Vermigli’s	ideal	commonwealth.	The	magistrate	is	instituted	by	God	who	
gives	 him	 power	 and	 authority.	 Moreover,	 this	 also	 manifests	 the	 first	 of	 the	 two	
structures	of	authority	in	Vermigli’s	commonwealth	which	are	the	focus	of	this	chapter.	
This	structure	is	one	in	which	authority	is	hierarchically	mediated,	and	where	God’s	power	
is	shared	by	participation.	
	The	second	characteristic	of	the	magistrate	in	Vermigli’s	ideal	political	universe	is	
that	 the	 person	 in	 power	 is	 virtuous	 and	 guides	 his	 or	 her	 subjects	 to	 live	 equally	
virtuously.	A	magistrate	is	nothing	else	than	a	father	(or	mother)	of	a	country,	Vermigli	
holds.35	Indeed,	they	“owe	their	subjects	a	fatherly	love.”36	That	the	ideal	magistrate	is	to	
his	or	her	country	what	a	father	or	a	mother	is	to	their	family	means	that,	for	Vermigli,	on	
the	one	hand,	they	should	function	as	role	models.	They	ought	to	be	“far	better	and	more	
excellent	than	those	whom	they	govern.”37	On	the	other	hand,	the	fatherly	or	motherly	
role	also	entails	that	magistrates	encourage	their	subjects	to	live	a	virtuous	life.	Vermigli	
firmly	believes	that	magistrates	can	engender	civil	virtues	in	the	minds	of	their	people.	
This	is	within	their	power,	because	they	can	“drive	their	subjects	unto	actions”	“by	laws	
and	edicts.”	Because	“virtue	arises	from	repeated	actions,”	moreover,	the	magistrates’	
laws	can	effectively	“drive”	their	subjects	“towards	virtues.”38	Indeed,	Vermigli	states	that	
many	“good	and	 innocent	men”	desire	to	 lead	an	upright	 life,	yet	they	“of	themselves	
cannot	keep	any	discipline.”	For	this	reason,	they	need	good	laws	to	direct	them	to	what	
																																																						
34	“Et	quamvis	tres	istae	species	vehementer	corruptae	et	vitiosae	sint,	Deus	tamen	etiam	illarom	est	autor.	
Vis	enim	et	potestas	in	illis	est	regendi,	et	coercendi	himines,	quae	certe	non	posset	ullo	modo	extare	nisi	a	
Deo.”	(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	604;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	3.)	
35	“Neque	enim	aliud	est	magistratus	quam	pater	patriae.”	(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	603;	Kingdon,	Political	
Thought,	2.)	
36	“Quare	principes	debent	subditis	paternam	dilectionem.”	(Vermigli,	In	librum	iudicum	commentarii,	183v;	
Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	27.)	
37	 “Debeant	 illis	 quibus	 praesunt	 longe	 meliores	 et	 praestantiores	 esse.”	 (Vermigli,	 In	 librum	 iudicum	
commentarii,	183v;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	28.)	
38	This	is	taken	from	a	reflection	in	the	Samuel	commentary,	at	the	end	of	1	Samuel	8:	“Nam	virtus	nascitur	
ex	frequentibus	actionibus.	Quare	cum	principes	legibus	et	edictis	adigant	suos	ad	actiones	adigunt	etiam	
eos	ad	virtutes.”	(Vermigli,	Samuelis,	49v.).	
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they	desire,	which	makes	the	magistrate	like	a	teacher	to	them.39	The	duty	of	this	teacher	
is	 “to	 punish	wicked	works,	 and	 to	 advance	 good	 ones.”40	 In	 short:	 good	magistrates	
promote	a	virtuous	life,	both	through	their	own	example,	and	by	punishing	those	who	do	
not	 live	 virtuously.41	 Given,	 moreover,	 that	 piety	 is	 the	 most	 excellent	 of	 all	 virtues,	
magistrates	ought	to	refer	all	things	to	the	exercise	of	piety.42	We	will	see	below	how	this	
affects	 Vermigli’s	 understanding	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 government	 and	 the	
church.	
Even	 when	 magistrates	 fall	 short	 of	 this	 virtuous	 and	 pious	 ideal,	 however,	
Vermigli	 still	 holds	 that	 they	 are	 instituted	 and	 sustained	 by	 God.	 Even	 non-ideal	
magistrates	 form	 part	 of	 the	 hierarchical	 ‘chain	 of	 authority’	 we	 saw	 above.	 Put	
differently:	of	the	two	characteristics	of	Vermigli’s	magistrate	that	we	have	described	so	
far,	the	first	outdoes	the	second.	“Not	only	good	and	just	princes	reign	by	the	will	of	the	
Lord,”	Vermigli	holds,	“but	also	ungodly	and	wicked	tyrants.“43	This	is	the	case	since	God	
may	“use	bad	and	ungodly	princes	to	punish	the	wicked	acts	of	the	people.“44	Remarks	
like	 these,	 incidentally,	 were	 what	 vexed	 Quentin	 Skinner.	 Contrary	 to	 what	 Skinner	
believed,	however,	Vermigli	wrote	all	of	the	above	in	his	Romans	commentary.	
The	 third	 characteristic	 of	 Vermigli’s	 ideal	 magistrate	 is	 that	 he	 or	 she	 is	 the	
guarantor	of	the	unity	and	peace	of	the	commonwealth.	This	 is	again,	 in	some	ways,	a	
function	of	the	first	characteristic	I	have	described	above,	since	Vermigli	is	convinced	that	
whatever	is	appointed	by	God	will	be	“constant	and	stable.”45	The	constancy	and	stability	
of	a	commonwealth	is	paramount	for	Vermigli.	What	worse	can	happen	to	a	society,	he	
																																																						
39	“Saepe	enim	videas	viro	probos	et	innocentes,	quamvis	mente	ac	voluntate	bona	sint,	cupiantque	vitam	
recte	instituere,	tamen	rationem	civilis	discipline	per	se	ipsos	non	tenere.	Opus	ergo	illis	est	ut	ad	id	quod	
cupiunt	bonis	et	piis	legibus	dirigantur.	Quare	potestas	civilis	illis	pro	paedagogo	esse	potest.”	(Vermigli,	Ad	
Romanos,	607;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	10.)	
40	“...ut	opera	mala	puniat	et	bona	promoveat.”	(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	608;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	
10.)	
41	Cf.	“Good	princes	make	virtues	easy,	in	that	they	both	urge	them	by	example	and	impel	human	beings	
unto	them	by	fear	and	punishments.”	/	“Principes	bonos	efficere	virtutes	faciles,	dum	eas	et	exemplo	urgant	
et	poenis	metuque	homines	ad	eas	impellant.”	(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	609;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	12.)		
42	Cf.	“Since	piety	is	the	most	excellent	of	all	virtues,	therefore	Lord	reigns	when	all	things	are	referred	to	
piety.”	 /	 “Cum	pietas	 omnium	 virtutum	 sit	 praeclarissima,	 tum	dominus	 regnat	 quando	 ad	 illam	omnia	
referuntur.”	(Vermigli,	In	librum	iudicum	commentarii,	107v;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	23.)	
43	 “Quare	 Domini	 voluntate	 non	 tantum	 boni	 et	 iusti	 principes,	 verum	 etiam	 impii	 et	 scelerati	 tyranni	
regnant.”	(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	605;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	5.)	
44	“..ut	malis	et	impiis	principibus	utatur	ad	punienda	populi	scelera.”	(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	605;	Kingdon,	
Political	Thought,	4–5.)	
45	 “Si	 sunt	 a	 Deo	 constitutae	 sunt	 etiam	 constantes	 et	 stabiles.”	 (Vermigli,	Ad	 Romanos,	 605;	 Kingdon,	
Political	Thought,	5.)	
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rhetorically	asks	in	his	scholium	on	“troubles	and	sedition,”	than	for	its	order	and	unity	to	
be	subverted?46	This	explains	why	he	insists	so	strongly	that	clergy	ought	to	pay	taxes	to	
the	magistrates:	 by	 not	 paying	 taxes,	 priests	 fail	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 socially	 unifying	
function	 of	 the	 magistrate,	 and	 hence	 weaken	 the	 “support	 and	 sinews”	 of	 the	
commonwealth.47		
Indeed,	 Vermigli’s	 commonwealth	 admits	 of	 only	 one	 centre	 of	 authority:	 the	
magistrate.	The	magistrate	binds	all	parts	of	society	together	in	his	very	office.	It	is	this	
conviction	that	leads	Vermigli	to	refuse	any	suggestion	that	priests	are	not	subject	to	the	
magistrate’s	authority.	This,	he	insists,	would	mean	to	“divide	the	commonwealth,	which	
ought	to	be	one	body	only,	 into	two	bodies.”48	This	division	would	be	absurd,	Vermigli	
holds,	for	it	would	suggest	that		
the	 Spanish	 clergy	 are	 not	 Spaniards;	 or	 the	 French	 clergy	 are	 not	
Frenchmen.	Doubtless	if	all	Spaniards	are	subject	to	their	king,	the	clergy	
are	so	too.	For	insofar	as	they	are	Spaniards,	they	ought	of	necessity	to	be	
subject	unto	him.49	
The	magistrate’s	office	therefore	holds	a	crucial	socially	unifying	function.	In	practice,	this	
means	that	magistrates	bear	the	responsibility	for	all	of	society.	They	oversee	adherence	
to	both	tables	of	the	law,	as	Vermigli	puts	it:	“Even	though	the	law	is	distributed	into	two	
tables,	both	are	entrusted	to	the	power	of	the	Magistrate.”50	The	reference	here	is	to	the	
two	stone	tables	on	which	the	Ten	Commandments	were	written.	Vermigli	insists	that	it	
is	the	magistrate’s	duty	to	enforce	both	the	ceremonial	commandments	of	the	first	table,	
and	the	social	commandments	of	the	second	table.	For	him,	it	is	the	magistrate’s	duty	to	
ensure	 that	 God	 is	 rightly	 worshipped,	 and	 that	 human	 beings	 exercise	 their	
responsibilities	towards	each	other.	In	doing	so,	magistrates	follow	the	good	example	of	
kings	 in	the	history	of	 Israel,	such	as	 Josiah,	David	and	Solomon.51	However,	as	above,	
																																																						
46	“Quid	peius	multitudini	potest	accidere	quam	si	ordo	et	unitas	ei	auferatur?”	(Vermigli,	Melachim,	146v;	
Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	95.)	
47	“...firmamenta	et	nervi...”	(Vermigli,	In	librum	iudicum	commentarii,	189v;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	48.)	
48	“An	non	vident	se	rem	publica	cuius	unum	corpus	esse	oportuit,	in	duo	corpora	dividere?”	(Vermigli,	In	
librum	iudicum	commentarii,	188v;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	45.)	
49	“Quali	clerici	Hispani	non	sint	Hispani,	aut	Galli	clerici	non	sint	Galli.	Certe	si	omnes	Hispani	subiecti	sunt	
regi	suo,	clericos	quoque.	Cum	sint	Hispani	necesse	est	 illi	esse	subiectos.”	 (Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	608;	
Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	7.)	
50	 “Cum	 lex	 distributa	 sit	 in	 duas	 tabulas	 utraque	 commissa	 est	 potestati	magistratus.”	 (This	 is	 from	 a	
comment	in	the	commentary	on	1	Samuel	28:3,	Vermigli,	Samuelis,	157r.)	
51	Cf.	Ibid.,	157v.	
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Vermigli’s	first	argument	for	why	the	magistrate	ought	to	be	responsible	for	all	parts	of	
society	is	not	scriptural,	but	Aristotelian.	In	a	hierarchy	of	practical	“arts,”	he	holds,	the	
art	of	government	is	the	chief	architectonic	art.	Therefore,	the	magistrate	
ought	to	rule	all	parts	of	the	commonwealth.	He	does	so	not	by	exercising	
all	other	arts,	but	by	making	sure	 that	no-one	corrupts	and	counterfeits	
them.	 If	 a	 physician	 cures	 not	 according	 to	 the	 prescript	 of	 Galen	 or	
Hippocrates,	 or	 if	 an	 apothecary	 sells	 bad	 and	 corrupt	 drugs,	 the	
Magistrate	ought	to	correct	them	both.	And	if	he	may	do	this	in	other	arts,	
I	see	no	cause	why	he	may	not	do	it	in	religion.52	
All	 practical	 “arts”	 ought	 to	 be	 overseen	 by	 the	 magistrate	 who	 exercises	 the	 most	
important	 and	 unifying	 “art.”	 Should	 anyone	 exercise	 their	 calling	 improperly	 –	 like	 a	
pharmacist	selling	contaminated	medicine	–	the	magistrate	is	to	hold	them	accountable.	
This	reasoning	is	then	applied	to	religion	as	well:	it	is	the	magistrate’s	duty	to	make	sure	
that	 his	 or	 her	 subjects	 worship	 God	 rightly,	 and	 that	 the	 Church’s	 teaching	 is	 pure.	
Vermigli	 primarily	 had	 church	 leaders	 in	mind	who	 –	 in	 his	 estimation	 –	 had	 become	
unfaithful	to	their	calling.	They	must	be	brought	to	account	by	the	magistrate.	For	who,	
he	asks	rhetorically,	will	take	a	pastor	away	who	had	become	a	wolf,	if	not	the	magistrate?	
And	who	will	punish	bishops	if	they	do	not	govern	according	the	Word	of	God,	if	not	the	
magistrate?53	In	short	–	as	Vermigli	puts	it	in	his	scholium	on	the	Magistrate	–	“it	belongs	
to	the	[duties	of	the]	Magistrate	to	provide	that	the	goods	of	the	Church	are	not	given	to	
the	enemies	of	godliness.”54	
However,	how	is	the	magistrate	to	know	whether	someone	has	become	an	enemy	
of	godliness?	What	standards	are	they	to	apply	when	they	judge	whether	their	subjects	
worship	rightly,	or	that	the	clergy	teach	purely?	These	questions	lead	us	to	the	second	
focal	point	of	authority	in	Vermigli’s	ideal	commonwealth:	the	word	of	God.	The	word	of	
God	is	the	measure	against	which	the	rightness	and	purity	of	worship	and	the	Church’s	
																																																						
52	 “Quare	 cum	 prima	 et	 summa	 ars	 sit	magistratus,	 imperare	 debet	 omnibus	 reipublicae	 partibus.	 Non	
exercet	ipse	quidem	eas	artes:	sed	videre	tamen	debet	ne	quis	eas	corrumpat	aut	adulteret.	Si	medicus	non	
curet	ad	praescriptum	Galeni	aut	Hypocratis,	aut	si	pharmacopola	merces	suas	corruptas	et	vitiatas	vendat,	
magistratus	debet	utrunque	coercere.	Et	si	hoc	potest	in	aliis	artibus,	non	video	cur	idem	in	religione	non	
possit.”	(Ibid.)	
53	“Quid	enim	si	pastor	efficiatur	lupus,	quis	eum	tollet,	nisi	magistratus?”	(Ibid.,	157r.)	
54	 “Magistratus	 est	 providere	 ne	 opes	 Ecclesiae	 dentur	 hostibus	 pietatis.”	 (Vermigli,	 In	 librum	 iudicum	
commentarii,	188r;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	44.)	
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teaching	is	to	be	judged,	for	Vermigli.	As	we	shall	see	in	the	next	section,	however,	this	
solution	sounds	more	straightforward	in	theory	than	it	proves	in	practice.	
	
3)	Authority	in	Vermigli’s	Ideal	Commonwealth	II:	The	Word	of	God	
We	have	seen	above	how	Vermigli	appeals	to	Aristotle	when	claiming	that	politics	(or,	the	
government)	 is	 the	 chief	 architectonic	 art,	 unifying	 the	 commonwealth.	 In	 his	
Commentary	on	the	Nicomachean	Ethics,	Vermigli	makes	a	similar	point.	He	stresses	that	
the	difference	between	ethics	and	politics	is	merely	one	of	degree,	because	both	have	the	
same	goal:	 ethics	 strives	 to	make	 individuals	 live	according	 to	 the	principles	of	 virtue,	
whereas	politics	has	the	same	aim,	but	for	the	entirety	of	the	commonwealth.55	Only	a	
few	pages	later,	however,	Vermigli	qualifies	this	praise	of	politics	by	stating	that	the	real	
architectonic	science	is	in	fact	not	politics,	but	the	study	of	the	Holy	Scriptures.	This	ranks	
above	 politics,	 he	 asserts,	 since	 the	 Scriptures	 determine	 the	 latter	 through	 their	
instructions	for	how	to	order	society.	For	example,	the	Scriptures	approve	of	magistrates,	
they	 declare	 that	 there	 should	 be	 priests,	 bishops	 and	 doctors	 as	 well	 as	mechanical	
skills.56	This	reshuffling	of	the	top	position	in	the	hierarchy	of	authorities	is	characteristic	
of	the	tension	between	the	authority	of	the	magistrate	and	that	of	the	Word	of	God	in	
Vermigli’s	ideal	commonwealth.	Having	studied	the	authority	of	the	magistrate	in	the	last	
section,	I	will	now	investigate	the	authority	Vermigli	ascribes	to	the	Word	of	God	as	an	
agent	for	ordering	society.	
In	the	De	Magistratu	scholium,	immediately	after	asserting	that	the	magistrate	is	
instituted	by	God,	Vermigli	makes	it	clear	that	the	same	is	true	for	Christian	ministers.	Like	
magistrates,	they	“are	keepers	of	the	word	of	God	and	of	his	law,	but	not	only	regarding	
outward	discipline.”57	As	Vermigli	spells	out,	magistrates	only	exercise	“outward	discipline	
																																																						
55	“Quid	enim	tanquam	finis	queritur	in	ethicis,	nisi	ut	quisque	singillatim	vivat	ex	virtute,	quod	idem	studet	
politica	 facultas	 in	 republica,	 nimirum	 ut	 cives	 omnes	 ex	 virtute	 agant?”	 (Vermigli,	 Kommentar	 zur	
Nikomachischen	Ethik,	96;	Vermigli,	Commentary	on	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics,	45.)	
56	“Ubi	primum	illud	occurrit,	proprietatem	illam	principis	 facultatis	vel	ut	 ipse	 loquitur	arcitektonikhj 
facultati	 divinarum	 literarum	 debere	 assignari.	 ...	 Approbant	 enim	 magistratus,	 volunt	 esse	 pastores,	
episcopos,	 doctores,	 artificia	 quoque	mechanica.”	 (Vermigli,	 Kommentar	 zur	 Nikomachischen	 Ethik,	 98;	
Vermigli,	Commentary	on	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics,	47.)	
57	“Ministri	Ecclesiarum,	qui	tamen	verbi	dei	et	legis	eius	custodes	sunt,	sed	non	tantum	quo	ad	externam	
disciplinam.”	(Vermigli,	In	librum	iudicum	commentarii,	183r;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	26.)	
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and	punishment”	on	transgressors	of	 the	 law.58	By	contrast,	ministers	“reach	even	the	
most	 intimate	motions	of	 the	mind,”	when	 they	bind	 the	guilty	and	 impenitent	 in	 the	
name	of	God,	and,	as	part	of	this	spiritual	discipline,	exclude	them	“from	the	kingdom	of	
heaven,	as	long	as	they	remain	impenitent.”59	It	is	the	duty	of	the	minister	to		
rebuke	sinners,	not	with	the	sword,	not	through	financial	penalty,	not	by	
imprisonment,	not	by	banishment,	but	after	his	own	manner,	that	 is,	by	
the	might	and	power	of	the	word	of	God.60	
More	 generally,	 this	means	 that	 each	 individual	 is	 under	 two	 kinds	 of	 authority:	 one	
political	 and	 one	 spiritual.	 Vermigli	 speaks	 of	 two	 kinds	 of	 subjections:	 a	 political	
subjection	 through	which	 individuals	 are	under	 the	authority	of	 the	magistrate,	 and	a	
spiritual	subjection.61	
Who	or	what	effects	such	a	spiritual	subjection?	Who	holds	the	spiritual	authority?	
Characteristically,	Vermigli’s	answer	to	this	question	does	not	involve	the	ministers	of	the	
Church.	The	spiritual	subjection,	in	his	understanding,	is	one	through	which	the	believer	
is	 directly	 subjected	 to	 the	 “Word	 of	 God.”	 This	 can	 be	 seen,	 for	 instance,	 when	 he	
discusses	the	mutual	relationship	of	magistrates	and	priests.	Distinguishing	in	either	case	
between	the	office	and	the	person	who	holds	it,	Vermigli	claims	that	the	civil	magistrate,		
insofar	as	he	is	a	Christian,	doubtless	 is	subject	to	the	word	of	God.	And	
insofar	as	he	exercises	authority	and	governs,	he	also	ought	to	be	subject	
to	 the	word	of	God.	For	he	ought	 to	get	 the	 rules	 for	how	to	 reign	and	
govern	out	of	this	word.62	
Note	that	the	magistrate	is	subject	to	the	word	of	God,	both	in	respect	to	his	office	and	as	
a	private	person.	The	ministers	of	the	Church	are	not	involved	in	his	spiritual	subjection.	
This	is	significant	insofar	as	the	reversal	is	not	symmetrical:	of	the	ministers	of	the	Church,	
																																																						
58“Magistratus	vero	in	transgressores	disciplinam	et	poenam	externam	tantummodo	exercet..”	(Vermigli,	In	
librum	iudicum	commentarii,	183v;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	26.)	
59	“...ad	intimos	usque	motus	animorum	pertingere.	...	Minister	sontes	et	impoenitentes	dei	nomine	ligat,	
et	dei	nomine	a	regno	coelorum,	dum	sic	manserint,	excludit.”	(Vermigli,	In	librum	iudicum	commentarii,	
183r-v;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	26.)	
60	“Eius	profecto	est	corripere	peccantes,	non	quidem	gladio,	non	pecuniaria	mulcta,	non	carcere,	non	exilio,	
sed	suo	modo,	hoc	est,	vi	et	potestate	verbi	dei.”	(Vermigli,	In	librum	iudicum	commentarii,	185r;	Kingdon,	
Political	Thought,	33.)	
61	 “Duae	 sunt	 subiectiones.	 Una	 politica	 et	 civilis	 ...	 altera	 subiectio	 est	 spiritualis.”	 (Vermigli,	 In	 librum	
iudicum	commentarii,	185v;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	34.)	
62	“Is	quatenus	homo	est	Christianus,	proculdubio	verbo	dei	subiicitur,	et	quatenus	potestatem	gerit	atque	
administrat	eidem	verbo	dei	subesse	debet.	Nam	inde	petat	oportet	regendi	atque	administrandi	regulas.”	
(Vermigli,	In	librum	iudicum	commentarii,	186r-v;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	37.)	
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Vermigli	 does	not	 say	 that	 they	are	 subject	 to	 the	word	of	God.	Rather,	ministers	 are	
subject	 to	 the	magistrate	–	at	 least	 insofar	 as	 they	are	 considered	as	private	persons:	
“With	regard	to	his	person,	the	minister	is	subject	to	the	civil	power.”63	I	will	return	to	this	
fascinating	asymmetry	in	the	next	section,	focussing	more	closely	on	why	it	is	difficult	to	
hold	that	the	civil	and	the	ecclesiastical	authorities,	for	Vermigli,	are	mutually	subjected	
to	each	other.	For	now,	however,	I	would	like	to	highlight	that	when	Vermigli	states	that	
everyone	 is	 under	 a	 double	 authority	 –	 one	 spiritual	 and	 one	 political	 –	 the	 spiritual	
authority	is	exercised	not	by	the	ministers	of	the	Church,	but	by	the	word	of	God.		
However,	what	does	Vermigli	mean	by	the	word	of	God?	Does	he	refer	to	Christ	
as	the	eternal	Logos,	or	to	the	Scriptures,	or	both?	The	following	quotation,	taken	from	
the	 section	 of	 the	 De	 Magistratu	 scholium	 that	 deals	 with	 political	 versus	 spiritual	
subjection,	makes	it	clear	that	the	“word	of	God”	denotes	a	set	of	directions	over	what	to	
do	or	not	to	do:	
For	immediately	as	soon	as	human	beings	hear	about	their	duty	out	of	the	
word	of	God	–	that	either	this	thing	or	that	is	to	be	done,	or	this	or	that	to	
be	avoided	–	they	submit,	believe	and	obey,	because	they	perceive	that	it	
is	the	word	of	God	which	is	spoken.64		
This	quotation	suggests	that	the	“word	of	God”	is	one	that	is	spoken	and	heard,	and	one	
which	is	characterised	by	being	a	kind	of	law.	This	suggests	that,	for	Vermigli,	the	“word	
of	God”	is	at	least	very	nearly	coterminous	with	Scripture,	especially	its	commandments.	
Moreover,	as	seen	in	the	above	quotation,	the	word	of	God	inspires	such	awe	in	those	
who	 hear	 it,	 that	 they	 cannot	 but	 follow	 the	 guidance	 it	 gives,	 and	 acknowledge	 its	
authority.	This	immediacy	or	non-mediation	is	highly	significant	for	our	purposes.	Why?		
Both	subjections,	spiritual	and	political,	are	ultimately	subjections	to	God.	Both	
kinds	of	authority	are	grounded	in	God’s	power.	In	the	case	of	the	political	authority,	we	
have	seen	how	God’s	power	is	mediated	in	the	person	of	the	magistrate.	The	word	of	God	
is	therefore	the	functional	equivalent	of	the	magistrate	in	that	they	both	mediate	God’s	
power.	The	crucial	difference	between	these	two	channels	of	God’s	power,	however,	is	
																																																						
63	“Quod	ad	personam	attinet,	civili	potestati	minister	subiicitur.”	(Vermigli,	In	librum	iudicum	commentarii,	
186v;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	37.)	
64	“Statim	enim,	ubi	audiunt	homines	de	officio	suo	ex	verbo	dei,	et	hoc	vel	illud	faciendum	esse,	illud	autem	
vel	 illud	 evitandum,	 cedunt,	 credunt,	 et	 obtemperant.	 Quia	 quod	 dicitur	 esse	 verbum	 dei	 sentiunt.”	
(Vermigli,	In	librum	iudicum	commentarii,	185v;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	34.)	
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that	 the	 first	 relies	 on	 institutional	mediation.	 There	 is,	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	 a	 ‘chain	 of	
power.’	This	means	that	the	way	through	which	ordinary	subjects	access	or	even	perceive	
God’s	 power	 in	 this	 context	 is	 through	 the	 magistrate	 –	 and	 only	 through	 him.	 The	
mediatory	chain	cannot	be	circumvented.		
This,	however,	is	radically	different	in	the	case	of	the	power	of	the	Word	of	God.	
The	latter	does	not	need	any	institutional	mediation.	To	be	sure,	it	is	the	ministers’	duty	
to	make	this	Word	known,	but	theirs	is	a	disseminating	role,	not	a	mediatory	one.	This	
means	that	the	full	power	of	God	in	his	Word	can	be	accessed	or	experienced	outside	of	
the	institution	of	the	Church.	This	is	precisely	what	the	above	quotation	expresses.	For	it	
does	not	matter	how	human	beings	hear	what	their	duty	is	from	the	word	of	God;	they	
are	 compelled	 to	 submit	 to	 it	 straightaway,	as	 soon	as	 they	hear	 it.	 There	 is	 a	double	
immediacy	to	the	word	of	God,	for	Vermigli:	its	authority	works	instantaneously,	and	it	
does	not	need	to	be	mediated.		
That	God’s	authority	needs	no	institutional	channelling	in	the	case	of	the	spiritual	
subjection	can	moreover	be	seen	from	the	fact	that	magistrates	–	as	everyone	else	–	can	
have	 direct	 and	 unmediated	 access	 to	 it.	 We	 have	 seen	 above	 how	 Vermigli,	 in	 his	
commentary	on	the	Nicomachean	Ethics,	contested	Aristotle’s	claim	that	politics	 is	the	
ultimate	architectonic	science	by	asserting	that	the	Scriptures	are	still	above	it.	Directly	
after	this,	Vermigli	writes:	“The	fact	that	we	attribute	the	supreme	faculty	to	the	wisdom	
contained	 in	 holy	 scripture	 should	 not	 make	 anyone	 think	 that	 anything	 is	 taken	 or	
detracted	from	the	political	administration.”	This	is	because	magistrates	themselves	will	
find	the	“rules	and	principles	of	their	own	faculty”	or	role	in	the	Scriptures.	How?	They	
can	read	the	Scriptures	for	themselves	and	gain	from	their	reading	whatever	knowledge	
they	need	to	fulfil	their	role.	That	a	minister	opens	the	Scriptures	to	them,	or	that	it	needs	
to	be	read	in	the	community	of	the	Church,	is	merely	optional: 
They	[i.e.	the	magistrates]	may	acquire	such	knowledge	by	either	searching	
the	sacred	scriptures	themselves	for	what	God	prescribed	as	the	duty	of	
monarchs,	or	by	getting	instruction	from	the	ministers	of	the	church.65	
																																																						
65	“Poterunt	autem	notitiam	huiusmodi	sibi	comparare,	vel	sacras	literas	per	seipsos	sedulo	evolvendo,	quod	
praecepit	Deus	regibus	ut	facerent,	vel	poterunt	per	ecclesiae	ministros	instrui.”	(Vermigli,	Kommentar	zur	
Nikomachischen	Ethik,	100;	Vermigli,	Commentary	on	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics,	48.)
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What	we	have	seen	so	 far	 is	a	different	approach	 to	 the	way	 in	which	God’s	power	 is	
channelled	 in	 political	 matters	 and	 in	 the	 spiritual	 realm.	 While	 the	 Magistrate	
hierarchically	 mediates	 God’s	 political	 authority	 in	 ways	 that	 cannot	 be	 eschewed,	
Vermigli	 practically	 dispenses	 with	 mediation	 in	 the	 spiritual	 realm.	 Despite	 these	
differences,	 however,	 there	 are	 some	 remarkable	 similarities	 in	 Vermigli’s	 ideal	
commonwealth	between	the	position	held	by	the	word	of	God	and	the	position	of	the	
magistrate.		
We	have	seen	that,	for	Vermigli,	the	magistrate	is	the	guarantor	of	unity.	In	some	
ways,	the	same	could	be	said	of	the	word	of	God.	It	too	has	a	unifying	function	because	
its	claim	is	universal.	It	 is,	as	Vermigli	writes,	“a	common	rule,	through	which	all	things	
ought	to	be	directed	and	controlled.”	He	moreover	holds	that	the	word	of	God	“shows	
how	all	things	ought	to	be	done	by	everyone.”66	Because	it	is	the	rule	of	all	things	and	all	
people,	the	word	of	God	has	a	unifying	function,	binding	all	parts	of	society	together	under	
its	authority.	Indeed,	“there	is	nothing	in	the	whole	world	that	the	word	of	God	does	not	
cover.”67	This	universal	claim	is	comparable	to	the	role	Vermigli	ascribes	to	the	magistrate.	
There	is	a	functional	equivalence	of	the	magistrate	and	the	word	of	God	in	Vermigli’s	ideal	
commonwealth:	both	their	claims	to	authority	are	universal,	and	both	unify	through	their	
very	claims	all	parts	of	society.	
Given	these	functional	or	architectural	similarities	between	the	authority	of	the	
magistrate	and	the	word	of	God,	it	comes	as	no	surprise	that	their	respective	claims	to	
authority	clash	with	one	another.	Both	the	claim	of	the	magistrate	and	of	the	word	of	God	
are	universal.	Much	of	the	De	Magistratu	scholium	is	an	attempt	to	resolve	these	tensions;	
although,	I	venture,	with	limited	success.	
	
4)	Conflicting	Authorities	and	Vermigli’s	Scholium	on	the	Magistrate	
The	 conflicting	 authoritative	 claims	 of	 the	 word	 of	 God	 and	 the	 magistrate	 manifest	
themselves	 in	 the	 De	 Magistratu	 through	 Vermigli’s	 working	 out	 of	 the	 relationship	
between	the	civil	and	the	ecclesiastical	powers.	The	relative	position	of	these	two	powers	
																																																						
66	“Verbum	autem	dei	communis	est	regula,	qua	omnia	et	dirigi	et	temperari	oportet	...	In	universum	etiam	
demonstrat	quemadmodum	omnia	ab	omnibus	gerenda	sint.”	 (Vermigli,	 In	 librum	 iudicum	commentarii,	
185r;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	33.)	
67	“Nihil	est	in	toto	mundo,	ad	quod	verbum	dei	se	non	extendat.”	(Vermigli,	In	librum	iudicum	commentarii,	
185r;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	33.)	
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cannot	 be	 negotiated	 without	 the	 word	 of	 God	 as	 the	 all-determining	 third.	 In	 what	
follows,	 I	will	 outline	 two	of	 Vermigli’s	main	 attempts	 to	 relate	 civil	 and	 ecclesiastical	
powers.	 Both	 express	 the	 tension	 between	 the	 conflicting	 claims	 to	 authority	 of	 the	
magistrate	and	the	word	of	God.	
The	first	way	in	which	Vermigli	proposes	to	clarify	the	relationship	between	the	
magistrate	and	the	spiritual	powers	is	by	means	of	a	distinction	between	the	office	and	
its	incumbent	(which	we	have	already	encountered).	As	we	have	seen,	Vermigli	holds	that	
the	civil	magistrate	is	subject	to	the	word	of	God	both	as	a	private	person	and	in	his	office.	
What	about	the	clergy?	
With	regard	to	his	person,	the	minister	is	subject	to	the	civil	power.	For	he	
is	 a	 citizen,	 he	 pays	 tax	 like	 others	 and	 he	 is	 held	 to	 account	 for	 his	
behaviour.	But	as	concerning	his	ministry,	he	is	also	in	some	way	subject	to	
the	magistrate.	For	if	he	teaches	or	administers	the	sacraments	against	the	
word	of	God,	he	will	be	punished	by	the	civil	magistrate.	And	yet	he	must	
not	ask	the	magistrate	for	the	rules	and	methods	of	his	function,	but	the	
word	of	God.68	
According	to	Vermigli,	ministers	of	the	Church	are	therefore	straightforwardly	under	the	
authority	of	the	magistrate	as	private	persons.	However,	because	magistrates	perform	a	
unifying	 function,	 bearing	 responsibility	 for	 all	 of	 society,	 ministers	 are	 under	 the	
jurisdiction	 of	 the	 magistrates	 also	 as	 holders	 of	 their	 office,	 even	 though	 less	
straightforwardly	so	(in	“some	way”).	The	two	examples	 in	which	magistrates	ought	to	
exercise	 their	 jurisdiction	over	ministers	as	ministers	 relate	 to	 two	of	Vermigli’s	 three	
marks	of	the	church:	purity	of	teaching	and	the	lawful	use	of	the	sacraments.69	If	ministers	
do	not	 fulfil	 their	ministry	 in	accordance	with	 these	marks,	 thereby	essentially	making	
their	church	into	something	less	than	a	church,	the	magistrate	ought	to	intervene.		
Indeed,	 in	 Vermigli’s	 view,	 the	 magistrate	 “ought	 to	 take	 care	 that	 bishops,	
pastors,	 and	 teachers	 in	 the	 Church	 teach	 purely,	 exhort	 fatherly,	 and	 administer	 the	
																																																						
68	“Quod	ad	personam	attinet,	civili	potestati	minister	subiicitur.	Nam	et	civis	est,	et	quemadmodum	alii	
tributum	solvit,	et	morum	censuram	subit.	Sed	quod	attinet	ad	ministerium,	aliquo	etiam	modo	subiicitur	
magistratui.	 Quia	 si	 contra	 verbum	 dei	 aut	 doceat,	 aut	 administret	 sacramenta,	 coercebitur	 a	 civili	
magistratu.	Nec	tamen	ab	eo,	sed	a	verbo	dei	regulas	et	rationes	petet	suae	functionis.”	(Vermigli,	In	librum	
iudicum	commentarii,	186v;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	37.)	
69	The	third	mark	is	Church	discipline.	On	Vermigli’s	doctrine	of	the	marks	of	the	Church,	see	Ackroyd,	“The	
Unwelcome	Bridle,”	52–57;	Kingdon,	“Peter	Martyr	Vermigli	and	the	Marks	of	the	True	Church.”	
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sacraments	according	to	the	word	of	God.“70	This	essentially	makes	the	magistrate	into	a	
custodian	of	the	word	of	God	and	its	absolute	claim	to	authority.	
This	view	presupposes	that	it	is	evident	to	magistrates	what	it	means	to	teach	or	
administer	 the	 sacraments	 according	 to	 the	 word	 of	 God.	 But	 there	 is	 a	 problematic	
impasse:	how	would	magistrates	acquire	such	knowledge?	Of	course,	Vermigli’s	answer	
would	be	that	they	could	either	read	the	Scriptures	themselves,	or	be	advised	on	them	by	
the	ministers,	as	seen	above.	Quite	apart	from	the	fact	that	it	is	unlikely	that	ministers	
would	tell	their	magistrates	that	they	themselves	are	teaching	against	the	word	of	God,	
the	crucial	question	is	not	so	much	one	of	pedagogy,	but	one	of	hermeneutics.	There	may	
be	more	than	one	way	of	celebrating	the	sacraments	or	of	teaching	the	gospel,	each	of	
which	can	lay	claim	to	be	based	on	the	word	of	God.	Vermigli’s	theory	does	not	seem	to	
factor	in	such	interpretative	disagreement	as	to	what	the	word	of	God	teaches.		
Vermigli’s	bypassing	of	hermeneutics	is	a	corollary	of	the	fact	that,	in	his	view,	the	
word	of	God	needs	no	mediation.	If	the	word	of	God	is	so	immediately	transparent	that	it	
needs	no	tradition	in	which	to	be	moored,	and	no	community	to	embody	it,	then	there	
should	 be	 no	 need	 for	 hermeneutics	 –	 even	 though	 this	 already	 constitutes	 a	
hermeneutical	 decision.	 However,	 looking	 more	 closely	 at	 Vermigli’s	 position	 on	 this	
point,	we	might	wonder:	If	the	word	of	God	really	were	evidently	clear,	why	should	the	
magistrate	need	to	control	its	teaching	at	all?	Should	it	not	be	self-evident	to	the	ministers	
of	the	Church?	Vermigli	believes	that	it	is	possible	for	ministers	to	fail	to	have	immediate	
insight	into	the	word	of	God	–	human	beings	are	fallen	and	sinful,	after	all.	He	also	believes	
that	magistrates	are	in	a	position	to	realise	instances	of	this	failure,	presumably	through	
their	 own	 immediate	 insight	 into	 the	 word	 of	 God.	 Given	 both	 the	 possibility	 of	 the	
ministers’	 failure,	and	 the	word-of-God-competence	of	 the	magistrates,	however,	why	
should	ministers	not	look	to	the	magistrate	for	“rules	and	reasons”	of	their	own	function?	
Indeed,	in	the	above	quotation,	the	conflicting	claims	to	authority	of	the	magistrate,	on	
the	one	hand,	and	the	word	of	God,	on	the	other	hand,	can	be	located	most	precisely	in	
the	“and	yet”	of	 the	 last	 sentence:	The	magistrate’s	 responsibility	 spans	all	of	 society,	
including	religion.	Specifically,	he	ought	to	be	the	custodian	of	the	integrity	of	the	word	
																																																						
70	“Curabit	enim	ut	episcopi,	pastores,	et	doctores	 in	ecclesia	pure	doceant,	paterne	reprehendant	et	ex	
verbo	dei	administrent	sacramenta.”	 (Vermigli,	 In	 librum	iudicum	commentarii,	185r-v;	Kingdon,	Political	
Thought,	33.)	
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of	 God.	 And	 yet,	 this	 custodian	 is	 not	 supposed	 to	 mediate	 the	 word	 of	 God,	 as	 its	
formidable	authority	is	beyond	even	the	need	for	mediation.	
The	second	way	in	which	Vermigli	seeks	to	specify	the	relationship	between	the	
magistrate	and	the	spiritual	powers	is	by	means	of	the	distinction	between	two	kinds	of	
subjections	(which	we	have	also	already	encountered	above).	The	argument	Vermigli	is	
pursuing	is	the	following:	Ministers	are	subject	to	the	magistrate	by	a	political	subjection	
whereas	the	magistrate	is	subject	to	the	ministers	by	a	spiritual	subjection.	However,	he	
never	quite	makes	 this	 argument	explicit.	He	 indeed	 strongly	holds	 the	 first	half	 of	 it:	
“There	is	no	doubt	that	ministers	are	subject	to	the	magistrate	insofar	as	they	are	human	
beings	 and	 citizens,	 together	with	 their	 lands,	wealth,	 and	 possessions.”71	 And	 yet	 he	
never	 actually	 says	 that	 the	 magistrate	 is	 spiritually	 accountable	 to	 ministers	 of	 the	
Church.	Rather,	he	is	accountable	to	the	word	of	God.72		
The	reason	Vermigli	never	makes	this	argument	explicit	again	lies	in	the	conflicting	
claims	of	authority	of	the	magistrate	and	word	of	God.	The	all-encompassing	claim	of	the	
magistrate	demands	a	political	subjection	of	everyone,	and	precludes	the	possibility	of	
the	magistrate	 being	 subject	 –	 even	 ‘only’	 spiritually	 subject	 –	 to	 anyone.	 This	 is	why	
Vermigli	cannot	ultimately	say	that	the	magistrate	is	subject	to	ministers	of	the	Church.	
Conversely,	 the	 rationale	 to	 which	 Vermigli	 appeals,	 when	 he	 draws	 the	 distinction	
between	political	and	spiritual	subjection,	is	that	by	which	the	absolute	authority	of	the	
word	of	God	might	be	guaranteed.	There	must	not	be	any	situation	where	magistrates	
could	restrict	the	authority	of	the	word	of	God:	
The	ecclesiastical	power	is	subject	to	the	magistrate	not	by	a	spiritual,	but	
by	 a	 political	 subjection.	 For	 it	 is	 not	 subject	 to	 it	 with	 regard	 to	 the	
sacraments	 and	preaching,	 because	 the	magistrate	 cannot	not	 alter	 the	
word	of	God	or	the	sacraments	which	the	minister	uses.	Neither	can	the	
magistrate	compel	pastors	and	teachers	of	the	church	to	teach	differently,	
or	to	administer	the	sacraments	in	another	way	than	is	prescribed	by	the	
word	of	God.73	
																																																						
71	“Ministri	tamen	quatenus	homines	sunt	et	cives,	una	cum	agris,	opibus	et	possessionibus	suis	absque	ulla	
dubitatione	magistratui	 subiiciuntur.”	 (Vermigli,	 In	 librum	 iudicum	 commentarii,	 185v;	 Kingdon,	Political	
Thought,	35.)	
72	E.g.	“The	civil	power	ought	to	be	subject	to	the	word	of	God,	which	is	preached	by	the	ministers.”	/	“Civilis	
itaque	 potestas	 at	 verbo	 dei	 quod	 a	 ministris	 praedicatur	 subiici	 debet.”	 (Vermigli,	 In	 librum	 iudicum	
commentarii,	185v;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	35.)	
73	 “Subiicitur	 ecclesiastica	 potestas	 magistratui	 non	 spirituali	 subiectione,	 sed	 politica.	 Nam	 quod	 ad	
sacramenta	 et	 conciones	 attinet,	 non	 ei	 subiicitur,	 quia	magistratus	 verbum	 dei	 et	 sacramenta,	 quibus	
Chapter	Four:	Authority	
	 150	
The	 conflicting	 authorities	 of	 the	magistrate	 and	 the	 word	 of	 God	 lead	 Vermigli	 to	 a	
position	that	is	at	least	paradoxical,	if	not	self-contradictory,	concerning	the	relationship	
of	ministers	and	magistrates.	On	the	one	hand,	a	minister	of	the	Church	is	not	subject	to	
the	magistrate	in	spiritual	matters.	But	on	the	other	hand,	this	very	magistrate	ought	to	
compel	 the	ministers	 if	 they	 teach	 against	 the	word	of	God.	 74	How	 is	 it	 possible	 that	
magistrates	 exercise	 such	 a	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	 ministers	 of	 the	 Church,	 without	
subjecting	them	spiritually?	
Granted,	the	magistrate	is	only	entitled	to	enforce	the	word	of	God	negatively,	as	
it	were.	Without	making	 it	 explicit,	 Vermigli	 effectively	 draws	 a	 distinction	 between	 a	
positive,	‘creative’	spiritual	authority	of	the	magistrate,	which	he	forbids,	and	a	negative,	
‘conservative’	 spiritual	 jurisdiction,	which	he	affords	 to	 the	magistrate.	This	distinction	
makes	some	sense.	However,	it	still	relies	on	the	same	problematic	premise	we	observed	
above:	The	meaning	of	 the	word	of	God	has	 to	be	abundantly	 clear,	 and	 immediately	
evident	to	the	magistrate.	For	if	this	were	not	the	case,	how	could	magistrates	be	able	to	
discern	when	they	needed	to	compel	clergy	to	adhere	to	the	word	of	God?		
Both	Vermigli’s	attempts	to	resolve	the	tension	between	the	conflicting	authority	
of	the	word	of	God	and	of	the	magistrate,	which	we	have	seen	so	far,	presuppose	that	the	
magistrate	clearly	and	unambiguously	understands	the	word	of	God.	Moreover,	both	take	
it	 for	granted	that	the	magistrates	and	the	ministers	of	 the	church	(or	 indeed	anyone)	
essentially	 agree	 on	 this	 understanding.	 The	 way	 in	 which	 Vermigli	 works	 out	 the	
relationship	 between	 the	 civil	 and	 the	 ecclesiastical	 powers	 does	 not	 allow	 for	 the	
possibility	of	disagreement	or	degrees	of	interpretation.	If	his	ideal	commonwealth	is	to	
work,	there	must	never	be	a	situation	in	which	magistrates	and	ministers	disagree	over	
what	the	“right”	understanding	of	the	word	of	God	is.	That	Vermigli	does	not	consider	the	
possibility	of	such	disagreement	over	the	word	of	God	seems	curious.	After	all,	Vermigli	
lived	all	his	life	in	societies	where	there	was	great	and	public	disagreement	over	the	right	
																																																						
ministerium	utitur,	non	potest	inflectere,	neque	cogere	pastores	aut	doctores	ecclesiae	ut	aliter	doceant,	
vel	 secus	 administrent	 sacramenta	 quam	 a	 verbo	 dei	 praescriptum	 fuerit.”	 (Vermigli,	 In	 librum	 iudicum	
commentarii,	185v;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	35.)	
74	As	we	have	already	seen,	Vermigli	repeatedly	and	in	no	uncertain	terms	maintains	that	if	ministers	do	not	
teach	 “right”	 or	 fail	 to	 administer	 the	 sacraments	 in	 an	 “orderly”	manner,	 then	 “it	 is	 the	 office	 of	 the	
Magistrate	to	compel	them	to	an	order,”	making	sure	they	“mingle	not	fables”	nor	“abuse”	the	Sacraments.	
Cf.	 “Quia	 si	 non	 recte	doceant,	 nec	ex	ordine	administrent	 sacramenta,	magistratus	est	 eos	 in	ordinem	
cogere,	ac	videre	ne	impure	doceant,	ne	fabulas	admisceant,	ne	sacramentis	abutantur.”	(Vermigli,	In	librum	
iudicum	commentarii,	185v–186r;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	35.)	
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understanding	 of	 the	 word	 of	 God,	 including	 disagreement	 between	magistrates	 and	
religious	entities.	
Vermigli’s	 attempt	 to	 resolve	 the	 tension	 between	 the	 conflicting	 claims	 to	
authority	 of	 the	 magistrate	 and	 the	 word	 of	 God	 seems	 therefore	 not	 ultimately	
successful.	The	fundamental	reason	for	this	lies	in	his	refusal	to	attend	to	hermeneutical	
questions.	Such	questions	about	how	to	understand	the	word	of	God	should	have	been	
of	paramount	importance	to	him	because	the	word	of	God	is	an	all-determining	factor	in	
his	ideal	political	commonwealth.	Denying	the	existence	of	hermeneutical	difficulties	or	
ambiguities	 in	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	word	 of	 God	 leads	 to	 passing	 over	 a	 host	 of	
power-related	questions	implied	in	the	“right”	understanding	of	the	word	of	God:	Who	
has	the	authority	to	decide	what	is	the	“right”	way	of	understanding	the	word	of	God?	Is	
there	anyone,	or	any	community	who	are	its	privileged	interpreters?	It	seems	that	a	vision	
of	a	commonwealth	ruled	by	the	word	of	God	ought	to	have	considered	such	issues	of	
interpretative	authority.		
Moreover,	 the	 question	 of	 authority	 is	 pertinent	 to	 Vermigli’s	 own	 practice	 of	
interpretation.	As	a	professor	teaching	the	Scriptures	at	leading	Protestant	schools	and	
universities,	Vermigli’s	own	interpretation	of	the	word	of	God	was	a	highly	powerful	one.	
Many	of	his	contemporary	readers	took	his	interpretation	of	the	word	of	God	as	the	‘right’	
interpretation.	Effectively,	Vermigli	therefore	takes	the	position	of	a	privileged	interpreter	
in	his	Scriptural	commentaries.	Moreover,	the	sheer	fact	that	he	self-consciously	writes	
to	defend	one	 interpretation	of	 the	word	of	God	over	against	a	host	of	other	possible	
interpretations	performatively	clashes	with	his	own	premise	that	the	word	of	God	needs	
no	mediation.	Vermigli	implicitly	is	a	mediator	of	the	word	of	God,	something	which	in	his	
own	framework	should	theoretically	be	redundant.	
However,	 is	 there	 an	 alternative	 way	 of	 understanding	 Vermigli’s	 political	
theology,	and	specifically	the	way	in	which	he	related	the	word	of	God	to	the	political	and	
ecclesiastical	 powers?	 Torrance	 Kirby	 offers	 a	 different,	 and	more	 charitable	 reading.	
Among	the	commentators	on	Vermigli’s	political	theology,	Kirby	and	Peter	Ackroyd	are	
unique	in	their	explicit	engagement	with	the	workings	of	authority	in	Vermigli’s	political	
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thought.	However,	because	Ackroyd’s	focus	is	not	primarily	Vermigli’s	political	theology,75	
I	will	focus	in	the	next	section	on	Torrance	Kirby’s	engagement	with	Vermigli’s	political	
theology.	
	
5)	Torrance	Kirby’s	Reading	of	Vermigli’s	Scholium	on	the	Magistrate		
Torrance	Kirby,	 in	his	book	The	Zurich	Connection	and	Tudor	Political	Theology,	argues	
that	there	was	a	kind	of	‘Zurich	school’,	primarily	represented	by	Heinrich	Bullinger	and	
Peter	Martyr	Vermigli,	whose	thought	provided	the	basis	for	“a	continuous	and	coherent	
tradition	 of	 political	 theology	 in	 England	 throughout	 the	 latter	 half	 of	 the	 sixteenth	
century.”76	Kirby	maintains	that	Bullinger	and	Vermigli	“were	no	less	than	chief	architects	
of	 the	 reformation	of	 the	Church	of	 England.”77	He	makes	 this	 argument	 through	 five	
“close	and	sympathetic”	readings	of	texts	by	the	Zurich	theologians,	one	of	them	being	
Vermigli’s	 De	 Magistratu	 scholium.78	 Kirby	 concludes	 that	 “Peter	 Martyr	 Vermigli	
constructs	 a	 sophisticated	 theological	 analysis	 of	 the	 ‘hypostatic’	 union	 of	 civil	 and	
ecclesiastical	 jurisdiction	 in	 the	 person	 of	 the	 godly	 Prince.”79	 In	 particular,	 Vermigli’s	
assertion	of	the	“due	subordination	of	all	subjects,	in	all	matters	civil	and	ecclesiastical,	to	
the	 supreme	magistrate”	 became,	 in	 Kirby’s	 estimation,	 “a	 key	 stabilising	 principle	 of	
early-modern,	secular	political	life	in	general	and	of	the	Tudor	state	in	particular.“80	In	this	
section,	I	shall	outline	and	discuss	Kirby’s	reading	of	Vermigli’s	political	theology.	
In	 short,	 Kirby	praises	Vermigli’s	 thought	 for	 simultaneously	 adhering	 (1)	 to	 an	
Aristotelian	conception	of	 the	unifying,	architectonic	 function	of	 the	magistrate,	which	
includes	 a	 Pseudo-Dionysian	 hierarchical	 logic	 of	 mediation,	 and	 (2)	 to	 an	 allegedly	
																																																						
75	Ackroyd’s	work	–	a	doctoral	thesis	–	primarily	argues	that	Church	discipline	was	a	mark	of	the	Church	for	
the	Reformers	and	especially	 for	Vermigli,	 and	 that	 the	 contemporary	Church	would	be	well-advised	 to	
rediscover	this	dimension	of	being-Church.	However,	in	his	discussion	of	Vermigli’s	ecclesiology,	he	is	critical	
of	 the	way	Vermigli	negotiates	 the	 relationship	between	civil	and	ecclesiastical	power,	 showing	 that	 for	
Vermigli,	the	Church	is	effectively	made	Church	–	in	a	jurisdictional	way	–	only	through	the	civil	government:	
The	 church	 “cannot	 exist	 in	 the	world	 without	 an	 order	 which	 is	 guaranteed	 by	 the	 temporal	 sword.”	
(Ackroyd,	“The	Unwelcome	Bridle,”	81;	264-265,	here	265.)	Ackroyd	is	sceptical	of	this	conclusion	because	
insofar	as	she	cannot	exist	 in	the	world	without	the	order	established	by	the	civil	power,	the	“church	…	
depends	on	the	magistrate,	but	the	reverse	is	not	the	case.”	(Ibid.,	265.)		
76	Kirby,	The	Zurich	Connection	and	Tudor	Political	Theology,	4.	
77	Ibid.,	5.	
78	Ibid.,	11.	Versions	of	the	same	article	were	published	as	Kirby,	“The	Charge	of	Religion	Belongeth	unto	
Princes”;	Kirby,	“Vermigli	and	Pope	Boniface	VIII.”	
79	Kirby,	The	Zurich	Connection	and	Tudor	Political	Theology,	22.	
80	Ibid.,	73.	
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Augustinian	 understanding	 of	 the	 clear	 distinction	 between	 the	 realms	 of	 externally	
coercive	and	internally	spiritual	power.	Vermigli	accomplishes	this	simultaneity,	according	
to	Kirby,	by	adapting	the	hierarchical	logic	of	Boniface	VIII’s	bull	Unam	Sanctam	 in	two	
ways.	First,	it	is	now	the	magistrate	who	holds	plenitude	of	power	which,	for	Boniface	VIII,	
was	held	by	the	pope,	and	secondly,	the	magistrate’s	sphere	of	power	is	limited	to	political	
and	external	power	only.	He	cannot	mediate	grace.		
In	more	detail,	Kirby’s	argument	runs	as	follows.	Vermigli’s	extensive	engagement	
with	Pope	Boniface’s	VIII’s	bull	Unam	Sanctam81	manifests,	in	Kirby’s	estimation,	a	tension	
between	 two	 kinds	 of	 Christian	 Platonism:	 Augustinian	 and	 Pseudo-Dionysian.	 He	
characterises	them	as	follows:	
At	 the	 Augustinian	 pole,	 emphasis	 is	 placed	 upon	 the	 utter	
incommensurability	 between	 the	 orders	 of	 grace	 and	 nature.	 …	 By	
contrast,	at	the	pole	of	Pseudo-Dionysian	spirituality,	the	orders	of	grace	
and	nature	constitute	a	continuous,	ascending	hierarchy	wherein	the	soul’s	
approach	to	God	is	accomplished	by	a	graduated	process	of	mediation.82		
Within	the	framework	of	this	distinction,	Kirby	places	Vermigli	clearly	at	the	Augustinian	
pole.	He	states	that	for	Vermigli,	“the	first	principle	of	order	does	not	consist	primarily	in	
a	gradual,	hierarchical	mediation	but	rather	in	a	simple,	binary	distinction	between	two	
principal	species	of	subjection,	namely	the	political/external	and	the	spiritual/internal.”83	
By	 contrast,	 hierarchical	mediation	 is	 characteristic	 of	 the	 bull	Unam	 Sanctam,	 which	
appeals	to	Pseudo-Dionysius’	“political	ontology.”84	Such	a	“cosmic	vision”,	Kirby	holds,	is	
“deeply”	though	“not	totally”	at	odds	“with	the	Augustinian	assumptions	underpinning	
Vermigli’s	own	thought.”85	The	fact	that	Vermigli	is	“not	totally”	at	odds	with	a	Pseudo-
Dionysian	 understanding	 of	 politics	 is	 due	 to	 his	 insistence	 that	 the	 magistrate	 is	 a	
mediator	 of	 divinely	 ordained	 governance.	 In	 this	 context,	 he	 operates	 within	 a	
hierarchical	logic.		
However,	 how	 does	 Vermigli	 square	 this	 “Pseudo-Dionysian”	 element	 of	 his	
thought,	 (viz.	 the	 magistrate’s	 all-encompassing	 jurisdiction),	 with	 the	 “Augustinian”	
distinction	between	nature	and	grace,	or	political	and	spiritual	matters?	It	is	in	this	context	
																																																						
81	Especially	in	the	De	Magistratu	scholium.	Vermigli,	In	librum	iudicum	commentarii,	184v–185r;	186v–189r.	
82	Kirby,	The	Zurich	Connection	and	Tudor	Political	Theology,	66.	
83	Ibid.,	68.	
84	Ibid.,	65.	
85	Ibid.,	66.	
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that	Kirby	is	most	acutely	aware	of	the	tensions	present	in	Vermigli’s	thought.	On	the	one	
hand,	 he	 writes,	 it	 might	 appear	 that	 “Vermigli’s	 Augustinian	 insistence	 upon	 the	
incommensurability	of	the	‘two	subjections’	has	 led	him	…	into	a	Manichean	dualism,”	
where	 there	are	 two	 independent	 realms,	one	entirely	worldly,	and	 the	other	entirely	
spiritual.	On	the	other	hand,	however,	“Vermigli’s	ascription	of	ecclesiastical	supremacy	
to	the	magistrate	appears	to	conflate	the	civil	and	ecclesiastical	powers	and	thus	to	raise	
the	contrary	logical	difficulty.”86		
How	does	Vermigli	escape	these	difficulties?	According	to	Kirby,	Vermigli	“both	
complicates	 and	 clarifies	 the	 question	 by	 arguing	 for	 a	mutual	 subjection	 of	 civil	 and	
spiritual	 jurisdiction.”87	 To	 support	 this	 interpretation	 of	 the	De	Magistratu	 scholium,	
Kirby	quotes	the	following	lines	penned	by	Vermigli:		
The	civil	power	must	be	subject	to	the	word	of	God,	which	is	preached	by	
the	ministers.	In	turn,	the	ecclesiastical	power	is	subject	to	the	civil	power	
when	the	ministers	conduct	themselves	badly	in	personal	or	ecclesiastical	
matters.88	
If	by	“spiritual	jurisdiction”	Kirby	means	the	Church	or	the	“ecclesiastica	potestas,”	then	
his	reading	of	this	passage	seems	problematic.	For	the	political	authorities	are	asked	to	
bow	not	to	the	ecclesiastical	authorities,	but	rather	to	the	word	of	God.	The	ministers	may	
preach	this	word,	but	the	magistrates	could	encounter	and	understand	the	word	of	God	
also	through	other	channels	–	such	as	their	own	reading	of	the	Bible.	As	we	have	seen	
above,	ministers	are	not	strictly	necessary	to	channel	or	communicate	the	word	of	God,	
as	 it	 can	 communicate	 itself.	 This	means	 that	 there	 is	no	 straightforward	mutuality	of	
subjection	 between	ministers	 and	magistrates	 –	 even	 if	 it	 is	 fair	 to	 say	 that	 Vermigli	
intended	for	the	church	and	the	magistrates	to	work	hand	in	hand.89	However,	 leaving	
																																																						
86	Ibid.,	69.	
87	Ibid.,	70.	
88	 “Civilis	 itaque	 potestas	 verbo	 dei	 quod	 a	 ministris	 predicatur	 subiici	 debet.	 At	 vicissim	 ecclesiastica	
potestas	civili	subiicitur,	cum	ministri	vel	in	rebus	humanis,	vel	in	ecclesiasticis	male	se	gesserint.”	(Vermigli,	
In	librum	iudicum	commentarii,	185v;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	35.)	
89	He	writes,	for	instance	that	“both	of	them	help	another:	for	the	political	prince	gives	judgement,	and	the	
ecclesiastical	power,	though	it	does	not	itself	give	judgement,	it	teaches	how	judgement	ought	to	be	given.”	
/	“Utraeque	tamen	se	mutuo	iuvant.	Nam	princeps	politicus	ius	dicit,	ecclesiasticus	vero	non	ille	quidem	ius	
dicit,	 sed	 tamen	docet	quemadmodum	 ius	dici	debeat.”	 (Vermigli,	 In	 librum	 iudicum	commentarii,	186r;	
Kingdon,	 Political	 Thought,	 37.)	 See	 also:	 “For	 these	 powers	 are	 somewhat	 interchangeable,	 and	 are	
occupied	 with	 the	 same	 things	 in	 different	 ways,	 and	mutually	 help	 one	 another.”	 /	 “”Sunt	 enim	 hae	
potestates	 quodammodo	 autisrofaj,	 ac	 variis	 modis	 circa	 eadem	 versantur,	 ac	 sese	 mutuo	 iuvant.”	
(Vermigli,	In	librum	iudicum	commentarii,	185v;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	35.)	
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aside	that	the	notion	of	“mutual	subjection”	of	civil	and	ecclesiastical	powers	is	difficult	
to	maintain	on	the	basis	of	Vermigli’s	work,	let	us	return	to	Kirby’s	explanation	of	how	
Vermigli	escapes	the	possible	tensions	inherent	in	his	work.		
Kirby’s	account	relies	on	a	distinction	Vermigli	makes	on	the	first	page	of	the	De	
Magistratu	 scholium,	 between	 laws	 “touching	 outward	 discipline”	 and	 “the	 inward	
motions	of	 the	mind.”90	 Based	on	 this	 distinction,	 Kirby	maintains	 that	 the	 “nature	of	
ecclesiastical	 power”	 for	 Vermigli	 is	 “inherently	 equivocal,”	 consisting	 of	 two	 non-
overlapping	aspects:	
To	 the	extent	 that	 the	ecclesiastical	 jurisdiction	 is	 involved	 in	 the	 ‘lawes	
touching	outwarde	discipline’	it	is	properly	subordinated	to	the	rule	of	the	
civil	magistrate.	At	the	same	time,	the	magistrate	is	bound	to	submit	to	the	
jurisdiction	 of	 that	 aspect	 of	 ecclesiastical	 power	 exercised	 in	 matters	
concerning	‘the	inwarde	motions	of	the	minde.’	Thus	in	the	internal	and	
invisible	realm	of	the	civitas	Dei,	power	 is	 immediately	derived	from	the	
divine	source	without	the	mediation	of	the	magistrate;	in	the	external	and	
visible	 realm	 of	 the	 civitas	 terrena,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 civil	 and	
ecclesiastical	jurisdiction	are	united	in	the	Prince	or	magistrate.91	
According	to	Kirby,	 therefore,	Vermigli	circumvents	both	a	Manichean	dualism,	and	an	
‘Erastian’	 conflation	 of	 civil	 and	 ecclesiastical	 powers	 by	 asserting	 that	 there	 are	 two	
separate	 kinds	 of	 ecclesiastical	 power	 (or	 better:	 two	 aspects	 in	 which	 authority	 is	
exercised	 in	 the	 Church).	 Their	 distinction,	 moreover,	 is	 a	 function	 of	 the	 distinction	
between	an	internal	and	an	external	realm.	Rather	than	holding	a	Manichean	distinction	
between	flesh	and	spirit,	 the	fundamental	distinction	 in	the	work	of	Kirby’s	Vermigli	 is	
therefore	between	‘inward’	and	‘outward.’	In	everything	related	to	‘outward’	matters,	the	
supreme	 power	 and	 authority	 over	 both	 civil	 and	 ecclesiastical	 matters	 lies	 with	 the	
magistrate.	 In	 everything	 ‘inward’,	 however,	 the	 supreme	 power	 is	 neither	 with	 the	
magistrate,	nor	mediated	by	him,	but	“immediately	derived	from	the	divine	source.”	It	
remains	unclear,	however,	why	this	immediate	power	should	still	be	termed	–	as	in	the	
above	 quotation	 –	 an	 “aspect	 of	 ecclesiastical	 power.”	 Is	 this	 power	 not	 operative	
independently	of	the	Church?		
																																																						
90	 “ad	 externam	 disciplinam	 leges;”	 “ad	 intimos	 usque	 motus	 animorum”	 (Vermigli,	 In	 librum	 iudicum	
commentarii,	183r-v;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	26.)	
91	Kirby,	The	Zurich	Connection	and	Tudor	Political	Theology,	70.	
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Nothing	can	be	said	against	Kirby’s	interpretation	of	Vermigli,	as	long	as	he	merely	
argues	 that	 for	 Vermigli	 “the	 power	 exercised	 by	 ministers	 through	 the	Word	 in	 the	
‘inward	 motions	 of	 the	 minde’	 is	 sharply	 distinguished	 from	 that	 wielded	 by	 the	
magistrate	through	the	sword	in	matters	of	‘outward	discipline.’”92	However,	everything	
hangs	on	the	interjection	“through	the	Word”	here:	when	ministers	exercise	power	over	
peoples’	 inner	life,	they	do	not	exercise	power	themselves,	nor	even	in	the	function	of	
their	office,	for	Vermigli.	Their	power	hangs	entirely	on	the	word	of	God.	And	as	I	have	
shown	 above,	 Vermigli	 categorically	 refuses	 the	 need	 for	 any	 kind	 of	 institutional	
mediation	of	the	word	of	God.	Ministers	therefore	do	not	mediate	the	word	of	God	qua	
their	 office;	 they	 merely	 voice	 it,	 as	 anyone	 equally	 could.	 Therefore,	 when	 Kirby	
distinguishes	between	two	aspects	of	“ecclesiastical	power”	in	Vermigli’s	work,	he	fails	to	
acknowledge	that	the	“power	of	the	Church,”	for	Vermigli,	never	straightforwardly	equals	
“the	power	of	the	word	of	God.”	
It	is	doubtful,	moreover,	whether	the	distinction	between	‘inward’	and	‘outward’	
can	 usefully	 serve	 as	 a	 hermeneutic	 key	 to	 the	 way	 in	 which	 Vermigli	 envisages	 the	
distinction	between	the	spheres	of	authority	of	the	civil	and	ecclesiastical	powers,	for	two	
main	reasons.	
First,	this	distinction	seems	difficult	to	maintain	in	reality.	What	would	it	mean	for	
something	to	be	an	‘inward’	issue	or	offence?	Toying	with	heretical	ideas,	or	entertaining	
violent,	 lusty	or	 gluttonous	 thoughts?	 If	 these	 are	 the	 kind	of	 “inward	motions	of	 the	
mind”	which	fall	under	the	 jurisdiction	of	the	ecclesiastical	power,	according	to	Kirby’s	
Vermigli,	 then,	 presumably,	 as	 soon	 as	 these	 thoughts	 are	 turned	 into	 actions,	 they	
become	 ‘outward’	 and	 visible,	 and	 hence	 fall	 under	 the	 magistrate’s	 jurisdiction.	
However,	 such	 a	 distinction	would	be	 impossible	 to	maintain	 in	 practice,	 because	 the	
distinction	between	thoughts	and	actions	 is	fluid:	 ideas	can	be	agents,	and	actions	can	
engender	thoughts.		
Secondly,	 and	 more	 importantly,	 Vermigli’s	 writings	 in	 De	 Magistratu	 and	
elsewhere	suggest	that	his	use	of	the	term	“outward”	serves	a	very	specific	purpose,	and	
one	that	is	not	about	demarcating	realms	of	power.	The	immediate	context	of	the	first	
instance	where	Vermigli	mentions	“outward	discipline”	in	De	Magistratu	–	the	one	quoted	
																																																						
92	Ibid.,	72.	
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by	Kirby	–	is	telling.	Vermigli	writes	that	magistrates	are	to	ensure	the	adherence	to	the	
“laws	 regarding	 outward	 discipline	 through	 punishing	 transgressors	 with	 bodily	
punishments.”93	This	suggests	that	Vermigli’s	“outward	discipline”	relates	to	the	manner	
of	 punishment	 appropriate	 to	 the	 magistrate,	 such	 as	 imprisonment	 or	 exile.	 Such	
punishments	of	 the	body	 cannot	be	administered	by	ministers	of	 the	Church,	 as	 their	
manner	of	punishing	 is	 clearly	defined	–	as	we	 shall	 see	–	 through	a	 church	discipline	
modelled	after	Matthew	18:15-17.		
Paragraphs	 10-12	 of	 De	 Magistratu	 display	 most	 evidently	 that	 the	 point	 of	
Vermigli’s	association	of	‘outward	discipline’	with	the	magistrate	is	not	that	magistrates	–	
in	his	view	–	are	responsible	for	an	outward,	bodily	realm	whereas	ministers	care	for	an	
internal,	 spiritual	 realm.	 Rather,	 by	 associating	 outward	 discipline	 with	 magistrates,	
Vermigli	reserves	certain	ways	of	punishing	offenders	to	the	civil	power.	Indeed,	Vermigli	
explicitly	debunks	Kirby’s	idea	of	a	distinction	between	a	“civitas	terrena”	and	a	“civitas	
dei”	as	follows:		
Ought	bishops	to	take	care	only	of	souls,	and	not	of	bodies	also?	What	if	
[their	 flock]	 give	 themselves	 up	 to	 gluttony	 or	 drunkenness,	 or	 live	
licentiously	regarding	outward	behavior,	should	bishops	not	reprove	these	
things?	They	surely	should,	and	neither	should	princes	only	 take	care	of	
their	subjects’	bodies,	and	neglect	their	souls.94	
Vermigli	could	not	be	clearer:	bishops	must	reprove	the	illicit	outward	behavior	of	those	
entrusted	 to	 their	 care,	 and	 princes,	 in	 turn,	 ought	 not	 to	 neglect	 the	 souls	 of	 their	
subjects.	They	both	care	for	the	holistic	wellbeing	of	the	people.	Where	thy	differ	is	in	the	
way	they	reprove	offenders:		
Whatever	 difference	 there	 is,	 ...	 it	 entirely	 concerns	 the	 manner	 of	
reproving.	 This	 the	 ministers	 of	 the	 Church	 reprove	 through	 the	 word,	
princes	through	outward	punishments.95	
																																																						
93	“...	ut	quo	ad	externam	disciplinam	leges	custodiat,	poena	corporis	transgressores	plectendo.”	(Vermigli,	
In	librum	iudicum	commentarii,	183r;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	26.)	
94	“An	animos	tantum	curare	debent	episcopi,	nonne	etiam	corpora?	Quid	si	se	gulae	aut	ebrietati	dedant,	
vel	in	externo	cultu	lasciviant,	nonne	ista	reprehendent?	Certe	reprehendent.	Nec	princeps	corpora	tantum	
hominum	curabit,	et	negliget	animos.”	(Vermigli,	 In	librum	iudicum	commentarii,	185v;	Kingdon,	Political	
Thought,	34.)	
95	“Quicquid	est	discriminis,	totum	id	est	...	quo	ad	modum	coercendi.	Ministri	Ecclesiae	id	verbo	faciunt,	
principes	externis	poenis.”	(Vermigli,	In	librum	iudicum	commentarii,	186r;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	36.)	
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The	 kinds	 of	 penalties	 princes	 or	 magistrates	 can	 inflict	 on	 their	 erring	 subjects	 are	
outward.	This	means	that	they	can	remove	a	bishop	whose	conduct	is	bad.	In	fact,	this	
seems	 to	 be	 one	 of	 the	main	 purposes	 of	 Vermigli’s	 deliberations	 here:	 he	wishes	 to	
maintain	that	“although	a	king	may	remove	an	unprofitable	and	harmful	bishop,	a	bishop	
cannot	 in	 turn	 depose	 a	 king,	 if	 he	 sinned.”96	 This	 is	 to	 say	 that	 a	 bishop’s	 tools	 for	
admonishing	 kings,	 in	 Vermigli’s	mind,	 simply	 do	 not	 include	 dethronement.	 This	 is	 a	
special	application	of	Vermigli’s	general	principle	that	the	Church’s	tools	for	admonishing	
cannot	be	“outward,”	or	involving	any	physical	force.	Excommunication	is	the	most	severe	
punishment	 a	minister	 of	 the	 church	 can	 administer,	which	 –	 as	 Vermigli	 reminds	 his	
readers	 –	 happened	 to	 several	 emperors	 in	 history	 who	 were	 excommunicated	 for	
committing	public	grievous	sins.	Vermigli’s	conclusion	from	this	 is,	however,	that	while	
“Ambrose	 and	 Innocent	 excommunicated	 Emperors,	 they	 proceeded	 no	 further.”97	
Ministers	of	the	Church	cannot,	in	Vermigli’s	view,	use	force	to	remove	emperors	from	
their	position.	Similarly,	they	cannot	use	any	‘outward’	measures	beyond	admonitions,	
and	–	should	the	offender	fail	to	repent	–	excommunication,	to	punish	erring	members	of	
the	Church.	
All	of	this	is	confirmed	by	the	way	Vermigli	envisages	ecclesiastical	discipline.	As	
both	Kingdon	and	Ackroyd	have	shown,	Church	discipline	forms	one	of	the	three	marks	of	
the	Church	for	Vermigli	–	along	with	pure	preaching	of	the	word	of	God	and	the	proper	
administration	 of	 the	 sacraments.98	 In	 a	 definition	 he	 makes	 in	 the	 context	 of	 his	
commentary	on	1	Cor	10,	Vermigli	defines	Church	discipline	as	follows:		
It	is	nothing	else	but	a	power	granted	to	the	Church	by	God,	by	which	the	
wills	and	actions	of	the	faithful	are	made	comfortable	to	the	law	of	God:	
which	 is	 done	 by	 doctrine,	 admonitions,	 correction,	 and	 finally	 by	
punishments,	and	also	by	excommunication	if	necessary.99	
																																																						
96	“Sed	quamvis	rex	possit	removere	inutilem	ac	noxium	episcopum,	non	tamen	episcopus	potest	vicissim	
regem,	si	peccaverit,	deiicere.”	(Vermigli,	In	librum	iudicum	commentarii,	186r;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	
36.)	
97	“Ambrosius	et	Innocentius	excommunicarunt	Imperatores.	At	non	sunt	progressi	ulterius.”	(Vermigli,	In	
librum	iudicum	commentarii,	186r;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	36.)	
98	Ackroyd,	“The	Unwelcome	Bridle”;	Kingdon,	“Peter	Martyr	Vermigli	and	the	Marks	of	the	True	Church.”	
99	“Nihil	aliud	est	quam	facultas	eccesiae,	divinitus	concessa,	qua	voluntates	et	actiones	fidelium	reddantur	
conformes	dividae	 legi:	quod	sit	doctrina,	monitionibus,	correctione,	demumque	poenis,	etsi	opus	fuerit	
excommunicatione.”	(Vermigli,	Ad	Corinthios,	251v.)	
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Sometimes,	Vermigli	holds	moreover,	the	Church	takes	such	disciplinary	measures	even	
when	the	civil	authorities	will	turn	a	blind	eye:	magistrates	tolerate	adultery,	drunkenness	
and	 slander,	 whereas	 the	 Church	 cannot	 allow	 such	 behaviour.100	 Similarly,	 the	 civil	
authorities	are	not	concerned	with	whether	or	not	offenders	repent	as	long	as	they	serve	
their	 sentences,	 whereas	 the	 church	 cannot	 reconcile	 offenders	 unless	 they	 are	
penitent.101	This	means	that	Vermigli	distinguishes	the	Church’s	jurisdiction	from	the	one	
exercised	by	the	civil	authorities.	There	are	differences	both	in	the	scope	of	offences	with	
which	 they	 are	 concerned,	 and	 in	 the	 purposes	 of	 correction.	 Furthermore,	 from	 the	
instances	mentioned	which	call	for	Church	discipline,	it	is	obvious	that	Church	discipline,	
in	 Vermigli’s	 view,	 cannot	 merely	 be	 concerned	 with	 ‘inward	 motions	 of	 the	 mind.’	
Adultery,	drunkenness	and	slander	are	hardly	only	motions	of	the	mind,	but	actions	that	
are	‘outward’	insofar	as	they	are	necessarily	embodied	and	affect	other	people.	The	fact,	
therefore,	that	Vermigli	envisages	specific	disciplinary	cases	that	are	proper	to	the	Church	
(only),	is	another	reason	why	Kirby’s	exclusive	association	of	outward	discipline	with	the	
civil	authorities	cannot	be	upheld.		
A	 final	 difficulty	 with	 Kirby’s	 reading	 of	 Vermigli	 concerns	 his	 emphasis	 that	
Vermigli	is	allegedly	“Augustinian”	by	maintaining	a	“clear	distinction	between	the	orders	
of	Grace	and	Nature.”102	There	are	reasons	to	believe	that	such	a	“clear”	distinction	is	not	
genuinely	Augustinian	at	all,	but	rather	owing	to	an	imposition	of	modern	categories	on	
St.	 Augustine.103	 Regardless	 of	whether	 it	 is	 fair	 to	 call	 such	 a	 distinction	Augustinian,	
however,	–	something	which	cannot	be	investigated	within	the	scope	of	the	present	study	
–	 it	 is	 far	 from	evident	 that	 it	 is	 ‘Vermiglian.’	For	 is	not	 the	very	 fact	 that	God	ordains	
princes	and	that	they	mediate	His	power	evidence	that	their	‘natural’	power	is	somehow	
‘graced’?	Moreover,	as	I	have	argued	in	Chapter	One,	despite	his	strong	understanding	of	
the	fallenness	of	creation,	there	are	strands	in	Vermigli’s	thinking	that	display	his	belief	in	
																																																						
100	Originating	from	the	scholium	on	excommunication,	at	the	end	of	his	commentary	on	1	Cor	5:	“Sed	isti	
noverint	 plurima	esse	 vitia,	 ad	 quae	 leges	 civiles	 connivent,	 ut	 adulteria,	 ebrietates,	maledicentia,	 et	 id	
genus,	quae	tamen	ab	Ecclesia	ferri	non	possunt.”	(Ibid.,	129r.)	
101	“Deinde	magistratus	punit	saepius	pecunia,	certo	exilio	et	carcere	ad	tempus,	quibus	poenis	depensis,	
cives	restituit,	neque	poenitentiam	ullam	requirit:	Ecclesia	vero	minime	potest	nisi	poenitentes	reconciliare.	
Non	itaque	confundantur	potestates:	Alia	esto	civilis,	alia	ecclesiastica.”	(Ibid.)	
102	Kirby,	The	Zurich	Connection	and	Tudor	Political	Theology,	72.	
103	See	on	this	e.g.	Michael	Hanby,	Augustine	and	Modernity	(London:	Routledge,	2003).	Hanby	refutes	the	
thesis	by	Stephen	Menn	and	others	who	see	Augustine	as	essentially	a	pioneering	a	modern	conception	of	
the	subject.	(Stephen	Menn,	Descartes	and	Augustine	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1998).)		
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God	working	intrinsically	in	all	of	nature.	Consequently,	Vermigli	at	least	sometimes	holds	
that	nature	is	governed	in	its	entirety	by	God	in	such	a	way	that	a	clear	line	cannot	usefully	
be	drawn	between	“nature”	and	“grace.”	In	addition,	as	a	corollary	of	a	clear	nature-grace	
distinction,	 Kirby	 holds	 that	 Vermigli	 “follows	 Augustine	 in	 looking	 directly	 to	 the	
incarnate	Christ	to	accomplish	an	immediate	union	of	the	soul	with	God	by	grace	alone	in	
a	 ‘forensic’	 justification.”104	 If,	 however,	 as	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 Chapter	 Two,	 Vermigli’s	
soteriology	is	not	exclusively	forensic,	then	such	an	argument	becomes	more	difficult	to	
maintain.	
In	conclusion,	Torrance	Kirby	is	right	in	perceiving	tensions	in	Vermigli’s	political	
theology.	However,	for	the	reasons	we	have	seen,	his	attempt	to	resolve	the	tensions	in	
Vermigli’s	political	work	by	distinguishing	an	external	political	 realm	of	power	 from	an	
internal	spiritual	realm	is	highly	problematic.		
How,	then,	can	we	make	sense	of	the	tension	between	the	conflicting	authorities	
–	the	magistrate	and	the	word	of	God	–	in	Vermigli’s	ideal	commonwealth?	We	could	take	
a	 ‘Skinnerian’	 route	 and	 judge	 that	Vermigli’s	 thought	 simply	 is	 not	 coherent.	A	more	
interesting	judgement,	however,	would	be	one	that	takes	into	account	the	reasons	why	
there	are	tensions,	or	perhaps	an	incoherence,	in	Vermigli’s	thinking.	Our	answer	to	this	
question,	as	we	shall	develop	it	in	the	following	final	section	of	this	chapter,	is	that	the	
tensions	in	Vermigli’s	political	theology	are	a	function	of	the	fact	that	he	simultaneously	
inhabits	two	metaphysical	frameworks,	with	two	different	understandings	of	causality.	
	
6)	The	Implied	Metaphysics	of	Vermigli’s	Political	Theology	
We	 have	 seen	 how	 the	 magistrate,	 in	 Vermigli’s	 view,	 mediates	 God’s	 power	 and	
authority.	The	structure	of	authority	thus	conveyed	 is	one	 in	which	God	 is	seen	as	the	
primordial	giver	of	authority,	who	shares	his	power	with	lesser	authorities.	In	this	sense	–	
and	as	Vermigli	explicitly	holds	–	the	magistrate	is	“between	God	and	human	beings.“105	
Even	 though	 his	 language	 of	 the	 magistrate	 being	 in	 God’s	 place	 could	 indicate	 a	
representational	 (rather	 than	ontologically	determined)	structure	of	power,	where	 the	
magistrate	 represents	 God	 without	 participating	 in	 him,	 his	 emphasis	 on	 mediation	
																																																						
104	Kirby,	The	Zurich	Connection	and	Tudor	Political	Theology,	66.	
105	“Constituitur	princeps,	qui	inter	Deum	et	homines	Dei	vices	gerat.”	(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	609;	Kingdon,	
Political	Thought,	12.)	
Chapter	Four:	Authority	
	 161	
suggests	 otherwise.	 Moreover,	 Vermigli	 is	 unambiguous	 about	 his	 belief	 that	 lesser	
authorities	 –	 the	 magistrates	 –	 participate	 in	 God’s	 power.	 This	 indicates	 that	 he	
presupposes	a	 structure	of	 authority	 in	which	God	acts	 in	 and	 through	worldly	power	
structures.	He	does	not	work	alongside	the	magistrates,	or	merely	delegate	his	power	to	
them,	but	works	through	them.		
Therefore,	 the	 acts	 of	 the	 magistrate	 unite	 in	 themselves	 divine	 and	 human	
causality.	The	 two	causalities	do	not	compete,	but	 rather	one	 indwells	 the	other,	as	 it	
were.	 This	 is	 because	 in	 this	 framework,	 causality	 and	 authority	 are	 ontologically	
determined.	God	is	not	only	the	giver	of	power	but	–	as	creator	–	is	also	the	giver	of	being.	
He	creates	magistrates	and	bestows	power	to	them	as	part	of	their	very	being.	This	means	
that	power	cannot	be	a	disembodied	or	abstract	force,	as	God	does	not	share	it	outside	
of	his	creative	sharing	of	being.	Consequently,	in	such	a	framework,	there	is	no	hierarchy	
of	power	outside	of	a	hierarchical	ontology.	
As	a	result,	communities	and	commonwealths	with	such	structures	of	authority,	
which	are	based	on	a	shared	participation	 in	God’s	being	and	power,	are	communities	
where	each	member	has	belonging	through	his	or	her	specially	assigned	place.	It	might	be	
objected,	 however,	 that	 such	 communities	 are	 in	danger	of	 harbouring	or	 legitimizing	
oppression.	Indeed,	the	fact	that	all	power	derives	from	a	single	source	does	come	with	
the	 potential	 danger	 of	 fostering	 totalitarianisms.	 Because	 Vermigli	 believes	 in	 the	
goodness	of	God	as	the	source	of	power,	however,	this	does	not	seem	to	trouble	him.	
Moreover,	the	strength	of	a	community	structured	in	such	a	way	is	that	it	is	unified.	It	is	
precisely	this	non-fragmentation	that	attracts	Vermigli	to	this	structure.	As	we	have	seen	
above,	Vermigli	wishes	for	the	commonwealth	to	be	unified,	as	this	is	the	prerequisite	for	
peace.	
Another	 picture	 presents	 itself	 in	 the	 case	 of	 God’s	 power	 and	 authority	
manifested	in	his	word.	Here,	God’s	power	needs	no	mediation,	as	Vermigli	maintains.	It	
is	 self-explanatory,	 immediately	 awe-inspiring	 and	 as	 such	 essentially	 self-mediating.	
Consequently,	God’s	power	needs	no	institutional	structures	to	embody	or	channel	it	in	
this	case.	Indeed,	its	authority	sits	uneasily	with	worldly	structures	of	authority,	as	it	not	
only	has	no	need	of	them	but	in	fact	actively	circumvents	them.	God	wields	his	authority	
through	his	word	not	in	and	through	worldly	authorities,	but	somehow	alongside	them.	
Consequently,	if	magistrates	act	according	to	the	precepts	of	the	word	of	God,	their	acts	
Chapter	Four:	Authority	
	 162	
have	two	partial	causes:	the	magistrates	themselves	and	the	word	of	God.	The	two	causes	
can	moreover	potentially	be	in	competition	with	each	other.	
This	is	an	effect	of	the	fact	that	in	the	case	of	the	non-mediated	power	of	his	word,	
God’s	authority	is	somewhat	disembodied.	It	is	not	necessarily	linked	to	the	essence	of	
those	endowed	with	it.	In	short:	authority	is	not	determined	ontologically.	Consequently,	
communities	governed	by	this	kind	of	authority	are	held	together	only	through	a	shared	
agreement	to	accept	this	immediate	authority.	These	communities	rely	on	a	more	or	less	
explicit	 ‘contract’	 through	which	 everyone	 submits	 to	 the	 immediate	 authority	 of	 the	
word	of	God.	They	equally	rely	on	a	shared	understanding	of	what	this	authority	demands.	
If	there	are	to	be	no	privileged	interpreters	or	mediators	of	it,	then	every	member	of	the	
community	has	 to	agree	on	what	 the	word	of	God	demands.	As	we	have	seen	above,	
Vermigli	 is	 very	 optimistic	 in	 this	 regard,	 believing	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 achieve	 an	
agreement	on	what	 the	word	of	God	calls	means	and	 requests,	 and	 that	hermeneutic	
considerations	 are	 superfluous	 because	 of	 the	 perspicuity	 of	 Scripture.	 Consequently,	
Vermigli	 relies,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 on	 a	 kind	 of	 unified	 Christendom;	 a	 unified	
commonwealth	governed	by	a	magistrate	 in	God’s	stead,	 in	which	a	commonly	shared	
‘objective’	understanding	of	the	word	of	God	can	be	taken	for	granted.	On	the	other	hand,	
however,	his	(and	his	fellow	reformers’)	insistence	on	the	authority	due	to	the	word	of	
God,	and	the	alleged	immediate	clarity	of	their	understanding	of	it,	did	not	foster	such	
unified	commonwealths.	It	proved	impossible,	in	practice,	to	achieve	a	commonly	shared	
‘objective’	understanding	of	the	word	of	God.	The	irony	that	Vermigli	depends	on	a	unified	
commonwealth,	which	his	own	political	theology	cannot	cultivate,	however,	springs	from	
his	hermeneutic	decision	that	God’s	power	as	given	in	his	word	needs	no	mediation.	
In	conclusion,	the	two	conflicting	authorities	in	Vermigli’s	ideal	commonwealth	–	
the	 magistrate	 and	 the	 word	 of	 God	 –	 each	 function	 within	 different	 structures	 of	
authority,	 and	 they	 in	 turn	 grow	out	 of	 two	metaphysical	 frameworks	 insofar	 as	 they	
embody	 different	 visions	 of	 how	God’s	 power	works	 in	 the	world.	 If	 this	 is	 the	 case,	
however,	 then	 it	 is	 no	wonder	 that	 there	 are	 tensions	 in	Vermigli’s	 political	 theology,	
because	 they	 are	 another	 means	 by	 which	 the	 non-uniform	 metaphysics	 underlying	
Vermigli’s	thought	is	made	manifest.	
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Conclusion	
	
The	challenge	involved	in	studying	“metaphysics	in	the	Reformation”	is	that	none	of	the	
Protestant	Reformers	commented	on	Aristotle’s	Metaphysics,	or	directly	expounded	on	
themes	relating	to	the	being	of	God	and	the	world	at	any	length.	In	order	to	examine	the	
metaphysics	sustaining	the	thought	of	a	Reformer,	we	must	therefore	proceed	indirectly,	
taking	seemingly	 ‘religious’	or	 ‘confessional’	 texts	on	subjects	 such	as	 justification,	 the	
sacraments	or	political	theology,	and	screening	them	for	the	metaphysical	framework(s)	
implied	within	them.	This	is	what	I	have	done	in	the	present	study,	taking	Peter	Martyr	
Vermigli	as	a	case	study.	In	these	concluding	pages,	I	will	reflect	on	the	merits	and	limits	
of	such	an	approach,	and	consider	what	our	argument	means	for	understanding	Vermigli’s	
work,	and	the	Reformation	more	broadly.	
The	argument	returned	to	in	every	chapter	of	this	dissertation	has	been	that	the	
metaphysics	sustaining	Vermigli’s	thought	is	complex	in	that	it	simultaneously	inhabits	a	
participatory	and	a	univocal	metaphysical	framework.	These	two	alternatives	of	how	to	
envisage	the	relationship	between	God’s	being	and	the	being	of	the	world	have	been	the	
hermeneutic	lens	through	which	I	have	analysed	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli’s	thought.	Some	
might	 object	 that	 enquiring	 into	 Vermigli’s	 implied	metaphysics	 amounts	 to	 imposing	
alien,	 anachronistic	 categories	 onto	 his	 work.	 I	 have	 indeed	 read	 him	 against	 the	
background	of	concepts	which	he	does	not	explicitly	use.	However,	apart	from	the	fact	
that	it	is	impossible	to	read	historical	texts	without	a	hermeneutic	lens,	and	that	it	seems	
preferable	to	be	upfront	about	one’s	own,	I	would	like	to	make	the	case	that	this	approach	
is	warranted	for	two	reasons.	
The	first	reason	 is	 theological,	and	follows	from	a	 ‘strong’	theology	of	creation,	
which	involves	the	conviction	that	everything	about	everything	is	created	and	sustained	
by	 God.	 If	 this	 theological	 premise	 is	 granted,	 then	 there	 can	 be	 no	 strict	 separation	
between	‘religious’	and	‘philosophical’	discourses,	or	between	faith	and	reason.	It	follows	
moreover	 that	 one	 should	 not	 envisage	 there	 to	 be	 purely	 ‘philosophical’	 or	 rational	
discourses	 outside	God’s	 gift	 of	 grace.	 All	 of	 this	 has	 been	 argued	 in	 great	 detail	 and	
applied	to	various	contexts	by	exponents	of	the	Nouvelle	Théologie,	or	by	members	of	the	
‘Cambridge	School’,	for	instance.	What	I	propose	to	do	is	to	attend	to	the	flipside	of	this	
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argument.	For	if	it	is	true	that	there	is	no	strict	separation	between	faith	and	reason,	and	
that	hence	there	are	no	purely	‘philosophical’	discourses,	then	surely	this	equally	means	
that	there	can	be	no	purely	‘religious’	or	‘doctrinal’	discourses	either.	As	soon	as	a	text	is	
part	 of	 a	 discourse,	 it	 wants	 to	 be	 understood.	 By	 explaining,	 arguing	 or	 refuting	
something,	it	presupposes	some	form	of	a	reasoned	communication,	and	implies	shared	
structures	of	thinking	that	are	intelligible	to	others.	In	this	sense,	all	religious	discourse	is	
philosophical.	 More	 specifically,	 it	 could	 be	 said	 that	 all	 religious	 discourse	 is	
metaphysical,	insofar	as	it	is	sustained	by	a	Divine	‘Other’,	and	insofar	as	this	necessarily	
raises	the	question	as	to	how	this	‘Other’	relates	to	the	self.	And	metaphysics,	as	I	have	
understood	it	here,	is	concerned	with	the	most	fundamental	–	ontological	–	dimension	of	
this	very	relationship.		
Therefore,	even	if	Vermigli	did	not	spell	out	how	he	envisaged	God’s	being	and	the	
being	of	the	world	to	relate,	he	assumed	there	to	be	a	God,	and	for	God	to	relate	to	the	
world.	Accordingly,	to	enquire	into	his	implied	metaphysics	is	to	make	this	dimension	of	
his	work,	which	had	been	there	all	along,	more	explicit.	Reading	Vermigli’s	work	against	
the	 backdrop	 of	 different	metaphysical	 frameworks	 does	 not	 therefore	 amount	 to	 an	
imposition	 of	 alien	 categories	 upon	 it,	 but	 rather	 to	 taking	 seriously	 that	 it	 has	
‘philosophical’	 weight	 even	 where	 it	 focusses	 on	 classically	 ‘religious’	 or	 ‘doctrinal’	
themes.	It	is	on	this	basis	that	it	seems	no	external	imposition	on	Vermigli’s	theological	
anthropology,	 his	 theology	 of	 justification,	 his	 Eucharistic	 thought,	 and	 his	 political	
theology	to	investigate	them	with	a	view	to	the	metaphysics	implicitly	at	work	in	them.	
The	second	 reason	why	 the	approach	 taken	 in	 this	 study	seems	warranted	 is	a	
more	 pragmatic	 one.	 We	 have	 seen	 that	 it	 yields	 fruitful	 results.	 The	 argument	 that	
Vermigli’s	 work	 simultaneously	 inhabits	 a	 participatory	 and	 a	 univocal	 metaphysical	
framework	has	provided	us	with	means	by	which	to	express	some	of	the	complexities	in	
his	thought	which	have	not	been	fully	accounted	for	by	earlier	commentators.	Therefore,	
one	merit	of	enquiring	into	implied	metaphysics	lies	in	its	capacity	to	give	expression	to	
some	 of	 the	 intricate	 configurations	 in	 the	 sources	 at	 hand.	 It	 would	 seem	 that	 if	 a	
hermeneutical	 lens	 enables	 readers	 to	 understand	what	 they	 are	 reading	 at	 a	 deeper	
level,	and	if	it	gives	them	tools	to	make	sense	of	and	express	what	they	have	read	more	
comprehensively,	 then	 the	 interpretative	 yield	 gained	 thereby,	 ought	 to	 justify	 the	
approach	taken.	
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Having	said	this,	the	approach	taken	in	this	study	has	its	limitations.	For	one	thing,	
not	every	theological	statement	is	always	indicative	of	a	clear	metaphysical	framework	
sustaining	it.	Readers	may	disagree	over	the	way	I	have	‘translated’	certain	quotes	from	
Vermigli	 into	a	metaphysical	framework.	There	are	 indeed	grey	zones,	and	some	–	but	
certainly	 not	 all	 –	 of	 Vermigli’s	 statements	 could	 make	 sense	 in	 either	 of	 the	 two	
frameworks	described.	However,	the	fact	that	not	all	his	statements	are	metaphysically	
determinate	does	not	invalidate	our	claim	about	the	complexity	of	his	metaphysics.	
Another	more	 serious	 limitation	 of	my	 approach	 is	 that	 the	 two	metaphysical	
frameworks	described	–	univocal	and	participatory	–	are	ideal	types.	In	reality,	they	will	
never	appear	in	a	pure	form,	and	it	is	not	my	intention	to	suggest	that	they	do.	I	have	used	
them	merely	as	heuristic	devices.	They	made	it	possible	to	find	and	give	expression	to	an	
intriguing	plurality	in	Vermigli’s	thought.	However,	it	would	be	ironic	if	the	very	argument	
that	Vermigli’s	implied	metaphysics	is	in	flux	would	lead	to	the	illusory	impression	that	
the	two	alternatives	between	which	he	moves	are	absolute	and	reified.	Because	of	this,	it	
would	be	misleading	to	conclude	from	this	study	that	Vermigli’s	thought	was	inconsistent.	
For	another	thing,	this	conclusion	would	mean	to	assume	that	there	has	to	be	a	radical	
either-or	between	the	two	metaphysical	frameworks	described.	Vermigli’s	work	seems	to	
suggest	that	it	makes	no	sense	to	conceive	of	such	a	radical	either-or.	Instead,	it	seems	
more	useful	to	conceive	of	degrees	of	metaphysical	complexity.	My	argument	is	that	the	
degree	in	which	Vermigli’s	implied	metaphysics	is	‘plural’	or	complex	is	higher	than	the	
metaphysical	complexity	we	would	find	in	some	thinkers	of	other	ages.	
It	may	nevertheless	be	objected	that	the	drift	of	this	dissertation	is	that	Vermigli’s	
position	 is	 inconsistent.	 However,	 even	 if	 this	 were	 the	 case,	 then	 Vermigli	 is	 rather	
‘consistently	inconsistent’.	We	have	observed	a	similar	pattern	or	move	–	that	of	the	non-
uniformity	of	his	implied	metaphysics	–	in	very	different	parts	of	his	thought.	Time	and	
again,	there	are	elements	of	his	thought	that	are	sustained	by	a	metaphysical	participation	
as	 well	 as	 other	 elements	 which	 presuppose	 a	 univocal	 metaphysics.	 Surely	 there	 is	
something	more	interesting	to	be	learned	from	this	observation	than	the	judgement	that	
Vermigli	 ‘simply	does	not	make	sense’.	This	judgement	seems	lazy,	and	also	somewhat	
presumptuous	–	after	all,	we	are	dealing	with	one	of	the	brightest	theological	minds	of	
the	 sixteenth	 century.	 Furthermore,	 behind	 any	 judgement	 of	 incoherence,	 there	 is	 a	
desire	to	synthesise.	But	is	not	anyone	wishing	to	synthesise	the	different	ways	in	which	
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Vermigli	 envisages	 God	 and	 the	 world	 to	 relate,	 imposing	 an	 external,	 anachronistic	
category	 on	 the	 sources,	 namely,	 ‘coherence’	 as	 they	 understand	 it?	 For	 all	 of	 these	
reasons,	I	propose	to	call	Vermigli’s	metaphysics	‘complex’.		
I	moreover	suggest	that	the	degree	to	which	the	implied	metaphysics	in	Vermigli’s	
thought	 is	 complex	 is	 not	 unique	 for	 his	 time,	 and	 indeed	 rather	 typical	 for	 the	
Reformation.	This	is	why	the	present	study	is	designed	as	a	case	study.	It	would	have	been	
beyond	the	scope	of	the	present	dissertation	to	examine	‘the	Reformation’	as	a	whole;	
instead,	I	have	focussed	on	one	thinker	of	the	Reformation.	I	propose,	however,	that	the	
findings	we	have	gained	from	analysing	the	implied	metaphysics	of	this	one	thinker,	can	
teach	us	something	about	the	nature	of	the	Reformation	more	broadly.	In	the	remainder	
of	this	conclusion,	I	will	elaborate	on	why	it	seems	justified	to	consider	Vermigli	as	a	case	
study	for	the	Reformation	in	general,	and	what	it	might	suggest	for	our	understanding	of	
the	 Reformation	 if	 the	 implied	 metaphysical	 complexity	 we	 have	 found	 in	 Vermigli’s	
thought	can	be	seen	as	typical	for	the	Reformation.	
I	 suggest	 that	 in	 terms	of	 his	 implied	metaphysics,	Vermigli	 is	 only	one	 among	
other	possible	examples	in	the	Reformation,	but	that	his	is	a	good	example.	We	have	seen	
how	Vermigli	was	at	the	academic	forefront,	defending	the	cause	of	the	Reformation	in	
debates	and	through	his	written	work	in	places	as	prominent	as	Oxford,	Strasbourg	and	
Zurich.	It	seems	likely	that	the	complexity	I	have	been	describing	is	more	clearly	manifest	
in	 someone	as	 scholarly	 and	academically	 vocal	 as	Vermigli.	As	we	have	 seen,	he	was	
known	 for	his	 thoroughness	and	 rigour	 in	 the	way	 in	which	he	expounded	 theological	
matters,	and	in	the	manner	in	which	he	engaged	with	arguments	of	his	opponents.	In	the	
detailed	expositions	flowing	from	this,	both	his	scholia	and	his	polemical	works,	the	kind	
of	complexity	that	I	have	described	arguably	manifested	itself	more	clearly	than	in	less	
rigorous	or	less	detailed	works.	It	seems	moreover	fitting	to	take	Vermigli	as	a	case	study	
for	 studying	 the	 implied	 metaphysics	 of	 the	 Reformation	 because	 he	 is	 articulate	 in	
‘philosophical’	terms,	especially	in	the	thought	of	Aristotle,	employing	his	categories,	such	
as	 the	 fourfold	 causes,	 in	 his	 writing.	 Regardless	 of	 whether	 this	 tendency	 indicates	
anything	about	Vermigli’s	scholasticism	–	we	have	seen	how	the	respective	debates	are	
less	than	fruitful	–	it	facilitates	the	kind	of	‘translation’	between	a	theological	statement	
and	the	metaphysical	framework	or	frameworks	it	inhabits	with	which	this	study	has	been	
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concerned.	Examining	Vermigli’s	work	seems	therefore	useful	and	fitting	for	the	present	
context.		
However,	Vermigli	is	not	only	a	good	example,	but	also	a	good	example.	I	would	
like	to	suggest	that	the	metaphysical	complexity	which	we	have	found	to	sustain	his	work	
is	typical	for	the	Reformation	more	broadly.	It	would	go	beyond	the	scope	of	this	study	to	
argue	in	any	detail	that	the	work	of	Luther,	Calvin	or	others	equally	manifests	an	implicitly	
complex	metaphysics.	In	order	to	establish	this	hypothesis	more	fully,	their	work	would	
have	to	be	analysed	in	similar	ways	to	those	by	which	this	study	has	analysed	Vermigli’s	
work.	All	I	can	do	here	is	point	to	indirect	evidence	which	seems	to	suggest	that	Vermigli	
is	not	the	only	example	of	a	Reformer	whose	implied	metaphysics	is	complex.		
Recent	developments	 in	 Luther	and	Calvin	 scholarship	highlight	a	dimension	of	
theosis,	 and	 the	believer’s	participation	 in	 the	Divine,	 in	 their	 thought.	This	dimension	
naturally	 follows	 from	 a	 participatory	 metaphysics.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Luther,	 a	 group	 of	
Finnish	Luther	experts	have	argued	that	the	heart	of	Luther’s	theology	of	human	salvation	
is	not	his	understanding	of	 justification	as	 imputed	 to	human	beings	 through	Christ	 in	
faith,	 or	 the	 simul	 iustus	 et	 peccator,	 but	 an	 understanding	 of	 human	participation	 in	
Christ.	The	Finnish	scholars	are	working	in	the	context	of	ecumenical	exchanges	between	
Lutheranism	 and	 Russian	 Orthodoxy	 and	 find	 that	 their	 reading	 of	 Luther’s	 view	 of	
justification	 resonates	 fruitfully	 with	 Orthodox	 notions	 of	 theosis	 or	 deification.1	 As	
exponents	of	this	Finnish	school	explicitly	acknowledge,	these	newly	discovered	layers	in	
																																																						
1	 The	 most	 recent	 summary	 of	 this	 view	 is:	 Risto	 Saarinen,	 “Justification	 by	 Faith:	 The	 View	 of	 the	
Mannermaa	School,”	in	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	Martin	Luther’s	Theology,	ed.	Robert	Kolb,	Irene	Dingel,	
and	 Lubomir	 Batka	 (Oxford	 University	 Press,	 2014),	 255–59.	 As	 intimated	 by	 Saarinen’s	 title,	 Tuomo	
Mannermaa	 is	 considered	 the	 founder	of	 this	Finnish	 reappraisal	of	 Luther.	Among	his	ground-breaking	
works	count	the	following:	Tuomo	Mannermaa,	Der	im	Glauben	gegenwärtige	Christus:	Rechtfertigung	und	
Vergottung	 zum	ökumenischen	Dialog	 (Hannover:	 Lutherisches	Verlagshaus,	1989);	 Tuomo	Mannermaa,	
“Theosis	als	Thema	der	finnischen	Lutherforschung,”	in	Luther	und	Theosis:	Vergöttlichung	als	Thema	der	
abendländischen	Theologie,	ed.	Simo	Peura	and	Antti	Raunio	(Erlangen:	Luther-Akademie	Ratzeburg,	1990).	
For	an	excellent	overview	of	the	Finnish	School	and	its	reception	in	the	English-speaking	world,	see:	Carl	E.	
Braaten	and	Robert	W.	Jenson,	eds.,	Union	with	Christ	 (Grand	Rapids	MI:	Eerdmans	Publishing,	1998).	A	
critical	 debate	 about	 it	 took	 place	 2003	 in	 The	Westminster	 Theological	 Journal:	Mark	 A	 Seifrid,	 “Paul,	
Luther,	and	Justification	in	Gal	2:15-21,”	The	Westminster	Theological	Journal	65,	no.	2	(September	2003):	
215–30;	Carl	R	Trueman,	“Is	 the	Finnish	Line	a	New	Beginning?:	A	Critical	Assessment	of	 the	Reading	of	
Luther	Offered	by	the	Helsinki	Circle,”	The	Westminster	Theological	 Journal	65,	no.	2	(September	2003):	
231–44;	Paul	Louis	Metzger,	“Mystical	Union	with	Christ:	An	Alternative	to	Blood	Transfusions	and	Legal	
Fictions,”	 The	Westminster	 Theological	 Journal	 65,	 no.	 2	 (September	 2003):	 201–13;	 Robert	W	 Jenson,	
“Response	to	Mark	Seifrid,	Paul	Metzger,	and	Carl	Trueman	on	Finnish	Luther	Research,”	The	Westminster	
Theological	Journal	65,	no.	2	(September	2003):	245–50.	Furthermore,	see:	Veli-Matti	Kärkkäinen,	One	with	
God:	Salvation	as	Deification	and	Justification	(Collegeville,	Minn.:	Liturgical	Press,	2004).	
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Luther’s	 work	 are	 premised	 on	 a	 realist	 metaphysical	 framework,	 especially	 on	 the	
analogy	of	being	and	metaphysical	participation.2		
As	for	Calvin,	Todd	Billings,	in	his	Calvin,	Participation	and	the	Gift,	has	rekindled	
an	 older	 reading	 of	 the	 Reformer	 which	 sees	 his	 work	 as	 premised	 on	 creaturely	
participation	 in	 the	Divine.3	 Such	an	 interpretation	paints	 a	 rather	different	picture	of	
Calvin	 than	 does	more	 traditional	 Calvin	 scholarship,	 focusing	 on	 Calvin’s	 theology	 of	
God’s	glory	and	human	sinfulness.	Billings	argues	for	a	“theological	logic	of	participation”	
at	work	in	Calvin.4	Julie	Canlis	concurs,	and	has	moreover	argued	not	only	that	Calvin’s	
theology	presupposes	a	notion	of	participation	in	the	Divine,	but	also	a	notion	of	spiritual	
ascent.5	In	parallel	to	what	the	Finnish	school	claims	about	Luther,	other	Calvin	scholars	
have	moreover	maintained	that	Calvin’s	theology	has	scope	for	a	notion	of	deification	and	
mediation.6	All	of	this	is	again	premised	on	a	framework	of	metaphysical	participation.	
However,	 more	 traditional	 Reformation	 scholarship	 would	 dispute	 these	
participatory	elements	to	be	present	in	Luther’s	and	Calvin’s	work	at	all,	as	can	be	seen	in	
numerous	critical	responses	to	the	Finnish	school	or	Billings’s	readings	of	Calvin.	Rather,	
they	insist	that	their	account	of	justification	and	grace	is	classically	forensic,	and	hence	–	
as	we	have	seen	in	chapter	two	–	based	on	a	univocal	notion	of	gift.	The	metaphysical	
framework	 implicitly	 sustaining	 the	 ‘classic’	 picture	 of	 Luther’s	 and	 Calvin’s	 work	 can	
therefore	be	said	to	be	largely	univocal.	What	is	more,	the	strand	of	Catholic	Reformation	
scholarship	which	goes	from	Denifle	through	Lortz	to	Bouyer,	which	we	have	seen	in	the	
introduction,	 indirectly	concurs	with	 this.	 It	holds	 that	 the	Reformation	 is	governed	by	
nominalist	 structures,	 and	 while	 it	 is	 contested	 whether	 nominalism	 entails	 a	
																																																						
2	Sammeli	Juntunen	argues	that	“Luther	…	does	not	deny	the	analogy	of	being	and	goodness	between	God	
and	the	world.”	See	Sammeli	Juntunen,	“Luther	and	Metaphysics:	What	Is	the	Structure	of	Being	According	
to	Luther?,”	in	Union	with	Christ:	The	New	Finnish	Interpretation	of	Luther,	ed.	Carl	E.	Braaten	and	Robert	
W.	Jenson	(Grand	Rapids	MI:	Eerdmans	Publishing,	1998),	132.	
3	J.	Todd	Billings,	Calvin,	Participation,	and	the	Gift:	The	Activity	of	Believers	in	Union	With	Christ	(Oxford:	
Oxford	University	Press,	2007).	An	earlier	example	of	this	kind	of	reading	of	Calvin	can	be	seen	in	the	so–
called	Mercersburg	 theology,	 and	 John	Williamson	Nevin	 in	 particular.	 See	 John	Williamson	Nevin,	The	
Mystical	Presence	(Hamden,	CT:	Archon	Books,	1963).	
4	Billings,	Calvin,	Participation,	and	the	Gift,	191.	
5	Julie	Canlis,	“Calvin,	Osiander,	and	Participation	in	God,”	International	Journal	of	Systematic	Theology	6,	
no.	2	(2004):	169–84;	Canlis,	Calvin’s	Ladder.	
6	Carl	Mosser,	“The	Greatest	Possible	Blessing:	Calvin	and	Deification,”	Scottish	Journal	of	Theology	55,	no.	
1	 (2002):	 36–57;	McClean,	 “Perichoresis,	 Theosis	 and	Union	with	Christ	 in	 the	Thought	of	 John	Calvin”;	
Edwin	 Chr.	 van	 Driel,	 “‘Too	 Lowly	 to	 Reach	 God	 Without	 a	 Mediator’:	 John	 Calvin’s	 Supralapsarian	
Eschatological	Narrative,”	Modern	Theology	33,	no.	2	(2017):	275–92.	
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metaphysical	dimension	at	all,	 it	is	safe	to	say	that	if	it	does,	then	it	would	much	more	
easily	align	with	a	univocal	than	with	a	participatory	metaphysical	framework.	In	terms	of	
the	nature	of	metaphysical	 frameworks	 implied	 in	Luther’s	and	Calvin’s	thought,	many	
strands	 of	 more	 traditional	 Reformation	 scholarship	 converge	 to	 suggest	 that	 it	 is	
univocal.7	By	 contrast,	 the	newer	 readings	of	 Luther’s	 and	Calvin’s	work	 that	we	have	
seen,	presuppose	an	implicitly	participatory	metaphysics	at	work	in	the	latter.	
Faced	with	 these	newer	readings	of	 the	Reformers,	one	has	 three	choices:	one	
denies	 that	 they	are	 legitimate	and	discards	 them	altogether,	or	one	welcomes	 them,	
implying	 that	 the	 ‘real’	 Luther	 and	 Calvin	 has	 finally	 been	 found	 after	 nearly	 half	 a	
millennium	of	misunderstanding,	or	else	one	finds	a	way	of	reconciling	the	old	and	the	
new	readings.	One	way	to	reconcile	them	is	to	postulate	that	Luther’s	and	Calvin’s	works	
are	as	much	sustained	by	a	complex	metaphysical	framework	as	is	Vermigli’s.	The	new	
readings	of	their	work	would	then	have	uncovered	a	‘layer’	of	implied	metaphysics	that	
had	always	been	there,	but	that	had	not	yet	been	attended	to.	This	hypothesis	allows	us	
to	make	sense	of	how	it	is	possible	that	Luther’s	works	can	be	interpreted	as	differently	
as	by	classical	Luther	scholarship,	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	Finnish	school,	on	the	other	
hand	 (and	 the	 same	 –	mutatis	 mutandis	 –	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Calvin).	 According	 to	 this	
hypothesis,	classical	Luther	scholarship	has	focussed	more	on	those	elements	in	Luther’s	
work	 that	 are	 sustained	 by	 a	 univocal	 metaphysics,	 whereas	 the	 Finnish	 school	
concentrates	on	other	facets,	such	as	those	which	imply	a	participatory	metaphysics.	If	
Luther’s	metaphysics	has	been	complex	 in	the	first	place,	 then	 it	would	not	come	as	a	
surprise	that	these	different	aspects	of	his	work	can,	and	eventually	would	be	unearthed.		
Supposing	this	hypothesis	is	correct,	and	the	metaphysical	plurality	seen	in	Peter	
Martyr	Vermigli’s	work	is	not	unique	to	him,	but	typical	of	the	Protestant	Reformation,	
then	this	has	far-reaching	consequences	for	understanding	the	Reformation,	which	I	can	
merely	sketch	here.8		
First	 of	 all,	 the	 history	 and	 development	 of	 Protestantism	 may	 be	 better	
understood	by	considering	the	long-term	effects	of	the	metaphysical	complexity	at	the	
																																																						
7	Graham	White’s	work,	while	 falling	 in	neither	of	 the	above	categories,	also	suggests	 this.	See	Graham	
White,	Luther	as	Nominalist:	A	Study	of	the	Logical	Methods	Used	 in	Martin	Luther’s	Disputations	 in	the	
Light	of	Their	Medieval	Background	(Helsinki:	Luther-Agricola-Society,	1994).	
8	The	following	is	taken	from	a	forthcoming	article,	see	Aspray,	“A	Complex	Legacy:	Louis	Bouyer	and	the	
Metaphysics	of	the	Reformation.”	
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heart	 of	 Reformation	 thought.	 For	 if	 the	 Reformers	 simultaneously	 inhabited	 two	
metaphysical	frameworks,	then	what	does	this	mean	for	the	development	of	their	legacy?	
Louis	Bouyer	has	argued	that	Reformation	thought	was	characterised	by	positive	truths	
trapped	in	a	stifling,	negative	framework.	In	his	view,	this	framework	inevitably	led	to	the	
fact	that	some	of	the	Reformers’	insights	were	subsequently	overturned.	If,	however,	the	
framework	sustaining	the	Reformers’	thought	was	not	uniform,	then	there	cannot	have	
been	such	an	historical	necessity.	Rather,	 the	Reformers’	 legacy	could	have	potentially	
evolved	differently.	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli	 at	 least	partially	 inhabited	a	metaphysics	of	
participation.	Because	of	this	part	of	the	Reformation’s	legacy,	any	eventual	overturning	
of	Reformation	affirmations	cannot	have	been	an	inexorable	fate.	Even	if	it	is	granted	that	
it	 was	 under	 the	 influence	 of	 univocal	 ontological	 structures	 that	 some	 Reformation	
insights	were	eventually	overturned,	as	Bouyer	holds,	this	does	not	sufficiently	explain	
why	these	structures	should	have	prevailed	over	the	alternative	metaphysical	structures	
which	had	equally	been	present	in	the	Reformation.	
Why,	 then,	 did	 the	 metaphysically	 univocal	 strand	 of	 Reformation	 thought	
eventually	gain	the	upper	hand?	One	possible	reason	for	this	is	that	it	resonated	with	and	
was	enforced	by	 larger	cultural	and	philosophical	developments.	Scholars	have	argued	
that	univocal	structures	of	being	gradually	became	prevalent	in	the	West	in	the	past	few	
hundred	years,	and	have	manifested	themselves	in	so-called	modern	developments	such	
as	the	secularisation	of	knowledge,	the	individualisation	and	fragmentation	of	society	and	
the	rise	of	a	monetary	economy.9	The	question	whether	and	how	the	Reformation	was	
causally	 involved	 in	 these	 developments	 has	 been	 hotly	 debated	 at	 least	 since	 Max	
Weber’s	 famous	 thesis	 on	 the	 nexus	 between	 Protestantism	 and	 capitalism.10	 Brad	
Gregory	is	a	recent	commentator	who	emphatically	holds	the	view	that	the	Reformation	
is	causally	 linked	to	key	elements	of	contemporary	Western	culture.11	 In	particular,	he	
takes	the	view	that	the	disagreements	in	the	Reformation	over	what	counted	as	Christian	
produced	a	“wide	range	of	incompatible	truth	claims,”	which	necessarily	had	to	relativize	
each	other.12	This	is	why	the	Reformation,	according	to	Gregory,	is	“the	most	important	
																																																						
9	Alliez,	Capital	Times;	Gillespie,	The	Theological	Origins	of	Modernity;	Milbank,	Beyond	Secular	Order;	Pfau,	
Minding	the	Modern:	Human	Agency,	Intellectual	Traditions,	and	Responsible	Knowledge.	
10	Max	Weber,	Die	protestantische	Ethik	und	der	Geist	des	Kapitalismus	(Tübingen:	Mohr,	1934).	
11	Gregory,	The	Unintended	Reformation:	How	a	Religious	Revolution	Secularized	Society.	
12	Ibid.,	95.	
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distant	historical	source	for	contemporary	Western	hyper-pluralism	with	respect	to	truth	
claims	about	meaning,	morality,	values,	priorities	and	purpose.”13	
If	the	Reformation	was	not	characterized	by	a	univocal	metaphysics	only,	however,	
it	becomes	more	problematic	to	hold	a	line	of	argument	which	makes	of	the	Reformation	
a	motor	of	modernity,	while	predicating	modernity	on	univocal	 structures	of	being,	as	
Gregory	 does.	 To	 be	 sure,	 our	 thesis	 about	 the	 metaphysical	 complexity	 of	 the	
Reformation	does	 not	make	 impossible	 the	 argument	 of	 a	 certain	 nexus	 between	 the	
Reformation	 and	 certain	 so-called	 modern	 developments.	 It	 recognizes	 this	 nexus	
precisely	because	 it	grants	 that	 there	were	univocal	 structures	of	being	present	 in	 the	
Reformation.	What	it	challenges,	however,	are	accounts	which	claim	the	Reformation	to	
be	linked	to	these	kinds	of	developments	only	–	and	Gregory,	even	though	certainly	aware	
of	the	intricacy	of	the	genealogical	claims	he	is	making,	sometimes	seems	to	take	this	line.	
However,	why	has	the	reception	history	of	the	Reformers’	thought	until	relatively	
recently	been	dominated	by	the	univocal	strand	of	their	thought?	As	we	have	suggested,	
it	is	likely	that	broader	developments	in	the	history	of	the	West	shaped	the	way	in	which	
Reformation	thought	has	been	perceived.	The	metaphysical	complexity	of	Reformation	
thought	precisely	means	that	it	can	be	perceived	and	framed	differently:	it	is	somewhat	
malleable.14	Put	differently:	the	Reformation’s	implied	metaphysical	complexity	may	have	
meant	 that	 the	 heirs	 of	 the	 Reformation	were	 able	 to	 embrace	whatever	 framework	
became	culturally	prevalent.	If	univocal	structures	of	being	have	become	prevalent	in	the	
last	 few	 centuries	 in	 the	West,	 as	many	 commentators	 believe,15	 then	 this	 suggests	 a	
reason	why	the	univocal	strands	in	Reformation	thought	have	become	dominant.	Insofar	
as	a	certain	metaphysical	malleability	was	constitutive	of	Reformation	thought,	this	meant	
that	 it	 had	 few	 structures	 of	 resistance	 in	 place	 against	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 above-
mentioned	 cultural	 and	philosophical	 developments	 of	 the	West	 in	 the	 past	 centuries	
																																																						
13	Ibid.,	369.	
14	Some	see	this	‘malleability’	as	a	virtue.	In	Todd	Billings’s	view,	it	was	a	strength	of	the	Reformers’	thought	
that	 they	 did	 not	 settle	 for	 one	 metaphysical	 framework.	 “Bringing	 closure	 on	 points	 of	 metaphysical	
ambiguity,”	for	Billings,	would	not	be	desirable	(Billings,	Calvin,	Participation	and	the	Gift,	195.)	The	fact	
that	Calvin’s	thought	was	somewhat	vague	metaphysically,	left	it	“open	to	be	adapted	to	a	wide	range	of	
metaphysical	 frameworks.”	 (Ibid.,	 194.)	 However,	 this	 conclusion	 assumes	 that	 there	 is	 a	 separation	
between	 doctrinal	 ‘content’	 and	 metaphysical	 ‘form’	 or	 idiom,	 with	 Calvin’s	 ‘content’	 standing	
independently	of	its	idiom.	It	is	doubtful,	as	we	have	seen,	that	this	separation	can	be	upheld.	
15	Cf.	e.g.	Gillespie,	The	Theological	Origins	of	Modernity;	Milbank,	Beyond	Secular	Order;	Pfau,	Minding	the	
Modern:	Human	Agency,	Intellectual	Traditions,	and	Responsible	Knowledge.	
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(secularisation,	individualisation,	fragmentation).	In	short,	therefore,	the	reasons	why	one	
metaphysical	strand	present	in	Reformation	thought	came	to	flourish,	whereas	another	
did	not,	seem	to	lie	not	so	much	in	the	Reformation	itself	as	in	the	powerful	influence	of	
what	came	to	be	known	as	modernity.	
Once	more,	 this	 indicates	 that	 those	who	wish	 causally	 and	 tightly	 to	 link	 the	
Reformation	 to	 ‘modern’	 developments	 are	 missing	 the	mark.	 If	 one	 were	 to	 charge	
Reformation	 thought	 for	being	 in	 some	ways	 complicit	 in	 these	developments,	 then	a	
more	sophisticated	line	of	argument	might	run	as	follows.	The	metaphysical	complexity	
of	 the	Reformation,	 in	 its	ability	 to	 inhabit	multiple	metaphysical	 frameworks	at	once,	
could	be	predicated	on	a	‘higher-level’	univocal	metaphysics.	This	is	because	the	condition	
of	possibility	of	a	plurality	of	metaphysical	frameworks	depends	on	the	possibility	of	an	
epistemological	 distancing	 between	 the	 thinking	 subject	 and	 the	 world.	 This	 kind	 of	
distancing,	 however,	 might	 only	 be	 possible	 in	 a	 metaphysical	 framework	 in	 which	
essence	and	existence	are	not	inherently	linked.	Such	a	‘formal	distinction’	is	historically	
associated	with	the	univocity	of	being,	as	Gilson	has	shown.16	
However,	if	it	is	true	that	there	was	a	metaphysical	complexity	at	the	heart	of	the	
Reformation,	why	 is	 it	 that	we	 have	 become	 aware	 of	 it	 only	 recently?17	 The	 clue	 to	
answering	 this	question,	 I	would	 suggest,	 lies	again	 in	what	we	have	 suggested	above	
about	the	powerful	influence	of	modernity	on	the	reception	history	of	the	Reformation.	
As	readers	of	Reformation	thought,	we	ourselves	are	influenced	by	the	dominance	of	the	
univocal	framework,	because	our	access	to	historical	texts	is	always	historically	mediated.	
There	is	a	self-reflexivity	at	play:	when	thinking	about	history	and	reading	its	sources,	we	
cannot	step	outside	the	particular	historical	moment	we	inhabit.	It	is	possible,	however,	
to	thematise	this	redoubling	of	historical	perspectives	in	and	through	exposing	it,	just	as	
according	to	the	artistic	or	literary	figure	of	the	mise-en-abyme.		
From	the	perspective	of	a	time	in	which	‘modern’	univocal	tendencies	were	most	
fully	developed,	the	univocal	elements	in	the	legacy	of	the	Reformation	were	understood	
																																																						
16	 Étienne	 Gilson,	 Jean	 Duns	 Scot:	 introduction	 à	 ses	 positions	 fondamentales,	 Études	 de	 philosophie	
médiévale	42	(Paris:	J.	Vrin,	1952),	243–48.	
17	 Parts	 of	 Henri	 De	 Lubac’s	 and	Maurice	 Blondel’s	 works	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 foreshadowing	 this,	 without	
however	dealing	with	the	Reformation	specifically.	See	for	instance	Blondel’s	engagement	with	extrinsicism	
in	History	and	Dogma,	Maurice	Blondel,	The	Letter	on	Apologetics	&	History	and	Dogma,	trans.	Alexander	
Dru	and	Illtyd	Trethowan	(Grand	Rapids,	MI:	Wm.	B.	Eerdmans	Publishing	Company,	1964).		
Conclusion	
	 173	
best.	 Readers	 of	 the	 Reformers’	 thought	 saw	 in	 it	 primarily	 what	 resonated	with	 the	
predominant	framework	of	the	culture	in	which	they	lived.	Put	negatively,	the	more	they	
themselves	were	‘modern’,	the	more	it	was	difficult	for	them	to	perceive	what	was	not	so	
‘modern’	in	the	work	of	the	Reformers.	It	seems,	therefore,	that	it	has	become	easier	now	
–	 in	 what	 is	 commonly	 agreed	 to	 be	 at	 least	 late	 modernity18	 –	 to	 perceive	 other	
metaphysical	frameworks	equally	present	in	Reformation	theology.	
Indeed,	we	 can	 assume	 that	 as	 the	 critical	 distance	 to	 ‘high	modernity’	 grows,	
scholars	will	 understand	more	 fully	 the	 degree	 to	which	 traditional	 understandings	 of	
Reformation	 theology	have	been	coloured	by	 the	univocal	 framework	characteristic	of	
modernity.	 The	 debates	 in	 New	 Testament	 scholarship	 about	 the	 ‘old’	 and	 ‘new’	
perspectives	on	Paul	may	be	seen	as	an	indication	of	a	parallel	case	to	this.	Proponents	of	
the	new	perspective	have	argued	that	certain	‘old	perspective’	readings	of	‘works	of	the	
law’	(as	condemnable	because	they	indicate	the	futile	human	attempt	to	earn	salvation)	
which	were	traditionally	associated	with	the	Reformation	and	its	heirs,	are	not	in	line	with	
what	Paul	understood	by	the	term	(which	is	more	to	do	with	community	markers	of	the	
old	 covenant).19	 Insofar	 as	 the	 Reformation	 prided	 itself	 on	 its	 faithfulness	 to	 the	
Scriptures,	 it	 might	 emerge	 that	 the	 ‘old’	 understanding	 of	 Paul	 is	 not	 so	 much	 a	
‘Protestant’	understanding	per	se,	as	a	particular	modern	reading	of	the	Reformation	and	
its	profoundly	complex	legacy.	
In	the	wake	of	the	500-year	anniversary	of	the	Reformation,	there	have	been	calls	
for	a	new	return	ad	fontes	reformationis,	heralding	a	Protestant	ressourcement	from	the	
sources	of	 the	Reformation.	Our	 thesis	concerning	 the	metaphysical	 complexity	of	 the	
Reformation	 may	 have	 implications	 for	 the	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 of	 such	 a	
ressourcement.	 For	 what	 does	 it	 mean	 to	 have	 recourse	 to	 sources	 which	 were	 as	
metaphysically	complex	as	we	suggest	Reformation	sources	to	be?	To	be	sure,	as	we	have	
seen	above,	in	reality	there	may	be	no	source	in	existence	in	any	period	which	inhabits	an	
entirely	unified	metaphysics.	However,	that	there	are	degrees	of	metaphysical	‘simplicity’,	
																																																						
18	See	for	instance	Charles	Taylor,	A	Secular	Age	(Cambridge,	MA:	Belknap	Press,	2007).	
19	The	 ‘old’	perspective	 is	exemplified	 in	 the	work	of	 the	Lutheran	Bultmann,	whereas	exponents	of	 the	
‘new’	 perspective	 include	 Sanders,	 Dunn	 and	 Wright.	 See	 Rudolf	 Bultmann,	 Theologie	 des	 Neuen	
Testaments	(Tübingen:	J.C.B.	Mohr,	1953);	E.P.	Sanders,	Paul	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1991);	James	
D.	G.	Dunn,	The	New	Perspective	on	Paul	(Grand	Rapids,	MI:	Wm.	B.	Eerdmans	Publishing	Company,	2008);	
N.T.	 Wright,	 Paul	 in	 Fresh	 Perspective	 (Minneapolis,	 MN:	 Fortress	 Press,	 2005).	 I	 am	 indebted	 to	 Dr.	
Matthew	Thomas	for	these	references.	
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and	it	would	seem	that	texts	which	more	clearly	inhabit	one	metaphysical	framework	than	
another	are	more	powerful	resources,	especially	when	one	is	looking	for	alternatives	to	
the	perceived	‘messiness’	of	today’s	intellectual	climate.	Perhaps,	therefore,	Protestants	
wishing	to	resource	their	theology	would	do	well	to	draw	from	older	sources	than	those	
stemming	from	early	modernity.	
In	 this	 sense,	 it	 is	hoped	 that	 the	present	 study	 is	not	only	a	case	study	of	 the	
implied	 metaphysics	 of	 one	 Protestant	 Reformer,	 but	 also	 an	 exercise	 in	 intellectual	
history	 in	 Annabel	 Brett’s	 sense.	 Brett	 held	 that	 “intellectual	 history	 can	 itself	 be	
understood	as	poetic”	 insofar	as	 it	“does	not	merely	unravel	 the	structure	of	what	we	
have	 inherited	but	can	also	unearth	what	we	have	 lost:	ways	of	 speaking	and	ways	of	
seeing	the	world,	once	current,	now	exotic	and	(perhaps)	full	of	possibility.”20	
	
	
	
																																																						
20	 Annabel	 Brett,	 “What	 Is	 Intellectual	 History	 Now?,”	 in	What	 Is	 History	 Now?,	 ed.	 David	 Cannadine	
(Basingstoke/New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2004),	127.	
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